Filed 8/3/26 Rosas v. Beverly Law CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
GUADALUPE ROSAS et al., B350611
Plaintiffs and (Los Angeles County
Appellants, Super. Ct. No.
21STCV07083)
v.
BEVERLY LAW et al.,
Defendants and
Respondents.
APPEAL from judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Lia Martin, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Mark B. Plummer and Mark B. Plummer for
Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Law Offices of Howard A. Kapp, Howard A. Kapp; Beverly
Law and Michael Shemtoub for Defendants and Respondents.
******
Two clients hired an attorney to represent them in a
personal injury action. By September 2017, they received letters
from the attorney reporting that he had settled the action
notwithstanding their direction that they take the case to trial.
They criticized him for mishandling the case, and had no further
communication. More than two years later, in February 2021,
they sued the attorney for legal malpractice. The trial court
dismissed the clients’ lawsuit as untimely. Because this was
correct, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts
A. The accident
In July 2012, plaintiffs Cristina Rosas and her mother
Guadalupe (the Rosas) were injured by a hit-and-run driver in a
rear-end collision in Los Angeles. At the time, Cristina1 was
starring in a martial arts film called “Kill the Dragon.” Due to
her injuries, she was unable to continue filming, which resulted
in losses both to her and to Guadalupe, who was also her
manager.
B. The original lawsuit
In June 2013, the Rosas retained Michael Shemtoub, who
does business as Beverly Law and Wilshire Law Group, to sue
the driver at fault for the accident. Shemtoub filed a complaint
on their behalf shortly thereafter (the personal injury action).
C. The settlement
In January 2017, Cristina told Shemtoub that she had
moved to Puerto Rico, and that she “d[id] not mind to have [her]
1 Because the parties share a last name, we use first names
to avoid confusion. No disrespect is intended.
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cause of action dismissed with prejudice.” Shemtoub continued
representing both Cristina and Guadalupe in the lawsuit, but
from that point forward, Guadalupe spoke on Cristina’s behalf.
On February 1, 2017, the parties filed a notice of settlement
in the personal injury action. Although Shemtoub states that
Guadalupe had authorized him, in a January 2017 phone call, to
accept settlements for $23,000 and $22,000 (for Guadalupe and
Cristina, respectively), the Rosas state that, in “mid-2017,” they
had instructed Shemtoub to reject those settlement offers and
proceed to trial to get more money—at which point Shemtoub had
told them “it would take a while” to get a trial date.
On May 23, 2017, a case manager at Beverly Law sent
Guadalupe an email providing a “status on [the] case.” The email
informed Guadalupe that Shemtoub was “waiting on the signed
settlement memo” and “waiting on [her] to sign the release so we
can receive the check from the insurance company.” Guadalupe
responded two days later, stating she had “no idea” “where we
stand” “at this point.”
On July 10, 2017, the superior court dismissed the lawsuit
pursuant to the February 2017 notice of settlement.
D. Post-settlement communications
In late August and early September 2017, respectively,
Guadalupe and Cristina received copies of letters that Beverly
Law sent to their medical providers seeking to resolve the
providers’ outstanding liens. Each letter stated that “[t]he case
settled for” and then listed the respective settlement amounts—
$23,750 for Guadalupe, and $22,000 for Cristina.
On October 11, 2017, Guadalupe sent an email to a case
manager at Beverly Law. In that email, she took issue with the
“fraudulent billings” on her and Cristina’s medical bills, said she
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would not sign a release, and stated, “[w]hatever you negotiated
is not cleared.”
Four months later, on February 27, 2018, Guadalupe sent
Shemtoub an email stating: “We have huge discrep[a]ncies as to
what you failed to disclose[]. As of today, I place you on notice to
clear this matter in [an] amicable manner. Instead, you place
deaf ears to money that you appar[e]ntly received and have failed
to deliver to us. Worst, we have never settle[d] with the
insurance . . . . You are going to be responsible for the
mishand[]ling of my case.”
There were no further commendations between Shemtoub
and the Rosas until October 2020.
E. The driver’s restitution hearing
In October 2020, the Rosas were told that the driver they
had sued had been convicted of a crime and that there would be a
restitution hearing, to which they should bring their medical bills
and receipts. When the Rosas arrived in court, the driver said
that the Rosas had already settled their claims against him with
his insurance company.
Guadalupe contacted Shemtoub, who told her that the case
had settled in 2017, with her and Cristina’s authorization.
Shemtoub claims that on January 20, 2018, his firm sent the
Rosas settlement memoranda detailing the settlement amounts
with deductions for medical bills and attorney fees, but, because
they refused to sign the memoranda and approve the
disbursements, he could not send the checks, and his “hands were
completely tied.”
After this conversation, Shemtoub sent Guadalupe a
$9,446.55 check dated July 25, 2020 for her share of the 2017
settlement. Cristina never received her share.
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II. Procedural Background
A. Complaint
The Rosas filed a complaint against Shemtoub, Beverly
Law, and Wilshire Law Group (collectively, the attorneys) on
February 19, 2021. In the operative first amended complaint,
they asserted causes of action for legal malpractice and unlawful
business practices under the Consumers Legal Remedies Act
(CLRA) (Civ. Code, § 1750 et seq.), alleging that the attorneys
settled their claims without their knowledge or permission and
kept the funds for themselves, contrary to their representations
that they were “elite” attorneys ready to try the case.2
B. Summary judgment
On February 13, 2024, Shemtoub and Beverly Law moved
for summary judgment on the grounds that the Rosas’ claims
were barred by Code of Civil Procedure3 section 340.6’s one-year
statute of limitations. In opposition, the Rosas argued that (1)
the statute of limitations had not started to run until October
2020, when they claim to have first discovered the misconduct,
and (2) the limitations period was in any event tolled until
October 2020 because they believed that Shemtoub was still
representing them, awaiting a trial date or disbursement of
settlement funds.
After holding a hearing on April 30, 2024, which the Rosas’
attorney did not attend, the trial court granted summary
judgment. The court ruled that (1) a one-year limitations period
2 The original complaint also plead a cause of action for
conversion, but the Rosas did not include that claim in the first
amended complaint.
3 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure unless otherwise indicated.
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applied to all of the Rosas’ claims, (2) the statute of limitations
began to run in February 2018 because Gaudalupe’s email that
month “evidence[d] [the Rosas’] awareness of an actual injury”
due to “a plethora of alleged wrongdoings,” and (3) the limitations
period was not tolled due to continued representation because the
Rosas “could not have a reasonable expectation that [Shemtoub
and his firm] were providing any further legal services with
regard to the settled and dismissed matter.”
The Rosas’ motion for reconsideration of this ruling was
denied on May 30, 2025.
D. Appeal
After the trial court entered judgment in favor of
Shemtoub, Beverly Law and Wilshire Law Group on October 6,
2025,4 the Rosas timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
The Rosas argue that the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment. A party is entitled to summary judgment if
it can “show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact”
and it “is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (§ 437c,
subd. (c).) A defendant moving for summary judgment may meet
this burden by showing that the undisputed facts establish “a
complete defense to the cause of action.” (Id., subd. (p)(2).) We
independently review the trial court’s order granting summary
judgment, “liberally construing the evidence in support of the
4 Default was entered against Wilshire Law Group on July
20, 2022 and set aside on May 30, 2025. The parties
subsequently stipulated that the summary judgment order apply
to Wilshire Law Group “in the same manner and to the same
extent” as to the other defendants, and Wilshire Law Group was
included in the final judgment.
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party opposing summary judgment and resolving doubts
concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Miller v.
Department of Corrections (2005) 36 Cal.4th 446, 460.)
I. Applicable Statute of Limitations
A claim for legal malpractice must be filed within (1) “one
year after the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable
diligence should have discovered, the facts constituting the
wrongful act or omission,” or (2) “four years from the date of the
wrongful act or omission”—whichever comes first. (§ 340.6, subd.
(a).) This limitations period begins to run once the plaintiff “‘has
a suspicion of wrongdoing’” (Peregrine Funding, Inc. v. Sheppard
Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 658,
685), even if the plaintiff is not yet aware of the specific facts or
legal theories underlying their claim (Bergstein v. Stroock &
Stroock & Lavan LLP (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 793, 818; Village
Nurseries v. Greenbaum (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 26, 42-43).
Section 340.6’s limitations period is tolled, however, during
any period when the attorney “continues to represent the plaintiff
regarding the specific subject matter in which the alleged
wrongful act or omission occurred.” (§ 340.6, subd. (a)(2).) The
purpose of this tolling exception is to avoid tasking clients with
rushing to the courthouse to sue their attorneys, which might
“disrupt an ongoing attorney-client relationship.” (Hensley v.
Caietti (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1165, 1171.) An attorney no longer
continues to represent a plaintiff (and the tolling exception no
longer applies) when the lawyer formally substitutes out as
counsel and simultaneously stops all work for the client (Engel v.
Pech (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1227, 1236; Shaoxing City Maolong
Wuzhong Down Products, Ltd. v. Keehn & Associates, APC (2015)
238 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1039; cf. Nguyen v. Ford (2020) 49
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Cal.App.5th 1, 13 [formal withdrawal does not terminate
relationship if attorney continues to do work for the client]), or
when the client terminates the lawyer (Wang v. Nesse (2022) 81
Cal.App.5th 428, 439). But where, as in this case, there is no
such formal severance of the relationship by the attorney or the
client, the determination of whether an attorney will be found to
be continuing to represent the client turns on whether an
objectively reasonable person in the client’s position would
believe that she had an “‘“ongoing mutual [attorney-client]
relationship”’” making it reasonable to anticipate that the
attorney would be pursuing tasks “‘“in furtherance of the
relationship”’” (in which case the tolling exception applies)
(Shaoxing City, at p. 1038; Wang, at p. 440) or, instead, an
objectively reasonable person in the client’s position would have
“‘“‘no reasonable expectation that the attorney [would] provide
further legal services’”’” to her, such as when the attorney has
“complet[ed] the tasks for which” he was retained (in which case
the tolling exception would not apply) (Nyugen, at p. 14; Wang, at
p. 440; Gonzalez v. Kalu (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 21, 28). (See
generally Hensley, at p. 1172 [“the question of representation
should be viewed from the perspective of the client”].) The test
turns on what an objectively reasonable client would believe—not
on the client’s subjective beliefs. (Nyugen, at p. 14.) Although
whether a client has a reasonable expectation that her attorney
will provide further legal services on a matter is typically a
question of fact, it may be decided on summary judgment where
the undisputed facts indicate no such reasonable expectation of
further services as a matter of law. (Kalu, at p. 31.)
This limitations period applies to any claim—regardless of
the label of the cause of action—that “necessarily depend[s] on
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proof that an attorney violated a professional obligation in the
course of providing professional services.” (Lee v. Hanley (2015)
61 Cal.4th 1225, 1236-1237; Austin v. Medicis (2018) 21
Cal.App.5th 577, 586.)
II. Analysis
The trial court properly granted summary judgment for the
attorneys based on statue of limitations grounds.
As a threshold matter, the court correctly determined that
section 340.6 applies to the Rosas’ legal malpractice and CLRA
claims because both rest on the same allegations that Shemtoub
and his firms violated professional standards.5
More to the point, the trial court properly determined that
the Rosas’ claim was barred by section 340.6’s one-year
limitations period. It is undisputed that Guadalupe, in her
February 2018 email at the latest, told Shemtoub that she
believed there were “huge discrep[a]ncies as to what [he] failed to
disclose[]” and that he had “mishand[led] . . . [her] case.” This
constitutes a suspicion of wrongdoing that started the one-year
clock ticking.
That clock was not tolled by the continuing representation
exception. To be sure, there was no formal substitution or formal
termination of the attorney-client relationship. But the
undisputed facts establish, as a matter of law, that an objectively
reasonable person in the Rosas’ position would have “no
reasonable expectation” that Shemtoub or his firm would provide
them further legal services. Although the Rosas both indicated
5 Because the Rosas decided not to pursue their conversion
claim, the holding of Lee v. Hanley (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1225, 1229-
1230 that section 340.6 does not apply to conversion claims does
not assist them.
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that they informed Shemtoub in “mid-2017” that they wished to
reject the settlement and go to trial, it is undisputed that the
Rosas subsequently received the August and September 2017
letters reporting that their “case[s had] settled.” It is undisputed
that Guadalupe’s subsequent communications expressed
displeasure about the settlement but expressed no expectation of
an upcoming trial. And it is undisputed that Shemtoub did
nothing and had no contact with the Rosas from the last email
Guadalupe sent in February 2018 until the Rosas contacted him
in the fall of 2020. An objectively reasonable client would have
no reasonable expectation that her attorney would provide
further legal services if, as happened here, (1) the attorney told
the client that he had settled the case (even if over the client’s
objection), and (2) the attorney subsequently did nothing and had
no contact with the client for the ensuing two years.
The declarations of Cristina and Guadalupe submitted in
this case indicating that they did not learn of the settlement until
October 2020 and believed that Shemtoub had been lining up a
trial date for them in the previous two-plus years are of no
moment. They reflect the Rosas’ subjective belief—and do not
create a triable issue of fact as to whether a reasonably objective
client getting notice that a case has “settled,” followed by nearly
three years of no action and no communication, would believe
that the attorney would complete additional services.
The Rosas assert that an objectively reasonable client
would believe that the attorney-client relationship was “ongoing”
until such time as the attorney sent the client the settlement
funds, such that Shemtoub’s failure to do so here means that the
tolling exception applies. We disagree. The question is whether
an objectively reasonable person in the Rosas’ position would
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expect Shemtoub to be taking further action. Here, Guadalupe—
speaking on behalf of herself and Cristina—unequivocally told
Shemtoub that they would not sign the releases, and she had
previously received an email indicating that “the check from the
insurance company” was contingent upon signing the release. No
objectively reasonable client would believe that her attorney was
undertaking a task that the client herself had rendered
impossible.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are entitled to
their costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
______________________, P. J.
HOFFSTADT
We concur:
_________________________, J.
MOOR
_________________________, J.
KIM (D.)
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