Filed 8/13/26 P. v. Lopez CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B347541
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. NA122419)
KRISTINA AMBER LOPEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, James D. Otto, Judge. Affirmed.
Wayne C. Tobin, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Nicholas Webster and Amanda V. Lopez,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________
Following a bench trial, defendant and appellant Kristina
Amber Lopez (Lopez) was found guilty of attempted voluntary
manslaughter. (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 192, subd. (a).)1 The trial
court found true allegations that Lopez personally used a firearm
(§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7,
subd. (a)). After striking the enhancements, the court sentenced
Lopez to serve three years in state prison.
On appeal, Lopez contends that the waiver of her right to a
jury trial was invalid. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
I. Facts
Because the facts underlying Lopez’s conviction are not
relevant to the resolution of this appeal, we summarize them only
briefly. Lopez and S.I.2 were romantically involved with the
same man. On August 26, 2023, Lopez arrived at her boyfriend’s
apartment and encountered S.I. The firearm Lopez was holding
discharged, and S.I. sustained a bullet wound to her shoulder.
S.I. survived.
II. Procedural Background
Lopez was charged with attempted murder. (§§ 664, 187,
subd. (a).)
On March 21, 2025, Lopez’s counsel notified the trial court
that he had “discuss[ed] a potential jury waiver” with the
prosecutor and wanted to revisit the issue the following week.
1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise stated.
2 Per California Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(4), we refer to
the victim in this criminal proceeding by her initials.
2
The court asked Lopez’s counsel if he had “discussed with [his]
client all of the rights she has[] to have a jury?” Counsel
responded, “Yes.”
After some discussion about scheduling, the trial court
stated: “It seems to me that, since the defendant is willing to
waive jury, I’ll go ahead and take the jury waiver now from her.
So if the People are willing to consent to waiving jury on
Tuesday, we can move forward from there and not have to go
back or have the defendant decide she doesn’t want it.”
The trial court advised Lopez: “[Y]ou have the right to a
jury trial in this case. At that jury trial you would have a right to
have 12 peers from the community decide your guilt or innocence
in this case beyond a reasonable doubt. You would have the right
to participate with your counsel and through your counsel in the
selection of these 12 jurors.”
Lopez’s counsel told the trial court that he wanted to defer
the waiver.
The following week, on March 25, 2025, Lopez’s counsel
told the trial court that he had spoken with “Lopez by phone the
last couple days, in person at the . . . [j]ail, this morning, and
other times” and that she was “willing to waive jury[.]”
The following colloquy ensued:
“THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Lopez, you have the . . .
absolute right to a jury trial. You would have the right to
participate with and through your counsel in the selection of
those 12 jurors. Those 12 jurors would then decide the case,
whether the people have met their burden of proving the charges
and allegations beyond a reasonable doubt. You would have a
right to call witnesses as you would in a court trial. [¶] Both the
People and the defendant have a right to a jury trial. Do you
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waive and give up that right and agree that this matter can be
tried in this court?
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
“THE COURT: Yes?
“THE DEFENDANT: Do I want to do it, just the judge
court?
“THE COURT: Yes.
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
“THE COURT: Okay. Counsel joins?
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Defense counsel joins.
“THE COURT: . . . [T]he People waive their right to a jury
trial?
“[THE PROSECUTOR]: Yes. People do waive.”
The trial court then found that both Lopez and the People
had “knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived their right
to a jury trial.”
Following a bench trial, the trial court found Lopez not
guilty of attempted murder, but guilty of the lesser included
offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter.
DISCUSSION
I. Relevant Law
Defendants in criminal proceedings have the constitutional
right to a jury trial. (U.S. Const., amend. VI; Cal. Const., art. I,
§ 16.) “However, a ‘jury may be waived in a criminal cause by the
consent of both parties expressed in open court by the defendant
and the defendant’s counsel.’ (Cal. Const., art. I, § 16.) Waiver
must be ‘express[ed] in words . . . and will not be implied from a
defendant’s conduct.’ [Citation.] Moreover, ‘a defendant’s waiver
of the right to jury trial may not be accepted by the court unless
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it is knowing and intelligent, that is, “ ‘ “made with a full
awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and
the consequences of the decision to abandon it,” ’ ” as well as
voluntary “ ‘ “in the sense that it was the product of a free and
deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or
deception.” ’ ” ’ [Citations.] ‘[W]hether or not there is an
intelligent, competent, self-protecting waiver of jury trial by an
accused must depend upon the unique circumstances of each
case.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th 151, 166
(Sivongxxay).)
“[T]o help ensure that a defendant’s jury trial waiver is
knowing and intelligent,” the California Supreme Court
“recommend[s] that trial courts advise a defendant of the basic
mechanics of a jury trial in a waiver colloquy, including but not
necessarily limited to the facts that (1) a jury is made up of 12
members of the community; (2) a defendant through his or her
counsel may participate in jury selection; (3) all 12 jurors must
unanimously agree in order to render a verdict; and (4) if a
defendant waives the right to a jury trial, a judge alone will
decide his or her guilt or innocence.” (Sivongxxay, supra,
3 Cal.5th at p. 169.)
It is “also recommend[ed] that the trial judge take
additional steps as appropriate to ensure, on the record, that the
defendant comprehends what the jury trial right entails. A trial
judge may do so in any number of ways—among them, by asking
whether the defendant had an adequate opportunity to discuss
the decision with his or her attorney, by asking whether counsel
explained to the defendant the fundamental differences between
a jury trial and a bench trial, or by asking the defendant directly
if he or she understands or has any questions about the right
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being waived. Ultimately, a court must consider the defendant’s
individual circumstances and exercise judgment in deciding how
best to ensure that a particular defendant who purports to waive
a jury trial does so knowingly and intelligently.” (Sivongxxay,
supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 169–170.)
The California Supreme Court’s recommended colloquy is
advisory, and “not intended to limit trial courts to a narrow or
rigid colloquy.” (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 170.) “[A]
trial court’s adaptation of or departure from the recommended
colloquy in an individual case will not necessarily render an
ensuing jury waiver invalid. [Citations.]” (Ibid.)
II. Standard of Review
We review de novo whether a defendant has adequately
waived the right to a jury trial. (See People v. Vargas (1993)
13 Cal.App.4th 1653, 1660; see also People v. Palmer (2020)
49 Cal.App.5th 268, 280 [reviewing de novo “the legal question of
whether [a] defendant’s constitutional rights were violated”].)
III. Lopez Knowingly and Intelligently Waived Her Right
to a Jury Trial
Examining “the totality of the circumstances” (Sivongxxay,
supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 167), we conclude that Lopez made a
knowing and intelligent waiver of her right to a jury trial in favor
of a bench trial.
Lopez was assisted by counsel, and it was her counsel who
initiated the waiver request. Lopez’s counsel represented to the
trial court that he had “discussed with [his] client all of the rights
she has[] to have a jury[.]” The court itself advised Lopez on
March 21, 2025, that (1) she had “the right to a jury trial in this
case”; (2) “[a]t that jury trial [she] would have a right to have 12
peers from the community decide [her] guilt or innocence . . .
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beyond a reasonable doubt”; and (3) she “would have the right to
participate with [her] counsel and through [her] counsel in the
selection of th[o]se 12 jurors.”
A few days later, on March 25, 2025, Lopez’s counsel
informed the trial court that he had spoken to Lopez several
times within “the last couple [of] days” and that his client was
“willing to waive” her right to a jury. The court again advised
Lopez of her “absolute right to a jury trial[,]” including the right
to participate with counsel in the selection of the 12 jurors who
would decide whether the People had met their burden of proving
the charges beyond a reasonable doubt and the right to call
witnesses. Even after Lopez agreed to waive her right to a jury,
the court asked Lopez to confirm her waiver. Lopez reconfirmed
that she wanted “just the judge court[.]”
Lopez argues that her waiver was invalid because the trial
court “fail[ed] to specifically advise [her] that a jury is selected
from members of the community, and that a jury’s guilty verdict
must be unanimous . . . .” We are unpersuaded. The court told
Lopez on March 21, 2025—only four days before Lopez waived—
that she had the right to a jury comprised of “12 peers from the
community.” That the advisement did not track all of
Sivongxxay’s advisory recommendations does not render Lopez’s
waiver unconstitutionally deficient as a matter of law. Even in
Sivongxxay, the California Supreme Court found a jury waiver to
be knowing and intelligent despite the preceding colloquy
omitting the advisement that a jury verdict must be unanimous.
(Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 166–167.)
Lopez also makes what she concedes is “a novel argument”
that her waiver was invalid because the trial court failed to
advise her “that a jury in California is now selected by a process
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through which the court takes an active role in preventing racial
and other forms of improper discrimination under Code of Civil
Procedure section 231.7.” This argument overlooks well-settled
precedent “eschew[ing] any rigid formula or particular form of
words that a trial court must use in taking a jury waiver[.]”
(Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 169; see also People v. Morelos
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 722, 753–754.)
“Viewed holistically, the circumstances surrounding
[Lopez]’s jury waiver demonstrate that it was knowing and
intelligent.” (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 168.) Lopez has
presented us with no reason to find the waiver invalid.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
GOORVITCH, J.
We concur:
LUI, P. J.
CHAVEZ, J.
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