Filed 8/3/26 P. v. Grajeda CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D088200
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. FSB23000148)
CHRISTOPHER SHAWN GRAJEDA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, Steven C. Malone, Judge. Affirmed.
James M. Kehoe, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, and Robin
Urbanski and Monique Myers, Deputy Attorney Generals.
A jury convicted Christopher Shawn Grajeda of four counts of grand
theft (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (a); counts 4, 6, 8, 10) and four counts of false
statements to sell or buy a security (Corp. Code, § 25401; counts 2, 5, 7, 9).
The victims’ total loss was found to be $124,000. The trial court sentenced
Grajeda to three years in prison.
On appeal, Grajeda claims his attorney provided ineffective assistance
of counsel by failing to examine or remove prospective Juror 168 for cause or
through a peremptory challenge. He contends Juror 168 harbored “actual
bias” and counsel’s failure to address the bias was prejudicial. On this
appellate record, we find no basis to conclude that defense counsel’s
performance was deficient. Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Grajeda was charged with multiple financial crimes in connection
with a house-flipping investment scheme he pursued between 2015 and 2017.
The matter proceeded to a jury trial. During jury selection, the trial court
gave each of 18 potential jurors a questionnaire and indicated it would ask
each of them a series of eleven questions, emphasizing, “[Can] you be fair
and impartial as a juror in this case?”
When asked this question, prospective Juror 168 initially indicated,
“I am not sure. Because I do have some biases concerning gender.” The
trial court sought clarification asking, “[H]ow does that apply?” Juror 168
responded, “I kind of see people differently sometimes. I don’t know.
Depending on their gender.” Juror 168 confirmed this was a bias “against
men,” but indicated an understanding that the justice “system” treated men
and women equally. The court then clarified the role of a juror; it explained
that a juror’s role is to determine facts based on witness testimony and
2
evidence and to determine whether the facts meet the elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt based on the instructions given. Juror 168
responded, “In that case, I would say yes,” and “[t]hank you for clarifying.”
When defense counsel began voir dire, he asked the 18 potential jurors
if there was a “topic that hasn’t come up yet” that would cause any of the
potential members to have an “inability to be fair.” He also asked whether
they had any “reservation about recommending [themselves] as potential
jurors.” Juror 168 did not volunteer an answer to either question. No further
inquiries were specifically addressed to Juror 168 individually, by either the
court or counsel. Defense counsel raised no for-cause challenges and did not
exercise any peremptory strikes. The trial court empaneled the jury, which
included Juror 168.
DISCUSSION
Grajeda contends his counsel provided constitutionally deficient
performance because he failed to examine Juror 168 about a possible gender
bias, and also failed to challenge the juror for cause or use a peremptory
challenge to remove the juror. He contends counsel’s alleged failure
prejudicially affected him because, as a result, an actually biased juror was
seated on the jury and he was deprived of his right to an impartial jury.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant
must show that counsel’s (1) “representation fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness” under prevailing professional norms and (2) “the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense.” (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466
U.S. 668, 688; see id. at p. 687.) “On direct appeal, a conviction will be
reversed for ineffective assistance only if (1) the record affirmatively discloses
counsel had no rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission,
(2) counsel was asked for a reason and failed to provide one, or (3) there
3
simply could be no satisfactory explanation.” (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th
986, 1009.)
Here, the appellate record contains no indication that counsel was
asked to explain, or otherwise volunteered an explanation for, his decision
not to individually examine Juror 168 for bias. There is also no indication
counsel offered a reason why he chose not to seek removal of the juror
through either a for-cause or peremptory challenge. Grajeda must therefore
show that there could be no satisfactory explanation or rational tactical basis
for retaining Juror 168. He points to the fact that defense counsel’s inaction
allowed a juror with “actual bias” to be seated on the jury. (See Code Civ.
Proc, § 225, subd. (b)(1)(C) [actual bias is “the existence of a state of mind on
the part of the juror in reference to the case, or to any of the parties, which
will prevent the juror from acting with entire impartiality, and without
prejudice to the substantial rights of any party”].) Yet, jury selection is an
inherently subjective process and the appellate record seldom discloses
incompetence. (See, e.g., People v. Montiel (1993) 5 Cal.4th 877, 911,
disapproved on other grounds [recognizing use of peremptory challenges is
intuitive and record will rarely show reversible incompetence].)
We can conceive of several rational tactical explanations for counsel’s
inaction with respect to Juror 168. Primarily, counsel could have reasonably
viewed the trial court’s voir dire as sufficiently probing to satisfy both the
court and counsel that Juror 168 could judge the evidence fairly, even
acknowledging the initial comments concerning a possible bias against men.
The court’s questioning shows that counsel could have reasonably believed
Juror 168 (1) was being honest about some preconceptions, (2) had initial
concerns about whether those preconceptions might affect their capacity to
be impartial, but (3) nevertheless affirmed an ability to fairly and faithfully
4
apply the law to the case after receiving a more complete explanation of a
juror’s role. Indeed, at no point did Juror 168 expressly proclaim an actual
bias that would affirmatively prevent them from “acting with entire
impartiality.” (Code Civ. Proc, § 225, subd. (b)(1)(C).)
Trial counsel was in the best position to judge the juror’s demeanor,
sincerity, and state of mind and could have reasonably reached the conclusion
that Juror 168 would be fair to both sides. Such a conclusion would have
been consistent with the court’s apparent satisfaction that Juror 168 could be
impartial. It was also buttressed by Juror 168’s failure to respond to defense
counsel’s later inquiry to the panel whether any of them had any reservations
about their ability to serve.1 Under these circumstances, counsel could have
reasonably believed that further examination or removal was unnecessary.
(See People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 367–368 [rejecting ineffective
assistance claim where juror indicated “distaste” for the defendant, but
counsel could have reasonably believed juror could be fair]; People v. Lloyd
(1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 724, 735 [counsel’s performance not ineffective when
counsel did not challenge juror who had admitted impartiality but was
rehabilitated].)
Counsel may also have had additional strategic reasons for retaining
the juror. Having observed Juror 168’s mannerisms and responses to other
questions, counsel could have reasonably construed the juror’s honesty and
thoughtfulness, comfort in discussing personal information, and willingness
to listen to the judge and reconsider a perspective as positive attributes.
1 Defense counsel may have reasonably believed a for-cause challenge
would be futile because the trial court appears to have accepted that Juror
168 would be fair and impartial. (People v. Thompson (2010) 49 Cal.4th 79,
122 [“Counsel is not ineffective for failing to make frivolous or futile
motions”].)
5
Counsel may have also viewed Juror 168’s profession (a math teacher) as
suggesting strengths or attitudes that would ultimately benefit Grajeda
during deliberations. These qualities could have persuaded the defense that
Juror 168 should be accepted as a juror and not further questioned. (See
People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 485 [best tactic may be to not ask a
potential juror questions, given that further examination could lead to
removal by prosecution or could antagonize the juror].)
For all these reasons, the record does not demonstrate that defense
counsel had no rational tactical purpose for failing to examine or remove
Juror 168. Grajeda has thus failed to establish on direct appeal that counsel
performed deficiently in this respect.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
DATO, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
BUCHANAN, J.
KELETY, J.
6
