Filed 8/14/26 P. v. Harris CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B337523
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA116513)
v.
SHAWN MICHAEL HARRIS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Daniel J. Lowenthal, Judge. Affirmed.
Randy S. Kravis, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Seth P. McCutcheon, Deputy
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________
Shawn Michael Harris appeals from the judgment of
conviction after a jury found him guilty of multiple sexual
offenses committed against his former fiancée, Angela L., and her
daughter, Lindsey. Harris was convicted of one count of rape,
two counts of forcible sodomy, one count of lewd act upon a child
under the age of 14, and one count of continuous sexual abuse of
a child under the age of 14. The jury also found the allegations
true that Harris committed lewd acts against multiple victims
and that he had committed a prior offense of forcible oral
copulation.
On appeal, Harris contends the trial court violated his
constitutional right to equal protection by refusing to provide him
with pretrial and trial transcripts despite his indigency. He also
contends the court abused its discretion by excluding three
exhibits and precluding his mother from testifying at trial.
Finally, Harris contends the court erred by failing to instruct the
jury with one of the factors enumerated in CALCRIM No. 266.
We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Prosecution Case
1. Harris’s relationship with Angela
Angela and Harris began dating in 2014, and in 2015 they
became engaged. In 2016 Harris, Angela, and Lindsey moved
into an apartment in Long Beach, California. Angela and Harris
shared one bedroom; Lindsey had her own bedroom.
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2. Sexual abuse of Lindsey
Lindsey, who was 18 years old at the time of the trial (in
2024), testified that one morning in November 2016, when she
was 11 years old, Harris entered her room, reached under her
nightgown, and put his hand on her vagina over her underwear.
Lindsey pretended to be asleep, then after a few seconds she
acted like she was waking up, and he stopped. A few months
later, Harris entered Lindsey’s room, led her to her bed, and
grinded his erect penis against her vagina. When Lindsey
started crying, Harris stopped.
Lindsey recounted multiple other occasions from 2017 to
2019 when Harris sexually abused her in the family home. On
one occasion Harris pushed her against the wall, lifted her up,
and grinded his erect penis against her vagina. On another
occasion, Harris wrapped Lindsey in a blanket, carried her into
Angela’s room, laid her on the bed, and grinded his erect penis
against her vagina. On a third occasion, Harris pushed Lindsey
down on a couch and grinded his erect penis against her while
she was face down. The last time Harris abused Lindsey was in
late 2019 when Harris pushed up against her from behind as she
was reaching into the refrigerator, and he grinded against her.
Lindsey recalled Harris abusing her more than twice on the
living room couch, and she estimated Harris had grinded his
penis against her buttocks or vagina 15 to 20 times from the time
she was 11 years old until she was 14 years old. Lindsey did not
tell anyone because they did not have sex, and she did not know
if it would “count.”
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3. Sexual abuse of Angela L.
Angela testified that in 2019 they ended their relationship.
Angela told Harris she no longer wanted to be intimate with him,
and she began sleeping on a reclining chair in the living room
instead of in their shared bedroom.
One day in February 2021, Harris told Angela that
something was happening outside of the apartment, so Angela
went to look out of Harris’s bedroom window. When Angela
realized nothing was going on outside, she turned to leave the
room, but Harris grabbed her and threw her on the bed. Angela
tried to pull herself away from Harris and told him, “‘No. Leave
me alone. Let me go. Get off me.’” Harris said he did not want
to stop, and he proceeded to rape and sodomize Angela.
On the evening of February 28, 2021, Angela was lying in
the living room reclining chair when Harris entered the room, sat
in the chair in front of her, and began “fondling” her under the
blankets. Angela asked him to leave her alone, but Harris pulled
his penis out and “fondled” himself. Despite Angela’s protests,
Harris grabbed her wrists, lifted her from the chair, and placed
her face down on the floor. Harris pulled Angela’s underwear
down and put his penis in her vagina, which caused her pain. As
he was doing this, Angela said, “No, I don’t want to . . . . Leave
me alone.”
Harris stopped when Lindsey opened her bedroom door to
get something from the living room, and she asked Angela what
was going on. Angela did not want to tell Lindsey what was
happening, so she told Lindsey that Harris had been crying
because he was considering moving to Texas but he did not want
to go. Lindsey testified that she recalled hearing a noise from the
living room after she left the bathroom, but Angela told her that
4
she was in the living room with Harris and to go back to her
room. Lindsey did not see Harris and did not hear any screams
or cries from the living room.
After Lindsey left, Harris moved Angela to the floor, and
Angela told him, “No. Just leave me alone.” Harris then
penetrated her vagina with his penis repeatedly, penetrated her
anus, ejaculated on her back, and wiped her back off with “some
tissue.” After the assault ended, Harris left the room, and Angela
sat back in the reclining chair, bleeding and in pain.
Angela estimated that Harris forced sexual acts on her
approximately 10 times since they broke up.
4. Reporting of the sexual abuse, the SART exam, and
DNA testing
On the morning of March 1, Angela called a rape hotline
while Harris was away from the apartment returning a vehicle
he had rented. While Angela was on the phone, Lindsey
approached her, and Angela disclosed that Harris had been
raping her. Lindsey went to the bathroom and cried, and when
she came out, Angela asked her why she was crying and whether
Harris had touched her. Lindsey said, “Yes.” Angela then called
911. Angela did not recall what time she had called the rape
hotline or when she placed the 911 call. Long Beach Police
Detective Rodolfo Rodriguez, one of the officers who responded to
the 911 call, testified that, according to his report, Angela called
the rape hotline in the morning and the 911 call occurred at
6:45 p.m.
Long Beach Police Detective Mary Marschke came to the
apartment with other officers at approximately 6:28 p.m. Angela
and Lindsey gave statements to the officers, and then Detective
5
Marschke and her partner transported Angela and Lindsey to the
hospital. Detective Marschke described Angela as being “scared”
and “hesitant” in reporting; Lindsey was “very upset” and “really
struggling.” Detective Marschke was wearing a body camera
(bodycam) that recorded the interviews. The camera was set to
Coordinated Universal Time (UTC), which was eight hours ahead
of Pacific Standard Time.
At the hospital, Angela and Lindsey gave statements to
Detective Rodriguez and his partner, and Angela was examined
that night by Jennifer Rivera, a sexual assault response team
(SART) nurse. Rivera found red abrasions on Angela’s right
knee, superficial abrasions on the base of her vaginal opening,
and multiple anal lacerations consistent with forcible sodomy.
Rivera also collected samples from multiple areas on Angela’s
body, including her cervix.
Long Beach Police Detective Vincent Kong testified that he
was present when Harris voluntarily provided a DNA sample to
the police on March 2, 2021. On cross-examination, he
acknowledged that Harris told him that he had a shoulder injury,
and in response Detective Kong put multiple handcuffs on him to
make him more comfortable.
Jessie Pettet, a criminalist with the Los Angeles County
Sheriff’s Department, analyzed samples collected from Angela’s
SART exam, Harris’s DNA sample, and “a set of crinkled up blue
paper napkins” included in the police case file. Pettet’s analysis
revealed the presence of Harris’s DNA in the cervical sample
from Angela’s SART exam and in semen detected on the blue
6
napkins. On cross-examination, Pettet confirmed there was no
other DNA contributor detected in the napkin sample.1
5. Crystal H.’s testimony about Harris’s prior sexual
assaults2
Crystal H., Harris’s ex-wife, testified that on March 28,
2008 she returned home from work after fighting with Harris all
week, and Harris insisted that he or Crystal move out of their
house. Crystal volunteered to leave and went to the bedroom to
change her clothes and decompress. While Crystal was reading
in bed, Harris entered the room, demanded oral sex, and began
pulling the blankets from the bed despite Crystal’s protests.
Crystal begged Harris to let her go to the bathroom first, which
he allowed, and on her way back to the bedroom, Crystal
activated an audio cassette recorder hidden in her underwear
drawer. Harris then jumped over the end of the bed, grabbed
Crystal by the arm, and pulled her back to the bed. Harris forced
his penis into Crystal’s mouth and put his hands around her neck
to choke her. Harris then vaginally raped her. Portions of the
audio recording of the assault were played for the jury, in which
Crystal said, “I’m choking. I’m choking.” Four days later they
got into another argument, and Harris again choked her, but this
time Crystal started to black out. Harris hit her in the head
twice and, as she pleaded for him to stop, anally raped her. That
1 Although there was no testimony about the blue napkins,
in his closing argument Harris described the blue napkins as the
“tissue” that Angela claimed he had used to clean Harris’s
ejaculation from her back during the February 28 assault.
2 The testimony was admitted pursuant to Evidence Code
section 1108.
7
night Crystal snuck out of the house and called the police, who
came to the house and arrested Harris.
B. The Defense Case
Harris represented himself at trial. He testified that he
never abused Angela or Lindsey. Harris met Angela after his
May 2014 release from prison, and they were engaged by
January 2015. In September 2019 Harris, Angela, and Lindsey
moved in together. Harris informed his parole officer that they
had gotten married, and his parole officers conducted monthly
checks of the apartment and asked Angela and Lindsey how they
were doing. Shortly after they moved in together, Harris
obtained permission from his parole officer’s supervisor to attend
a father-daughter banquet at Lindsey’s school, and the event
went well. Harris testified, “Angela and Lindsey were very
happy with me. And I regularly took pictures of my family life,
because it was something I was proud of.” Harris sought to
introduce 15 photographs of the family, but the trial court
sustained the prosecutor’s objection to admission of the
photographs.
In November 2020 Harris, Angela, and Lindsey decided to
move to Odessa, Texas, where Harris could get a higher paying
job and they could live more cheaply. On February 7, 2021
Harris reserved a cargo van for him to pick up on February 26,
and on February 15 he provided notice to their landlord of their
intent to vacate the apartment. On February 20, however, Harris
injured his hip, shoulder, and back while he was attempting to
move a 300-pound treadmill out of their apartment in
preparation for the move. Harris went to the chiropractor on
February 21 and three more times over the next nine days.
8
Harris marked an email from a chiropractic club as an exhibit,
although the trial court later sustained a hearsay objection to the
exhibit.
On February 26 Harris went to the rental location with
Angela to pick up the cargo van. Angela left to run errands, and
Harris returned to the apartment and loaded the van. At around
9:00 or 10:00 a.m. Harris left by himself in the van to drive to
Texas. He arrived in Texas on February 27, and he loaded
everything from the van into storage. He talked to Angela that
evening from his hotel room. Early the next morning Harris
drove back to Los Angeles and returned to their apartment at
10:00 or 11:00 p.m. Angela was asleep on the reclining chair. He
kissed her and went to sleep in his bedroom. He woke up at
4:00 a.m. and masturbated “out of habit,” cleaned himself with
the blue napkins they kept in the house, threw the napkins in the
trash, and went back to sleep.
Harris woke up around 7:00 a.m. (on March 1) to return the
cargo van. Angela was still asleep in the reclining chair, and he
kissed her on his way out. After he returned the van, he used the
Uber application to get a ride to the apartment. Harris marked
as an exhibit a document he described as his “Uber receipt on
March 1st, at 8:40 a.m.” According to Harris, he arrived back at
the apartment at 8:14 a.m.3 He kissed Angela again, then made
breakfast for the two of them while Lindsey slept. After
breakfast, Harris iced his back in his bedroom and at around
10:30 a.m. walked Angela to her car so she could run errands.
When Harris returned to the apartment, Lindsey was awake
3 Harris did not explain how the 8:39 a.m. receipt (that he
described as the 8:40 receipt) showed he was in the apartment at
8:14.
9
attending school remotely. At 11:30 a.m. Harris left to run
errands; he ate lunch out and returned around 2:00 p.m.
After Harris returned, he emailed his boss two weeks’
notice of his resignation. Around 3:30 p.m., Harris and Angela
got into an argument after Angela told him she did not want to go
to Texas. She said that she wanted Harris to give her the Dodge
Dart that she had owned with a man named Raymond. The two
continued to argue, and Harris left the apartment around
5:45 p.m. and went to a friend’s house. The next morning Harris
went to a storage facility where the Dodge Dart was kept and
drove it to another friend’s house. Harris was arrested later that
day when he drove to the Long Beach Police Department to
report his change in residence.
Harris explained that he spent six years in prison as a
result of Crystal’s accusations but he “maintained [his] innocence
about all the accusations she made against [him].”
C. Harris’s Closing Argument
Harris argued in his closing that if Angela’s account of the
February 28 assault were true, the blue napkins would have also
had her DNA on them, but they did not. He also argued that he
could not have committed multiple sex acts on Angela on the
night of February 28 because he was exhausted from his trip to
Texas and had injured himself a week earlier while attempting to
move the treadmill, which was corroborated by his visits to the
chiropractor and Detective Kong’s testimony regarding his
shoulder injury. Further, Angela and Lindsey provided
conflicting testimony regarding their interaction during the
assault that night.
10
Harris further argued the evidence showed that Angela did
not call the rape hotline on the morning of March 1 because
Harris took an Uber ride from the van rental location to the
apartment that morning, which placed him at home at the time of
the alleged call. Further, the prosecution presented no evidence
that Angela made a call to the rape hotline. In addition, Angela
testified that she called the rape hotline in the morning right
before she called the police, “but that call [to the police] happened
at night.” Harris made other arguments regarding the
inconsistency of the evidence (and lack of evidence) with respect
to his alleged sexual assaults of Angela and Lindsey. Harris also
argued Angela and Lindsey fabricated the alleged abuse after
Angela had a “complete meltdown” in front of Lindsey on the
evening of February 28 following Angela’s decision not to go to
Texas and Harris’s refusal to give her the Dodge Dart she
claimed she owned.
D. The Verdict and Sentencing
The jury found Harris guilty with respect to Angela of one
count of forcible rape (Pen. Code,4 § 261, subd. (a)(2); count 1) and
two counts of forcible sodomy (§ 286, subd. (c)(2)(A); counts 2 &
5). The jury found Harris guilty with respect to Lindsey of a lewd
act upon a child under the age of 14 (§ 288, subd. (a); count 3) and
continuous sexual abuse of a child under the age of 14 (§ 288.5,
subd. (a); count 4). The jury also found true as to all counts that
Harris committed lewd acts against multiple victims within the
meaning of the one strike law (§ 667.61, subd. (e)(4)), and that he
4 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
11
committed the prior offense of forcible oral copulation (of Crystal)
(former § 288a, subd. (c)(2)).5
The trial court sentenced Harris to an aggregate sentence
of 100 years to life in state prison comprising four consecutive
sentences of 25 years to life on counts 1, 3, 4, and 5 imposed
pursuant to the one strike law (§ 667.61, subds. (a) & (d)(1)). The
court imposed a sentence of 25 years to life on count 2 but stayed
the sentence under section 654. Harris timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. The Trial Court Did Not Violate Harris’s Right to Equal
Protection by Denying His Requests for Transcripts
1. Factual background
At a pretrial hearing on February 6, 2024, Harris requested
the transcripts and minute orders from the pretrial hearings held
on January 18 and 23. The trial court denied Harris’s request for
the transcripts, explaining that daily transcripts were available
only for capital cases, but it granted Harris’s request for minute
5 The abstract of judgment incorrectly lists Harris’s
convictions on counts 4 and 5 as violations of section 288,
subdivision (a), and section 288.5, subdivision (a), respectively.
Harris was convicted on count 4 of continuous sexual abuse of a
child under the age of 14 (§ 288.5, subd. (a)) and on count 5 of
sodomy by use of force (§ 286, subd. (c)(2)(A)). The superior court
is directed to prepare an amended abstract of judgment that
correctly identifies the convictions on counts 4 and 5 consistent
with the verdict. (See People v. Bradley (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th
64, 90 [“the abstracts of judgment should be corrected to conform
to the verdicts”].)
12
orders from those days. At a hearing on February 22, Harris
renewed his request for the January 18 transcript, arguing he
needed the transcript because the prosecutor had stated in court
on January 18 that the “metadata” on certain videos from the
police bodycams disclosed in discovery was “wrong.” The
prosecutor responded that the data was not incorrect; rather, the
timestamps on the videos were stated in UTC time, which needed
to be converted into local Pacific Standard Time. Harris then
requested a transcript from the February 22 hearing because he
was “not able to write fast enough.”
On February 28 Harris renewed his request for the
January 18 transcript. The trial court responded that there was
a “dire” shortage of court reporters in the superior court, so “the
court reporters are spread too thin to provide transcripts from
routine pretrial conferences.” The court instead provided a
“one paragraph rough draft of January 18 referencing the
discussion on metadata,” which the court stated confirmed the
prosecutor never said the metadata was incorrect. At the end of
the hearing Harris requested transcripts for the pretrial hearings
held on January 18 and 23 and February 6, 15, 22, and 28 in
order “to submit an appeal.” The court denied the request,
explaining, “There’s nothing to appeal. There’s no final judgment
in this case.” The court stated further, “The court does not find
that a showing has been made of need for those routine pretrial
conference transcripts for you to present a defense on your behalf
in this matter.” However, the court agreed to provide Harris the
transcript for January 18 given that there was some confusion
about what was said at the hearing.
At the sentencing hearing on April 10, 2024, Harris filed a
motion to vacate and to set aside the judgment (motion to vacate)
13
and a motion for transcripts. Harris sought transcripts for
13 pretrial hearings and the five days of trial. Harris submitted
a declaration in which he stated he was indigent and had
“repeatedly requested transcripts and been denied.” Harris
explained at the hearing that he needed the transcripts “to [have]
a meaningful hearing regarding the motion to set aside
judgment.” Specifically, he needed the transcripts “to give
meaning to some of the things that were in” his motion to vacate
and “to cite page and line[s] of things that were said [at trial]
that were problems for the trial.”
The trial court stated it had reviewed Harris’s motion to
vacate and found that “each and every ground contained in this
motion to set aside are identical [to] the issues that were
previously adjudicated over and over and over by this court,”
including issues raised in “a motion to continue in the days
leading up to trial” and a habeas petition Harris had filed during
trial. The court noted the only new evidence raised in the motion
was a “reference to a gentleman named Weldon McDavid,” whom
Harris had first mentioned in a series of questions during his
cross-examination of Crystal.6 The court explained that had
Harris sought to admit testimony about McDavid in an Evidence
Code section 402 motion (instead of just asking questions), the
6 During Harris’s cross-examination of Crystal, Harris asked
Crystal whether she had purchased a gun from McDavid,
whether she had played the March 28, 2008 audio recording of
the alleged assault for McDavid, whether Crystal had asked
McDavid if the recording “sounds like rape,” whether McDavid
stated on television that he wanted to kill Harris, and whether
McDavid was convicted of attempted murder. The court
sustained the prosecutor’s objections to Harris’s questions on
relevance grounds.
14
court would have excluded the testimony under Penal Code
section 352. The court denied Harris’s motion to vacate and did
not further address the motion for transcripts, impliedly denying
the motion.
2. Governing law
“[T]he State must, as a matter of equal protection, provide
indigent prisoners with the basic tools of an adequate defense or
appeal, when those tools are available for a price to other
prisoners. While the outer limits of that principle are not clear,
there can be no doubt that the State must provide an indigent
defendant with a transcript of prior proceedings when that
transcript is needed for an effective defense or appeal.” (Britt v.
North Carolina (1971) 404 U.S. 226, 227 (Britt); accord, People v.
Reese (2017) 2 Cal.5th 660, 663 (Reese) [“Both this court and the
United States Supreme Court have long held that one such tool
[for an adequate defense] is access to a transcript of prior
proceedings.”]; People v. Hosner (1975) 15 Cal.3d 60, 64 (Hosner).)
Britt, Reese, and Hosner held that an indigent defendant
facing a retrial has a right to a free transcript of the first trial.
(Britt, supra, 404 U.S. at p. 227; Reese, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 665;
Hosner, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 66.) As the Supreme Court in
Reese explained, “the federal Constitution’s equal protection
clause presumptively entitles an indigent defendant facing retrial
to a complete transcript of his first trial.” (Reese, at p. 666.) The
appellate courts have not applied the presumption of entitlement
to other requests for pretrial or trial transcripts. The California
Supreme Court in Reese adopted the framework established in
Britt, which “emphasized the importance of two factors that
determine whether an indigent defendant’s interest in obtaining
15
a transcript of prior proceedings is strong enough to entitle him
or her to the transcript: (1) the value of the transcript to the
defendant; and (2) the availability of alternative means that
would fulfill the same functions as a transcript.” (Reese, at
p. 665; see Britt, at p. 227.)
In contexts other than an appeal or a retrial, an indigent
defendant’s need for transcripts must be determined on a case’s
“own peculiar facts and circumstances.” (People v. Lopez (1969)
1 Cal.App.3d 78, 83 [affirming denial of trial transcripts to
prepare motion for new trial, noting “no showing was made as to
why the deputy public defender could not have assisted [new
counsel] to prepare for the motion”]; accord, People v. Markley
(2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 230, 241, 243 [affirming denial of request
for witness testimony from 2002 trial for use in 2004 trial on
different charges where counsel “did not articulate with any
specificity how the transcript would have been helpful”]; People v.
Hayden (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 48, 55 [denying request for
transcripts from separate trials of former codefendant because
defendant failed to show why he needed transcript from
codefendant’s trial on different charge]; People v. Bizieff (1991)
226 Cal.App.3d 1689, 1704 [affirming denial of transcripts to
support motion for new trial where defendant “failed to make an
adequate showing of need” for transcript from first trial to prove
ineffective assistance of counsel at second trial].)
3. The trial court did not violate Harris’s constitutional
right to transcripts
As discussed, on February 28, 2024 Harris requested
transcripts for the pretrial hearings on January 18 and 23 and
February 6, 15, 22, and 28. Harris argued he needed the
16
January 18 transcript to show the prosecutor had stated the
metadata for the bodycam footage was incorrect. Then, on
April 10 Harris sought transcripts for 13 pretrial hearings
(including those in his first request), stating he needed them for
an appeal or to provide a “meaningful hearing” on his motion to
vacate. Harris concedes on appeal, however, that he was
provided the January 18 transcript, and as to the other pretrial
transcripts, he “did not affirmatively demonstrate a
particularized need” for the transcripts. The record is consistent
with Harris’s concessions: He did not articulate specific reasons
why he needed a transcript for any of the pretrial hearings except
for January 18.
Harris instead contends he had a presumptive entitlement
to the pretrial transcripts he requested under the reasoning in
Hosner, supra, 15 Cal.3d at page 64 because the transcripts were
necessary “in preparation for his defense at trial.” This
contention fails. As discussed, the Supreme Court in Hosner, and
more recently in Reese, supra, 2 Cal.5th at page 665, held only
that an indigent defendant facing a retrial is entitled to a
complete trial transcript. In other contexts, a defendant needs to
make a particularized showing of his or her need for the
requested transcripts. (See People v. Markley, supra,
138 Cal.App.4th at p. 241; People v. Bizieff, supra,
226 Cal.App.3d at p. 1700; People v. Lopez, supra, 1 Cal.App.3d at
p. 83.)
17
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Excluding
Defense Exhibits I, J, and K, and the Testimony of Karin
Harris
1. Governing law and standard of review
“Only relevant evidence is admissible.” (People v. Helzer
(2024) 15 Cal.5th 622, 667; see Evid. Code, § 350.) “‘Relevant
evidence’ means evidence, including evidence relevant to the
credibility of a witness or hearsay declarant, having any tendency
in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action.” (Evid. Code,
§ 210.)
“[H]earsay statements are generally inadmissible as
evidence . . . .” (People v. Jasso (2025) 17 Cal.5th 646, 668; see
Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (b).) “‘Hearsay evidence’ is evidence of
a statement that was made other than by a witness while
testifying at the hearing and that is offered to prove the truth of
the matter stated.” (Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (a).) Conversely,
“[w]hen an out-of-court statement is offered for any relevant
purpose other than to prove the truth of the matter stated, the
statement is not hearsay.” (People v. Wilson (2021) 11 Cal.5th
259, 305; accord, People v. Armstrong (2019) 6 Cal.5th 735, 785-
786.) When considering whether an out-of-court statement is
nonhearsay, “[t]he first, and most basic, requirement for applying
the not-for-the-truth limitation . . . is that the out-of-court
statement must be offered for some purpose independent of the
truth of the matters it asserts. That means that the statement
must be capable of serving its nonhearsay purpose regardless of
whether the jury believes the matters asserted to be true.”
(People v. Hopson (2017) 3 Cal.5th 424, 432]; accord, Hart v.
18
Keenan Properties, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 442, 447; Armstrong, at
p. 786.)
Even if evidence is otherwise admissible, the trial court has
discretion to exclude it under Evidence Code section 352 “if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability
that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time
or (b) create a substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing
the issues, or of misleading the jury.” (See People v. Hamilton
(2009) 45 Cal.4th 863, 930 [trial court did not abuse its discretion
under Evid. Code, § 352 by excluding evidence with limited
probative value where presentation would result in time-
consuming “‘mini-trial’” on collateral issues]; People v. Holford
(2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 155, 178, fn. 14 [evidence “may have a
lower probative value if it is merely cumulative of other evidence
[citations] and there is a substantial danger of confusing or
misleading the jury or a substantial danger of necessitating an
undue consumption of time”].)
We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude
evidence for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Helzer, supra,
15 Cal.5th at p. 667; see Pannu v. Land Rover North America,
Inc. (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1298, 1317.) “‘[T]he trial court is
vested with wide discretion in determining relevance and in
weighing the prejudicial effect of proffered evidence against its
probative value.’” (People v. Hardy (2018) 5 Cal.5th 56, 87.)
“‘[W]e will not disturb the trial court’s ruling “except on a
showing the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary,
capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest
miscarriage of justice.’”” (Briley v. City of West Covina (2021)
66 Cal.App.5th 119, 132; accord, People v. Miles (2020) 9 Cal.5th
513, 587-588.) The appellant has the burden to establish an
19
abuse of discretion. (Shaw v. County of Santa Cruz (2008)
170 Cal.App.4th 229, 281; accord, People v. Woodward (2025)
116 Cal.App.5th 379, 399.)
2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion
a. The photographs (exhibit I)
As discussed, the trial court excluded 15 undated
photographs (marked as exhibit I) that Harris described as
“taken during the relationship in the time period in question.”
The exhibit included six photographs of a Christmas tree adorned
with varying holiday decorations, three photographs of Lindsey,
and six photographs of Harris with Angela or Lindsey (or both) in
which the three generally appeared happy. Harris offered that
one of the photographs depicted a “birthday tree,” which rebutted
Angela’s testimony that birthdays were never celebrated in their
apartment. The court found the photographs were not relevant
and Harris’s offer of proof misstated Angela’s testimony and
sought to impeach a witness on a collateral matter.
Harris contends the 15 photographs were relevant to show
that Harris’s relationship with Angela and Lindsey was a “happy
one,” which was “directly contrary to the picture painted of him
as a resident sexual abuser who [Angela] was anxious to have
move away.” However, Harris did not present any evidence that
the photographs were taken around the time the alleged sexual
abuse took place other than his vague statement that the
photographs occurred during “the time period in question.” Even
if he had made this showing, evidence that Harris, Angela, and
Lindsey appeared to experience discrete happy moments together
does not tend to disprove that Harris committed sex offenses
20
against Angela and Lindsey from November 2016 to
February 2021.
b. The Joint Chiropractic email (exhibit J)
The trial court also excluded as hearsay a February 21,
2021 email from The Joint Chiropractic confirming that Harris
had joined the chiropractic club (Exhibit J). Harris mentioned in
his opening statement and closing argument that he had joined
the chiropractic club on February 21, arguing it was proof that he
had injured himself by moving the treadmill. He also argued
that given his injury, he was not capable of committing the
sexual assaults.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the
email as hearsay: The email was an out-of-court statement
offered for the truth of the statement—that Harris bought a
“membership to the Joint Chiropractic.”7 Moreover, the email did
not tend to prove, as argued by Harris, that he was injured or
visited the chiropractor on that date; rather, the email stated
only that he had joined the club.
c. The March 1, 2021 Uber receipt (exhibit K)
Harris marked as exhibit K an email from “Uber Receipts”
dated March 1, 2021 (Uber receipt) that stated, “Thanks for
riding, Shawn,” and listed an 8:22 a.m. pick up in Lomita,
California and an 8:39 a.m. drop off at the Long Beach
7 We note that the business records exception in Evidence
Code section 1271 did not apply because Harris did not offer a
“custodian or other qualified witness” who could “testif[y] to [the
email’s] identity and the mode of its preparation,” as required by
subsection (c).
21
apartment. Harris asserted in his opening statement and closing
argument that the receipt placed him at the Long Beach
apartment at 8:40 a.m. on March 1, which showed that Angela’s
account of calling the rape hotline early that morning was false
because he would have been present for the call. The prosecutor
objected to admission of the receipt as hearsay, and the trial
court sustained the objection.
Harris contends on appeal that the trial court abused its
discretion because the receipt is a computer-generated document
and thus falls within an exception to the hearsay rule. (See
People v. Nazary (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 727, 732, 754 (Nazary),
overruled on other grounds in People v. Vidana (2016) 1 Cal.5th
632, 648 [receipts printed by “Pay Island Cashiers” (PIC)
machines at gas pumps reflecting amount of cash received at
pump were admissible as computer-generated receipts printed by
PIC machines]; People v. Hawkins (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1428,
1446, 1450 (Hawkins) [computer printout of times when
defendant’s computer was accessed was not hearsay because a
computer printout is presumed to be accurate under Evid. Code,
§ 1552].)8
8 Evidence Code section 1552, subdivision (a), provides, “A
printed representation of computer information or a computer
program is presumed to be an accurate representation of the
computer information or computer program that it purports to
represent. This presumption is a presumption affecting the
burden of producing evidence. If a party to an action introduces
evidence that a printed representation of computer information
or computer program is inaccurate or unreliable, the party
introducing the printed representation into evidence has the
burden of proving, by a preponderance of evidence, that the
printed representation is an accurate representation of the
22
As the Court of Appeal explained in Nazary, “The printed
portions of the PIC receipts, including the date, time, and totals,
were not statements inputted by a person, but were generated by
the PIC machine. ‘The essence of the hearsay rule is a
requirement that testimonial assertions shall be subjected to the
test of cross-examination. [Citation.] . . . Under no possible
scenario could the PIC machines have been cross-examined.
Rather the witnesses who explained the data printed on the PIC
receipts . . . could have been, and were.” (Nazary, supra,
191 Cal.App.4th at pp. 754-755.)
The challenge for Harris is that he presented no witness
testimony or other evidence that the rideshare company uses a
computer to automatically generate a receipt of rides with a
timestamp that reflects the correct local time, and that the
company sends the receipt to an email associated with the
customer’s account containing the results of that computer
printout. Harris presented only the email from “Uber Receipts”
to an email address with the name “shawnharris” as part of the
address. By contrast, in Nazary there was extensive testimony
about how the PIC machines generated a receipt reflecting the
amount of cash deposited each day. (Nazary, supra,
191 Cal.App.4th at p. 732; see Hawkins, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1447-1448 [computer expert testified about the computer file
access times found on defendant’s computer].)
existence and content of the computer information or computer
program that it purports to represent.”
23
Even if the Uber receipt falls within the computer-
generated document exception to the hearsay rule, any error in
excluding the receipt was harmless. Harris has not shown under
People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 (Watson) it was reasonably
probable that had the trial court admitted the Uber receipt,
Harris would have had a more favorable result. (See People v.
Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1308 [abuse of discretion in
admitting hearsay evidence is reviewable for harmless error
under Watson]; People v. Homick (2012) 55 Cal.4th 816, 872
[same].)
Harris argued that the Uber receipt disproved Angela’s
account that when she called the rape hotline early on the
morning of March 1, Harris was not in the apartment. The
receipt supported Harris’s contention that he was in the
Long Beach apartment at 8:39 a.m. on the morning of March 1.
But Angela did not provide a precise time for when she called the
rape hotline, testifying only that she called the rape hotline that
morning. Thus, the receipt did not show that Angela was lying
about the time of her call to the rape hotline. Rather, she could
have called the hotline prior to 8:39 a.m. or later that morning.
Further, as discussed, Angela and Lindsey provided
detailed accounts of the sexual assaults; the results from the
SART examination of Angela showed vaginal abrasions and anal
lacerations that were consistent with the sexual assaults; and
Crystal provided a detailed account of a similar sexual assault
Harris had previously committed. It is not reasonably probable
the jury would have discounted this evidence based on evidence
that Harris returned to the apartment at 8:39 a.m. on the
morning of March 1.
24
d. Exclusion of Karin Harris’s testimony about the car
At a hearing outside the presence of the jury, Harris
requested the court allow his mother, Karin Harris (Karin), to
testify about an occasion in August 2022 when Angela and her
former boyfriend Raymond Barlow went to Karin’s house and
demanded Karin give them the Dodge Dart after they had
“fraudulently lien-saled” the car, sending a notice of the sale of
the car even though Harris owned the car and Angela and Barlow
knew he was in custody. Harris argued the testimony was
relevant because his argument with Angela about the car led to
Angela’s false allegations. Harris explained Karin would testify
that Angela and Barlow continued to go to Karin’s house to
demand the car, leading Karin to seek a restraining order against
them based on elder abuse.
Harris submitted an October 20, 2022 minute order from
Karin’s elder abuse action against Angela and Barlow. The
minute order stated with respect to Karin’s request for a
restraining order against Angela and Barlow that she “has not
met the burden of proof that is required.” The minute order
further stated “this court cannot determine who the vehicle in
question belongs to.”
The trial court observed that the minute order was issued
more than 18 months after the alleged February 28 assault, and
the order involved “a court in a different county . . . [that] was
unable to determine to whom the car belong[ed],” which was
“absolutely not relevant to this case.” Further, Karin’s testimony
concerned a collateral matter (the car) that was “far afield” and
would result in “a trial within a trial on what happened with
regard to [the Dodge Dart] a significant period of time after the
25
last allegation.” The court excluded Karin’s testimony based on
lack of relevance and Evidence Code section 352.
Harris contends the trial court abused its discretion in
excluding Karin’s testimony because the litigation over
ownership of the car was central to Harris’s defense that Angela
fabricated her sexual assault allegations after Harris refused to
relinquish the car to her. Further, Karin’s testimony would not
consume excessive time because it did not matter who owned the
car, but rather, that there was a dispute about ownership. The
trial court did not abuse its discretion. Karin’s testimony about
Angela’s efforts to obtain the car after February 28 could have
provided some support for Harris’s theory that Angela fabricated
the sexual assault to obtain the return of the car. However, as
the trial court observed, Karin’s testimony had minimal probative
value because the events she would describe occurred 18 months
after the alleged sexual assault on February 28. Moreover, the
superior court in the elder abuse action denied Karin’s request for
a restraining order and stated it did not have sufficient
information to determine ownership of the car. Thus, this
evidence could create confusion over how a court ruling that
denied any relief to Karin on her claims of abuse and theft of the
car was relevant to whether Harris had sexually abused Angela
and Lindsey.
Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
finding that Karin’s testimony would result in a mini-trial on the
collateral issues of Karin’s efforts in 2022 to obtain a restraining
order against Angela and the dispute over ownership of the
Dodge Dart. Although Harris argued the jury did not need to
determine who was the rightful owner of the car, Angela would
26
have the right to rebut Karin’s allegations, resulting in the very
mini-trial that Harris claims would not occur.9
C. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Instructing the Jury with
CALCRIM No. 226
After the prosecutor and Harris presented their closing
arguments, the trial court instructed the jury. Harris contends
the court committed prejudicial error in its instruction of the jury
with CALCRIM No. 226 on the credibility of witnesses. The court
instructed the jury that “[i]n evaluating a witness’s testimony,
you may consider anything that reasonably tends to prove or
disprove the truth or accuracy of that testimony. Among the
factors that you may consider are,” and then the court listed 10
factors from the pattern CALCRIM No. 226 instruction. Harris
contends the court erred in omitting one of the factors in the
pattern instruction: “Did other evidence prove or disprove any
fact about which the witness testified?” Any error in failing to
instruct the jury on this factor was harmless.
9 Because we conclude the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in excluding exhibits I, J, and K and Karin’s testimony,
the court did not violate Harris’s constitutional right to due
process or his right to present a defense. (See People v. Edwards
(2013) 57 Cal.4th 658, 728 [“As ‘“a general matter, the ordinary
rules of evidence do not impermissibly infringe on the accused’s
right to present a defense.”’”]; In re L.J. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th
741, 754 [“‘The due process right to present evidence is limited to
relevant evidence of significant probative value to the issue
before the court.’”]; see People v. Chhoun (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1, 45
[“‘“[A] defendant does not have a constitutional right to the
admission of unreliable hearsay statements.”’”].)
27
1. Governing law and standard of review
“A trial court has a sua sponte duty to ‘instruct on general
principles of law that are closely and openly connected to the
facts and that are necessary for the jury’s understanding of the
case,’ including instructions relevant to evaluating the credibility
of witnesses.” (People v. Blacksher (2011) 52 Cal.4th 769, 845-
846; accord, People v. Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 586.) “‘[T]he
court should give the substance of CALJIC No. 2.20 [now
CALCRIM No. 226] in every criminal case, although it may omit
factors that are inapplicable under the evidence.’” (Mitchell, at
p. 586; accord, People v. Rincon-Pineda (1975) 14 Cal.3d 864, 883;
see Evid. Code, § 780 [setting forth factors a jury may consider in
deciding the truthfulness of witness testimony].)
We review a claim of instructional error de novo. (People v.
Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327, 382; accord, People v. Lewis (2023)
14 Cal.5th 876, 900.) “‘In reviewing a claim of instructional error,
the court must consider whether there is a reasonable likelihood
that the trial court’s instructions caused the jury to misapply the
law in violation of the Constitution. [Citations.] The challenged
instruction is viewed “in the context of the instructions as a
whole and the trial record to determine whether there is a
reasonable likelihood the jury applied the instruction in an
impermissible manner.”’” (Lewis, at p. 900; accord, Thomas, at
p. 382.) Further, “[i]nstructions should be interpreted, if possible,
to support the judgment, rather than defeat it, if they are
reasonably susceptible to such interpretation.” (People v. Parker
(2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 1261, 1271; see People v. Morales (2021)
69 Cal.App.5th 978, 994.)
28
2. The trial court did not commit prejudicial error
Harris contends the court should have instructed the jury
on whether there was other evidence that “prove[d] or disprove[d]
any fact about which the witness testified” because there was
evidence, including his testimony, that contradicted the accounts
given by Angela and Lindsey. We agree the court should have
instructed the jury on this factor in light of the conflicting
testimony. (People v. Mitchell, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 586; People
v. Rincon-Pineda, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 883.) However, the error
was harmless.
Harris argues he was prejudiced because the jury, after
being instructed that the 10 enumerated factors were “‘[a]mong
the factors that you may consider,’” may have “assume[d] that the
factors which the court enumerated were an exclusive list.” That
is not a fair reading of the instruction, which told the jurors the
opposite—that they may “consider anything that reasonably
tends to prove or disprove the truth or accuracy” of a witness’s
testimony, including factors other than the 10 the court listed.
Moreover, it is not a reasonable assumption that the jury would
have entirely disregarded Harris’s testimony (and other
conflicting evidence) given the absence of an instruction
specifically directing the jurors that they may consider evidence
that disproved the testimony of Angela and Lindsey.
Accordingly, it is not reasonably probable that had the court
instructed the jury on this factor, there would have been a more
favorable outcome for Harris. (See People v. Murillo (1996)
47 Cal.App.4th 1104, 1107-1108 [Watson harmless error standard
applied to trial court’s error in failing to instruct the jury
regarding evaluation of testimony of witness who provides
willfully false testimony]; People v. Galloway (1979)
29
100 Cal.App.3d 551, 567-568 [error in omission of factor on
inconsistent witness statement from predecessor to CALCRIM
No. 226 was harmless under Watson standard].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The superior court is directed to
prepare an amended abstract of judgment that reflects Harris’s
conviction on count 4 of continuous sexual abuse of a child under
the age of 14 (§ 288.5, subd. (a)) and on count 5 of sodomy by use
of force (§ 286, subd. (c)(2)(A)). The clerk of the superior court is
ordered to forward a copy of the amended abstract of judgment to
the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
FEUER, J.
We concur:
SEGAL, Acting P. J.
STONE, J.
30
