Filed 8/11/26 Suva v. Suva CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
CLIFFORD SUVA II,
Plaintiff and Appellant, G065822
v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2020-
01155729)
NAVEEN SUVA,
OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Sheila Recio, Judge. Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded with
directions.
Law Offices of Benjimin Michael Brees and Benjimin M. Brees
for Plaintiff and Appellant.
No appearance for Defendant and Respondent.
Clifford Suva II1 appeals from the trial court’s order entering
judgment in favor of Naveen Suva. After Naveen defaulted, and multiple
continuances for Clifford to submit affidavits and documentary evidence of
damages, the court ruled Clifford was not entitled to any recovery, and
judgment was entered in favor of Naveen. Clifford argues the judgment must
be reversed because the evidence was sufficient to warrant judgment in his
favor. We agree. Clifford alleged defamation per se, which presumes the
existence of general damages. He submitted competent evidence of his own
damage and, at a minimum, was therefore entitled to nominal damages. We
therefore affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for reconsideration of
damages.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The complaint in this action asserts causes of action for
defamation per se, false light, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The allegations center on a text message allegedly sent by Clifford’s
daughter-in-law, Naveen, to Jennie Cheng, Clifford’s sister-in-law, accusing
Clifford of being a “child molester.” As alleged, the text message is “entirely
false.” Clifford contended the false accusation was defamatory “as a matter of
law.”
The complaint originally named Cheng as a defendant, who
answered the complaint and was dismissed. Naveen did not answer, and
default was entered. Clifford then requested a default judgment. The trial
court continued the case multiple times, for more than two years, to allow
Clifford to provide evidence substantiating his request for damages.
1 For ease of reference and with no disrespect intended, we shall
refer to members of the Suva family by their first names.
2
Over the course of those continuances, the trial court voiced
concerns about Clifford’s evidence. In a minute order the court indicated,
“The evidence submitted remains deficient. For example, the new
declarations again rely on hearsay and contain statements made without
proper foundation. Also, admissible evidence to support claimed damages is
again lacking.” The court further “noted deficiencies in the evidence
submitted (e.g., foundation, hearsay).” The court found Clifford “failed to
introduce competent evidence establishing a prima facie case of damages”
and Clifford “claims damages from a text message between [Naveen] and a
non-party, which begins with, ‘[s]o this is what I found out,’” but “[n]o
declaration was [proffered] from the non-party who purportedly received the
text [message].”
Ultimately, Clifford presented evidence of damages which fell
into two categories: emotional distress and economic damages. As to this first
category, Clifford filed multiple individual personal statements and
declarations attesting to his own emotional distress. He explained his
emotional distress centered on the sexual abuse he suffered as a child and the
text message reopened those emotional wounds. He also claimed his
relationships with family members have been impacted and he no longer
spoke with many family members after the text was sent.
Clifford also filed several declarations from his wife, purporting
to corroborate Clifford’s emotional distress as well as to describe the negative
impact of the text message on family relationships.
Additionally, Clifford provided a letter from his treating
psychologist in which the psychologist indicated, “Mr. Suva is currently
struggling with [posttraumatic stress disorder] symptoms as a result of the
accusation of his daughter-in-law by text that he is a pedophile.”
3
Clifford requested $100,000 in emotional distress damages.
In respect to his economic damages, Clifford submitted
declarations that were supported by documents purporting to substantiate
his economic damages, centering on lost wages and income. He claimed his
emotional distress led to an inability to work and requested $241,382.09.
Clifford also included excerpts of Cheng’s deposition. At her
deposition, Cheng testified she recognized the text message sent by Naveen,
acknowledged its receipt, and indicated she believed to have received the
message around November 20, 2019.
In a minute order, the trial court found Clifford did not
sufficiently address its concerns and characterized the evidence as “replete
with inadmissible hearsay, conclusory assertions, [and] foundational issues.”
The court concluded the “evidence submitted by [Clifford] fail[ed] to support
the requested damages” and, in view of the prior continuances, it appeared
Clifford “[could not] meet his burden of proof.” Judgment was entered in favor
of Naveen.
DISCUSSION
Clifford argues the trial court’s blanket rejection of the evidence
of damages was erroneous because his own testimony was competent
evidence of damages in the forms of emotional distress and lost income.2 We
2 Clifford’s opening brief quotes multiple cases for authority not
found in those decisions. For example, Clifford cites Kim v. Sumitomo Bank
(1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 974 for the standard of review on appeal from a default
judgment and the admissibility of the plaintiff’s own testimony as to their
damages. That decision was an appeal following a grant of summary
judgment and does not anywhere state, as quoted by Clifford, “‘plaintiff’s own
testimony as to his or her own damages may be sufficient in itself to justify
an award of damages.’” Similarly, Erich v. Granoff (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d
920, 925, is cited for the proposition that a plaintiff’s “‘testimony as to pain
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agree. Since the court did not fault the defamation per se allegations in the
complaint, general damages are presumed. The court, however, denied any
damages based on the sufficiency of the evidence of such.
On default judgment, the trial court engages in a two-part
inquiry, examining the complaint and then evidence of damages. First, as to
liability, a default “confesses [the] properly pleaded facts [in a complaint],”
relieving a plaintiff of the responsibility “to provide the court with sufficient
evidence to prove them.” (Kim v. Westmoore Partners, Inc. (2011)
201 Cal.App.4th 267, 281.) No evidence is therefore required to establish
liability, and “[t]he only additional proof required for a default judgment is
that needed to establish damages.” (Carlsen v. Koivumaki (2014)
227 Cal.App.4th 879, 883–884.) “That the plaintiff lacks evidence to prove the
well-pleaded allegations of the complaint is of no consequence.” (Id. at p. 884.)
That said, damages “may only be awarded for a well-pled cause of action, and
to that end, the complaint must be examined.” (Id. at p. 900.)
Second, to recover damages, a litigant need only “establish a
prima facie case” of entitlement to damages. (Johnson v. Stanhiser (1999)
72 Cal.App.4th 357, 361 (Johnson).) Assuming a claim is stated in the
admitted allegations, “the trial court may not disregard” the same evidence of
damages “but must hear the evidence offered by the plaintiff and must render
judgment in his favor for such sum, not exceeding the amount stated in the
and suffering is competent evidence.’” However, the Erich court made no such
finding and that case involves the purchase of real property. This could be an
instance of counsel improperly using artificial intelligence (AI) to assist in
brief writing or there could be another explanation. Regardless, it is
potentially sanctionable, and we take this opportunity to remind counsel of
their obligation not to falsely represent the holdings of cited authority.
(Shayan v. Shakib (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 619, 624.)
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complaint, or for such relief, not exceeding that demanded in the complaint,
as appears from the evidence to be just.” (Id. at p. 362.) If the court proceeds
via affidavits, as opposed to testimony, the “facts stated in the affidavit or
affidavits shall be within the personal knowledge of the affiant and shall be
set forth with particularity.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 585, subd. (d).) Appellate
review of the court’s decision is “‘severely circumscribed,’” and reversal is
appropriate only in limited circumstances such as “‘where the award is so out
of proportion to the evidence that it shocks the conscience of the appellate
court’” or where the damages awarded are “‘without evidentiary
justification.’” (Johnson, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 361.)
Here, after Naveen defaulted, the trial court focused on the
second part of the default judgment inquiry regarding damages. However, the
court did not acknowledge the claims at issue (i.e., the accusation Clifford
was a child molester) constitute “false allegations of criminal conduct” which
are defamatory per se. (Weinberg v. Feisel (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1122,
1136.) Consequently, the failure to prove actual damages does not defeat the
claim. (Walker v. Kiousis (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1443.) Instead, “general
damages are presumed as a matter of law.” (Douglas v. Janis (1974)
43 Cal.App.3d 931, 940.) General damages include “damages for loss of
reputation, shame, mortification, and hurt feelings.” (Civ. Code, § 48a.) Thus,
it is long established, “one guilty of a libel per se is liable to the person libeled
for at least nominal damages.” (Di Giorgio Fruit Corp. v. AFL-CIO (1963)
215 Cal.App.2d 560, 577.) Nominal damages may also entitle a party to
recover costs. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032.)
Clifford’s declarations regarding his emotional distress therefore
could support the award of at least nominal damages. “[L]ay witnesses are
generally competent to testify as to their own knowledge of their diseases,
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injuries, or physical condition.” (Behr v. Redmond (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th
517, 528.) “The law in this state is that the testimony of a single person,
including the plaintiff, may be sufficient to support an award of emotional
distress damages.” (Knutson v. Foster (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 1075, 1096.)
Indeed, a party’s “own testimony commonly establishes his damages for pain
and suffering,” and “attorneys frequently invoke the testimony of other
parties as well.” (Capelouto v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1972) 7 Cal.3d
889, 895.)
Nothing in the record indicates the trial court made any findings
as to Clifford’s or his wife’s credibility or competency as a witness. Instead,
the record suggests the court deemed this evidence to be inadmissible
hearsay or lacking in foundation. Clifford’s wife may be competent to offer
her own observations of her husband’s distress. Regarding Clifford’s lost
income, a party “may testify as to the value of [his] own services.” (Burke v.
City & County of San Francisco (1952) 111 Cal.App.2d 314, 318.) Clifford may
be competent therefore to testify as to his own earnings.
The trial court’s generalized concerns over hearsay and
foundational issues do not justify the court’s refusal to consider Clifford’s
evidence and its decision to award no recovery at all.3 The judgment appears
3 We note the trial court’s specific concern about the lack of a
declaration from Cheng, the recipient of the text message, which would
appear to be relevant to prove publication of the defamatory statement. (See
Sanchez v. Bezos (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 750, 765 [no publication without “a
declaration from anyone who personally heard defendants make any
defamatory comments”].) However, Clifford did not need to prove publication.
(See Carlsen v. Koivumaki, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 884 [whether “the
plaintiff lacks evidence to prove the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint
is of no consequence”].) Moreover, Clifford did include excerpts of Cheng’s
deposition wherein Cheng appears to authenticate the text message.
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to be “without evidentiary justification” and does not contemplate the
presumption of general damages and availability of nominal damages.
(Johnson, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 361.) We therefore remand for
reconsideration of the amount of damages that should be awarded Clifford.
Nothing in this opinion should be construed as indicating how the
trial court should weigh the evidence or how it should calculate damages.
(See Johnson, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 362 [court may award an amount
that is “‘just’”].) However, the court must at a minimum award nominal
damages and appropriate costs.
DISPOSITION
The portion of the judgment denying the requested damages is
reversed. We remand to the trial court to rehear and reconsider whether
Clifford is entitled to his requested damages. At a minimum, the court should
award nominal damages and appropriate costs. In all other respects, the
judgment is affirmed. In the interests of justice, no costs are awarded.
MOTOIKE, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
DELANEY, J.
SCHWARM, J.*
*Judge of the Orange County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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