Filed 8/3/26 Camarillo v. Bostanchyan CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)

STEPHEN CAMARILLO, C103979
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 34-2018-
v. 00242397-CU-OR-GDS)

DAVID BOSTANCHYAN,
Defendant and Appellant.

This case involves a contentious boundary line dispute between adjoining
landowners (i.e., neighbors) in a residential subdivision in Sacramento County.
Defendant David Bostanchyan appeals from the judgment entered after a bench trial. He
challenges the order requiring him to remove the portion of his new driveway that
encroached onto plaintiff Stephen Camarillo’s property, which was based on the trial
court’s finding that it constituted a nuisance and trespass. Bostanchyan argues reversal is
required for various reasons, including Camarillo’s failure to join an indispensable party
and the trial court’s erroneous adoption of the findings of a professional land surveyor,
who was appointed as a referee to determine the boundary line between the subject
properties. We affirm.

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 BACKGROUND
Before we summarize the background of this case, we observe that our review of
the merits of this appeal has been hampered by Bostanchyan’s noncompliance with the
rules covering the format and content of appellate briefs. This includes Bostanchyan’s
failure to provide an adequate statement of significant facts limited to matters in the
record and a sufficient summary of the relevant procedural history. (See Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.204(a)(2)(A), (C); People v. Ashford University, LLC (2024) 100
Cal.App.5th 485, 503 [leading California appellate practice guide instructs appellants to
accurately and fairly state critical facts free of bias before addressing legal issues].)1
As for the significant facts, Bostanchyan’s two-paragraph statement in his opening
brief is inadequate. For example, while Bostanchyan identifies the “crux” of the dispute
as “largely a matter of competing surveys,” the statement of facts portion of his brief
includes no discussion of those surveys or the findings of the referee, who was appointed
to provide an opinion about the disputed boundary line after considering relevant
evidence, including the parties’ competing surveys. Further, Bostanchyan’s opening
brief does not accurately describe how the boundary line dispute arose.
The procedural background portion of Bostanchyan’s opening brief is also
inadequate. The one-paragraph statement of procedural history does not identify the
specific claims alleged in the operative complaint and their factual basis or describe the
parties’ stipulation to the appointment of a referee to assist the court in resolving the
boundary line dispute. Nor does it include a summary of the arguments made by the
parties in their trial briefs or any detail concerning the substance of the trial court’s 11-

1 Further rule references are to the California Rules of Court.

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page written ruling, including the court’s ruling on the objections Bostanchyan lodged to
the referee’s findings and opinion as to the disputed boundary line.2
Despite these deficiencies, we will address his claims of error. We next
summarize, as best we can, the relevant background of this case beginning with a
summary of the underlying legal principles to provide context for the factual and
procedural background that follows.
Legal Background
“Under California law, the location of a disputed boundary line is proven by
retracing, as nearly as possible based upon existing evidence, the footsteps of the original
surveyor whose survey fixed the boundaries.” (Bloxham v. Saldinger (2014) 228
Cal.App.4th 729, 736 (Bloxham) [the “golden rule” of surveying is to follow the
“ ‘footprints of the original surveyor’ ”].) A surveyor’s expert opinion is often vital to
that determination. (See id. at pp. 737-738 [“ ‘Surveyors and civil engineers, like other
experts, may give testimony on questions involving matters of technical skill and
experience with which they are peculiarly acquainted’ ”].)
“ ‘[T]he question presented to the court in a boundary dispute is not that of making
a resurvey but one of determining as a question of fact from the preponderance of expert
and nonexpert evidence … the actual location of the monuments, corners or lines as
actually laid out on the ground by the official surveyor.’ [Citation.] ‘The questions
where the line run by a survey lies on the ground, and whether any particular tract is on

2 We recognize that Bostanchyan’s opening brief includes a short and generalized
summary of the parties’ dispute and the trial court’s written ruling under a heading titled
“Statement of the Case.” However, this portion of the brief includes no citations to the
appellate record, which violates rule 8.204(a)(1)(C). The statement is not an adequate
substitute for Bostanchyan’s failure to provide a proper recitation of factual and
procedural matters, including a clear summary of the material facts.

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one side or the other of that line, are questions of fact.’ ” (Bloxham, supra, 228
Cal.App.4th at p. 737.)
In retracing the footsteps of the original surveyor, “ ‘[t]he location of the
monuments placed in connection with the original survey is of primary importance’ ”
(Bloxham, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 742.) Monuments are visible objects, either
natural or manmade, and include things like rivers, mountains, fences, marked trees,
stakes, posts, and roads. (See Colton v. Seavey (1863) 22 Cal. 496, 502; Belle Terre
Ranch, Inc. v. Wilson (2015) 232 Cal.App.4th 1468, 1472-1473.) The physical
monument established by the original surveyor, even if it should have been placed
elsewhere, is “controlling.” (Claudino v. Pereira (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1282, 1287.)
When the original monument cannot be found, the surveyor should endeavor to
reestablish it, if possible, from traces of the monument or its accessories, or from other
acceptable evidence or testimony bearing upon its original position. (Bloxham, supra,
228 Cal.App.4th at pp. 745, 747-749; Chandler v. Hibberd (1958) 165 Cal.App.2d 39,
52, 57 (Chandler).) In the field of land surveying, the phrases “obliterated corner” and
“lost corner” are terms of art. (Bloxham, at p. 747.)
An “obliterated corner” is one in which there are no remaining traces of the
monument (or its accessories), but for which the position (or approximate position) of the
monument can be located by reference to existing data or sources of information.
(Bloxham, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at pp. 747-748; Finley v. Yuba County Water Dist.
(1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 691, 695, fn. 1; Reid v. Dunn (1962) 201 Cal.App.2d 612, 614, fn.
2; Chandler, supra, 165 Cal.App.2d at p. 52.) By contrast, a “lost corner” is one which
cannot be replaced by reference to any existing data or sources of information, and whose
location can be restored only by reference to one or more interdependent corners.
(Bloxham, at p. 748; Finley, at p. 696, fn. 1; Reid, at p. 614; Chandler, at p. 52.)

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 The “obliteration” of a monument does not destroy the survey nor justify a court in
disregarding it where its position can be determined either from traces of the original
marks or from acceptable evidence or testimony that bears upon the original position,
including testimony of the interested landowners, competent surveyors, other qualified
local authorities, or witnesses. (Bloxham, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 748; Reid v.
Dunn, supra, 201 Cal.App.2d at p. 614, fn. 2; Chandler, supra, 165 Cal.App.2d at p. 52.)
If there is some acceptable evidence of the original location of a monument, that position
will be employed in preference to the rule that would be applied to a lost corner—
application of the proportionate measurement method. (Bloxham, at p. 748; Reid, at p.
614; see State of California v. Thompson (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 368, 377 [“It is settled
law that the proportionate measurement method may be used only as a last resort when
the original corner is ‘lost’ and cannot be relocated on the ground”].) The position of a
“lost” corner can be restored only by proportionate measurement between one or more
identified interdependent corners. (Finley v. Yuba County Water Dist., supra, 99
Cal.App.3d at p. 696, fn. 1; Reid, at p. 619; Chandler, at pp. 51-52; see County of Yolo v.
Nolan (1904) 144 Cal. 445, 448-449 [explaining that lost corners are restored by putting
them at an equal distance between two known corners].)
Factual Background
At all relevant times, the parties were neighbors; they owned adjoining parcels of
real property in a residential subdivision in Orangevale, known as the Kloepfer Estates.
Camarillo owned the real property located at 9387 Manette Way, also known as lot 16.
Bostanchyan and his wife (Vera)3 owned the real property immediately to the west,
located at 9381 Manette Way, also known as lot 15.

3 Because Vera shares the same last name as her husband, we refer to her by her
first name to avoid confusion.

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 The subdivision map for Kloepfer Estates was approved by Sacramento County in
the late 1950’s. The record reflects that the “block of interest” is bounded by Oak
Avenue to the north, Main Avenue to the east, Elm Avenue to the south, and Walnut
Avenue to the west. The block of interest is rectangular in shape with the long sides
(Main Avenue & Walnut Avenue) running in a north-south direction. The short sides
(Oak Avenue & Elm Avenue) run in an east-west direction. Manette Way also runs in an
east-west direction, with Main Avenue to the east and Walnut Avenue to the west of the
subject properties (i.e., lot 15 and lot 16).4
In the 1960’s, Camarillo’s father purchased lot 16 and built a home on the
property and a retaining wall between the subject properties. In 1998, Camarillo became
the owner of lot 16. In 2014, Bostanchyan and Vera purchased lot 15. They “remodeled
the existing home from the foundation.”
In 2017, as part of the remodel, Bostanchyan constructed a new concrete driveway
along the eastern boundary of his property; he “widen[ed] the walkway on the east side of
the house” so he could drive his RV (recreational vehicle) to the back of the property.
Bostanchyan started construction in July 2017 without notifying Camarillo and without
obtaining a survey to determine the boundary line separating their properties or a building
permit. Over Camarillo’s objections, construction was completed in or around August
2017.
Procedural Background
In October 2018, after Camarillo obtained a professional land survey and a dispute
arose as to whether Bostanchyan’s new driveway encroached onto the western portion of
Camarillo’s property, Camarillo filed this action against Bostanchyan. The survey was
prepared by a licensed land surveyor employed by CNA Engineering, Inc. He

4 All future references to “subject properties” are references to lots 15 and 16.

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determined that Bostanchyan’s new driveway encroached onto the western portion of
Camarillo’s property (lot 16) by more than two feet.
The operative first amended complaint was filed in April 2019. It alleged causes
of action for quiet title, nuisance, negligence, trespass, and declaratory relief. These
claims were based on Camarillo’s contention that Bostanchyan’s new driveway
encroached more than two feet onto the western portion of his property, and that the
construction of the driveway resulted in the destruction and removal of a “good neighbor
fence”5 and a concrete retaining wall or “pony wall,”6 which were located near the front
of Camarillo’s lot (i.e., the southwestern corner of lot 16). Camarillo sought an
injunction and other relief, including a judicial determination that he was the sole lawful
owner of lot 16, as determined by the survey conducted by his land surveyor.
In 2021, Bostanchyan obtained a professional land survey to determine the
boundary line between the subject properties.7 According to Bostanchyan, his surveyor
determined there was a “serious problem” in that there were “monuments indicating that
as many as four center lines may have been marked along Main Avenue and that … there
[were] two marked center lines along Main Avenue.” Bostanchyan further asserted that
his surveyor was “not certain whether either of the two marked center lines [were] the

5 A “good neighbor fence” is a fence that sits directly on the property line between
adjoining landowners.
6 A “pony wall” is a short wall, typically standing three to four feet tall. When built
between lots, these low walls serve as a property marker defining the boundary of the
lots. If, as here, one lot (lot 15) sits slightly higher than the other (lot 16), a pony wall
also serves as a low retaining wall, stabilizing the soil and preventing erosion.
7 Bostanchyan’s survey was prepared by a licensed land surveyor employed by Geo
Land. After this appeal was filed, we granted Bostanchyan’s request to augment the
record to include the survey, which was submitted as evidence in the proceedings before
the trial court. As Bostanchyan correctly points out, the entire document was not
included in the clerk’s transcript.

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original center lines and public records [did] not appear to have the original.” Using the
“second center line” (“Centerline B” or “CTR-B”), Bostanchyan’s surveyor retraced the
historical monuments that created the subdivision in 1958 and determined that
“Bostanchyan’s property boundaries comport[ed] with [the] original, controlling
boundary line from the 1950’s.”
Although Bostanchyan conceded that he removed the pony wall between the
subject properties, he maintained that his new driveway was “laid on top of the pre-
existing cement,” including “up to the lip,” that is, “the slight step of concrete at the base
of the pony wall.” Bostanchyan also claimed that the “starting point” of the survey
conducted by Camarillo’s surveyor—the center line of Main Avenue—was “almost
certainly” in a different location than it was when the lots along Manette Way were
developed in 1958. In Bostanchyan’s view, the survey conducted by Camarillo’s
surveyor was flawed because 1) it disregarded the fact that the subdivision (Kloepfer
Estates) was based upon a 1958 survey, and 2) because Camarillo’s land surveyor
ignored “the actions of Sacramento County’s contactors during the 1980s,” including
their inadvertent placement of “the survey monuments in different locations” in
connection with the rebuilding of Main Avenue. Bostanchyan contends these flaws were
the reason why Camarillo’s surveyor found that Bostanchyan’s new driveway encroached
two feet onto Camarillo’s property. Notably, Bostanchyan did not claim that the “actual
measurements” made by Camarillo’s surveyor were inaccurate. Instead, Bostanchyan
claimed that Camarillo’s survey was inaccurate because the “starting point” of the survey
(centerline of Main Avenue) was incorrect.
In July 2024, the parties stipulated to a trial via the submission of written briefing,
declarations, and other evidence. The parties also agreed, pursuant to Code of Civil
Procedure section 638, subdivision (b), to the appointment of a referee to provide the
court with an “analysis as to the merits and/or defects of the parties’ respective surveys
pertaining to the boundary line between the [p]arties properties.” Neither surveyor

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submitted a declaration containing their findings and/or opinion about the disputed
property line.
In October 2024, the parties stipulated to the appointment of Referee Jesse Fullen,
a professional land surveyor, for the purpose of providing “an opinion and findings to the
Court of the boundary line between [the subject properties] and the amount that
[Bostanchyan’s] driveway encroaches onto [Camarillo’s] property, if any.” As part of
this stipulation, the parties agreed to provide the referee with access to their properties,
the surveys prepared by their land surveyors, and any relevant, nonprivileged documents
the referee determined were necessary to form an opinion and/or make findings about the
disputed boundary line. The parties also agreed that the referee would not prepare his
own survey. Instead, the referee would “give opinions and findings” about the boundary
line based upon the preexisting surveys and other relevant evidence. The parties further
agreed that the referee would file a statement of decision and recommendation
(Recommended Order) with the court, the parties could file written objections to that
order, and the failure to object would be deemed acquiescence to the order.8
In December 2024, the referee issued his Recommended Order. After describing
how he made his measurements, the referee opined that Bostanchyan’s driveway was
1.19 feet east of the lot 15 boundary line and therefore encroached onto the western
portion of Camarillo’s property (lot 16). In reaching this conclusion, the referee

8 The language of the parties’ stipulation suggests that they agreed to the
appointment of a general reference referee. However, based on the terms of their
agreement, including the statutory provision relied upon—subdivision (b) of Code of
Civil Procedure section 638—it appears that the parties agreed to the appointment of a
special reference referee.

We need not and do not decide whether the parties stipulated to the appointment of
a general or special reference referee. On appeal, neither party claims the referee had the
authority to make a binding determination as to the disputed boundary line.

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acknowledged that there were multiple centerlines along Main Avenue and explained that
he considered various materials in making his measurements, including the parties’
surveys, numerous parcel maps and final maps (e.g., the 1958 final map for the Kloepfer
Estates), and the 1981 Sacramento County Department of Public Works survey notes.
Guided by the rule that “the original survey and monuments control lot locations,” the
referee explained how he determined the disputed boundary line, which included use of
monuments found in the “[b]lock of [i]nterest,” including monuments at the centerline
intersection of Oak Avenue and Main Avenue and the centerline intersection of Oak
Avenue and Walnut Avenue. In relying on the monument characterized as “Centerline
A” or “CTR-A” on the survey prepared by Bostanchyan’s surveyor, the referee explained
that “evidence of occupation” supported the use of that monument, since not doing so
resulted in fences for lot lines plotting east of the mathematical location of the lot lines.
In February 2025, after Bostanchyan filed objections to the Recommended Order
and the parties submitted their trial briefing and evidence, the matter was taken under
submission. One of the objections lodged by Bostanchyan included his contention that
the referee “appeared” to have improperly relied on the first centerline (“Centerline A” or
“CTR-A”) found by Bostanchyan’s surveyor at the intersection of Main Avenue and
Manette Way, which (in Bostanchyan’s view) was not the original monument used when
the Kloepfer Estates was originally surveyed in the 1950’s. In his trial briefing,
Bostanchyan requested the trial court find that Camarillo did not satisfy his burden of
proof; specifically, that Camarillo failed to establish that the new driveway encroached
onto his property because the original center line for Main Avenue was unknown, there

10
were multiple possible center lines, and the center line used by Camarillo’s surveyor was
“unlikely” to be the original center line when the subdivision was created in 1958.9
Several weeks later, the trial court issued a detailed written ruling. Of relevance
here, the court adopted the referee’s Recommended Order, finding it “credible and
persuasive.” Specifically, the court concluded that Bostanchyan’s new driveway
encroached onto the western portion of Camarillo’s property by 1.19 feet, which
constituted a trespass and nuisance.
In its written order, the trial court explained:

“Although [Bostanchyan] argues that his driveway merely replaces
improvements that have been in existence for a number of years,
[Camarillo] has presented evidence showing the … driveway was built …
beyond the established boundary line that had existed between the
properties prior to [Bostanchyan’s] improvement. [Citation.] [Camarillo’s]
Exhibit 3 shows the ‘pony wall’ and ‘concrete lip’—which [Bostanchyan]
argues marks the outermost limit of his property—were on [Camarillo’s]
side of the ‘good neighbor fence.’ [Citations.] [Camarillo] provides
evidence that his father constructed the ‘pony wall’ and the fence on
[Camarillo’s] property and that these were in place on [Camarillo’s] side of
the fence prior to [Bostanchyan’s] construction of the driveway. [Citation.]
Furthermore, [Bostanchyan’s] Exhibits, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 all appear to show
the driveway that existed prior to [Bostanchyan’s] reconstruction in 2017
extended only to the ‘good neighbor fence[,]” not to the far edge of the
‘pony wall’ and ‘concrete lip,’ which were on [Camarillo’s] side of the

9 In support of his trial brief, Bostanchyan filed a declaration. Among other things,
Bostanchyan explained: “[W]hen [Vera and I] tore the house down to the foundation and
created the new driveway, we simply poured new cement on top of the old cement. The
new cement on top went right up [to] the edge of the old concrete. I did not extend the
retaining wall farther to the east (into [Camarillo’s] lot) than the old concrete. The only
exception [was] near the front of the lot, but as will be explained below, even that did not
extend into [Camarillo’s] lot. In the end, the new driveway maintained a straight line
along where the original fence used to be.”

As the trial court subsequently observed in its written ruling, Bostanchyan never
explained how the portion of his new driveway “near the front of the lot” did not
encroach onto the southwestern portion of Camarillo’s property.

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 fence. [Citation.] As such, [Camarillo] presents credible and persuasive
evidence that [Bostanchyan’s] improvements, initiated in July 2017, created
new and different encroachments on the boundary line between the
properties.”
Later, in discussing Camarillo’s trespassing cause of action and rejecting
Bostanchyan’s request for an equitable easement over the disputed property, the trial
court stated:

“[Bostanchyan] has failed to show he is an innocent trespasser.
Initially, the Court notes that [Bostanchyan] commenced construction of the
driveway without notifying [Camarillo] and completed construction over
[Camarillo’s] objections. [Citation.] [Bostanchyan’s] own evidence
indicates that [he] only informed [Camarillo] he would be removing the
fence and failed to disclose that he would be reconstructing the driveway
beyond the boundary of the actual fence (to where [the] ‘pony wall’ and
‘concrete lip’ were in place). [Citation.] It appears that aside from
measuring his lot from the assumed western boundary, [Bostanchyan] made
no further efforts to ascertain whether the ‘pony wall’ and ‘concrete lip’
separating the properties was on his lot, whether it was on the boundary
line, or whether it was on [Camarillo’s] lot. [Citation.] Given the existence
of a preexisting boundary line, i.e., the ‘good neighbor fence,’ the location
of the ‘pony wall’ and concrete lip’ on [Camarillo’s] side of the ‘good
neighbor fence,’ and [Bostanchyan’s] failure to discuss the property line
with [Camarillo] prior to construction, the Court concludes that
[Bostanchyan] was, at best, negligent with respect to his effort to ascertain
the boundary line between the properties.”
Consequently, the court ordered injunctive relief by directing Bostanchyan to
“remove all encroaching structures, including the easterly edge of the driveway, to
conform with the boundary line [found by the referee] and restore [Camarillo’s] property
to its original state within … 120 … days of entry of judgment.” While the court found
that Bostanchyan’s negligent construction of the driveway constituted a nuisance, it
denied Camarillo’s request for “structural and erosion damage caused by the driveway”
($45,765) due to insufficient evidentiary support. The court also denied Camarillo’s
request to quiet title based on his failure to join an indispensable party—Bostanchyan’s
wife (Vera).

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 In April 2025, judgment was entered in favor of Camarillo on the declaratory
relief, trespass, and nuisance causes of action. Bostanchyan timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I
Appellate Rules of Procedure
As a preliminary matter, we summarize the rules of appellate procedure that guide
our analysis.
“[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is
ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the
basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error
that justifies reversal of the judgment. [Citations.] ‘This is not only a general principle
of appellate practice but an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of reversible error.’ ”
(Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-609 (Jameson).)
In order to secure the reversal of an adverse judgment, it is not enough for the
appellant to establish that the trial court committed some error; the appellant must also
affirmatively demonstrate the error complained of was prejudicial. (Cal. Const., art. VI,
§ 13; F.P. v. Monier (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1099, 1108; see In re Marriage of McLaughlin
(2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 327, 337 [“ ‘The burden is on the appellant in every case to show
that the claimed error is prejudicial; i.e., that it has resulted in a miscarriage of
justice’ ”].) Error is prejudicial when “ ‘it is reasonably probable that a result more
favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.’ ”
(Cassim v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 780, 800.)
The burden of overcoming the presumption of correctness includes the obligation
to present argument and legal authority on each point raised. This requires more than
simply stating a bare assertion that the judgment or challenged order is erroneous and
leaving it to the appellate court to figure out why; it is not the appellate court’s role to
construct theories or arguments that would undermine the judgment or order and defeat

13
the presumption of correctness. (Dilbert v. Newsom (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 317, 323;
see also Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 52 (Allen).)
An “appellant must present meaningful legal analysis supported by citations to
authority and citations to facts in the record that support the claim of error.” (In re S.C.
(2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408.) When an appellant asserts a point but fails to support
it with reasoned argument and citations to pertinent authority, the court may treat it as
waived or forfeited. (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793; Salas v. Department
of Transportation (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1058, 1074; see Allen, at p. 52 [“citing cases
without any discussion of their application to the present case results in forfeiture”];
Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd.
(2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1066, 1078 [“Mere suggestions of error without supporting
argument or authority other than general abstract principles do not properly present
grounds for appellate review”].) Likewise, when an appellant fails to support an
argument with necessary citations to the record, the court may treat the argument as
forfeited. (United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142,
153.) We disregard all factual assertions without citation to the record. (City of
Lincoln v. Barringer (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1239.)
“ ‘ “The rule is well settled that the theory upon which a case is tried must be
adhered to on appeal. A party is not permitted to change his position and adopt a new
and different theory on appeal.” ’ ” (Sumner Hill Homeowners’ Assn., Inc. v. Rio Mesa
Holdings, LLC (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 999, 1027; see Glassman v. Safeco Ins. Co. of
America (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 1281, 1326 [“ ‘ “[a]s a general rule, theories not raised in
the trial court cannot be asserted for the first time on appeal; appealing parties must
adhere to the theory (or theories) on which their cases were [decided]” ’ ”].) We do not
consider a new theory on appeal because “[t]o permit a change of position in the appeal
‘would, in most cases, be highly prejudicial and accordingly is not permitted.’ ” (Sumner
Hill, at p. 1026.)

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 With these rules in mind, we turn to Bostanchyan’s appellate contentions.
II
Failure to Join Indispensable Party
Bostanchyan first argues that the judgment entered in favor of Camarillo on the
declaratory relief, trespass, and nuisance causes of action must be reversed because
Camarillo failed to join an indispensable party.
We deem this argument forfeited because it was not adequately raised below or on
appeal. In the trial court, Bostanchyan did not argue in his opening trial brief that
Camarillo could not prevail on his declaratory relief, trespass, or nuisance causes of
action based on his failure to join an indispensable party. Instead, Bostanchyan’s
indispensable party argument was limited to Camarillo’s quiet title cause of action. In his
closing trial brief, under a heading titled “The Appropriate Remedy,” Bostanchyan stated
in passing and without further elaboration: “[I]t is hard to see how this Court can grant
any manner of an injunction in favor of [Camarillo]. Vera … is not named in the action
and neither are any of the neighbors who are undoubtedly affected.”
Later in that same brief, Bostanchyan asserted: “[T]he Court should hold that the
failure to include indispensable parties is fatal to [Camarillo’s] claims because complete
relief cannot be realized against those that would be affected by any ruling [that finds an
encroachment].” Except for a citation to one case, the point was otherwise undeveloped;
Bostanchyan made no attempt to explain how and why the case he cited supported his
position. As a result, the trial court could have easily overlooked the argument or
reasonably determined that it was forfeited because it was inadequately briefed.
In any event, we conclude the issue was not preserved for appellate review. It was
not raised and developed in Bostanchyan’s written filings in the trial court, nor was it
considered or ruled upon, by the trial court. (Brockman v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals
(2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 569, 591-592 & fn. 12; see Wisner v. Dignity Health (2022) 85
Cal.App.5th 35, 44 [declining to reach argument where it was raised for the first time on

15
appeal and thus not “developed before, nor considered or ruled upon by, the trial court”];
Mendoza v. Trans Valley Transport (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 748, 770 [undeveloped
argument raised in a “cursory manner” and buried within another argument did not
adequately raise the issue in the trial court or preserve the issue for appeal].)
For similar reasons, we conclude Bostanchyan has forfeited the issue on appeal.
In his opening brief, Bostanchyan includes citation to authority for general abstract legal
principles but fails to adequately explain how and why those principles support reversal
under the facts of this case. In short, because this claim of error is undeveloped, we
decline to consider it. (People v. Stanley, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 793; Salas v. California
Department of Transportation, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 1074; see Allen, supra, 234
Cal.App.4th at p. 52 [“citing cases without any discussion of their application to the
present case results in forfeiture”]; Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control v.
Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at p. 1078 [“Mere
suggestions of error without supporting argument or authority other than general abstract
principles do not properly present grounds for appellate review”].)10

10 In his reply brief on appeal, Bostanchyan suggests that he did not forfeit his
indispensable party argument because the “failure to join an indispensable party
constitutes a jurisdictional defect which may be raised initially on appeal.” We are
unpersuaded. A claim that a party absent from the proceeding was indispensable “is not
cognizable on appeal unless it [was] appropriately raised in the trial court or there is some
compelling reason of equity or policy which warrants belated consideration.” (Jermstad
v. McNelis (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 528, 538.) “ ‘[T]he failure to join an “indispensable”
party is not “a jurisdictional defect” in the fundamental sense; even in the absence of an
“indispensable” party, the court still has the power to render a decision as to the parties
before it which will stand.’ ” (Reliant Life Shares, LLC v. Cooper (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th
14, 55, italics added.)

On appeal, Bostanchyan has made no effort to explain how and why this
justification applies here. Nor has he advanced any compelling reason which warrants
consideration of his belated argument. Moreover, having reviewed the record, we

16
 Even if we were to overlook forfeiture, Bostanchyan has not shown prejudicial
error based on Camarillo’s purported failure to join an indispensable party. (See
Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 609; Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557,
564.) In his opening brief, Bostanchyan did not identify, let alone discuss, the various
requirements and factors courts consider in determining whether an absent party is an
indispensable party. (See American Indian Model Schools v. Oakland Unified School
Dist. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 258, 296 [listing the criteria used to make an indispensable
party determination].) Instead, he simply asserts that the “injunction remedy issued by
the trial court”—removal of the encroaching portion of his new driveway—“necessarily
affects” his wife’s property rights. This showing is insufficient to demonstrate that
reversal is required based on the failure to join an indispensable party.
Bostanchyan makes no effort to explain how and why he did not adequately
represent Vera’s interests in this action. It is well-established that an absent party will not
be considered “indispensable” where a party already before the court adequately
represents the absent party’s interests. (See Citizens Assn. for Sensible Development of
Bishop Area v. County of Inyo (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 151, 161 [landowner would have
been a proper party but was not indispensable because developer (real party in interest)
had “ably argued” on behalf of landowner’s interests]; Save Berkeley’s Neighborhoods v.
Regents of University of California (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 705, 721-724 [developers
were not indispensable parties because the regents had similar interests in having project
proceed in timely manner and adequately represented developers’ interests].)

conclude that the failure to join Vera did not deprive the trial court of the power to render
an effective judgment between Bostanchyan and Camarillo on the declaratory relief,
trespass, or nuisance causes of action.

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 III
Declaratory Relief
Next, in a related argument, Bostanchyan contends that the trial court erroneously
ruled in favor of Camarillo on the declaratory relief cause of action. Bostanchyan
contends that because the trial court ruled against Camarillo on the quiet title cause of
action based on his failure to join an indispensable party, it was improper for the court to
declare Camarillo “the 100% fee simple owner of [lot 16] in accordance with the
boundary line as determined in the Recommended Order.” In support of his position,
Bostanchyan argues that the case relied upon by the trial court— XPO Logistics Freight,
Inc. v. Hayward Property, LLC (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 1166—is distinguishable.
As an initial matter, because this argument was not adequately raised in the trial
court or on appeal, we deem it forfeited. (See Mendoza v. Trans Valley Transport, supra,
75 Cal.App.5th at p. 770 [undeveloped point did not adequately raise the issue in the trial
court or preserve the issue for appeal]; Allen, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 52 [argument
forfeited for failing to adequately raise on appeal].)11 As the trial court observed in its
written ruling, Bostanchyan did not “directly address” the declaratory relief cause of
action in the briefing he submitted in connection with the bench trial.
Forfeiture aside, we see no basis for reversal. Section 1060 of the Code of Civil
Procedure provides that a party may bring an action for “declaration of his or her rights or
duties with respect to another, or in respect to, in, over or upon property.” It also
provides that “the court may make a binding declaration of these rights or duties” (ibid.)
and that the “declaration may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect” (ibid.).
In an action for declaratory relief, the proper function of the court is to make a full and

11 For the same reasons, we deem forfeited Bostanchyan’s suggestion that reversal as
to the declaratory relief cause of action is required because “Camarillo’s pleading is not
worded broad enough to encompass any other determination of rights other than having
Camarillo’s survey be deemed as having a correct description of Camarillo’s property.”
This issue was not adequately raised in the trial court or on appeal.

18
complete declaration, disposing of all questions actually involved in the case as between
all of the respective parties. (Amerson v. Christman (1968) 261 Cal.App.2d 811, 823.)
Likewise, “[a] quiet title action seeks to declare the rights of the parties in realty.
A trial court should ordinarily resolve such dispute. This accords with the rule that a trial
court should not dismiss a regular declaratory relief action when the plaintiff loses, but
instead should issue a judgment setting forth the declaration of rights and thus ending the
controversy.” “ ‘ “The object of the action is to finally settle and determine, as between
the parties, all conflicting claims to the property in controversy, and to decree to each
such interest or estate therein as he may be entitled to.” ’ ” (Western Aggregates, Inc. v.
County of Yuba (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 278, 305, italics added.)
A plaintiff bringing a quiet title action must name as defendants all “persons
having adverse claims” to the property that are of record, known to the plaintiff, or
reasonably apparent from an inspection of the property. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 762.010,
762.060, subd. (b).) Indeed, a quiet title judgment may not be entered without joining all
parties who have an interest in the property. (See Ranch at the Falls LLC v. O’Neal
(2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 155, 173, 178-180 [individual homeowners deemed
necessary/indispensable parties to quiet title action seeking access easement over private
streets in gated subdivision].)
Here, Camarillo (via the operative complaint) sought to quiet title to the disputed
property and declaratory and injunctive relief. Camarillo requested a judicial
determination that he held 100 percent fee simple ownership in lot 16, as determined by
the boundaries set forth in the survey prepared by his surveyor. Camarillo asked for a
“judicial determination of his rights and duties, and a declaration as to his entitlement …
to … ownership based on the proper boundary lines as it pertains to [lot 16].” Although
the trial court denied Camarillo’s request to quiet title due to his failure to join an
indispensable party (Vera), it declared “as between [Camarillo] and [Bostanchyan] only,

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[Camarillo] is the 100% fee simple owner of [lot 16] in accordance with the boundary
line as determined [by the referee] in the Recommended Order.” (Italics added.)
In so ruling, the trial court cited XPO Logistics Freight, Inc. v. Hayward Property,
LLC, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at page 1180 for the proposition that “judgment for
declaratory relief regarding property ownership as between the named parties is proper
even if there is insufficient basis to grant quiet title to the plaintiff.” To the extent
Bostanchyan contends the trial court erred in relying on XPO Logistics Freight or
otherwise committed reversible error by ruling in favor of Camarillo on his declaratory
relief cause of action, we disagree. Under the circumstances presented, it was proper for
the trial court to determine the boundary line between the subject properties.12
IV
Recommended Order
We conclude Bostanchyan has forfeited his undeveloped contention that the trial
court erred in adopting the referee’s Recommended Order. In his opening brief,
Bostanchyan failed to present meaningful legal analysis supported by citation to pertinent
authority and evidence in the record. (In re S.C., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 408.)
Instead, Bostanchyan argues, without citation to any authority, that the referee used the
wrong standard in reaching his conclusion as to the disputed boundary line. Bostanchyan
further argues the referee erred by failing to determine whether the “missing
monuments,” which the original survey relied upon to establish the property lines of the
Kloepfer Estates subdivision in the late 1950s, were “lost or obliterated” or could be “re-
established.” Although unclear, Bostanchyan appears to claim, as he did in the trial

12 We reject Bostanchyan’s suggestion that the judgment on the declaratory relief
cause of action must be reversed because the injunction was issued as a remedy for that
cause of action. The record reflects that the injunction was granted as a remedy for the
trespass cause of action, not the declaratory relief cause of action. Bostanchyan provides
no reasoned legal analysis demonstrating that reversal is required on this basis.

20
court, that the referee improperly relied on a survey conducted by Sacramento County
when it rebuilt Main Avenue in the 1980s.
It is a fundamental rule of appellate procedure that when, as here, “a point is
asserted without argument and authority for the proposition, ‘it is deemed to be without
foundation and requires no discussion by the reviewing court.’ ” (In re S.C., supra, 138
Cal.App.4th at p. 408; see Berger v. Godden (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 1113, 1117 [“failure
of appellant to advance any pertinent or intelligible legal argument … constitute[s] an
abandonment of the [claim of error”].) “Issues do not have a life of their own: if they are
not raised or supported by [substantive] argument or citation to authority, we consider the
issues waived.” (Jones v. Superior Court (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 92, 99.) Further, it is
not our role to construct theories or arguments that would undermine the judgment and
defeat the presumption of correctness. (Dilbert v. Newsom, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p.
323.) Given Bostanchyan’s deficient briefing, we need not say anything further about
this issue.
But even if we were to consider the issue, we would conclude that Bostanchyan
failed to carry his burden to affirmatively demonstrate prejudicial error. (See Jameson,
supra, 5 Cal.5th at 609; Denham v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 564.) His
argument on appeal simply amounts to a disagreement with how the referee determined
the disputed boundary line, without any substantive legal analysis showing how and why
the trial court’s adoption of the referee’s Recommended Order constitutes reversible
error. As we have noted, Bostanchyan’s opening brief cites no legal authority in support
of his conclusory claim of error.
V
Superior Title
Finally, Bostanchyan argues that the judgment in favor of Camarillo on the
declaratory relief, trespass, and nuisance causes of action must be reversed because
Camarillo failed to establish superior title to the disputed property. According to

21
Bostanchyan, the trial court erred in concluding that Camarillo presented sufficient
evidence to support a finding that he owned the property. In making this argument,
Bostanchyan claims that the referee’s findings and opinion as to the boundary line are
insufficient as a matter of law because the referee did not rely on the original survey
monuments established by the 1958 survey, and because there was no evidence presented
that the missing monuments were “lost” or “obliterated” and that the centerline along
Main Avenue could be reestablished using proper survey methods in light of the missing
monuments.
We are unpersuaded that reversal is required. As we have discussed, the parties
stipulated to the appointment of a referee because there were competing surveys as to the
location of the disputed boundary line. The parties agreed that the referee would make a
finding on this matter based on the parties’ surveys and other relevant evidence. After
considering objections to the referee’s Recommended Order, the trial court adopted it,
finding that Bostanchyan’s driveway encroached onto the western portion of Camarillo’s
property by more than one foot (1.19). In so finding, the court rejected the arguments
Bostanchyan now offers on appeal. The court stated: “[The] Recommended Order
makes the requisite findings needed to support the determination of the boundary line at
issue in this case and that [Camarillo] has presented sufficient evidence to meet his
burden to support encroachment. The Court concludes that the referee’s Recommended
Order is credible and persuasive.” On appeal, Bostanchyan has failed to demonstrate
reversible error. He has not provided substantive legal analysis showing that the referee’s
Recommended Order was insufficient as a matter of law or that there was insufficient
evidence to support the judgment.
Under the substantial evidence standard, we do not reweigh evidence. Instead, we
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving that party the
benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in its favor. (Jessup
Farms v. Baldwin (1983) 33 Cal.3d 639, 660.) “ ‘It is an elementary, but often

22
overlooked principle of law, that when a [judgment] is attacked as being unsupported, the
power of the appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is
any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the
conclusion reached by the [trier of fact]. When two or more inferences can be reasonably
deduced from the facts, the reviewing court is without power to substitute its deductions
for those of the trial court. [Citations.]’ [Citations.] ‘The fact that it is possible to draw
some inference other than that drawn by the trier of fact is of no consequence.’ ”
(Bloxham, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 739.) Our job is only to see if substantial
evidence exists to support the verdict in favor of the prevailing party, not to determine
whether substantial evidence might support the losing party’s version of events. (Pope v.
Babick (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1245.)
Here, it was the duty of the trial court to ascertain the location of the boundary line
between the subject properties. (Bloxham, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at pp. 738-739.) In
performing this duty, it was the function of the trial court to weigh and evaluate the
evidence and make a finding of fact as to the disputed boundary line. (Id. at pp. 737-
738.) In doing so here, the trial court relied on the findings in the Recommended Order,
which constitute substantial evidence to support the trial court’s judgment. (See
Bloxham, at p. 738.) To the extent the trial court resolved conflicts in the evidence
adversely to Bostanchyan, we cannot disturb those determinations on appeal. (See
Bowers v. Bernards (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 870, 874 [as long as there is substantial
evidence, the appellate court must affirm, even if other substantial evidence supports a
different result].)

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 DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Camarillo shall recover his costs on appeal. (Rule
8.278(a).)

/s/
WISEMAN, J.

We concur:

/s/
ROBIE, Acting P. J.

/s/
MESIWALA, J.

 Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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