Filed 8/11/26 Cal. Civil Rights Dept. v. Space Exploration Technologies CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

CALIFORNIA CIVIL RIGHTS B346853
DEPARTMENT,
Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No.
25STCP01327
v.

SPACE EXPLORATION
TECHNOLOGIES CORP.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Maureen Duffy-Lewis, Judge. Affirmed.
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, Jennifer B. Zargarof, Joseph
Bias, Thomas M. Peterson; Horvitz & Levy and Jeremy B. Rosen
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Michael L. Newman,
Assistant Attorney General, William H. Downer, Lucia J. Choi
and Jennifer M. Soliman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
_________________________
 Space Exploration Technologies Corp. (SpaceX) appeals
an order compelling it to comply with the California Civil Rights
Department’s (CRD) investigatory subpoena. CRD issued
the subpoena after receiving an administrative complaint from
a former SpaceX employee alleging violations of California’s
Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA, Gov. Code,
§ 12900 et. seq.).1 SpaceX argues the federal constitution,
the presumption against extraterritorial application of laws,
and FEHA precluded CRD from investigating the complaint
because it alleges conduct outside FEHA’s territorial reach.
We conclude SpaceX has not met its burden to show error
on any of these grounds. Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. The administrative complaint
In April 2024, a former SpaceX employee (the Employee)
filed a complaint with CRD alleging the company discriminated
and retaliated against her in violation of FEHA. The Employee
listed a California address for SpaceX. She alleged SpaceX
paid her less than a male employee hired around the same time
and passed her over for a promotion in favor of a less experienced
male employee. The Employee asserted SpaceX eventually
increased her and another female employee’s salary, without
giving any reason for doing so. The Employee also alleged
SpaceX terminated her in retaliation for her participation in
drafting and circulating an open letter criticizing the company
and its CEO for creating a hostile work environment and
engaging in sexual harassment and gender discrimination.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Government
Code.

2
2. The investigation
After receiving the complaint, CRD served on SpaceX
interrogatories and a subpoena duces tecum seeking information
related to the Employee and her allegations. SpaceX objected
to all the requests on the ground that CRD lacked jurisdiction
over the claims because the Employee was a resident of
Washington and FEHA does not apply outside California.
Notwithstanding that objection, SpaceX agreed to produce
the Employee’s resume and application, as well as records
of her badge swipes.
In response to SpaceX’s objection, CRD agreed to focus
its investigation on the jurisdictional questions before deciding
whether to investigate the merits of the Employee’s claims.
CRD identified 14 discovery requests seeking information related
to the location where the conduct giving rise to the claims took
place, and it asked SpaceX to respond to those specific requests.
SpaceX eventually provided supplemental responses.
Based on those responses, CRD determined it had jurisdiction
over the retaliation claim. However, CRD concluded SpaceX
had not provided enough information for it to determine whether
it had jurisdiction over the discrimination claims. CRD asked
SpaceX to respond to discovery requests related to the merits of
the retaliation claim and provide more information related to its
jurisdiction over the discrimination claims. SpaceX apparently
declined to do so.
3. The petition
In April 2025, CRD filed a petition in the superior court
seeking an order compelling SpaceX to comply with its subpoena.
CRD asked the court specifically to compel SpaceX to produce
documents that would help it to evaluate the merits of the

3
Employee’s retaliation claim and the jurisdictional issue
concerning her discrimination claims.
CRD acknowledged SpaceX hired the Employee to work
in its Redmond, Washington office. However, CRD stated the
law requires it to investigate the allegations and determine
whether the conduct has a substantial connection to California.
CRD argued FEHA applies to non-California residents if the
discriminatory conduct occurred in California. Therefore, it
needed to investigate whether SpaceX’s alleged discriminatory
conduct occurred or was ratified in California, where SpaceX
was headquartered at the time.
4. SpaceX’s opposition
SpaceX opposed the petition. It argued, because the
employee lived and worked in Washington, CRD’s assertion of
jurisdiction violates the United States Constitution and
California law. According to SpaceX, Washington-based
managers determined the Employee’s compensation, position,
and promotion opportunities. SpaceX argued its company-wide
policies were “entirely irrelevant” to CRD’s jurisdiction, and the
Employee’s employment was governed solely by Washington law.
SpaceX asserted that the mere possibility the discriminatory
conduct may have occurred or been ratified in California was
too speculative.
In support of its opposition, SpaceX submitted a declaration
from its Director of Human Resources for the Redmond,
Washington office, Theresa Roncari. Roncari stated the
Employee was hired to work in Washington, assigned to work
in Washington, and lived in Washington during the relevant
times.

4
 Roncari asserted Redmond-based managers—who have
discretion and are the ultimate decisionmakers for compensation
and promotion—were “primarily responsible” for determining the
employee’s compensation, position, and promotion opportunities.
Roncai said SpaceX’s Senior Director of Human Resources,
Lindsay Chapman, flew to Washington and interviewed the
employee as part of an investigation into the open letter.
Chapman made the decision to terminate the employee while
in Washington. Two days after the interview, Chapman called
the employee at her residence in Washington to notify her of the
termination. Roncari asserted SpaceX terminated the Employee
for violating its policy against leaking confidential company
information and dishonesty during an internal investigation.
5. CRD’s reply
In its reply, CRD asked the court to take judicial notice
of a complaint the Employee and seven other former SpaceX
employees filed in superior court. The complaint listed the
Employee’s connections to California, including that she
“reported up to” a SpaceX vice president located in California,
her “direct manager” since September 2021 was located in
California, her pay statements were issued from California and
listed a California facility as her employer, and her new-hire
paperwork contained documents related to California
employment law.
6. The order and appeal
The court held a hearing on May 23, 2025 and granted
the petition.2 The court did not state its reasons for doing so.
SpaceX timely appealed.

2 After granting the petition, the court set a hearing to
consider the scope of CRD’s requests. The court ordered the

5
 DISCUSSION
SpaceX challenges the superior court’s order compelling
it to comply with CRD’s subpoena. SpaceX argues the court
should have denied the petition because CRD “cannot plausibly
establish jurisdiction to issue the subpoena.” As we understand
its arguments, SpaceX contends the federal constitution, the
presumption against extraterritorial application of laws, and
FEHA precluded CRD from investigating the complaint because
it alleges conduct outside FEHA’s territorial reach.
Before turning to the merits of SpaceX’s arguments,
we must discuss the scope of our review. CRD’s petition sought
an order compelling SpaceX to disclose information on two
issues: (1) CRD’s jurisdiction to investigate the Employee’s
discrimination allegations; and (2) the merits of the Employee’s
retaliation allegations. Whether CRD has jurisdiction and
whether the Employee’s allegations have merit are distinct
issues, and it is conceivable that CRD would have authority
to request information related to one issue but not the other.
However, SpaceX does not meaningfully distinguish between
them. Instead, as we understand its arguments, SpaceX
contends CRD was categorically prohibited from seeking any
information related to the complaint. Therefore, we limit our
consideration to that issue, without distinguishing between
CRD’s requests related to jurisdiction and those related to
the merits of the Employee’s allegations.

parties to meet and confer on that issue before the next hearing.
The record does not include documents related to that issue.

6
1. Relevant law
FEHA prohibits discrimination in employment on the
basis of certain protected characteristics, including sex and
gender. (§ 12940.) As a matter of fundamental public policy,
FEHA declares the need to “protect and safeguard the right and
opportunity of all persons to seek, obtain, and hold employment
without discrimination” on the specified grounds. (§ 12920; see
Bailey v. San Francisco Dist. Attorney’s Office (2024) 16 Cal.5th
611, 626.) FEHA’s overriding purpose is “to provide effective
remedies that will eliminate these discriminatory practices.”
(§ 12920.)
As relevant to this case, it is an “unlawful employment
practice” under FEHA for an employer to “discriminate against
[a] person in compensation or in terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment” because of sex or gender. (§ 12940, subd. (a).)
It also is an unlawful employment practice for an employer “to
discharge, expel, or otherwise discriminate against any person”
for opposing practices that violate FEHA. (Id., subd. (h).)
FEHA establishes a “procedure for the prevention and
elimination of” unlawful employment practices. (§ 12960, subd.
(a).) Under section 12960, “[a]ny person claiming to be aggrieved
by an alleged unlawful practice may file . . . a verified [written]
complaint” with the name and address of the employer and
setting forth the “particulars thereof” and “other information
as may be required by [CRD].” (Id., subd. (c).)
The Legislature created CRD to “represent[ ] the interests
of the state and effectuate[ ] the declared public policy of the
state to protect and safeguard the rights and opportunities of
all persons from unlawful discrimination and other violations
of” FEHA. (§ 12930, subd. (o).) Section 12930 grants CRD the

7
“functions, duties, and powers” to “receive, investigate, conciliate,
mediate, and prosecute complaints alleging practices made
unlawful pursuant to . . . Section 12940.” (Id., subd. (f)(1).)
“In connection with any matter under investigation or
in question . . . pursuant to a complaint filed under Section
12960,” CRD may issue subpoenas and written interrogatories,
take depositions, and request the production of documents.
(§ 12930, subd. (g); see § 12963.1 [describing the procedure for
issuing subpoenas].) CRD may petition the superior courts to
compel compliance with its investigatory requests. (§ 12930,
subd. (g)(5); see § 12963.5.)
2. SpaceX has not shown enforcement of the subpoena
violates the federal constitution
SpaceX first argues enforcement of CRD’s subpoena
violates the federal constitution.
SpaceX’s analysis of the federal constitutional issues is so
cursory that it warrants little discussion. The relevant section
of SpaceX’s opening brief—which spans roughly two pages—
consists of four paragraphs summarizing the law followed by a
one-sentence conclusion. SpaceX cites cases concerning at least
four constitutional provisions: the commerce clause (National
Pork Producers Council v. Ross (2023) 598 U.S. 356; Edgar
v. MITE Corp. (1982) 457 U.S. 624; Healy v. Beer Institute
(1989) 491 U.S. 324), the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment (BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore (1996) 517
U.S. 559), the full faith and credit clause (Huntington v. Attrill
(1892) 146 U.S. 657), and the supremacy clause (Edgar). SpaceX
does not discuss those provisions in any detail. In fact, it is not
even clear which provisions SpaceX argues enforcement of CRD’s
subpoena violates. The only constitutional provision SpaceX

8
mentions by name in its opening brief is the commerce clause.
However, SpaceX fails meaningfully to explain how enforcement
of an investigatory subpoena violates the commerce clause—or
any other constitutional provision for that matter—particularly
when the subpoena is directed at a company with a significant
presence in California, issued in response to an administrative
complaint filed in California and alleging violations of California
law, that requests information to determine if the company
violated California law.3
“The most fundamental rule of appellate review is that
the judgment or order challenged on appeal is presumed to be
correct, and it is the appellant’s burden to affirmatively
demonstrate error.” (Argueta v. Worldwide Flight Services, Inc.
(2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 822, 833.) To meet that burden, the
appellant must provide “cogent argument[s] supported by legal
analysis.” (City of Santa Maria v. Adam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th
266, 286–287 (Adam); see Paterno v. State of California (1999)
74 Cal.App.4th 68, 106 [“the appellant bears the duty of spelling
out in his brief exactly how the error caused a miscarriage of
justice”].) We do not serve as backup appellate counsel, and
we are not required to make arguments for the parties. (See

3 At oral argument, SpaceX argued its briefs are “clear” it
makes a “dormant commerce clause argument.” We disagree.
SpaceX’s briefs do not even mention the applicable test to
determine whether a California statute violates the commerce
clause, let alone meaningfully apply that test. (See Sullivan v.
Oracle Corp. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1191, 1201 (Sullivan) [noting
“[c]hallenges to state statutes under the commerce clause are
typically addressed under the test set out in Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc. (1970) 397 U.S. 137, 142”].)

9
Martine v. Heavenly Valley Limited Partnership (2018) 27
Cal.App.5th 715, 728.) Instead, “we may disregard conclusory
arguments that are not supported by pertinent legal authority
or fail to disclose the reasoning by which the appellant reached
the conclusions [it] wants us to adopt.” (Adam, at p. 287; see
Thurston v. Midvale Corp. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 634, 651
[appellant forfeited claim “by failing to support it with
appropriate legal citations or argument”].) Here, SpaceX’s
cursory treatment of the constitutional issues in its opening
brief is far from sufficient to meet its burden to show error.
Accordingly, we consider the arguments forfeited and decline
to consider them.
For the first time in its reply brief, SpaceX argues CRD’s
subpoena constituted a “fishing expedition” that violates the
constitutional prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures.
SpaceX supports this argument with significantly more analysis
than its other constitutional arguments. Nevertheless, SpaceX
forfeited the issue by failing to raise it in its opening brief. (See
Christoff v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th
118, 125 [“an appellant’s failure to discuss an issue in its opening
brief forfeits the issue on appeal”].) Accordingly, we decline to
consider it.
3. SpaceX has not shown enforcement of the subpoena
violates the presumption against extraterritorial
application of laws
SpaceX next argues enforcement of CRD’s subpoena
violates the presumption against extraterritorial application
of laws. (See North Alaska Salmon Co. v. Pillsbury (1916)
174 Cal. 1.)

10
 The presumption is a rule of statutory construction under
which courts “ordinarily will not give extraterritorial effect to
legislative enactments absent an affirmative indication that
such was the Legislature’s intent.” (Ward v. United Airlines,
Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 732, 749 (Ward).) The rule “reflects an
assumption that a legislature generally legislates with domestic
concerns in mind” and also “serves the incidental purpose of
avoiding unintended conflicts with other sovereigns.” (Id. at
pp. 749–750.)
In Ward, the California Supreme Court discussed the
limited usefulness of the presumption against extraterritoriality,
particularly in cases involving interstate employment. The court
explained application of the presumption is determinative only
in cases where any extraterritorial effect is sufficient to bar
application of the law. (Ward, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 749–750.)
In all other cases, “it is not sufficient to ask whether the relevant
law was intended to operate extraterritorially or instead only
intraterritorially, because many employment relationships and
transactions will have elements of both. The better question
is what kinds of California connections will suffice to trigger
the relevant provisions of California law.” (Id. at p. 752.) To
answer that question, courts may consider the provision’s aims
and role within the greater statutory scheme, keeping in mind
the “central insight” that the “Legislature ordinarily does not
intend for its enactments to create conflict with other sovereigns.”
(Id. at pp. 752, 755.)
Here, SpaceX does not contend—nor could it—that any
extraterritorial effect is sufficient to bar application of FEHA.
Therefore, under Ward, we must ask what sort of California

11
connections are sufficient to trigger the relevant provisions of
California law. (See Ward, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 752.)
To the extent SpaceX argues enforcement of CRD’s
investigatory subpoena violates the presumption, we are
concerned only with the connections required to trigger
provisions granting CRD authority to issue and enforce
investigatory subpoenas. CRD’s investigatory authority is
set out primarily in sections 12930, 12963.1, and 12963.5.
However, SpaceX does not directly address the connections
required to trigger those provisions. Instead, it focuses on the
connections required to trigger FEHA’s substantive provisions.
SpaceX seems to assume that, if there are insufficient
connections to trigger FEHA’s substantive provisions, there
necessarily are insufficient connections to trigger FEHA’s
investigatory provisions. However, these are separate issues
requiring separate analyses. (See People ex rel. DuFauchard
v. U.S. Financial Management, Inc. (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th
1502, 1519 [noting whether corporations commissioner could
investigate violations of California law involving nonresidents
is separate from whether California law would apply in an action
against a business for the alleged violations].) By conflating
them, SpaceX overlooks the fact that different FEHA provisions
have different aims, roles, and potentials to create conflict
with other sovereigns. Indeed, the potential for conflict with
other sovereigns is far less when CRD seeks to exercise its
investigatory powers than when it seeks to enforce FEHA’s
substantive provisions by enjoining employment practices.
Therefore, it is at least conceivable that fewer connections
are required to trigger CRD’s investigatory provisions than to
trigger FEHA’s substantive provisions. SpaceX does not even

12
acknowledge that possibility. Its failure to discuss meaningfully
FEHA’s provisions governing CRD’s investigatory authority
provides sufficient grounds to reject its arguments on this issue.
(See Adam, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at pp. 286–287.)
4. SpaceX has not shown CRD lacks jurisdiction
under FEHA
Finally, SpaceX argues the superior court should have
denied the petition because CRD failed to establish the basis
for its jurisdiction under FEHA.
SpaceX’s argument seems to be as follows. Under FEHA,
CRD’s investigatory jurisdiction arises only upon receipt of a
complaint alleging conduct that, if proven, would be a violation
of FEHA. (See § 12930, subd. (f)(1); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2,
§ 10004, subd. (a).) The allegations in the complaint, if proven,
would not be a violation of FEHA because the allegedly unlawful
conduct falls outside FEHA’s territorial reach. Therefore, CRD
lacked jurisdiction under FEHA to investigate the allegations.4
We will assume—without deciding—FEHA does not grant
CRD jurisdiction to investigate complaints alleging conduct
outside the reach of FEHA’s substantive provisions. Even
with that assumption, SpaceX still must show the Employee’s
allegations fall outside FEHA’s territorial reach. That issue, in
turn, depends on how far FEHA’s substantive provisions reach.
As we discussed above, this is an issue of statutory construction,
which requires an analysis of the relevant provisions’ aims, roles

4 SpaceX specifically argues CRD’s lack of jurisdiction caused
it to fail to comply with section 12963.5, which states a petition
to compel compliance with a subpoena must “describe the inquiry
or investigation” before CRD and “the basis for its jurisdiction
therein.” (§ 12963.5, subd. (b).)

13
in the statutory scheme, and potential to create conflict with
other sovereigns.5 (See Ward, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 752, 755.)
SpaceX does not directly conduct that analysis with respect
to FEHA’s substantive provisions. Instead, it proposes two
categorical rules, which it derives from various California
Supreme Court cases. We are not persuaded either rule applies.
The first rule—which SpaceX proposes in its briefing—
is that FEHA’s territorial reach turns on the location of the
alleged adverse employment action. SpaceX suggests, if the
adverse employment action occurred in California, FEHA applies.
Otherwise, FEHA does not apply.
SpaceX derives this rule from Kearney v. Salomon Smith
Barney, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 95 (Kearney). Kearney concerned
Penal Code section 632, which generally prohibits the secret
recording of confidential conversations. (Kearney, at pp. 117–
118.) The California Supreme Court held the statute applied
where persons in Georgia secretly recorded phone calls with
persons in California. (Id. at pp. 99, 120.) The court rejected the
argument that this constituted an unauthorized extraterritorial
application of the statute. It explained the situation was “more
reasonably . . . viewed as an instance of applying the statute to
a multistate event in which a crucial element—the confidential
communication by the California resident—occurred in
California.” (Id. at p. 119.) The court continued, “[b]ecause there
can be no question but that the principal purpose of section 632

5 To the extent SpaceX argues the federal constitution
prohibits application of FEHA’s substantive provisions to the
allegations in the complaint, we think it has forfeited the
argument for the same reasons it forfeited its argument that
enforcement of the subpoena violates the federal constitution.

14
is to protect the privacy of confidential communications of
California residents while they are in California, we believe
it is clear that section 632 was intended, and reasonably must
be interpreted, to apply in this setting.” (Id. at pp. 119–120.)
Contrary to SpaceX’s suggestions, Kearney does not stand
for the proposition that California law applies only if the crucial
element of the claim occurred in California. However, even if
it did, SpaceX still has not shown the allegations in the
Employee’s complaint fail that test.
According to SpaceX, the crucial element of a FEHA claim
is the “ ‘adverse employment action.’ ” SpaceX insists it is
undisputed all the alleged adverse employment actions occurred
exclusively in Washington, but it does not explain how it came to
that conclusion. At oral argument, SpaceX asserted an adverse
employment action “necessarily occurs where the employment
occurs.” SpaceX did not cite authority for that proposition.
Nor did it explain how to determine where the “employment
occurs” when the employee and employer are potentially
in different locations. SpaceX’s conclusory assertions are
not sufficient to show error.
Nor do we agree with SpaceX’s suggestion that the
Employee’s complaint alleges the adverse employment actions
occurred exclusively in Washington. According to SpaceX, the
complaint alleges “management in Washington discriminatorily
denied [the Employee] equal pay and promotion in Washington
and then fired her in Washington for retaliatory reasons.”
SpaceX’s characterization of the complaint is misleading at best,
and deceptive at worst. The complaint contains a single explicit
allegation referring to Washington. It states SpaceX’s Human
Resources Director “flew to Redmond, Washington” and met the

15
Employee in person. The complaint also implies the Employee
was in Washington when a Human Resources employee
informed her she was being placed on administrative leave.
With the possible exception of the Employee’s address—which is
redacted—the complaint does not allege any other connections to
Washington. It certainly does not allege the adverse employment
actions occurred there.6
At oral argument, SpaceX argued a different rule applies
to California’s labor and employment laws—including FEHA—
and is determinative in this case. According to SpaceX, the
key question for such laws is: “Where did the employee work?”
SpaceX asserted, if the employee did not work in California,
the employee is not protected under California’s laws. SpaceX
stated this rule is compelled by California Supreme Court
jurisprudence on the extraterritorial reach of California’s labor
laws, specifically Tidewater Marine Western, Inc. v. Bradshaw
(1996) 14 Cal.4th 557 (Tidewater); Sullivan, supra, 51 Cal.4th
1191; Ward, supra, 9 Cal.5th 732; and Oman v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 762, 772 (Oman).
As with Kearney, SpaceX reads too much into these cases.
First and foremost, none of the cases involved FEHA, let alone
the specific FEHA provisions at issue here. Instead, they
concerned Industrial Welfare Commission (IWC) wage orders
(Tidewater), the Unfair Competition Law (Sullivan), and Labor
Code provisions related to overtime, wage statements, and the

6 It is not clear whether SpaceX argues CRD has jurisdiction
only if the complaint explicitly alleges the adverse employment
action occurred in California. If so, SpaceX has forfeited the
argument by failing to support it with meaningful analysis and
citations to legal authority. (See Adam, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 286–287.)

16
minimum wage (Sullivan, Ward, and Oman). As the Supreme
Court explained in Ward, “[t]here is no single, all-purpose answer
to the question of when state law will apply to an interstate
employment relationship or set of transactions. As is true of
statutory interpretation generally, each law must be considered
on its own terms.” (Ward, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 752.) Therefore,
even if the Supreme Court held the specific provisions at issue
in those cases do not apply to individuals working outside
California, it would not compel the same conclusion with respect
to the specific FEHA provisions at issue here.
Nor do we read Tidewater, Sullivan, Ward, or Oman as
otherwise compelling a broad rule that California’s labor and
employment laws categorically do not apply to workers outside
California. In Tidewater, the California Supreme Court expressly
declined to hold IWC wage orders never apply “to employment
outside California,” noting it was possible the Legislature
intended extraterritorial application of such orders in limited
circumstances. (Tidewater, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 577–578.)
The Sullivan court expressly left open the possibility that the
Unfair Competition Law would apply to overtime work performed
in other states by non-California residents if the wages were paid
in California. (Sullivan, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1208.) The fact
the court left open that possibility alone seems to refute SpaceX’s
suggestion that Sullivan compels a conclusion that California’s
labor protections do not apply to individuals working outside
California. Nor do we read Ward or Oman to support such
a broad, categorical rule. To the contrary, those cases caution
that each law must be considered on its own terms. (See Ward,
supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 752; Oman, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 772

17
[“the application of California wage and hour protections to
multistate workers . . . may vary on a statute-by-statute basis”].)
We do not mean to suggest these cases hold California’s
labor and employment laws necessarily apply to workers outside
California, or even that they support application of FEHA in this
case. We also recognize that the location of the worker was an
important factor in those cases. Nevertheless, we reject SpaceX’s
suggestion that the cases compel a categorical rule that FEHA
does not apply under any circumstances to any employee working
outside California.
SpaceX’s reliance on Mahdavi v. Fair Employment Practice
Com. (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 326, and Gay Law Students Ass’n
v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 458, is misplaced.
The plaintiffs in those cases alleged discrimination on grounds
the law did not protect at the time. (See Mahdavi, at p. 341;
Gay Law Students, at p. 489.) Therefore, as a matter of law,
the alleged conduct did not constitute unlawful practices. Here,
there is no dispute the types of conduct alleged in the complaint
—discrimination based on sex or gender and retaliation for
protected activities—are unlawful under section 12940. The only
question is whether there are sufficient connections to California
to apply FEHA to them. SpaceX has not shown the allegations in
the complaint conclusively resolve that issue. Therefore, unlike
in Mahdavi and Gay Law Students, we cannot say the complaint
fails to allege a FEHA violation as a matter of law.
SpaceX’s reliance on Campbell v. Arco Marine, Inc. (1996)
42 Cal.App.4th 1850 (Campbell) is misplaced for similar reasons.
In Campbell, an employee filed an action against a California-
based employer alleging FEHA violations that occurred on a
ship while at sea. (Id. at pp. 1852–1854.) The court affirmed

18
summary judgment for the employer on the ground that FEHA
did not apply to the employee’s claims. (Id. at pp. 1854–1855,
1860.) The court concluded there were insufficient connections
to California, noting the employee resided in Washington, applied
for the position and was hired in Washington, performed her
official duties “on the high seas,” and suffered harassment at sea
and in Washington. (Id. at p. 1858.) The court explained the
fact the employer was headquartered in California was not a
sufficient connection, noting no one working at the headquarters
“participated in or ratified the conduct” underlying the claims.
(Ibid.) The court also pointed to statements of legislative intent
referring to the “ ‘people of the State of California’ ” and the
“ ‘California citizenry’ ” as supporting a conclusion that FEHA
“should not be construed to apply to nonresidents employed
outside the state when the tortious conduct did not occur
in California.” (Id. at p. 1860, italics omitted.)
Campbell is distinguishable. In Campbell, the connections
to California—or lack thereof—were settled. Despite SpaceX’s
insistence otherwise, the same is not true here. Indeed, one of
the primary purposes of SpaceX’s subpoena was to determine
whether there are sufficient connections to this state. Moreover,
for the reasons we discussed, SpaceX has not shown the
connections that are undisputed—mainly, the fact the Employee
lived and worked in Washington—compel a conclusion that
FEHA does not apply.

19
 DISPOSITION
We affirm the order. The California Civil Rights
Department shall recover its costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

EGERTON, Acting P. J.

We concur:

ADAMS, J.

KARNOW, J.


Retired Judge of the San Francisco Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6
of the California Constitution.

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