Filed 8/12/26 Bonta v. Superior Court CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
ROB BONTA, as Attorney General, etc. et al., C106936
Petitioners,
(Super. Ct. No.
v. 26WM000201)
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SACRAMENTO
COUNTY,
Respondent;
JENNIFER YODER et al.,
Real Parties in Interest.
As directed by statute, petitioner the Attorney General of the State of California
prepared language for the ballot title and summary as well as the ballot label for
Proposition 42, a proposed amendment prohibiting new state taxes on personal property.
Real parties in interest Jennifer Yoder, California Senior Alliance, and Peace Officers
Research Association of California1 brought a petition for writ of mandate in the superior
court challenging the ballot label, which in pertinent part states that the initiative
“[p]rohibits any new state tax [] imposed on the ownership of personal property (all
1 Other real parties in interest are the Secretary of State and State Printer, which take no
position on the merits here.
1
things people own other than real estate).” Real parties maintain that language will
mislead voters.
Respondent court agreed, finding by clear and convincing evidence that the ballot
label is misleading, and ordered the ballot label changed.
The Attorney General challenges that decision by way of mandate filed in this
court. We conclude respondent court erred.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I Title and Summary and Ballot Label
For Proposition 42, the Attorney General prepared a ballot title and summary,
along with the ballot label that is at issue here. (See Elec. Code,2 §§ 9050, 9051.) The
ballot label contains a condensed version of the ballot title and summary and is limited to
75 words or fewer. (§ 9051.) In pertinent part, the label states: “PROHIBITS NEW
STATE PERSONAL PROPERTY TAXES AND CERTAIN RETROACTIVE STATE
TAXES. INITIATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT.
“Prohibits any new state tax (1) imposed on the ownership of personal property
(all things people own other than real estate)….”
Real parties challenged that language as misleading. They explained that the
measure is “designed to protect Californians from novel taxes on the ownership of
retirement and investment accounts and business interests, among other forms of personal
property....” But the label, real parties insisted, misleads and confuses by omitting the list
of specific forms of personal property that would be protected from taxation under the
initiative. Rather, the label states that the initiative protects from taxation the ownership
of “personal property (all things people own other than real estate)” — a phrase real
parties assert “is certain to mislead large swaths of voters.”
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Elections Code
2
Real parties also argued that courts have repeatedly recognized that the concept of
personal property is “grossly misunderstood” by many, if not most, Californians.
As a remedy, real parties asked that the ballot label be modified to include a
definition found in the ballot title and summary (also prepared by the Attorney General).
That summary defines personal property to include “business interests, intellectual
property, and financial assets (including assets in retirement and investment accounts).”
II Respondent Court Grants the Writ
Respondent court issued writ relief, finding real parties had shown by clear and
convincing evidence that the term “personal property” in the ballot label is misleading.
The court explained that “personal property” is ambiguous and often understood to
encompass tangible property, citing four appellate decisions as examples.3 It found that
while the Proposition 42 ballot label may be correct as a legal matter, it is nonetheless
materially misleading. And while “personal property” is correctly defined in the ballot
title and summary, that does not fix the problem that the term as defined in the label is
misleading. The court found distinguishable Bonta v. Superior Court (2024)
104 Cal.App.5th 147 (Bonta); Becerra v. Superior Court (2017) 19 Cal.App.5th 967
(Becerra), and Yes on 25, Citizens for an On-Time Budget v. Superior Court (2010)
189 Cal.App.4th 1445 (Yes on 25), all opinions of this court vacating superior court
orders erroneously modifying ballot language changes.
As a remedy, respondent court ordered the ballot label language changed from
“imposed on the ownership of personal property (all things people own other than real
estate)” to “imposed on personal property, including business interests, intellectual
3 Estate of Dodge (1971) 6 Cal.3d 311; Parker v. Schwarcz (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 418;
Estate of Nielsen (1962) 204 Cal.App.2d 357; and Estate of Marin (1945) 69 Cal.App.2d
147, all discussed below.
3
property, and financial assets (including assets in retirement and investment
accounts)….”
DISCUSSION
Petitioner contends respondent court erred insofar as it failed to apply the correct
legal standard.4 We agree the high threshold to override the Attorney General’s prepared
language for the ballot label was not overcome.
The Attorney General is tasked with giving “a true and impartial statement of the
purpose of the measure in such language that the ballot title and summary shall neither be
an argument, nor be likely to create prejudice, for or against the proposed measure.”
(§ 9051.) “In preparing the ballot title and summary and the ballot label, the Attorney
General is afforded considerable latitude.” (Yes on 25, supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p.
1452.) “This deference stems in part from the recognition that drafting a title and
summary ‘can be a difficult task where multiple reasonable interpretations of the
referendum ... are possible.’ ” (Id. at p. 1453.)
“In contrast to the latitude and discretion granted the Attorney General, courts do
not have a wide range of discretion in ruling on a preelection challenge to the sufficiency
of a title and summary prepared by the Attorney General.” (Becerra, supra,
19 Cal.App.5th at p. 976.) Courts may intervene only “upon clear and convincing proof
that the copy in question is false, misleading, or inconsistent with the requirements of [the
applicable codes].” (§ 9092; see also Gov. Code, § 88006.)
4 In their opposition, real parties argue the petition should be stricken for
misrepresenting the respondent court’s order. Real parties take issue with various
representations in the petition, including petitioner’s erroneous statement that respondent
court “does not even mention that relief may only be granted upon a showing of ‘clear
and convincing proof’….” Such misstatements may be the product of the necessity of
filing the petition mere hours after respondent court issued the challenged ruling and do
not warrant striking the petition. And in any event no erroneous representations were
relied upon by this court.
4
Where a court finds clear and convincing evidence that language is misleading, we
review that finding to determine whether there is substantial evidence from which a
reasonable fact finder could conclude it is highly probable the challenged language could
mislead. (Bonta, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 155.) Courts must “indulge all legitimate
presumptions favoring the propriety of the Attorney General’s actions when reviewing
ballot materials he is tasked with drafting.” (Id. at p. 154.) “If reasonable minds may
differ as to its sufficiency, the title and summary prepared by the Attorney General must
be upheld …” (Becerra, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 975.) “Only in a ‘clear case’ should
a title and summary prepared by the Attorney General be held insufficient.”5 (Ibid.)
This is not such a case.
At the outset, this court has emphasized that the ballot summary and ballot label
“should be read together as a whole….” (Bonta, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 155.) In
Bonta, this wholistic reading fundamentally undermined a challenge to a ballot label
made in isolation. (Id. at p. 155.) We explained that, “[w]hile the ballot label is
undoubtedly prominent in the voter information materials, the fact the title and summary
here contain the information that real parties in interest want included in the label
substantially diminishes the force of their argument that there is a danger voters will be
misled.” (Ibid.)
And here we have a strikingly similar situation where a label is challenged in
isolation — with no claim that the ballot summary is deficient — and where the
requested remedy is copying language from the summary into the label. We have
explained the label naturally includes less information by virtue of its 75-word restraint
(and its requirement to include the Legislative Analyst’s fiscal impact summary), versus
the 100-word maximum afforded to the summary. (See Bonta, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at
5 The same strict threshold for judicial intervention in ballot summaries applies to ballot
labels. (§ 13282.)
5
p. 155; cf. § 9051, subds. (a)(1) & (b)(1).) Here, as in Bonta, we conclude the language
in the ballot label is factually accurate, and further when read in conjunction with the
summary, fully addresses real parties’ concerns.6
Respondent court, however, purported to distinguish Bonta and related cases on
the ground that the term “personal property” itself was misleading, and therefore the label
could not be saved by the fact that the summary provides a proper definition. But the
evidence offered in support of that position fell short of clear and convincing proof.
The cases cited by respondent court support only the conclusion that the term
personal property — like many terms in the English language — may have different
meanings in different contexts. The first case, Estate of Dodge, supra, 6 Cal.3d 311,
concerned the use of “personal property” in a will and found the will did not adopt the
technical meaning of the term. (Id. at p. 325.) The second, Parker v. Schwarcz, supra,
84 Cal.App.5th 418, considered whether “personal property” encompassed
“communications and documents” for purposes of a petition for the return of property
from a temporary conservatorship. (Id. at pp. 422, 426.) The third, Estate of Nielsen,
supra, 204 Cal.App.2d 357, like Dodge, considered the use of “personal property” in a
will, finding it was used in its ordinary nontechnical sense. (Id. at p. 363.) Finally,
Estate of Marin, supra, 69 Cal.App.2d 147, also considering a will, noted personal
property, “[i]n its ordinary and popular sense … it is often times used in a more restricted
sense embracing goods and chattels only.”7 (Id. at p. 150.)
6 As was the case in Bonta, real parties argue the 75-word limit left room to include the
summary’s explanation of personal property. But as we explained there, the fact that the
challenged label included fewer than 75 words is not significant to our analysis. (Bonta,
supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 155.)
7 In its opposition, real parties aver to more than a dozen published cases involving
courts determining that Californians did not realize personal property includes intangible
financial assets. (See e.g. Estate of Whetmath (1963) 216 Cal.App.2d 430; In re Estate of
Combs (1934) 136 Cal.App. 286; Estate of Barbikas (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 285; In re
6
While these cases support the view that multiple reasonable interpretations of
personal property are possible, they do not establish that “personal property” is implicitly
misleading. It bears repeating that the law requires proof that the language is misleading
— not merely ambiguous. (§ 9092; see also Yes on 25, supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 1453
[a referendum may have multiple reasonable interpretations]; Becerra, supra,
19 Cal.App.5th at p. 975 [“If reasonable minds may differ as to its sufficiency, the title
and summary prepared by the Attorney General must be upheld ….”].)
Respondent court also relied on Huntington Beach City Council v. Superior Court
(2002) 94 Cal.App.4th 1417 (Huntington Beach), for the principle that a statement might
be literally true, while at the same time materially misleading. (Id. at p. 1432.) There, a
statement that a certain business was the “only Business in Huntington Beach that does
not pay this tax” was both literally true (in that it wasn’t paying the proposed tax), and at
the same time misleading because the business was the only business that would pay the
proposed tax. (Id. at pp. 1432-1433.) The statement was also verifiably false in that the
business did in fact pay the same existing utility tax as other residents. (Id. at p. 1432.)
Thus, “[i]t deliberately confuses the proposed tax with the existing tax.” (Id. at p. 1433.)
The same cannot be said here. Whether or not the term could be further defined,
nothing in “personal property” — either alone or when followed by the definition “all
things people own other than real estate” — drives the reader to a verifiably false
conclusion.8 And, as we emphasized, the ballot title and summary otherwise provide the
additional clarity that real parties claimed was lacking.
Estate of Olsen (1935) 9 Cal.App.2d 374.) But these cases (all involving estates) too fail
to show “personal property” is misleading, versus merely ambiguous.
8 Real parties argue a similar scenario exists here, in that it is true, in a legal sense, that
personal property means all things people own other than real estate, but it is also true
that courts have found the words personal property to be inherently ambiguous. The
point of distinction, however, is that here both claimed points are true, while in
7
Finally, real parties seek to distinguish Bonta on the grounds that it involved an
omission of potentially useful ballot information, such that a voter could read the label
and summary together to gain the contextual information sought by the petitioners in that
case. Whereas here, the label and summary provide competing definitions, in that the
label “employs a per se misleading term (‘personal property’) and then compounds the
defect by setting out an impermissibly misleading, technical, and legalistic
description….” But here again real parties confront the same hurdle respondent court
could not surmount: showing clear and convincing proof that use of the words personal
property was misleading. There is ample evidence of ambiguity; there is no evidence that
the words are misleading.
In sum, the statutory requirement for issuance of a preemptory writ of mandate, as
set forth in section 9092, was not satisfied.
DISPOSITION
Having complied with the procedural requirements for issuance of a peremptory
writ in the first instance, we are authorized to issue the writ forthwith and without oral
argument. (See Brown, Winfield & Canzoneri, Inc. v. Superior Court (2010) 47 Cal.4th
1233, 1243-1244; Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171.) Let a
peremptory writ of mandate issue vacating respondent court’s August 10, 2026, order and
judgment for peremptory writ of mandate and entering a new and different order denying
real parties’ mandate petition.
This decision is final forthwith as to this court. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.490(b)(2)(A).) The temporary stay order issued by this court on August 10, 2026,
which in part directed the State Printer not to use or begin preparation of ballot materials
concerning the ballot label for Proposition 42, is vacated. Respondent court’s order and
Huntington Beach it was verifiably false that the business did not pay the same utilities
tax as everyone else. (Huntington Beach, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 1432.)
8
judgment of August 10, 2026, directing the Attorney General to make changes to the
ballot label for Proposition 42, is stayed pending finality of this decision for purposes of
review.
The parties shall bear their own costs. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.493(a)(1)(B).)
/s/
EARL, P. J.
We concur:
/s/
HULL, J.
/s/
MAURO, J.
9
