Filed 8/13/26 In re Z.W. CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re Z.W., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
ORANGE COUNTY SOCIAL
SERVICES AGENCY,
G066321
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. Nos. 23DP1247,
v. 23DP1247A)
T.W., OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Daphne Grace Sykes, Judge. Conditionally reversed and remanded with
directions.
Leila H. Moncharsh, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Leon J. Page, County Counsel, Debbie Torrez and Aurelio Torre,
Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
No appearance for the Minor.
* * *
T.W. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating
parental rights to her child, Z.W., under Welfare and Institutions Code
section 366.26.1 Mother does not challenge the merits of that ruling. Instead,
she argues the order should be conditionally reversed because the Orange
County Social Services Agency (SSA) and juvenile court did not comply with
the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.; ICWA) and
the California Indian Child Welfare Act (§ 224 et seq.; Cal-ICWA).2 Although
many of Mother’s arguments on appeal are unavailing, we conclude SSA’s
inquiry was insufficient because it failed to adequately inquire into the
biological family of Mother, who was adopted. Thus, we conditionally reverse
and remand the matter for compliance with ICWA and Cal-ICWA in
accordance with this opinion.
1
All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2
This opinion uses the term “Indian,” except when quoting
material that uses an alternative term, because both ICWA and Cal-ICWA
use the term “Indian.” (See In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1125, fn. 1
(Dezi C.) [“we use the term ‘Indian’ throughout to reflect the statutory
language but keep the terminology used by the various courts when quoting
from their opinions”].)
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Because Mother’s arguments on appeal are limited to compliance
with ICWA and Cal-ICWA, we primarily discuss background facts related to
those issues and only briefly address the general procedural history of the
child welfare proceedings. In November 2023, SSA filed a petition asserting
Z.W. came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under section 300. In
its November 17, 2023 detention report, SSA noted Mother denied Indian
ancestry.3 SSA also stated the maternal grandmother had denied any Indian
ancestry, and the maternal grandmother also had said Mother was adopted
and she did not believe Mother had Indian ancestry.4
On November 17, 2023, Mother signed a parental notification of
Indian status form and selected the statement that she had no Indian
ancestry as far as she knew. At a November 17, 2023 hearing, Mother’s
counsel identified A.G. as the child’s father (Father). The court found there
was no reason to believe the child was an Indian child and noted the
continuing duty of inquiry.
In its January 5, 2024 jurisdiction and disposition report, SSA
recounted Mother said she was adopted, did not have Indian ancestry, and
had not seen her biological mother in more than 30 years. Mother also
indicated she has two half-brothers on her biological father’s side, but has
3
The report noted that, in 2016 and 2017, the court in prior child
welfare proceedings had found ICWA did not apply to Mother’s two other
children.
4
For clarity and ease of reference, this opinion refers to Mother’s
biological family by adding the word biological to the familial description—
e.g., maternal grandmother refers to Mother’s adoptive mother, and biological
maternal grandmother refers to Mother’s biological mother.
3
limited contact with them. SSA had not been able to locate Father. In a
declaration of due diligence, a social worker discussed attempts to contact
Father. Among other things, the social worker stated she had called various
phone numbers that might belong to Father. During one of those calls, the
social worker reached the paternal grandmother, who stated she does not
know how to locate Father and had not spoken to him in a while.5
At a January 5, 2024 hearing, Mother submitted to the petition
as amended by interlineation. The juvenile court found the child came within
its jurisdiction under section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (j), and declared the
child a dependent of the court. Father did not appear at the hearing. The
court found ICWA does not apply.
In its June 27, 2024 status review report, SSA stated that, in an
April 2024 interview, Mother denied knowledge of her family having Indian
heritage and “denied having information about [Father’s] heritage or contact
information for individuals who could provide additional information.” In an
April 2024 interview, the maternal grandmother also “denied knowledge of
her family having Native American heritage or having contact information
for individuals with additional information.” Additionally, on May 22, 2024, a
social worker attempted to contact the paternal grandmother at the same
telephone number at which the agency previously had reached her and “left a
voicemail inquiring about [Father’s] heritage and [Father’s] whereabouts.”
In July 2024, SSA filed a subsequent petition under section 342,
alleging the child came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under
5
During a call to a different phone number, the social worker
spoke with the mother of one or two of Father’s other children, who provided
a phone number for Father, but that phone number was the number at which
SSA later reached the paternal grandmother.
4
section 300, subdivision (b)(1). In its July 9, 2024 detention report, SSA noted
it had been able to speak with Father and he denied knowledge of his family
having Indian ancestry. Father did not appear at a July 9, 2024 hearing.6 The
juvenile court again found ICWA does not apply.
In its July 30, 2024 jurisdiction and disposition report, SSA
provided additional information related to ICWA. The report recounted the
following: In a July 9, 2024 interview, the maternal grandmother noted she
was not enrolled in a tribe but “reported some Indian ancestry on her
mother’s (the child’s maternal great-grandmother) side but could not identify
the tribe.” The maternal grandmother also “clarified that she had reported
that her niece . . . was registered Cherokee through her father, who married
into the family.” The maternal grandmother stated, “she would attempt to
reach out to [Mother’s] biological family to inquire if there was Native
American ancestry in their family.” Also in a July 9, 2024 interview, Mother
again denied any Indian ancestry and said “she had never heard the
maternal grandmother talk about Native American ancestry.” Mother said
“she would attempt to contact her biological paternal grandmother in an
attempt to obtain further information,” and said she “did not have additional
information and deferred to the maternal grandmother to provide family
information.” On July 10, 2024, the maternal grandmother emailed the social
worker with information related to certain of her relatives who she listed as
belonging to Cherokee and Choctaw tribes (e.g., a maternal great-great-
grandmother). Additionally, the maternal grandmother sent an email stating:
“‘Bio maternal grandmother says there is no Indian heritage that she knows
6
A maternal aunt attended the hearing and denied having any
Indian ancestry.
5
of. We don’t have info on the biological mother’s side but [Mother] was born
into the system (born to a teenager in a group home), and adopted by me out
of the system after being in placement with her grandmother for a few years.
It was never mentioned to me during our adoption process.’”7
SSA’s July 30, 2024 jurisdiction and disposition report also noted
SSA had interviewed a maternal grandaunt and maternal great-
grandmother. The maternal grandaunt indicated “she heard the family had
Cherokee ancestry through her grandmother . . . and Choctaw through her
grandfather,” but she “did not have additional information and could not
identify other relatives who could provide further information.” The maternal
great-grandmother told SSA “her older sister had told her they had Indian
ancestry, but she could not recall the tribe the family was affiliated with” and
she was not enrolled in a tribe. The maternal great-grandmother also could
not provide additional information or identify other relatives who could
provide further information.
In light of the information it had received from maternal
relatives, SSA stated in its July 30, 2024 jurisdiction and disposition report
that “there is reason to believe the child may be an Indian child, and further
inquiry is being conducted with the Cherokee and Choctaw tribes.” SSA also
discussed its further inquiry efforts. SSA noted it “[u]tilized the [Bureau of
Indian Affairs] and its resources for assistance in identifying the names and
7
It is not clear from SSA’s report whether maternal
grandmother’s email used the term “‘Bio maternal grandmother,’” to refer to
the biological maternal grandmother of Z.W. or to Mother’s biological
maternal grandmother (i.e., Z.W.’s biological maternal great-grandmother).
In either case, it is clear the maternal grandmother represented to SSA that
she had communicated with a biological relative of Mother and Z.W, and that
biological relative had denied knowing of any Indian heritage.
6
contact information of the tribe(s) in which the child may be a member or
eligible for membership.” SSA listed six tribes it had identified and
summarized its attempted contacts and results as of that time. For each of
the tribes, SSA stated, “[o]n July 24, 2024, the ICWA inquiry was sent to the
tribe via email and certified mail, including information on the Family’s
Native American ancestry and a family tree.” As of July 25, 2024, one tribe
had responded the child was not eligible for membership in the tribe, and the
other tribes had not yet responded. In its September 19, 2024 addendum
report, SSA noted each of the six tribes had responded that the child was not
eligible for membership.
On November 12, 2024, Father signed a parental notification of
Indian status form that selected “[n]one of the above apply,” indicating there
was no ground to believe the child may be an Indian child. At a November 18,
2024 hearing, Father pleaded no contest and Mother submitted to the July
2024 subsequent petition as amended by interlineation. The juvenile court
sustained the subsequent petition as amended by interlineation and removed
Z.W. from the parents. Father appeared at the hearing, but the court did not
ask him if he had Indian ancestry.
In its January 27, 2025 interim review report, SSA noted that, on
December 19, 2024, Mother, the maternal grandmother, and Father each
denied Indian ancestry. SSA also noted that, on December 19, 2024, a social
worker again attempted to contact the paternal grandmother at the same
telephone number where SSA had previously reached her, and the social
worker “left a voicemail inquiring about the family’s heritage.”
In its May 8, 2025 status review report, SSA stated that, on April
1, 2025, Mother, the maternal grandmother, and Father each again denied
Indian ancestry. SSA further noted Father had not provided contact
7
information for additional family members and had “expressed not wanting
family involved” with child protective services; in addition, although the
social worker had explained to Father the purpose of the ICWA inquiry, he
“refuses to provide any further information.” Additionally, on April 14, 2025,
a social worker again attempted to contact the paternal grandmother by
phone and “left a voicemail inquiring about the family’s heritage.”
The juvenile court held a six-month review hearing on June 26,
2025. Mother and Father appeared at the hearing. At that hearing, Mother,
Father, and a maternal aunt denied having Indian ancestry. The court
terminated reunification services and set a hearing regarding termination of
parental rights under section 366.26.
In its October 23, 2025 section 366.26 report, SSA stated ICWA
does not apply. SSA noted that, on September 29, 2025, Mother and Father
again denied Indian ancestry. SSA also reiterated Father refused to provide
contact information for his family.
On October 23, 2025, the juvenile court held its section 366.26
hearing and terminated parental rights. Mother and Father did not attend
the hearing. The court found ICWA does not apply. Mother appealed.
DISCUSSION
I.
ICWA AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Congress enacted ICWA in 1978 in response to ‘rising concern in
the mid-1970’s over the consequences to Indian children, Indian families, and
Indian tribes of abusive child welfare practices that resulted in the
separation of large numbers of Indian children from their families and tribes
through adoption or foster care placement, usually in non-Indian homes.’”
8
(Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1128.)8 “ICWA establishes minimum
standards for state courts to follow before removing Indian children from
their families and placing them in foster care or adoptive homes and does not
prohibit states from establishing higher standards. [Citations.] Indeed, ICWA
expressly yields to state laws that provide ‘a higher standard of protection to
the rights of the parent or Indian custodian of an Indian child . . . .’” (Dezi C.,
at p. 1129.)
“Section 224.2 codifies and expands on ICWA’s duty of inquiry to
determine whether a child is an Indian child. Agencies and juvenile courts
have ‘an affirmative and continuing duty’ in every dependency proceeding to
determine whether ICWA applies by inquiring whether a child is or may be
an Indian child.” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1131–1132, fn. omitted.)
“The duty to inquire begins for a county when first contacted regarding a
child, including, but not limited to, asking a party reporting child abuse or
neglect whether the party has any information that the child may be an
Indian child, and upon a county department’s first contact with the child or
the child’s family, including extended family members as defined in
paragraph (1) of subdivision (c) of [s]ection 224.1. At the first contact with the
child and each family member, including extended family members, the
county welfare department or county probation department has a duty to
8
“An ‘Indian child’ is defined as ‘any unmarried person who is
under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is
eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a
member of an Indian tribe.’ (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4).)” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th
at p. 1129; see also § 224.1, subd. (b).)
9
inquire whether that child is or may be an Indian child.”9 (§ 224.2, subd.
(b)(1).) “In California, the child protection agency is obligated to ask ‘the
child, parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members,
others who have an interest in the child, and the party reporting child abuse
or neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child.’” (In re K.L.
(2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 989, 994 (K.L.); see § 224.2, subd. (b)(2).) The agency,
however, “has an obligation to contact only those extended family members
who are ‘reasonably available.’” (K.L., at p. 995.)
“When the agency has ‘reason to believe’ that an Indian child is
involved, further inquiry regarding the possible Indian status of the child is
required.” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1132; see § 224.2, subd. (e).)10 “The
required further inquiry includes (1) interviewing the parents and extended
family members; (2) contacting the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and State
Department of Social Services; and (3) contacting tribes the child may be
affiliated with and anyone else that might have information regarding the
9
“‘Extended family member’ has the same meaning as defined by
the law or custom of the Indian child’s tribe or, in the absence of such law or
custom, shall be a person who has reached 18 years of age and who is the
Indian child’s grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law or
sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second cousin, or stepparent.” (§ 224.1,
subd. (c)(1); see also 25 U.S.C. § 1903(2).)
10
“There is reason to believe a child involved in a proceeding is
an Indian child whenever the court, social worker, or probation officer has
information suggesting that either the parent of the child or the child is a
member or citizen, or may be eligible for membership or citizenship, in an
Indian tribe. Information suggesting membership or eligibility for
membership includes, but is not limited to, information that indicates, but
does not establish, the existence of one or more of the grounds for reason to
know enumerated in paragraphs (1) to (6), inclusive, of subdivision (d).”
(§ 224.2, subd. (e)(1).)
10
child’s membership or eligibility in a tribe. (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(A)–(C).) At
this stage, contact with a tribe ‘shall, at a minimum, include telephone,
facsimile, or electronic mail contact to each tribe’s designated agent for
receipt of [ICWA] notices,’ and ‘sharing information identified by the tribe as
necessary for the tribe to make a membership or eligibility determination, as
well as information on the current status of the child and the case.’ (Id., subd.
(e)(2)(C).)” (Dezi C., at pp. 1132–1133.) “The sharing of information with
tribes at this inquiry stage is distinct from formal ICWA notice, which
requires a ‘reason to know’—rather than a ‘reason to believe’—that the child
is an Indian child.” (Id. at p. 1133; see also § 224.2, subd. (d) [listing
circumstances where “[t]here is reason to know a child involved in a
proceeding is an Indian child”].)
“The juvenile court’s factual finding that ICWA does not apply is
‘subject to reversal based on sufficiency of the evidence.’ (§ 224.2, subd.
(i)(2).)” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1134.)11 “[T]he juvenile court’s fact-
specific determination that an inquiry is adequate, proper, and duly diligent
is ‘a quintessentially discretionary function’ [citation] subject to a deferential
standard of review. [Citations.] ‘“On a well-developed record, the court has
relatively broad discretion to determine whether the agency’s inquiry was
proper, adequate, and duly diligent on the specific facts of the case. However,
11
Our Supreme Court has noted “[s]ome courts apply a
straightforward substantial evidence test when reviewing the juvenile court’s
conclusion that ICWA does not apply. [Citation.] ‘By contrast, other courts
have used a hybrid standard, reviewing for substantial evidence whether
there is reason to know a minor is an Indian child, and reviewing a finding of
due diligence and proper inquiry for abuse of discretion.’” (Dezi C., supra, 16
Cal.5th at p. 1134, fn. omitted.)
11
the less developed the record, the more limited that discretion necessarily
becomes.”’” (Id. at p. 1141.)
II.
ANALYSIS
A. The Paternal Side of the Family and the Biological Maternal Side of the
Family
Mother argues SSA failed to adequately conduct the initial
inquiry under ICWA. In her opening brief, Mother focuses on SSA’s
purported failure to sufficiently inquire into the paternal family. She asserts,
“[t]he social worker failed to follow up on obvious leads to extended family
members.” Mother faults SSA for not contacting “the mothers of [F]ather’s
older children to obtain contact information for [Father’s] extended family
members to find out if he had Indian ancestry.” According to Mother, SSA
failed to ask her about family members on the paternal side. She also argues
SSA needed to ask the maternal grandmother and Mother’s independent
living skills provider for contact information about family members on the
paternal side. Mother also argues that, at a minimum, SSA should have sent
a written inquiry to the paternal grandmother, and she faults SSA for not
attempting to meet with the paternal grandmother in person.
We disagree with Mother’s assertions that SSA’s efforts to
inquire into the paternal side of the family were inadequate. Father denied
having any Indian ancestry on multiple occasions, and notwithstanding that
SSA explained to Father the purpose of the ICWA inquiry, he refused to
provide additional information regarding his family. Mother’s suggestion that
SSA never spoke with her about Father’s heritage is belied by the record;
SSA reported that Mother “denied having information about [Father’s]
heritage or contact information for individuals who could provide additional
12
information.” SSA also was able to discover a phone number for the paternal
grandmother and left voicemails for her on three different dates to inquire
about Father’s ancestry.12 Mother points to no case authority requiring SSA
to send a written inquiry to or meet in person with the paternal
grandmother, and we disagree that its attempts to contact the paternal
grandmother by phone and voicemail were insufficient here, particularly
given SSA was previously able to reach her at that phone number.
Although Mother asserts there were additional people SSA
should have contacted, such as the mothers of Father’s other children and
Mother’s independent living skills provider, to try to obtain contact
information for the paternal extended family, SSA “is not required to ‘cast
about’ for investigative leads.” (See K.L., supra, 120 Cal.App.5th at p. 996.)13
The record does not support that the mothers of Father’s other children fall
12
In her reply brief, Mother asserts SSA’s voicemail on May 22,
2024, “concerned only [F]ather’s whereabouts, not Indian ancestry.” The
record does not support that assertion. SSA’s report noted that, on May 22,
2024, the social worker “left a voicemail inquiring about the family’s heritage
and [Father’s] whereabouts.” (Italics added.)
13
Mother cites In re Claudia R. (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 76, but it
does not support her argument that SSA’s inquiry into the paternal side of
the family fell short under the circumstances here. In that case, the court
explained the agency “did not inquire of the maternal grandfather, maternal
aunt, or maternal uncle, all of whom were in contact with [the mother], and
their contact information was known to [the mother] or the [agency],” and the
agency “also should have asked [the father] and the paternal grandmother for
the paternal grandfather’s contact information, and if the [agency] obtained
this information, it should have attempted to reach him.” (Id. at p. 81.) Here,
as discussed, SSA did attempt to obtain information regarding additional
paternal family members (if any existed) from Father, but he refused to
provide that information, and Mother denied having contact information for
individuals who could provide additional information about Father’s heritage.
13
within the statutory definition of extended family members. (See § 224.1,
subd. (c)(1); 25 U.S.C. § 1903(2).)14 There is no indication in the record that
either of the mothers of Father’s older children is Z.W.’s “grandparent, aunt
or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew,
first or second cousin, or stepparent.” (§ 224.1, subd. (c)(1).)
Mother also asserts the juvenile court failed to ask Father about
Indian ancestry when he first appeared at court on November 18, 2024.
14
Mother also refers to section 309, subdivision (e)(1), which
requires a social worker to conduct an investigation within 30 days of a
child’s removal to identify and locate certain individuals and provide them
certain information regarding the proceedings. (Ibid.) Additionally,
“[w]henever a child is removed from a parent’s or guardian’s custody, the
court shall make a finding as to whether the social worker has exercised due
diligence in conducting the investigation, as required pursuant to paragraph
(1) of subdivision (e) of [s]ection 309, to identify, locate, and notify the child’s
relatives, including both maternal and paternal relatives.” (§ 358, subd.
(b)(2).) Mother asserts the mothers of Father’s other children should have
been contacted pursuant to section 309, subdivision (e)(1), and “[t]here is no
documentation that the court made the findings required by section 358,
subdivision (b)(2)–(3), confirming compliance with section 309.” Even if the
mothers of Father’s other children should have been contacted under section
309, subdivision (e)(1), and SSA failed to do so, we disagree that would
demonstrate reversible error for purposes of the ICWA inquiry. Although
some of the same people listed in section 309, subdivision (e)(1), may be
contacted for purposes of the ICWA inquiry, section 309, subdivision (e)(1) is
a different statute. Moreover, Mother is incorrect that the juvenile court did
not make the required finding under section 358, subdivision (b)(2), regarding
compliance with section 309, subdivision (e)(1). At the November 18, 2024
jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the court found SSA had “made diligent
efforts to identify, locate, and contact the child’s family members.” To the
extent Mother is attempting to challenge the finding that SSA complied with
section 309, she asserts no basis that would permit her to do so now given
that she did not appeal from the November 18, 2024 disposition order. (See In
re Meranda P. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1143, 1150 [“an unappealed disposition
or postdisposition order is final and binding and may not be attacked on an
appeal from a later appealable order”].)
14
Section 224.2, subd. (c), provides that “[i]nquiry shall also be made at the
first appearance in court of each party or interested person who was not
present at the first hearing on the petition,” “[t]he inquiry and responses
shall occur on the record,” and “[t]he court shall instruct the parties and
persons present to inform the court if they subsequently receive information
that provides reason to know the child is, or may be, an Indian child.”
Mother is correct that the record does not reflect the court asked
Father about Indian ancestry at the November 18, 2024 hearing. But she
does not dispute that Father denied having Indian ancestry during the June
26, 2025 hearing. Even if the juvenile court did not comply with section 224.2,
subdivision (c), when Father first appeared,15 Mother cites no authority for
the proposition that this would constitute reversible error where Father later
denied on the record at another hearing (and on numerous other occasions
when asked by SSA) that he has any Indian ancestry. To the extent Mother is
suggesting such circumstances would provide an independent ground for
reversible error, we disagree.
Additionally, Mother argues there was insufficient inquiry into
the biological side of her family. In her reply brief, Mother asserts SSA
“needed to obtain the contact information from adoptive maternal
grandmother K.W. for [Z.W.’s] biological grandmother and conduct the
required ICWA inquiries, including asking about any available biological
maternal grandfather and extended family members if needed. If it proves
15
A minute order notes Father appeared at a September 19, 2024
hearing and was appointed counsel, but neither Mother nor SSA address that
hearing. The minute order does not reflect that Father was asked about
Indian ancestry at the September 19, 2024 hearing, and that hearing was not
reported.
15
necessary, [SSA] needs to include the correct name of the biological maternal
grandmother and grandfather in the formal or informal communications with
the tribes.” Mother also contends in her reply brief that SSA needed to ask
her “for any contact information she may have for her biological half-siblings.
If so, make contact and ask them if there is Indian ancestry in their biological
parents’ families.”16
Although Mother denied having Indian ancestry and SSA spoke
with members of Mother’s adoptive family, the record does not reflect that
SSA ever contacted, or even attempted to contact, any biological maternal
extended family members as part of its ICWA inquiry. Notably, it appears
the maternal grandmother was in contact with one of Mother’s biological
relatives, and it also appears Mother knew the identities of two biological
half-siblings. This suggests Mother and the maternal grandmother were
aware of the names and contact information for at least some of Mother’s
biological family. The record, however, does not reflect SSA ever asked for the
16
At our invitation, Mother and SSA filed supplemental letter
briefs addressing whether Mother forfeited these arguments by making them
for the first time in her reply brief, and SSA’s letter brief also responded on
the merits. “‘Points raised for the first time in a reply brief will ordinarily not
be considered, because such consideration would deprive the respondent of an
opportunity to counter the argument.’” (Jameson v. Desta (2009) 179
Cal.App.4th 672, 674, fn. 1.) Here, the parties dispute whether Mother
forfeited these arguments. Mother’s opening brief generally asserted the
initial inquiry was insufficient, but as discussed, that argument focused on
the inquiry into the paternal side of the family. Nevertheless, we decline to
find Mother forfeited these arguments under the circumstances here. (See In
re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1051–1052 & fn. 11 [“because Indian
tribes have an interest in ascertaining whether a child in a dependency
action is an Indian child, we address the merits of the ICWA claim despite
any defects in a parent’s brief”].) SSA also was able to respond to the
arguments on the merits in its supplemental briefing.
16
names or contact information for any of the biological maternal extended
family.17 Under the circumstances here, we conclude SSA’s inquiry was
insufficient in this respect. (See In re Y.W. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 542, 552–
553 [concluding the agency “failed to satisfy its duty to inquire, under section
224.2, subdivision (b), whether [the children at issue] are or may be Indian
children because it did not make meaningful efforts to locate and interview
[the mother’s] biological parents, who were ‘extended family members,’ as
defined by ICWA and related California law”].)
SSA concedes “the record reflects no direct contacts between
SSA” and the biological maternal grandmother or Mother’s biological half-
siblings, and “such biological relatives are part of the family lineage subject
to ICWA inquiry under California law.” SSA, however, notes Mother
indicated she would attempt to contact her biological grandmother, but then
did not provide SSA any additional information. SSA also asserts “Mother’s
adoptive mother reported that she would reach out to the biological family for
relevant information, and soon thereafter reported that the (apparent)
biological great-grandmother recounted no Native American heritage.”
According to SSA, “while there was no direct contact between SSA and this
biological relative, SSA did obtain relevant information through its extended
ICWA inquiry efforts that this biological relative disclaimed any known
relevant heritage.” SSA’s arguments are unavailing because the record does
17
The maternal grandmother’s email noted, “‘[w]e don’t have info
on the biological mother’s side . . . .’” It is not clear whether this means the
maternal grandmother did not know the name of Mother’s biological mother
(i.e., Z.W.’s biological maternal grandmother) or whether she knew the name
of Mother’s biological mother but did not know the names or contact
information of other members of Mother’s biological family on the maternal
side. Additional inquiry presumably will make this clear.
17
not reflect that SSA made any efforts itself to contact biological maternal
extended family members. SSA’s arguments might be more persuasive if the
record showed Mother and the maternal grandmother had refused to provide
the names and contact information for biological family members. But the
record does not reflect SSA ever asked Mother and the maternal
grandmother for such information. On these facts, we are not willing to find
that SSA can effectively delegate its duty to make the statutorily required
inquiry to the adoptive maternal grandmother, at least where the record does
not reflect that SSA ever asked for any names or contact information of the
Mother’s biological family.
In sum, SSA should have, at a minimum, made an effort to
determine whether any extended family members on Mother’s biological side
of the family were reasonably available and attempted to contact them as
part of its ICWA inquiry. Depending on what information may be learned as
a result of those inquiries, additional inquiry or notice may be required.
Given our conclusion there was an inadequate inquiry, we conditionally
reverse with directions to SSA to comply with ICWA and Cal-ICWA. (See
Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1136, 1152.)
B. Communications with the Tribes
Although we have concluded conditional reversal is required for
the reason discussed above, we also address Mother’s additional arguments
regarding SSA’s communications with the tribes. In her opening appellate
brief, Mother argues SSA “failed to conduct an adequate further inquiry by
not filing the required ICWA documents with the juvenile court.” (Boldface
and capitalization omitted.) Mother argues SSA “failed to file in the juvenile
court the ICWA documents required under . . . section 224.3, subdivisions
(a)–(e).” According to Mother, “[u]nder 25 C.F.R. § 23.111(d) and section
18
224.3, subdivision (a)(5), [SSA] was obligated to send the tribes Form ICWA-
030, a copy of the dependency petition, and all known identifying information
about the child, parents, grandparents, great-grandparents, and other direct
lineal ancestors, as well as any family history information that could assist in
tribal identification. The packet also had to include a certified-mail return-
receipt request.” Mother also argues, “[t]here is also a separate legal
requirement under section 224.3, subdivision (c), and California Rules of
Court, rule 5.482(b), concerning what [SSA] must file with the juvenile court
to establish proper notice. [SSA] must file copies of the ICWA-030 forms sent,
copies of the dependency petition that accompanied the notice, certified-mail
receipts, return receipts showing delivery to the BIA or tribes, any returned
mail, and any responses received.”
Mother’s argument is misplaced because it relies on authority
that applies only when SSA or the juvenile court knows or has reason to
know an Indian child is involved, and SSA never reached that point here.
(See § 224.3, subd. (a) [“If the court, a social worker, or probation officer
knows or has reason to know, as described in subdivision (d) of [s]ection
224.2, that an Indian child is involved”]; California Rules of Court, rule
5.482(a)(1) [“If it is known or there is reason to know a child is an Indian
child”]; 25 C.F.R. § 23.111(a) [“When a court knows or has reason to know
that the subject of an involuntary foster-care-placement or termination-of-
parental rights proceeding is an Indian child”].) To be sure, there are certain
notice and filing requirements that apply at the “knows or has reason to
know” phase. (See § 224.3, subd. (c) [“Proof of the notice, including copies of
notices sent and all return receipts and responses received, shall be filed with
the court in advance of the hearing, except as permitted under subdivision
(d)”].) But here, SSA only had concluded that further inquiry was required
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given the information provided by the maternal relatives, which Mother does
not dispute.
Indeed, in her reply brief, Mother concedes SSA “is correct that
formal ICWA notice under section 224.3 is required only when the agency or
the court has ‘reason to know’ the child is an Indian child; this case never
reached that stage.” Mother nevertheless argues that “[o]nce [SSA] undertook
further inquiry under section 224.2, subdivision (e), and actually contacted
tribes, it was required to provide the juvenile court with ‘documentation of all
inquiries and all information received’ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
5.481(a)(5)[]), not merely a social worker’s paraphrase.” According to Mother,
the juvenile court cannot make a finding that inquiry and due diligence were
adequate “without reviewing the actual information sent to and received from
tribes.”
We disagree with Mother’s assertion that the juvenile court must
always review copies of the actual written communications with the tribes at
the further inquiry phase. Section 224.2, subdivision (e), does not mandate
that SSA file such communications with the court. “[S]ection 224.2,
subdivision (e) does not require that [SSA] report its inquiry efforts to the
juvenile court in the form of a declaration or in any particular form at all.” (In
re M.W. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 1034, 1046.) Here, the juvenile court could
reasonably determine the information provided in the SSA reports was
sufficient without requiring SSA to file copies of the actual written
communications.18
18
California Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(5) provides: “The
petitioner must on an ongoing basis include in its filings a detailed
description of all inquiries, and further inquiries it has undertaken, and all
information received pertaining to the child’s Indian status, as well as
20
In her reply brief, Mother asserts SSA “provided the tribes with
the incorrect name for the child’s maternal biological grandmother and no
contact information for her.” Mother claims, without citation, “[h]arm to the
tribes’ interests occurred because [SSA] never located or provided the name of
the maternal biological grandmother.” According to Mother, “the failure to
obtain the maternal biological grandmother’s contact information and
correctly reveal her name in the information sent to the tribes rendered the
further inquiry inadequate.” We understand Mother to be arguing that
(1) SSA never gave the tribes the name of the biological maternal
grandmother; and (2) SSA may have misidentified, in their contacts with the
tribes, adoptive family members as biological family members.19 Neither
argument requires reversal.
As to the first issue, Mother offers no explanation with authority
regarding why the name of the biological maternal grandmother also needed
to be provided in SSA’s communications with the tribes based on the current
record. If the additional inquiries we direct SSA to conduct on remand reveal
the name of the biological maternal grandmother (or other biological family
members) and information triggering the need to inquire with any tribe
about them, those inquiries can be made post-remand and the results
evidence of how and when this information was provided to the relevant
tribes. Whenever new information is received, that information must be
expeditiously provided to the tribes.” (Ibid.) Mother cites no case authority
interpreting this rule as requiring SSA to always file its communications
with tribes, and we do not interpret this rule as requiring such.
19
When describing its further inquiry, SSA’s report appears to
mislabel certain maternal adoptive family members as biological family
members (e.g., the maternal grandmother’s name is listed as “Mother’s
biological mother”).
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presented to the juvenile court, along with the results of the prior tribal
contacts. As to the second issue, Mother has not shown that, even if SSA
mislabeled adoptive family members as biological family members in its
inquiries to the tribes, any such mislabels could have materially impacted the
tribes’ responses, given that all six tribes were provided “information on the
family’s Native American ancestry and a family tree” and all confirmed Z.W.
was not eligible for membership.
DISPOSITION
The October 23, 2025 order terminating parental rights is
conditionally reversed. The matter is remanded to the juvenile court for
further proceedings to ensure compliance with ICWA and Cal-ICWA in
accordance with this opinion. “If the juvenile court thereafter finds a proper
and adequate further inquiry and due diligence has been conducted and
concludes ICWA does not apply (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2)), then the court shall
reinstate the order terminating parental rights. If the juvenile court
concludes ICWA applies, then it shall proceed in conformity with ICWA and
California implementing provisions.” (Dezi C, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1152.)
GOODING, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOORE, ACTING P. J.
DELANEY, J.
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