Filed 8/4/26 In re L.R. CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re L.R., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
ORANGE COUNTY SOCIAL
SERVICES AGENCY, G066508
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 24DP0678)
v. OPINION
A.O.,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Joseph Kang, Judge. Affirmed.
Christopher R. Booth, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Leon J. Page, County Counsel, and Deborah B. Morse, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
No appearance for Minor.
A.O. (Mother) appeals from the order that terminated her
parental rights and approved the permanent plan of adoption for her
daughter L.R. (the child). (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26; all undesignated
statutory references are to this code.) Mother contends the order must be
reversed because the Orange County Social Services Agency (the Agency) and
the juvenile court failed to comply with their duties under the Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA) and the California
Indian Child Welfare Act (§ 224 et seq.) (Cal-ICWA).1 We disagree and find
the court properly exercised its discretion to conclude the Agency’s ICWA
inquiry was sufficient. The order terminating Mother’s parental rights and
approving the permanent plan of adoption is therefore affirmed.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The precise details of the proceedings before the juvenile court
and facts regarding the child’s circumstances are not necessary to understand
the issue before us. To summarize, shortly after the child’s birth, the Agency
filed a child welfare petition, pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b)(1), (g),
and (j), due to concerns over parental drug abuse. At the initial petition
hearing, the child was taken into protective custody, removed from the
father’s care, and returned to Mother subject to protective orders. Thereafter,
however, the Agency filed an application for a protective custody warrant to
remove the child from Mother’s home. At the June 2024 hearing on the
amended petition, the court ordered the child removed from Mother’s care
and ordered the Agency to find suitable temporary placement for the child.
1 Because ICWA and section 224.2 use the term “Indian,” we will
do the same for consistency. But “we recognize that other terms, such as
‘Native American’ or ‘indigenous,’ are preferred by many.” (In re Benjamin M.
(2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 735, 739, fn. 1.)
2
In July 2024, Mother pleaded nolo contendere to the petition’s
allegations and the father submitted. The juvenile court declared the child a
dependent child of the court under section 360, subdivision (d), and vested
custody of the child with the Agency. Reunification services were ordered.
The child was placed with her paternal grandmother in October 2024. The
court held a six-month review hearing in December 2024 and a contested
twelve-month review hearing in August 2025 before ultimately terminating
Mother’s parental rights in January 2026. The paternal grandmother
planned to adopt the child, and the court approved the permanent plan of
adoption. While the father was initially involved in the proceedings, he
passed away in December 2024.
With respect to ICWA, the Agency’s detention report noted both
Mother and the child’s maternal grandmother denied Indian ancestry. The
father refused to participate. At the initial May 2024 detention hearing, the
juvenile court ordered the Agency to investigate the applicability of ICWA.
During this hearing, the court also made a direct ICWA inquiry as to both
Mother and the father. Neither stated a reason to believe the child was or
may be an Indian child. The court deferred making a finding as to the
applicability of ICWA at the time. During a subsequent June 2024 detention
hearing, the court continued to defer making a finding on the applicability of
ICWA. The court asked Mother whether there was an update suggesting a
reason to believe the child was an Indian child and Mother responded there
was not. At the July 2024 jurisdiction hearing, the court found ICWA did not
apply but noted the Agency’s inquiry duty under ICWA was to continue.
Finally, in January 2026, at the hearing terminating Mother’s parental
rights, the court again found ICWA did not apply.
3
Prior to the juvenile court’s determination, and throughout the
period of inquiry, the Agency documented asking Mother about the
applicability of ICWA on four occasions in May, June, July, and December
2024. Mother consistently denied having any reason to believe the child was
an Indian child and denied knowledge of any Indian heritage in her family.
Before his death, the father completed a parental notification of Indian status
form (ICWA-020) and denied the child was an Indian child. The Agency also
documented asking the father about ICWA applicability on four occasions in
June, July, October, and December 2024. The father denied having any
reason to believe the child was an Indian child and denied knowledge of any
Indian heritage in his family.
In addition to Mother and the father, the Agency documented
contacting extended family on both sides of the child’s family—specifically,
the child’s maternal grandmother, maternal aunt, maternal uncle, paternal
grandmother, and paternal aunt. These individual inquiries were completed
prior to the juvenile court’s July 2024 determination that ICWA did not
apply. Each relative denied Indian heritage. None of the child’s relatives
provided any information suggesting any other family members might
provide different information.2
2 The child’s maternal grandfather was reported to have died
prior to the initiation of these proceedings.
4
The record reflects the child also has a maternal half sister,
paternal half sister, and paternal cousin. The maternal half sister and
paternal half sister are both under the age of 18. The child’s paternal cousin
is over 18 years of age.3 The Agency had contact with the paternal cousin on
at least two occasions in April and May 2025 during supervised visits with
the child. There is no indication the Agency asked these relatives whether
they had any reason to believe the child is an Indian child.
DISCUSSION
Mother contends the juvenile court erred when it determined
ICWA did not apply because the Agency did not fulfill its duty to investigate
all available extended family members.
I.
ICWA DUTY TO INVESTIGATE EXTENDED FAMILY MEMBERS
Congress enacted ICWA to “‘formalize[] federal policy relating to
the placement of Indian children outside the family home.’” (In re Dezi C.
(2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1124–1125 (Dezi C.).) Among other things, ICWA
established hierarchical placement preferences “which apply to all custody
proceedings involving Indian children” (Haaland v. Brackeen (2023) 599 U.S.
255, 267) and are designed “to keep Indian children connected to Indian
families.” (Id. at p. 265.) After it was passed, “California struggled to comply
with ICWA” and Cal-ICWA was passed to “‘affirm ICWA’s purposes’” and
“‘mandate compliance with ICWA.’” (Dezi C., supra, at p. 1130.) “ICWA and
Cal-ICWA are unique statutory schemes that are intended to protect Native
American heritage, cultural connections between tribes and children of
3 The record does not reflect the age of the paternal cousin, but
the Agency’s brief concedes the cousin is over 18 years old.
5
Native American ancestry, the best interests of Indian children, and the
stability and security of Indian tribes and families.” (Id. at p. 1125.)
Section 224.2 of Cal-ICWA therefore “codifies and expands on
ICWA’s duty of inquiry to determine whether a child is an Indian child.” (Dezi
C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1131.) The juvenile courts and child welfare
agencies have an “affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether a child
... is or may be an Indian child” in child welfare cases. (§ 224.2, subd. (a).)
“Child welfare agencies discharge this state law duty by ‘asking the child,
parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members, others
who have an interest in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or
neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child and where the child,
the parents, or Indian custodian is domiciled.’” (Dezi C., at p. 1125.)
Cal-ICWA makes clear who constitutes extended family within
the meaning of the law. “‘Extended family member’” is defined to have “the
same meaning as defined by the law or custom of the Indian child’s tribe or,
in the absence of such law or custom, shall be a person who has reached 18
years of age and who is the Indian child’s grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother
or sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second
cousin, or stepparent.” (§ 224.1, subd. (c)(1).)
Courts have reviewed “whether the child welfare agency has
engaged in a ‘proper and adequate further inquiry and due diligence as
required’ … for an abuse of discretion.” (In re C.L. (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 53,
66 (C.L.).) Our Supreme Court held in Dezi C., “[A]n inadequate Cal-ICWA
inquiry requires conditional reversal of the juvenile court’s order terminating
parental rights with directions to the agency to conduct an adequate inquiry,
supported by record documentation.” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1125.)
While the court in Dezi C. did not decide the appropriate standard of review
6
or what constitutes an adequate ICWA inquiry, the court noted, “[T]he
juvenile court’s fact-specific determination that an inquiry is adequate,
proper, and duly diligent is ‘a quintessentially discretionary function.’”
(Dezi C., at p. 1141.) Thus, “[o]n a well-developed record, the court has
relatively broad discretion to determine whether the agency’s inquiry was
proper, adequate, and duly diligent on the specific facts of the case,” but “the
less developed the record, the more limited that discretion necessarily
becomes.” (Ibid.) The court further advised, if the court’s determination
ICWA does not apply is “supported by sufficient evidence and record
documentation,” then conditional reversal is not required “even if the agency
did not inquire of everyone who has an interest in the child.” (Ibid.)
II.
ADEQUACY OF THE ICWA EXTENDED FAMILY INQUIRY
Mother contends the ICWA inquiry was inadequate because the
child’s maternal half sister, paternal half sister, and paternal cousin were not
questioned as part of the Agency’s ICWA inquiry. However, because neither
the maternal half sister nor the paternal half sister is over the age of 18, they
are not “‘[e]xtended family’” within the meaning of section 224.1, subdivision
(c)(1).4 The paternal cousin, however, is an extended family member within
4 Mother does not contend there is any “law or custom of the
Indian child’s tribe” impacting the definition of “ ‘[e]xtended family’” here.
(§ 224.1, subd. (c)(1).) However, Mother appears to argue the child’s maternal
half sister and paternal half sister have an interest in the child and therefore
should have been included in the ICWA inquiry regardless of their age. The
child’s maternal half sister is approximately four years old. The child’s
paternal half sister is approximately 15 years old. Notably the maternal half
sister is herself subject to a separate ICWA inquiry which is discussed in the
record and does not suggest she is an Indian child. Mother does not explain
the nature of the claimed interest the half sisters have in the child such that
it falls within the meaning of section 224.2, subdivision (b)(2). The argument
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the meaning of ICWA, and the Agency, despite having contact with this
cousin, did not question the cousin about the applicability of ICWA. There is,
however, no bright-line rule an ICWA inquiry is automatically inadequate if
it omits an extended family member. (See Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p.
1141.) Rather, we must evaluate the adequacy of the inquiry based on the
specific facts and how developed the record is before us. (Ibid.)
In arguing the ICWA inquiry here was inadequate, Mother cites
authority such as In re Y.W. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 542 emphasizing the
necessity of a broad extended family inquiry because “parents may not know
their possible relationship with or connection to an Indian tribe.” (Id. at p.
554.) We agree it is important for any ICWA inquiry to address “the realities
of generational loss of information.” (C.L., supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at p. 70.)
But this reality counsels in favor of ensuring “available extended family
members in the older generations” are consulted as part of the ICWA inquiry.
(Ibid., italics added.) That appears to have taken place here. Moreover, the
“older generations” category is not one encompassing the child’s paternal
cousin or any of the extended family members at issue. (Ibid.)
We infer from the record the paternal aunt, who was asked about
ICWA, was the paternal cousin’s mother. We also infer the paternal
grandmother, with whom the child is placed and who was also consulted, is
the paternal cousin’s grandmother. Accordingly, while the paternal cousin
was not individually asked about ICWA, the paternal cousin’s mother and
grandmother were. Both denied knowledge of any Indian heritage or any
is also not supported by citation to authority, let alone authority finding the
failure to ask a minor child about the possible applicability of ICWA renders
an ICWA inquiry deficient. Accordingly, we find the argument unsupported
and waived. (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408.)
8
reason to believe the child was an Indian child. Additionally, we note the
maternal side of the family was explored through inquiries to the child’s
maternal grandmother, maternal aunt, and maternal uncle.
The ICWA inquiry here is similar to C.L. where the juvenile court
found substantial evidence supported the court’s finding ICWA did not apply
because the ICWA inquiry included “all available extended family members
in the older generations, namely the paternal grandmother, the maternal
great uncle, and in further interviews with the maternal grandmother.” (C.L.,
supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at p. 70.) The omission of the child’s maternal uncle
in C.L. did not negate the “substantial evidence supporting the juvenile
court’s implied and express findings” ICWA did not apply. (Id. at p. 69.)5
Likewise here, the omission of the child’s paternal cousin did not
render the ICWA inquiry inadequate or the juvenile court’s conclusion ICWA
did not apply unsupported by sufficient evidence. The Agency’s inquiry
reasonably encompassed the child’s maternal and paternal extended family.
The record is well-developed and, accordingly, we find the court properly
exercised its discretion to find ICWA did not apply.
5 The circumstances here are therefore unlike In re Claudia R.
(2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 76 where the inquiry was inadequate because the
omission of extended family members left “unexplored two branches of the
children’s family tree.” (Id. at p. 81.)
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DISPOSITION
The order terminating Mother’s parental rights and approving
the permanent plan of adoption is affirmed.
MOTOIKE, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
GOODING, J.
SCOTT, J.
10
