Filed 8/10/26 In re E.S. CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
In re E.S., a Person Coming B350924
Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
18CCJP00639H)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
A.M., et al.,
Defendants and
Appellants.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of the County of
Los Angeles, Donald A. Buddle, Jr., Judge. Affirmed.
Melissa A. Chaitin, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant A.M.
Michelle D. Peña, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Y.S.
Dawyn L. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, and Kimberly Roura, Principal
Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________
I. INTRODUCTION
Y.S. (mother) appeals1 from the juvenile court’s order
terminating parental rights to her child E.S (the child) pursuant
to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.2 She contends
the court erred by failing to apply the beneficial parental
relationship exception in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i)
and the sibling relationship exception in subdivision (c)(1)(B)(v)
to the termination of her parental rights. We affirm.
1 A.M. (father) filed a joinder in mother’s appeal which does
not raise any separate arguments. Citing California Rule of
Court, rule 5.725(a)—which prohibits a court from terminating
the parental rights of only one parent—he maintains that if the
order terminating mother’s parental rights is reversed, we must
also reverse the order terminating his rights.
2 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
2
II. BACKGROUND
A. Petition and Detention
On March 12, 2021, the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (the Department) filed a section
300 petition, under subdivisions (a), (b), and (j), on behalf of the
children: Ji.S., born August 2003; D.S., born November 2004;
Je.S., born January 2012 (older brother); and the child, born
August 2018, alleging that the parents’ domestic violence and
mother’s failure to protect the children from it endangered and
placed them at risk of serious physical injury.
When the social worker interviewed mother by telephone
on March 12, 2021, mother declined to make a statement but
disclosed that she had sent the children to live in Georgia in
November 2020.
At the March 17, 2021, detention hearing, the juvenile
court detained the children from the parents’ custody, placed
them with the Department, and issued protective custody
warrants for them.
On April 2, 2021, following information from mother that
the children were living with maternal aunt R.M. in Georgia and
further Department investigation there, the juvenile court
ordered the children temporarily placed with that maternal aunt.
The Department subsequently applied for an order under
section 385 modifying the children’s placement, and on May 18,
2021, the juvenile court granted the application, detained the
children from maternal aunt, and placed them in shelter care
under the Department’s supervision.
3
On June 2, 2021, the juvenile court issued protective
custody warrants for the children and ordered mother to bring
them to court on June 10, 2021.
On June 10, 2021, mother appeared with counsel and the
juvenile court ordered her to use her best efforts to contact the
maternal aunt and instruct her to turn over custody of the
children.
On July 8, 2021, a social worker went to mother’s home,
rang the doorbell, and an older child, who matched the
description of sibling Ji.S., answered the door and standing
behind him was a younger child, who matched the description of
the child. But the door then closed, and when the social worker
knocked, mother answered over a doorbell speaker, claimed she
was not home, stated that the children were in Georgia, and
ordered the social worker to get off her property.
From August 2021 to the beginning of August 2022, the
Department continued to make efforts to locate the children, and
mother continued her refusal to cooperate or accurately disclose
their whereabouts.
On August 3, 2022, mother told the social worker that older
brother and the child were living with her and doing well.
Mother offered to meet with the social worker at a public place
and bring the children, and the social worker scheduled a
meeting for August 5, 2022.
On August 5, 2022, two social workers attempted to serve
an arrest warrant issued by the juvenile court on mother at her
home, but the woman who answered the video doorbell refused to
identify herself or provide information about mother and instead
asked the social workers to leave.
4
On November 22, 2022, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s
Department deputies served a forced-entry warrant at mother’s
home, arrested her, and took older brother and the child into
custody. Both children were placed in the home of caregiver K.S.
At the December 9, 2022, warrant hearing, the juvenile
court ordered monitored visits for the parents.
B. Amended Petition and Adjudication
On December 14, 2022, the Department filed an amended
section 300 petition, which included new domestic violence
allegations based on an incident during which mother slashed
paternal grandmother’s tires, and added allegations that older
brother and the child were further at risk based on drug and
alcohol use by mother and father, an unsanitary home
environment, and mother’s mental and emotional issues,
including bipolar disorder and anxiety.
On February 16, 2023, the juvenile court held an
adjudication hearing on the amended petition, sustained it
against mother, removed the children from the parents, and
ordered family reunification services for mother. The court also
ordered monitored visits at the Department’s office or other
location approved by the Department.
C. Reunification
1. Six-Month Review Period
In a July 20, 2023, status review report, the social worker
reported that the child had behavioral problems both at school
and in his placement, including hitting another student in the
5
mouth at school and stealing food and breaking things in the
caregiver’s home.
During the reporting period, mother’s monitored visits were
scheduled in the Department’s office once a week. Between
January and June 2023, she attended 18 of the scheduled visits
but missed or cancelled another seven. Mother also had two
monitored phone calls per week with the children.
During visits, mother demonstrated affection for older
brother and the child, played board games with them, talked
about upcoming religious holidays, and inquired about their
placement.
On June 8, 2023, mother canceled a visit 27 minutes before
it was scheduled to begin, after the children had already arrived
at the Department’s office. The child “appeared to want to visit
with … mother” when the social worker picked him up from
school that day, but after mother cancelled, he asked for food and
“appeared to have no changes in behavior[ ].”
As to the children’s wishes regarding placement, older
brother told the social worker that he would like to be returned to
mother, and the child “stated that he want[ed] to go home with
his mom.”
In an August 14, 2023, last minute information, the social
worker advised that school personnel, service providers, social
workers, and K.S. all noted that the child continued to exhibit
concerning behavior, which included “biting and hitting other
students, getting expelled from preschool, banging his head on
[the] floor during tantrums[,] and being dishonest.”
On August 8, 2023, K.S. called the social worker and
advised that the child’s behavioral problems were escalating.
6
During an August 10, 2023, meeting, K.S. asked the social
worker to remove the child from her home over concerns that he
might hurt other children. Older brother and his attorney asked
the Department to allow him to remain placed in K.S.’s home.
The next day, the child was placed in the home of a new
caretaker but, in an August 30, 2023, last minute information,
the social worker reported that the new caregiver could no longer
care for the child.
At the six-month review hearing on September 12, 2023,
the juvenile court found that the parents’ progress had “been
unsubstantial,” continued reunification services, and set the
matter for a 12-month review hearing.
2. 12-Month Review Period
In a November 22, 2023, status review report, the social
worker noted that the Department had placed the child in the
home of caregiver P.M. on August 30, 2023. The social worker
also reported that the child continued to engage in aggressive
behavior, including hitting other children and care providers.
Mother made “minimal phone contact during the week and
minimally engage[d] with the [child] during weekly in-person
visits.”
In a December 13, 2023, last minute information, a social
worker reported that during a December 11, 2023, visit with the
child by father at the Department’s offices, father received a
phone call and walked quickly outside the office holding the child.
The social worker followed them outside and directed father to go
back inside the offices. Father ignored the direction and instead
walked to a waiting car and, while holding the child in his arms,
7
entered it. Mother, who was driving the waiting car, sped away
from the Department’s offices. The social worker called 911.
At approximately 10:30 p.m., deputies called the social
worker and reported that mother’s vehicle was located at a motel
in Kern County where local deputies arrested the parents and
took custody of the child. Los Angeles County Sheriff’s deputies
then transported the child and the parents to the Lancaster
Sheriff's station. The child was returned to P.M.’s home the next
morning at approximately 4:30 a.m.
At a hearing on December 14, 2023, the juvenile court
limited the parents’ visitation to monitored virtual visits and
ordered them to stay 100 yards away from the child’s school and
placement. That same day, a criminal court issued protective
orders prohibiting mother and father from having any contact
with the child.3
In a January 17, 2024, last minute information, the social
worker reported that she had spoken to P.M. on December 21,
2023, who explained that the child’s negative behaviors had
increased since the abduction. The child told P.M. that he feared
mother was going to “‘whoop’” him. The child was now scared of
the dark, would not use the restroom on his own, had trouble
eating, had attempted to hit P.M., was using foul language, and
had wet himself, which had not occurred before the abduction.
At the 12-month review hearing on January 31, 2024, the
juvenile court found the parents’ progress toward reunification
had been “unsubstantial,” terminated their reunification services,
and set a section 366.26 hearing.
3 On December 19, 2023, the juvenile court ordered that any
visitation must be consistent with the criminal protective order.
8
D. Permanency Planning Period
Mother had no visits with the child from the December 11,
2023, abduction until April 25, 2024, when the juvenile court
ordered that mother could have virtual monitored visits.
In a May 16, 2024, section 366.26 report, the social worker
explained that the child continued to exhibit aggressive
behaviors, including “slapp[ing] his teacher and [becoming]
physical[ly] aggressive with peers in his class.” But his behavior
began to improve once his medication was changed. The child
had “a knowingly loving relationship” with P.M. and called her
“‘mom.’” The child also referred to her as his mother when
speaking to others. And, when asked about guardianship, the
child stated that “he ‘love[d] living with [his] mom [P.M.]’ as he
jumped around his room.”
The social worker also reported that P.M. and K.S. had
“teamed up for sibling visits [between older brother and the child]
to maintain family ties.”
In a July 12, 2024, last minute information, the social
worker reported that on June 12, 2024, the child told the social
worker that he wanted to “live with [P.M.] forever” and that he
loved P.M. The social worker also reported that on July 10, 2024,
older brother and the child had a visit at the Department offices
and had scheduled weekly phone calls and in-person visits
monitored by the caregivers. The social worker “observed how
special the bond [was] between the brothers. [Older brother] was
observed being protective by demonstrating a strong sense of care
for [the child].”
In a July 16, 2024, status review report, the social worker
again noted that the child called P.M., “mom,” and her children,
“sister” and “brother.” P.M. remarked that she had seen “a
9
drastic change” in the child’s behavior in the months since his
medication was changed.
During the reporting period, mother had weekly monitored
virtual visits.
In a January 14, 2025, supplemental report, the social
worker reported that P.M. had been approved as an adoptive
parent and adoption had therefore been identified as the plan for
the child.
In a January 29, 2025, status review report, the social
worker confirmed that P.M. wanted to adopt the child. P.M. said
the child “was family” and she was “proud of his progression and
… [wanted] to give him the forever home that he deserve[d].”
The child had enrolled in a new school, had not had any
behavioral issues, and continued to progress with P.M.’s help.
Mother continued to be consistent with her once-weekly
phone calls with the children.
P.M. and K.S. continued to arrange sibling visits, and the
children confirmed they had maintained both telephone and in-
person visits. P.M. advised that the child’s behaviors had
improved since he began attending his new school.
In an April 16, 2025, supplemental report, the social
worker who met with older brother on March 6, 2025, reported
that, when they discussed adoption, older brother explained that
“he did not want to be adopted by his current caregiver [K.S. and]
expressed that he would ideally like to be adopted by his older
adult sister.” K.S. told the social worker that, although she was
still willing to adopt older brother, she would defer to older
brother’s decision and support a guardianship for him. She
understood that the case would remain open and that a social
worker would remain assigned.
10
In a July 17, 2025, last minute information, the social
worker reported that during a private meeting, the child stated
that he wanted to live with P.M. permanently and be adopted by
her. He described P.M. as “nice” and said she read to him, tied
his shoes, fed him, and took him to school.4 He also said that he
wanted to visit mother on Fridays.
In a July 18, 2025, status review report, the social worker
advised that P.M. had “provided [the child] with a safe and
nurturing environment where he ha[d] been observed to make
overall progress. … [She also had observed] a noticeable
improvement [in the child’s] behavior especially as he
transitioned back to public school. [He] continue[d] to make
significant progress with the support of [P.M.].”
During his interview with the social worker, the child
stated that he enjoyed school and was no longer fighting with his
peers. The child also said he was “happy with [P.M.] and
identifie[d her] as ‘mom’ [and] also identified [her] family as his
own family although he under[stood] they [were] not biologically
related.” And, he “love[d] spending time with his cousins,” that
is, “[P.M.’s] biological extended family.”
In an August 18, 2025, section 366.26 report, the social
worker advised that she met with P.M. on August 7, 2025, and
4 In a subsequent May 22, 2025, interview with the child and
P.M., the child told a different social worker that adoption was
“‘when someone doesn’t have a family, and they go with a family
to have forever. They live with the family, and they love you
forever.’” When the social worker asked the child, “‘Do you feel
like this can be a home where you can be adopted,’” he “nodded
his head and smiled.”
11
discussed mother’s visitation with the child.5 P.M. described the
visits with the child since the last hearing as “short” calls during
which the child was “often not fully engaged in the conversation
and [spoke] as though he [was] trying to rush off the call” without
“a lot of dialogue back and forth… .” During calls, mother would
tell the child that she was making efforts for his return to her
care.
P.M. and K.S. agreed to sibling visits between older brother
and the child “bi-weekly … in person on Saturdays” for one hour.
They also agreed to have phone or video calls when the children
requested.
P.M. reported that mother’s calls with the child had
recently increased from three or four minutes to 10 to 15
minutes, but he still rushed mother off the phone.
When the social worker asked the child how often he
wanted to speak to mother, he said he wanted to speak with
mother “‘one time a week.’” The social worker asked if he wanted
to speak with mother more often, and he shook his head “‘[n]o[,]’”
but said he would like the calls to be a little bit longer.
In an August 27, 2025, last minute information, the social
worker advised that when she spoke with the child by telephone
on August 20, 2025, he said he liked talking to mother. They
talked about his day and how he was doing in school. According
to the child, mother made him feel happy and he missed her. He
also said he wanted to live with mother because “‘she ha[d his]
motorcycle,’” but once he got his motorcycle, he wanted to “‘come
back to the house [he was] staying at.’” He liked where he lived
because they did “a lot of things like ‘go to the park and to a lot of
5 As of August 2025, mother’s monitored virtual visits with
the child were scheduled for one hour on Fridays.
12
different places.’” The child confirmed that he liked P.M. and
that her family members were nice to him.
E. August 27, 2025, Section 366.26 Hearing
At the August 27, 2025, section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile
court continued the matter as to older brother at the request of
his counsel because older brother said he wanted to return to
mother’s care.
Mother then testified as follows concerning the section
366.26 hearing as to the child. On visitation with the child, she
confirmed that she was currently visiting with the child by phone
once a week for an average of 15 minutes per call. She wished
the visits lasted longer and said that either she or the child would
decide when to end them. At the end of calls, she would “tell him
that [she] love[d] him and [that they] all miss[ed] him, and then
[she would] end the visit.”
Mother described her current relationship with P.M. as
“stagnant.” She did not have an issue with P.M. but admitted
that she sometimes recorded their conversations.
The child testified that he did not know the difference
between “a truth and a lie,” but he knew the difference between
right and wrong. He was able to answer questions about whether
statements made by counsel were right or wrong. The child
claimed that no one had explained to him what adoption was. He
was not told that an adoption would mean he would no longer
have a relationship with mother and father. But he understood
that, if he was adopted, he would no longer be able to see his
mother or father. When asked if he would be interested in a
different plan that would allow him to see his parents, the child
responded, “Yeah.” And, when asked why he would want to
13
continue his relationship with his mother, the child replied,
“Because she’s nice and I love her.”
The child also said that it made him feel good to see older
brother in court, he loved older brother, and felt sad that he did
not get to see him more. If he never saw his brother again, it
would make him feel “[v]ery sad.” No one had told him that
adoption would mean he would not get to see his brother
anymore.
When his own counsel asked the child if he remembered
saying he wanted P.M. to be his new mom, the child responded,
“Yeah.” But when counsel followed up by asking if the child still
wanted P.M. to be his new mom, he replied, “No.”
Under questioning by the Department’s counsel, the child
said he could not remember when he last saw mother. He did not
know how often he got to visit with mother, but he knew he
talked with her by phone. Either he would call mother or she
would call him.
In a September 22, 2025, last minute information for the
continued section 366.26 hearing, the social worker described
calls between mother and the child. Mother asked the child
about his week, his school friends, what he was currently doing,
and expressed her love. On one occasion, mother referenced a
motorcycle she had for the child, repeatedly reminding him it
would be there when he returned to her care. She also told the
child she would speak to the Department about scheduling an in-
person visit.
The social worker who interviewed the child on
September 19, 2025, about adoption reported that now he wanted
to continue living with P.M. because he liked his iPad and P.M.
was nice. He said he wanted to live with her forever.
14
Following another continuance of the section 366.26
hearing, a social worker submitted an October 1, 2025, last
minute information advising that, when she interviewed the child
on September 11, 2025, he explained he did not want to be
adopted because the judge told him he would never speak to
mother or older brother again. But the child then stated he now
wanted to be adopted by P.M. and to live with P.M. He also
wanted to continue speaking with mother and older brother.
The social worker further reported that, not only was P.M.
willing to consider a post-adoption agreement for continued
contact with mother, she was also amenable to a post-adoption
agreement for sibling contact.
According to the social worker, mother had a 13-minute
video call with the child on September 26, 2025, during which
they talked about their day and meals. When the child asked to
see his room, mother showed it to him, but said it was not ready
yet, as she was still decorating it, and assured him his toys were
there waiting for him.
The Department continued to recommend adoption for the
child.
F. October 29, 2025, Final Section 366.26 Hearing
At the October 29, 2025, continued hearing, older brother
testified under examination by mother’s counsel and confirmed
that he knew he was in court because his permanent plan was
guardianship, but denied knowing that the child’s permanent
plan was adoption. He and the child liked to play together and
have fun, the child looked up to him, and he missed seeing him.
Older brother described his relationship with the child as “really
close” and explained that during visits, the child was excited to
15
see him and a little “bummed out” when he left visits. When they
spoke between visits, the child said that he missed older brother.
Under examination by the Department’s counsel, older
brother confirmed that he saw the child face-to-face once a month
and visited virtually twice a month. Older brother explained that
there were a few times when the child’s caregiver said no to
proposed sibling visits, but he understood it was because of
problems she was having with her daughter. But generally, if he
wanted to speak with the child, he would be given the
opportunity to do so.
Following testimony, mother’s counsel argued that because
both the parent benefit exception and the sibling exception
applied, the juvenile court should not terminate parental rights
and instead order a guardianship for the child. Father’s counsel
also argued that both exceptions applied. And, the children’s
counsel joined in the parents’ arguments in favor of guardianship
over adoption.
Following further argument, the juvenile court ruled as
follows. On the beneficial parental relationship exception, the
court explained that mother did not visit the child consistently:
“Mother’s visits were sporadic throughout the first [12] months or
so during the reunification period. The reports note that she
frequently canceled, failed to confirm, arrived late, and at times
ended visits early. The court does note that her visits improved
at a later point, and they did become more consistent.”
The juvenile court then stated, “assuming arguendo that …
mother met the [consistent visitation] prong, although the court
is finding that she didn’t, the court will analyze element two.
The court notes that although [the child] has spent about half of
his life with mother, and he testified that he does not wish to be
16
adopted. The evidence does not support the condition that [the
child] has a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to his
mother. [¶] There’s been reports that he didn’t react when
informed that mother canceled a visit. There’s no indication that
he experiences sadness at the conclusion of visits. During one
observed visit, [the child] focused on his phone rather than
engaging with mother. The court notes that the contrast between
[the child’s] earlier behavior when he acted out in hopes of
returning home and his more recent conduct is significant. He
now refers to his caregiver as ‘mom,’ [and] expressed a desire to
remain in her home … .”
The juvenile court added: “Terminating the parent-child
relationship would not be detrimental to him. The … court
further finds that there will not be a substantial interference
with the relationship between … the children’s siblings and that
any – [¶] [Interruption by mother.] [¶] … [¶] And that any
risk of loss of any ongoing contact between the children and the
child and the child’s sibling is outweighed by the long-term
benefit to him from the permanency and stability of adoption. [¶]
So the court finds that no exception to adoption appl[ies] in this
case.”
Mother and father both filed timely notices of appeal from
the orders terminating parental rights.
17
III. DISCUSSION
A. Beneficial Parental Relationship Exception
1. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
“[T]he goal at the section 366.26 hearing is ‘specifically …
to select and implement a permanent plan for the child.’
[Citations.] To guide the court in selecting the most suitable
permanent arrangement, the statute lists plans in order of
preference and provides a detailed procedure for choosing among
them. [Citation.] According to that procedure, the court must
first determine by clear and convincing evidence whether the
child is likely to be adopted. [Citation.] If so, and if the court
finds that there has been a previous determination that
reunification services be terminated, then the court shall
terminate parental rights to allow for adoption. [Citation.] But if
the parent shows that termination would be detrimental to the
child for at least one specifically enumerated reason, the court
should decline to terminate parental rights and select another
permanent plan. [Citation.]” (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th
614, 630–631 (Caden C.).)
One such enumerated exception to the termination of
parental rights is the beneficial parental relationship exception.
(§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) In order to demonstrate that this
exception applies, a parent must show: “(1) regular visitation
and contact, and (2) a relationship, the continuation of which
would benefit the child such that (3) the termination of parental
rights would be detrimental to the child.” (Caden, C., supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 631.)
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“‘Concerning the third element—whether “termination
would be detrimental to the child due to” the relationship—the
court must decide whether it would be harmful to the child to
sever the relationship and choose adoption.’ (Caden C., supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 633.) ‘When it weighs whether termination would
be detrimental, the court is not comparing the parent’s attributes
as custodial caregiver relative to those of any potential adoptive
parent(s)... . Accordingly, courts should not look to whether the
parent can provide a home for the child.’ (Id. at p. 634.) ‘When
the relationship with a parent is so important to the child that
the security and stability of a new home wouldn’t outweigh its
loss, termination would be “detrimental to the child due to” the
child’s beneficial relationship with a parent.’ (Id. at pp. 633–
634.)” (In re M.V. (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 486, 508.)
“The parent bears the burden to show the statutory
exception applies. [Citation.] When a parent meets that burden,
the beneficial parental relationship exception applies such that it
would not be in the best interest of the child to terminate
parental rights. In that case the court must select a permanent
plan other than adoption. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
pp. 636–637.)” (In re M.V. (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1155, 1184.)
“We review the court’s findings using a hybrid approach:
for the first two elements, which require factual findings
(parental visitation and the child’s emotional attachment), we
apply the substantial evidence standard of review; and for the
court’s weighing of the relative harms and benefits of terminating
parental rights, we use the abuse of discretion standard. (Caden
C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639–640.)” (In re M.V., supra, 87
Cal.App.5th at p. 1184.)
19
2. Analysis
Mother contends that “[t]he juvenile court should have
found that [she] met her burden to show that the beneficial
parent-child relationship exception to termination of parental
rights under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) applied.” We
disagree.
Even if we assume for purposes of argument that mother
maintained regular visitation and contact with the child (the first
element), and that mother had a relationship with the child that
would benefit him (the second element), the juvenile court did not
abuse its discretion in determining that the advantages the child
would gain through adoption outweighed any potential detriment
resulting from the termination of mother’s parental rights (the
third element). The child’s relationship with mother, even if we
assume it was of some benefit to him, was not strongly so.
Indeed, the court first ordered the child to be detained from
mother’s custody on March 17, 2021, when the child was two
years old. But because mother refused to comply with the
juvenile court’s orders, the Department was unable to implement
the court’s detention order until November 2022, when the child
was four years old. Further, by mother’s own admission, she had
sent the child to reside with maternal aunt in Georgia in
November 2020, when the child was two years old. Due to
mother’s lack of candor with the Department about the location of
the child during the first two years of detention, it is unclear how
long the child resided in Georgia, but the evidence supported an
inference he had spent a significant portion of his life outside of
mother’s custody.
Further, although the child expressed affection for mother,
the juvenile court could reasonably conclude that part of his
20
desire to maintain contact with mother was based on her
inducements, including the purchase of a motorcycle and other
toys for him. The child’s phone calls with mother were described
as short, he seemed to want to rush off the phone, and he did not
express sadness when visits ended or when mother canceled a
visit. The child also stated that he did not want to visit with
mother more than once a week. Perhaps most importantly,
following his abduction by mother, the child’s behaviors regressed
and he expressed fear that she would “whoop” him, became afraid
of the dark, and began to wet himself.
The evidence also showed that child was thriving in P.M.’s
care. As noted, his behavior improved greatly following his
placement with prospective adoptive parent P.M. Although
mother contends that the child’s improved behavior was
attributable to his changed medication, the juvenile court was
entitled to draw a more nuanced inference and credit P.M.’s
nurturing care for the child’s continued improvement. (J.M. v.
G.H. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 925, 935 [“We draw all reasonable
inferences in support of the court’s ruling and defer to the court’s
express or implied findings when supported by substantial
evidence”].) The child consistently expressed to the social worker
a desire to be adopted by P.M. And, although he testified both
that he wished to be adopted by P.M. and to continue to see his
mother, he also stated that he wanted to obtain his motorcycle
and then return to P.M. Thus, the court did not abuse its
discretion when it concluded that the termination of the child’s
relationship with mother, when balanced against the positive
benefits of his new, adoptive home and family, would not be
detrimental to the child.
21
B. Sibling Relationship Exception
1. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
A juvenile court considering the sibling relationship
exception to adoption under section 366.26, subdivision
(c)(1)(B)(v), follows a two-step analysis. First, the court
determines whether the parent has shown “the existence of a
significant sibling relationship, the severance of which would be
detrimental to the child.” (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th
942, 952, fn. omitted.) Second, “[i]f the court determines
terminating parental rights would substantially interfere with
the sibling relationship, the court is then directed to weigh the
child’s best interest in continuing that sibling relationship
against the benefit the child would receive by the permanency of
adoption.” (Ibid.)
“The sibling bond exception is evaluated from the
perspective of the child who is being considered for adoption, not
the perspective of that child’s siblings.” (In re D.O. (2016) 247
Cal.App.4th 166, 174.) “[T]he application of this exception will be
rare, particularly when the proceedings concern young children
whose needs for a competent, caring[,] and stable parent are
paramount.” (In re Valerie A. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 987, 1014.)
Unlike the beneficial parental relationship exception, “sibling
relationships enjoy legal recognition after termination of parental
rights.” (In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289, 300; see also In re
D.O., supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 175 [“It is not a foregone
conclusion that terminating parental rights will substantially
interfere with a sibling relationship, and the juvenile court must
make this factual determination”].)
22
The parent bears the burden to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that an exception to the statutory
preference for adoption applies. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 636.)
“We apply the substantial evidence standard of review to
the [juvenile] court’s factual findings regarding the applicability
of the sibling relationship exception, ‘and the abuse of discretion
standard to the court’s weighing of competing interests.’” (In re
Isaiah S. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 428, 438.)
The exception requires the parent contesting adoption to
show that adoption would cause “substantial interference with a
child’s sibling relationship … .” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).)
2. Analysis
Mother contends the juvenile court erred when it found
that the sibling relationship exception did not apply. Again, we
disagree.
Here, the caregivers for older brother and the child
arranged for regular in-person and telephone visits and the
child’s caregiver (and proposed adoptive parent), P.M. expressed
a willingness to enter into a post-adoption agreement for the
continuation of sibling visits. That evidence supported a
reasonable inference that adoption was not substantially likely to
interfere with the relationship between older brother and the
child.
Mother points to other evidence showing that the child’s
behavioral issues caused him to be removed from the home of
older brother’s caretaker, K.S., and that he continued to have
such issues after the removal. As mother views that evidence, it
23
supported an inference that the caregivers would not be willing to
continue the relationship between the two brothers in the future.
Although it is undisputed that, early in the case, K.S. had
difficulty dealing with the child’s behaviors and that she
ultimately asked that the child be removed from her care,
mother’s argument ignores other evidence in the record showing
that the child’s behaviors in P.M.’s home and in school
dramatically improved once he was consistently under her care,
began receiving services, and was prescribed the appropriate
medications. That evidence supported an inference that the
child’s past behavioral issues were not likely to interfere with the
caregivers’ ability to ensure future visitation between the
brothers.
Mother also maintains that the caregivers had “historical
difficulties” arranging for consistent visits. Specifically, she
points to evidence showing that K.S. “repeatedly did not adhere
to court orders which caused significant disruption to the sibling
visitation schedule.”
Although there was evidence that K.S. was not always
responsive to requests for sibling visits earlier in the case, there
was also more current evidence showing the siblings visited
regularly, including the caregivers’ agreement to have bi-weekly
Saturday visits and phone calls on request and older brother’s
hearing testimony that he saw the child in-person at least once a
month and they spoke twice more during the month by phone.
That evidence supported a finding that, after adoption, the
siblings’ relationship was likely to continue and therefore that
the exception did not apply.
24
IV. DISPOSITION
The order terminating parental rights are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
KIM (D.), J.
I concur:
MOOR, J.
25
In re E.S.
B350924
BAKER, Acting P. J., Concurring
I agree the parental rights termination order should be
affirmed.
There was no error in finding the parental benefit
exception did not apply because substantial evidence supports
the juvenile court’s determination that Y.S. did not “‘visit
consistently,’ taking into account ‘the extent permitted by court
orders.’” (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 632; see also ibid.
[“[c]ourts should consider . . . whether parents ‘maintained
regular visitation and contact with the child’ [citation] but
certainly not to punish parents or reward them for good behavior
in visiting or maintaining contact—here, as throughout, the focus
is on the best interests of the child”].) There were multiple
missed and truncated visits, and there was also a months-long
period of no visitation at all that occurred as a consequence of
Y.S.’s abduction of the child in question during a monitored visit.
As for the sibling relationship exception, I agree Mother did
not prove that exception applied for the reasons stated in the
opinion for the court.
BAKER, Acting P. J.
