Filed 7/29/26 Bennett v. Sacramento County Public Defender’s Office CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
AUSTIN BENNETT, C102484
Plaintiff and Appellant,
(Super. Ct. No. 23CV005471)
v.
SACRAMENTO COUNTY PUBLIC
DEFENDER’S OFFICE et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
As this court explained in a related appeal (Bennett v. Jakubowski (Mar. 9, 2026,
C102483) [nonpub. opn.] (Bennett)), Austin Bennett was charged with misdemeanor
battery based on allegations that he pushed a California state senator in August 2019.1 In
March 2022, a court commissioner declared a doubt as to Bennett’s mental competence
to stand trial. (Ibid.) Bennett objected that a clinical psychologist’s report was without
legal or factual basis, but the trial court found Bennett mentally incompetent to stand trial
based on the report and the testimony of witnesses at a competency hearing. (Ibid.) The
criminal charges against Bennett were subsequently dismissed.
Bennett filed the instant civil action against defendants Sacramento County Public
Defender’s Office, individual public defenders Amanda Founi, Amanda Massimini, and
1 Bennett stated during oral argument in this appeal that he pushed Richard Pan.
1
Juan Contreras (collectively Public Defenders), the Superior Court of Sacramento County
(Superior Court), and others. Among other things, the operative complaint alleged that
the Public Defenders failed to challenge the competency hearing procedures, and it
sought an order vacating the finding of incompetence. The Public Defenders and
Superior Court filed demurrers asserting several grounds, including that the trial court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Bennett’s claims.
The trial court sustained the demurrers without leave to amend, concluding that it
lacked subject matter jurisdiction because a civil court could not exercise jurisdiction
over criminal cases and decisions. The trial court added that “even if there was some
level of jurisdiction as to a part” of plaintiff’s case, those claims were barred by the
doctrines of judicial and quasi-judicial immunity and the litigation privilege set forth in
Civil Code section 47.
Bennett appeals from the order sustaining the demurrers.2 In his opening brief
he asserted that the trial court made “merits determinations” regarding immunity and
privilege after determining that it lacked authority to adjudicate. Bennett argued
“jurisdiction is a threshold question,” the trial court’s “binding merits determinations”
were “entered without power,” its determinations “exceeded the court’s authority,”
and its order was “ultra vires and void.” He claimed: “Jurisdiction is the foundation
of judicial power. When it is absent, restraint is not optional, it is mandatory.”
2 Bennett’s notice of appeal purports to appeal from a judgment of dismissal, but
although there is a notice of entry of judgment or order, there is no signed judgment
of dismissal. As we have done in a closely related case, Bennett, supra, C102483, we
will deem the order sustaining the demurrers as incorporating a judgment of dismissal
and will review the order. (See Melton v. Boustred (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 521, 527,
fn. 1 [while an order sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend is not appealable, an
appellate court may treat the order as incorporating an appealable judgment of dismissal
when the trial court has sustained a demurrer to all of the complaint’s causes of action,
since all that is left to make the order appealable is the formality of the entry of a
dismissal order or judgment].)
2
According to Bennett, he asked “only that the judgment be reversed because it was
entered without authority.” He claimed oral argument in this court would assist “in
addressing the threshold jurisdictional defect presented in this appeal … .” In his reply
brief, he stated: “A court without jurisdiction may dismiss; it may not adjudicate. Those
are distinct acts. The defect is not the dismissal itself, but the exercise of judicial power
beyond jurisdiction.”
We disagree that the trial court made merits determinations on causes of action
over which it determined it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Because Bennett appears
to urge that the trial court lacked jurisdiction, and because he has not met his burden to
show that the trial court erred or that there is a reasonable likelihood he could amend his
complaint to state a cause of action, we will affirm the trial court’s order sustaining
defendants’ demurrers without leave to amend, which we deem to incorporate a judgment
of dismissal.
BACKGROUND
Bennett filed a complaint in the Superior Court of Sacramento County against the
Public Defenders and others, and later filed an amended complaint--the operative
complaint--that added the Superior Court as a named defendant. The complaint alleged
as follows: During misdemeanor criminal proceedings against Bennett, a doubt was
declared as to Bennett’s competence to stand trial. The trial court suspended criminal
proceedings and ordered an evaluation of Bennett’s competence. A psychologist
prepared and submitted to the trial court a report opining that Bennett lacked the requisite
mental competence to stand trial. Bennett was never shown the report and was not given
a competency trial. The prosecutor, defense attorney, and trial court agreed that Bennett
was not competent to stand trial. Thereafter, the criminal charges against Bennett were
dismissed. Bennett obtained a copy of the psychologist’s report and determined it was
fraudulent. The psychologist who wrote the report subsequently admitted she had
confused Bennett with another patient.
3
The amended complaint asserted numerous causes of action.3 It generally alleged
that the Public Defenders failed to challenge the competency hearing procedures or
provide Bennett with a copy of the psychologist’s report, and deceived judicial officers
by failing to challenge the report’s validity. The amended complaint sought
compensatory, special, and punitive damages, pre- and post-judgment interest, and an
order vacating the finding of incompetence.
The Public Defenders and the Superior Court filed demurrers to the amended
complaint, arguing in part that the amended complaint was subject to dismissal because
the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Bennett’s claims. The trial court
sustained the demurrers without leave to amend, concluding that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction because a civil court could not exercise jurisdiction over criminal cases and
decisions. The trial court added that “even if there was some level of jurisdiction as to a
part” of plaintiff’s case, those claims were barred by the doctrines of judicial and quasi-
judicial immunity and the litigation privilege set forth in Civil Code section 47. The trial
court denied leave to amend because it was not reasonable to expect that Bennett could
allege additional facts to state a viable cause of action against defendants.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the challenged pleading. (Milligan v.
Golden Gate Bridge Highway & Transportation Dist. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1, 5.)
3 The causes of action included (1) legal malpractice, (2) intentional infliction of
emotional distress, (3) negligent infliction of emotional distress, (4) abuse of process,
(5) fraud and intentional deceit, (6) constructive fraud, (7) negligent misrepresentation,
(8) defamation, (9) libel, (10) slander, (11) false light, (12) breach of fiduciary duty by
attorney, (13) personal injury, (14) negligent undertaking, (15) negligent hiring, retention,
and supervision, (16) public entity failure to discharge a mandatory duty, (17) public
entity acts and omissions of employees, (18) gross negligence, (19) negligence, (20) loss
of consortium, (21) intentional misrepresentation, (22) concealment, (23) conversion, and
(24) violation of the Bane Act.
4
We independently evaluate the pleading, construing it liberally, giving it a reasonable
interpretation, reading it as a whole and viewing its parts in context. (Blank v. Kirwan
(1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318 (Blank); Milligan, at pp. 5-6.) We presume the truth of all
properly pleaded allegations (Heckart v. A-1 Self Storage, Inc. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 749,
753), and we determine de novo whether the factual allegations of the challenged
pleading are adequate to state a cause of action under any legal theory (Milligan, at p. 6).
The appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that the demurrer was sustained
erroneously. (Friends of Shingle Springs Interchange, Inc. v. County of El Dorado
(2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1485 (Friends of Shingle Springs Interchange, Inc).)
“ ‘The judgment must be affirmed “if any one of the several grounds of demurrer is well
taken.” ’ ” (Genesis Environmental Services v. San Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution
Control Dist. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 597, 603 (Genesis Environmental Services).)
We review a trial court’s decision to deny leave to amend for abuse of discretion.
(Blank, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 318.) If the challenged pleading could be amended to state
a cause of action, the trial court abused its discretion in denying leave to amend and we
will reverse; if not, there has been no abuse of discretion and we will affirm. (Ibid.) “It
is the plaintiff’s burden on appeal to show in what manner it would be possible to amend
a complaint to change the legal effect of the pleading; we otherwise presume the pleading
has stated its allegations as favorably as possible.” (Fuller v. First Franklin Financial
Corp. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 955, 962, fn. omitted.) “To meet this burden, a plaintiff
must submit a proposed amended complaint or, on appeal, enumerate the facts and
demonstrate how those facts establish a cause of action. [Citations.] Absent such a
showing, the appellate court cannot assess whether or not the trial court abused its
discretion by denying leave to amend.” (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992)
4 Cal.App.4th 857, 890.)
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DISCUSSION
Bennett contends the trial court erred in making merits determinations after it
determined that it lacked jurisdiction.
For a court to consider a plaintiff’s claims, it must have subject matter jurisdiction
over those claims. (Lefebvre v. Southern California Edison (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 143,
151.) “ ‘The principle of “subject matter jurisdiction” relates to the inherent authority of
the court involved to deal with the case or matter before it.’ [Citation.] Thus, in the
absence of subject matter jurisdiction, a trial court has no power ‘to hear or determine
[the] case.’ [Citation.] And any judgment or order rendered by a court lacking subject
matter jurisdiction is ‘void on its face … .’ ” (Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino
(2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 196.) For this reason “ ‘an alleged lack of subject matter
jurisdiction must be addressed whenever it comes to a court’s attention.’ [Citation.]
Moreover, it ordinarily is addressed as a threshold matter, as its absence deprives the
court of authority to adjudicate the merits of the dispute.” (Lefebvre, at p. 152.) Lack of
subject matter jurisdiction is an appropriate basis for sustaining a demurrer. (See, e.g.,
Holiday Matinee, Inc. v. Rambus, Inc. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1413, 1427.)
Bennett argues the trial court should not have made merits determinations
regarding immunity and privilege after determining that it lacked authority to adjudicate.
But we disagree that the trial court made merits determinations on causes of action over
which it determined it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court made a clear
distinction, stating that “even if there was some level of jurisdiction as to a part” of
plaintiff’s case, those claims were barred by the doctrines of judicial and quasi-judicial
immunity and the litigation privilege.
Bennett’s apparent urging that the trial court lacked jurisdiction, and his failure to
show that the trial court erred or that there is a reasonable likelihood he could amend his
complaint to state a cause of action, are dispositive in this appeal. (See Friends of
Shingle Springs Interchange, Inc., supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 1485 [appellant bears the
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burden of demonstrating error]; In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408 [“appellant
must present meaningful legal analysis supported by citations to authority and citations to
facts in the record that support the claim of error”]; Genesis Environmental Services,
supra, 113 Cal.App.4th at p. 603 [judgment must be affirmed if any ground for demurrer
is well-taken]; Fuller, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 962 [plaintiff must show how it
would be possible to amend the complaint]; see also Bennett, supra, C102483 [no trial
court error regarding determinations of immunity and privilege; no showing by Bennett
of how the complaint could be amended].)
DISPOSITION
The order sustaining defendants’ demurrers without leave to amend, which
we deem to incorporate a judgment of dismissal, is affirmed.
/S/
MAURO, J.
We concur:
/S/
ROBIE, Acting P. J.
/S/
MESIWALA, J.
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