Filed 7/30/26 In re A.D. CA2/4
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re A.D., B336356

a Person Coming Under the (Los Angeles County
Juvenile Court Law. Super. Ct. Nos. 23CCJP04283,
23CCJP04283A)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

Y.D. et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Mary E. Kelly, Judge. Affirmed.
Sean Angele Burleigh, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Appellant Mother.
 Paul Couenhoven, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Appellant Father.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County
Counsel, Brian Mahler, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Janette Freeman Cochran, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Respondent Minor.
____________________
INTRODUCTION
Mother Y.D. challenges the juvenile court’s order exercising jurisdiction
over her six-year-old son, A., under Welfare and Institutions Code section
300, subdivision (b).1 Mother and A.’s father, I.D., both challenge the juvenile
court’s disposition ruling removing A. from mother’s care and placing A. with
father, and continuing jurisdiction over A. We find no error, and therefore
affirm.2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Detention
A. was born in July 2017. According to an assessment in 2023, he was
“non-verbal in diapers, can’t feed himself, ... and he has ga[it] problems.” The
Regional Center diagnosed A. with “intellectual disability,” and at school he

1 All undesignated section references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.

2 This court issued an opinion in this matter on August 29, 2025
affirming the juvenile court’s orders. Mother sought review in the California
Supreme Court, which granted review and stayed the matter. The Supreme
Court decided In re S.R. (2025) 18 Cal.5th 1042 (S.R.) and transferred the
matter back to this court with directions to vacate the prior decision and
reconsider the cause in light of S.R. Mother filed a supplemental brief
following transfer, which we have considered.
2
qualified for the “severely handicapped” program. A. was attending a school
on an out-of-district permit, but the school was not able to meet A.’s needs
and he was disenrolled.
In October 2023, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and
Family Services (DCFS) received a referral stating that A. might be a victim
of physical abuse by mother.3
A children’s social worker (CSW) met with mother on October 30, 2023.
Mother was upset about the referral and asked who was “making things up”
about her.
Mother admitted that she said she sometimes wanted to “kill” A. but
said she never meant it. She said she was going through a lot, and “I am a
human being, I have the right to feel overwhelmed, anxious and depressed
but that doesn’t mean I cannot take care of my son.” The CSW “explained to
mother that the statements she made about ‘wanting to kill her son’ are not
being taken lightly [and] with a combination of statements of feeling
depressed and overwhelmed raised concerns for the Department for her
ability to parent child [A.] an Autistic non-verbal child.” The CSW asked
mother to take a psychological examination, but mother refused because she
said she was planning to be a surrogate mother and she was concerned that a
psychological evaluation could interfere with that plan.
A. had been referred to the Regional Center in 2019 for developmental
delays, but he was not currently receiving any services, and mother could not
recall when A. last received services. When the CSW expressed the
importance of A. receiving services, mother said, “You are asking me to do so

3 There had been previous referrals of abuse and neglect in February
2019, September 2021, January 2022, and June 2023; each was deemed
“inconclusive.”
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much and right now I feel overwhelmed so you’re going to have to give me
time.” Mother also told the CSW she was being evicted and had to move out
of her apartment in less than two weeks. The CSW gave mother information
about housing support.
The CSW noted that A. was “comfortable and happy” with mother, and
he had no marks or bruises. A. was minimally verbal, and would point and
make sounds to get mother’s attention. Mother refused to sign forms to allow
DCFS to access A.’s medical records.
An academic counselor at the community college mother attended
reported that she had been mother’s counselor for about two years. Mother
had recently dropped all of her classes. The counselor said mother showed
signs of depression and had been suicidal, but she did not have a plan to
carry it out. Mother had told the counselor that sometimes “I feel like
killing” A., but mother “quickly retracted her statement with, ‘I mean, I
would never do that. It is just overwhelming.’” The counselor’s colleague
reported that mother said she wanted to put A. up for adoption.
The CSW texted mother on two weeks later to ask how she was doing,
check about finding housing, and to ask about a psychological evaluation.
Mother responded, “I’m overwhelmed. And I just feel like I don’t want to do
anything with my life anymore. I would like the help for the evaluation.”
When the CSW met with mother at the DCFS office on November 21,
2023, mother said she was homeless and started to cry. Mother said A. was
still not enrolled in school and was not receiving any services. Mother said
she did not like schools in Los Angeles Unified School District and wanted to
continue trying to get A. enrolled in an out-of-district school. Mother said she
was angry at father and thought he was having a romantic relationship with

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A.’s former behavioral therapist. Mother also said, “I don’t want to kill
myself, it’s just thoughts but I don’t have a plan.”
The CSW told mother that four things were needed for DCFS to close
the investigation: a psychological evaluation to address mother’s statements
about her depression and harming A., confirmation that A. was up to date on
his medical care, reinstatement of services for A., and for A. to be enrolled in
school. Mother said, “It’s too much. I am overwhelmed and you people need
to give me time.” Mother declined to sign the form for a psychological
evaluation. Mother initially agreed to take a drug and alcohol test, but after
the CSW texted mother the relevant information, mother replied that she
should not have to do “all these things” just because someone lied about her.
The CSW spoke with father by phone. Father said he had no concerns
about mother’s mental health or A.’s safety in mother’s care. A.’s daycare
provider said she had no concerns about mother abusing or neglecting A. The
daycare provider said mother was “very involved” and asked appropriate
questions when she picked up A. She also said that only mother drops off
and picks up A.; she had never met father.
On November 29, 2023 the Regional Center service coordinator told the
CSW that A. had not had services since July 2023. Mother had canceled and
rescheduled multiple appointments. When the coordinator tried to schedule
a meeting with mother, mother said “I cannot think right now.” Mother had
also accused the Regional Center of reporting her to DCFS.
The CSW spoke with Ms. S., the principal of A.’s former school. Ms. S.
said there were “a lot of concerns” about A., and that mother was “very
unstable” and “a very difficult person to work with.” A. had been enrolled in
the school “as a speech only kid,” but testing revealed that he “qualified for
the severely handicapped program because he has a lot of needs.” School

5
staff tried “to get the mother to meet with them to discuss their concerns”
about A. needing additional services, but “mother was not receptive to their
observations and refused to engage with them.... When the school staff was
finally able to talk to the mother about the minor being evaluated and
scheduling an IEP, the mother refused to sign the IEP which included
services such as speech and occupational therapy. Ms. S[.] indicated that
when the mother finally agreed to sign the IEP it was nearly two months
after the meeting,” at which point the school “was impacted and would not be
able to service the minor.” Ms. S. said that mother was provided with
relevant paperwork, and “[a]ll [mother] had to do was take the paperwork to
her home district and by law that district was obligated to meet her child’s
educational needs.” Mother then “blew up all our emails,” sending “very
erratic, very irrational” emails “at all hours of the night.” Mother complained
to the district and was kicked out of the district office.
Ms. S. said that mother also engaged in “constant yelling and abusing
[the] school staff in front of [A.], belittling [the] campus staff and belittling
[the] office managers.” Ms. S. described an incident between mother and
another parent. The incident started with a verbal altercation, then, with A.
in the car, mother backed into the other parent’s car before driving away.
Two weeks later, mother yelled at the same parent again, threatening to
follow the parent home and saying, “[Y]ou are going to see what happens
because you disrespected me.” Ms. S. “informed mother ... that her permit for
her child to attend school was in jeopardy. At that point, finally [mother]
calmed down.” Mother was then banned from the school campus for two
weeks, but she violated the ban by going to the school before the two-week
period ended.

6
 On December 1, 2023, mother enrolled A. at a different school. The
CSW spoke with an office secretary at the school on December 6. The
secretary said mother brought A. to school in a wet diaper and dirty clothing;
A. looked like he had just woken up. The secretary said the district was
working with mother to provide clothing, housing, and diapers.
On December 8, 2023, the juvenile court ordered that A. be detained
from mother’s care. On December 11, A. was placed with father who had just
moved to New York with his girlfriend. Mother then sent a series of text
messages to the CSW that included statements such as, “You will pay later in
the future. I will get my son back. I never ever did anything to my child and
never abuse[d] him. There is no pro[of] and definitely there’s war between
you and me you bitch!!” Mother also called the CSW a “miserable bitch” and
said, “Hope you go to hell!! And you will.”
When a different CSW spoke with mother on December 12, mother
ranted about how the first CSW was “corrupt” and a “dirt bag.” Mother said
the first CSW had “brainwashed” father, and that karma would get her.
When the second CSW asked if mother wanted to leave a message for the
first CSW, mother said to tell her, “Fuck you, fuck yourself. [The first CSW’s
name] will be on her tombstone. Someone will murder her,” and mother
laughed. When the second CSW asked if mother was threatening the first
CSW, mother said, “Not me, someone will murder her. Fuck her.” Mother
also threatened that she would “do everything to take [the first CSW’s] child.”
On December 13, 2023, DCFS filed a juvenile dependency petition
under section 300, subdivision (b)(1). Allegation b-1 asserted that A. had
been diagnosed with intellectual disabilities but mother had medically
neglected him by failing to follow up with the Regional Center since July
2023. Allegation b-2 asserted that mother had a history of mental and

7
emotional problems, including depression, suicidal ideation, homicidal
ideation, anxiety, “paranoid and erratic behavior, and volatile and unstable
behavior,” which interfered with her ability to care for A. Allegation b-3
asserted that mother created a dangerous situation for A. by engaging in a
verbal altercation with another parent at A.’s school, hitting the other
parent’s car with her own while A. was in the car, and engaging in verbal
altercations with school staff.
At hearings on December 28 and 29, 2023, the juvenile court found a
prima facie basis for detention.
B. Jurisdiction
According to the jurisdiction/disposition report filed on January 24,
2024, A. was living with father in New York. When the DCFS investigator
asked father about closing the case with an order granting father full
custody, father said it was not his goal to get full or partial custody of A., and
he thought A. should be with mother. Father “did not know where to take
the minor for medical attention [or dental care] and stated, ‘he looks fine to
me.’” A. was not enrolled in any therapy, services, or school in New York.
When asked about the petition allegations, father said he was not aware that
mother had not obtained services for A.
At an interview on January 19, 2024, mother denied the allegation that
A. stopped receiving services. She said that A. was getting speech and
occupational therapy at his school. However, mother later said that the
school “never gave my son the services that he needed.” Mother denied she
had mental health issues such as depression, anxiety, paranoia, or erratic
behavior. She denied ever saying she wanted to kill herself or A. Mother
also said she did not get a psychological evaluation because the CSW told her
it was voluntary, and mother was already seeing a therapist at her college.

8
 The Regional Center coordinator said that school-age children typically
get services in school, but the Regional Center offers “supportive services
such as Case Management, assistance applying for SSI, school enrollments,
and ABA Services” if not otherwise provided. The coordinator said that
mother refused services, was uncooperative, and accused the coordinator of
reporting mother to DCFS.
An addendum report filed February 7, 2024, stated that father, “after
having time to reconsider” his position regarding A., decided it was in A.’s
best interest for father to have custody. Father made an intake appointment
for A. at his local Regional Center in New York; the appointment was set for
June. Father had also taken A. to medical and dental appointments, and A.
was enrolled in school, where he would receive speech and occupational
therapy. During a visit, the CSW observed that A. appeared to be happy and
comfortable living with father, his partner, and the partner’s family
members.
Mother was having monitored video visits with A.; she was on time,
consistent, engaged, and affectionate with A. Mother had enrolled in anger
management and parenting courses, and had completed one class in each
course. Mother also submitted a letter from a therapist at the community
college stating that mother was meeting with him “regularly.”
At the jurisdiction hearing on February 8, 2024, counsel for mother
asked the court to dismiss the petition for insufficient evidence. Counsel for
A. asked that the petition be sustained, and counsel for DCFS joined A.’s
argument. Father’s counsel did not take a position. The juvenile court
amended the petition to remove the allegation about mother saying she
wanted to kill A. because mother had “immediately retracted the statement,”
and sustained the petition as amended.

9
 The court ordered mother to participate in parenting classes and
individual counseling, and ordered mother to complete a psychological
evaluation.
C. Disposition
A last-minute information filed March 25, 2024 stated that father, his
girlfriend, and A. moved back to California and were living in Orange
County. A. had been enrolled in school and was receiving special education
services in school. Connection with the appropriate Regional Center office
was pending.
The last-minute information stated that mother sent DCFS a copy of an
evaluation for psychotropic medications; it is a photograph of a two-page
handwritten paper and is largely illegible. Mother had attended a therapy
intake appointment in January and had attended a single therapy session in
February. When the CSW told mother that her therapy sessions should be
weekly instead of monthly, mother “was skeptical.” Mother had attended one
parenting class.
Mother had in-person monitored visitation with A. after his return to
California; she was affectionate and caring with A. However, toward the
CSW mother was “reactive and [took] offense easily.” When A. cried about
leaving mother, mother “lacked the ability to understand” A.’s reaction, and
instead began asking A. if the CSW hit him or touched him inappropriately.
At the disposition hearing on March 28, 2024, mother’s counsel asked
that A. be returned to mother’s care and the case be closed, or in the
alternative that the case remain open with mother’s visitation advancing to
unmonitored visits. Father’s counsel asked that the case be closed with an
order granting custody to father, who was nonoffending. A.’s counsel argued
against unmonitored visitation for mother due to her “volatile” behavior in

10
A.’s presence and lack of progress in her case plan. A.’s counsel also asked
that the case remain open because A. had special needs that were not being
met because A. was not yet receiving Regional Center services. The court
suggested that it might be “premature” to close the case because father just
moved back to California and he was still trying to get A. enrolled in services.
DCFS’s counsel also requested that the case be closed with an order for
custody to father.
The court found clear and convincing evidence to support A.’s removal
from mother. The court expressed concern about closing the case before A.
was connected with appropriate Regional Center services, and therefore
found that conditions warranted continued jurisdiction. The court set a
hearing for September 25, 2024.4
Mother and father each timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Mother challenges the court’s jurisdiction ruling and disposition order
removing A. from her care. Father challenges the court’s disposition order to
keep the case open rather than close the case with an exit order granting
custody to him. DCFS asserts that the jurisdiction ruling should be affirmed,
and the disposition order removing A. from mother’s care should be affirmed;
DCFS takes no position on father’s challenge to the disposition ruling. A.
asserts that the jurisdiction and disposition rulings should be affirmed in full.

4 A. filed a request for judicial notice in this court attaching minute
orders from the juvenile court dated May 2, 2024, September 25, 2024, and
January 6, 2025, citing Evidence Code sections 452, subdivision (d) and 459.
A. did not explain why he was seeking judicial notice or how these documents
might be relevant to this appeal. A.s’ request is therefore denied. (See, e.g.,
In re R.M. (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 240, 246, fn. 4 [“‘a litigant must
demonstrate that the matter as to which judicial notice is sought is both
relevant to and helpful toward resolving the matters before this court’”].)
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 “‘In reviewing the jurisdictional findings and the disposition, we look to
see if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports them.
[Citation.] In making this determination, we draw all reasonable inferences
from the evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency court;
we review the record in the light most favorable to the court’s
determinations; and we note that issues of fact and credibility are the
province of the trial court.’” (In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633.)
A. Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b)(1) is appropriate when
“[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will
suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of any of the following: [¶]
(A) The failure or inability of the child’s parent or guardian to adequately
supervise or protect the child. [¶] ... [¶] (C) The willful or negligent failure
of the parent or guardian to provide the child with adequate food, clothing,
shelter, or medical treatment. [¶] (D) The inability of the parent or guardian
to provide regular care for the child due to the parent’s or guardian’s mental
illness, developmental disability, or substance abuse.”
Mother contends the jurisdiction order is not supported by substantial
evidence. She challenges each of the three jurisdictional findings: allegation
b-1, alleging that mother “medically neglected” A. by failing to obtain
Regional Center services; allegation b-2, alleging that mother’s mental and
emotional problems placed A. at risk of harm; and allegation b-3, relating to
the hit-and-run incident at A.’s school. We address mother’s contentions on
allegations b-1 and b-2.5

5 Because we find jurisdiction was appropriate under allegations b-1 and
b-2, mother’s contentions regarding allegation b-3 are moot. (See, e.g., In re
D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 283 [“the principle that ‘[d]ependency jurisdiction
attaches to a child, not to his or her parent’ [citation], means that ‘“[a]s long
12
 1. Allegation b-1
Allegation b-1 asserted that A. had an “intellectual disability” and was
“severely handicapped,” and that mother “medically neglected the child by
failing to follow up with Regional Center services since 07/20/2023, for
recommended speech and occupational therapy,” which placed A. at risk of
serious physical harm. Mother contends this allegation was not supported by
substantial evidence.
First we address mother’s mootness argument. This court’s August 29,
2025 opinion affirmed the juvenile court’s jurisdiction finding as to allegation
b-2, and found the remaining two allegations moot. (See ante, fns. 2 & 4.)
Following transfer from the Supreme Court, mother argues that under the
reasoning of S.R., supra, 18 Cal.5th 1042, her arguments as to allegation b-1
are not moot.
S.R. stated that “a parent’s appeal from a juvenile court’s jurisdictional
finding survives a mootness challenge where the parent shows that an agency
must report the allegation underlying the court’s finding for inclusion in the
CACI.” (S.R., supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 1048.) Substantiated findings must be
included in CACI when they amount to “severe neglect”; findings of “general
neglect” are not included. (See Pen. Code, § 11169, subd. (a); In re Emily L.
(2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 1, 14.)
Mother argues that medical neglect, as alleged in allegation b-1, can
qualify as either severe neglect or general neglect depending on whether it

as there is one unassailable jurisdictional finding, it is immaterial that
another might be inappropriate”’”].) Mother has provided no basis to
overcome a mootness challenge (see S.R., supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 1048 [the
burden is on the parent to overcome mootness]), and we decline to exercise
our discretion to consider the issue despite its mootness. (See In re D.P.,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 283–284.)
13
was intentional. Indeed, Penal Code section 11165.2, subdivision (a) defines
“severe neglect” to include “the intentional failure to provide adequate ...
medical care” to a child, and subdivision (b) defines general neglect to include
“negligent failure ... to provide adequate ... medical care” to a child. Mother
asserts that the sustained findings in allegation b-1 could be interpreted to be
intentional and therefore could be included in the CACI, so her arguments as
to this allegation are not moot. We agree, and find that mother’s contentions
as to allegation b-1 are not moot.6
Turning to the merits of mother’s argument, she contends allegation
b-1 was “plainly contradicted by the record” because “[a]s the Regional Center
services coordinator clearly explained, school-aged children obtain speech and
occupational therapy from school and not the Regional Center.” Mother is
correct that a Regional Center coordinator said this. However, substantial
evidence demonstrates that A. was a special needs child who had a history of
not receiving the services he needed.
A. was referred to the Regional Center in 2019, but the record does not
reflect any consistency in services. An assessment in early 2023 showed that
A. was minimally verbal, he needed help eating and drinking, and he could
not use the toilet by himself. A.’s school was not able to meet A.’s needs, and
A. was disenrolled. Mother then did not enroll A. in a new school for months,
nor did mother take A. to receive services at the Regional Center.
Mother blames the lapse in services on A.’s school for disenrolling him,
stating that the lack of services was “due to the actions of [the school and] not
Mother.” This argument is not persuasive. First, dependency jurisdiction
under section 300, subdivision (b) does not require a finding that “a parent is

6 Mother’s motion to consider additional evidence, filed May 22, 2026, is
denied.
14
at fault or blameworthy for her failure or inability to supervise or protect her
child.” (In re R.T., supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 624.) Thus, it does not matter
whether mother caused the disruption in A.’s services; the only relevant
question was whether A. was at risk of harm while in mother’s care.
Second, mother did play a significant role in the disruption in services.
Evidence showed that A.’s disenrollment from his first school was caused by
mother’s lack of cooperation and delays in signing documents. After A. was
disenrolled, mother did not enroll him in a new school because she did not
like the local options available. The Regional Center coordinator also
reported that she had “offered supportive services however, the mother
refused the services many times,” “mother kept canceling her appointments,”
and “every time she made contact with the mother, the mother had an
attitude and was uncooperative.” Thus, mother’s contention that she had
nothing to do with A. not receiving needed services is not supported by the
record.7
Mother also argues that substantial evidence does not prove that A.’s
lack of services placed him at serious risk of physical harm at the time of the
jurisdiction hearing. She argues that A.’s move to New York caused even
more delays in his receipt of services, and “[w]hile it is appalling that the

7 Mother also argues that A. was “presumably” receiving services at he
school where he had recently been enrolled. She does not point to any
evidence in the record to support this presumption. As we must under a
substantial evidence standard of review, we “review the record in the light
most favorable to the [juvenile] court’s determinations” (In re R.T., supra, 3
Cal.5th at p. 633), and do not presume a silent record supports the
appellant’s position.

15
Department’s unnecessary intervention caused this additional disruption,
there is no evidence that [A.] was seriously physically harmed as a result.”8
Whether A. suffered actual harm is not relevant; a court “need not wait
until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take
steps necessary to protect the child.” (In re Cole L. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th
591, 602.) A. was severely handicapped and had trouble with basic functions
such as speaking, feeding himself, and toileting. A. was therefore more
vulnerable than a typical school-aged child, with a limited ability to meet his
own physical needs or ask for help. “[A] child’s youth and maturity level can
bear upon the care that the child may require and whether a parent’s
[conduct] places the child at substantial risk of serious physical harm.” (In re
N.R. (2023) 15 Cal.5th 520, 559.) A. was connected with the Regional Center
for services in 2019, yet mother had a history of failing to follow up, attend
appointments, or provide any consistency in A.’s services. Mother was also
combative with those attempting to provide support for A., thus neglecting
A.’s special needs and undermining his potential to improve basic life skills.
(See, e.g., In re John M. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1126 [due to a child’s
significant needs, the “mother’s failure to ensure that he attended his
specialized school, and her failure, and even resistance, to procuring

8 Appellate counsel’s representation of DCFS’s actions as “appalling” and
“unnecessary” is representative of commentary peppered throughout mother’s
briefing, which expresses scorn for father, DCFS, A.’s schools, and more. We
remind counsel that “[a]d hominem attacks and other invective detract from
counsel’s legal arguments, signal inappropriate personal embroilment in the
dispute, and indicate an inability to engage in the reasoned analysis the
courts need and counsel’s clients deserve. When counsel resort to name-
calling and to unsupported claims of misconduct, they risk obscuring any
meritorious arguments they may have. Appellant’s counsel would be well
advised to refrain from incivility in the future.” (WasteXperts, Inc. v.
Arakelian Enterprises, Inc. (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 652, 667.)
16
appropriate services for [the child], placed him at substantial risk of serious
harm”].) Substantial evidence therefore supports the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction finding as to allegation b-1.
2. Allegation b-2
As sustained, allegation b-2 asserted that mother “has a history of
mental and emotional problems, including depression, suicidal and homicidal
ideation, anxiety, paranoid and erratic behavior, and volatile and unstable
behavior, which renders the mother unable to provide regular care of the
child.... The mother failed to participate in consistent mental health services
for the mother’s mental and emotional problems. Such mental and emotional
problems on the part of the mother tend [to] endanger the child’s physical
health and safety from time to time, and places [sic] the child at risk of
serious physical harm, damage and danger.”
Mother argues that “proof of a mental health issue alone” is insufficient
to support a jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision (b). Mother
acknowledges that people found her “difficult and demanding,” but asserts
that substantial evidence did not demonstrate that A.’s physical health and
safety were at risk as a result.
We disagree; the record contains substantial evidence that mother’s
depression, hostility, volatility, aggression, and sense of being overwhelmed
placed A. at risk of harm. The staff at A.’s school recognized that A.’s needs
were not being met, but mother refused to engage with school staff and
missed A.’s Regional Center appointments. By the time an IEP was
completed and mother finally agreed to sign it, the school was “impacted” and

17
was no longer able to meet A.’s needs. Mother also engaged in a hit-and-run
accident, while A. was in the car, during an altercation with another parent.9
By the end of October 2023, A. was not enrolled in any school or
services. When the CSW told mother that A. was overdue for a medical
check-up and he needed to be enrolled in school and special services, mother
told the CSW that she was too overwhelmed to attend to A.’s needs. Mother
also told the CSW that she had not been happy since 2014, and she had
thoughts of suicide. The evidence therefore showed that mother’s depression,
sense of being overwhelmed, and ongoing hostility toward school staff, the
Regional Center coordinator, and social workers substantially interfered with
A.’s ability to receive the services he needed.
Mother argues that “by the time of the jurisdictional hearing Mother
had shown that she had been regularly attending individual therapy ... for
nearly 3 months.” The record does not support this claim. DCFS first
requested that mother get a psychological evaluation in October 2023, and by
the time of the jurisdiction hearing on February 8, 2024, mother still had not
completed one. Mother points to the letter from a therapist at her college,
dated in January 2024, stating that mother had been seen “regularly” for
individual therapy since October 2023. However, the record also shows that
mother dropped out of college in October 2023. Mother completed an intake
appointment and began working with a different therapist in January 2024,
suggesting that she either was not consistently seeing the college therapist or
that the college therapist was not meeting her needs.
Mother also argues that the court should have stricken the phrase
“homicidal ideation” from allegation b-2. She notes that the court struck the

9 Mother does not deny this occurred. She argues that “a single fender
bender where the child was unharmed is not jurisdictional.”
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allegation that mother wanted to kill A. Mother asserts that the “only piece
of evidence that could possibly be connected to the notion that Mother ever
thought about killing another human being” was mother’s comment that
sometimes she wanted to kill A., which she quickly retracted.
There are other instances in the record of mother threatening to harm
or kill people. Mother threatened to follow a parent home from school and
“see what happens” as a result of the parent “disrespect[ing]” mother.
Mother also threatened the CSW, saying that she was going to “war” against
the CSW. Mother asked a second CSW to convey a message to the first CSW
that her name “will be on her tombstone. Someone will murder her,” then
mother laughed. Thus, mother has not demonstrated that the inclusion of
“homicidal ideation” in allegation b-2 is unsupported by substantial evidence.
Substantial evidence supports a finding that mother’s mental health
needs were not being sufficiently addressed at the time of the jurisdiction
hearing, and that A.’s safety was at risk as a result. Mother therefore has
not demonstrated error with respect to allegation b-2.
B. Disposition
Both mother and father challenge the disposition order. Mother argues
that substantial evidence does not support the court’s decision to remove A.
from her care. Mother also asserts that the court’s reliance on an
unsubstantiated allegation violated mother’s due process rights. Father
contends the court erred by continuing jurisdiction rather than closing the
case with an exit order granting full custody to him. We find no error.
1. Mother’s Contentions
We first address mother’s contention that A. should not have been
removed from her care. “A dependent child shall not be taken from the
physical custody of [a parent] with whom the child resides at the time the

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petition was initiated, unless the juvenile court finds clear and convincing
evidence” that “[t]here is or would be a substantial danger to the physical
health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor if
the minor were returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which
the minor’s physical health can be protected without removing the minor
from the minor’s parent’s ... physical custody.” (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) As noted
above, we review a disposition order for substantial evidence, reviewing the
record in the light most favorable to the order and drawing all reasonable
inferences from the evidence to support the findings of the dependency court.
(In re R.T., supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 633.) When doing so, however, we take into
account the level of confidence required by the “clear and convincing
evidence” standard in section 361, subdivision (c). (In re Zoe H. (2024) 104
Cal.App.5th 58, 71.)
Substantial evidence supports the court’s ruling. As discussed above,
there was substantial evidence that mother’s mental health issues placed A.
at risk of harm. A. has significant special needs and requires an increased
level of attention and care. Mother was depressed, too overwhelmed to timely
arrange for the services A. needed, combative with the other adults in A.’s life
who were trying to offer support and services, and committed a hit-and-run
accident while A. was in the car as part of an altercation with another parent.
Notably, DCFS tried to work with mother without removing A. from
her care from the time of the referral in late October 2023 until early
December 2023. However, mother was uncooperative and openly hostile to
the CSW. After A. was removed from mother’s care in December 2023,
mother threatened the CSW. In early 2024, mother continued to be
“reactive” and easily took offense with respect to the CSWs who monitored
her visitation with A. This suggests that mother had not made significant

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progress with the issues that led to jurisdiction, because she still had anger
issues and was still being uncooperative and hostile to the other adults in A.’s
life. The evidence supported the court’s finding by clear and convincing
evidence of a threat to A.’s well-being if he were returned to mother’s care,
and that there were no reasonable means by which A.’s health could be
protected without removing him from mother’s physical custody.
Mother contends the court erred by referencing a referral by an
anonymous caller during the disposition hearing. Mother asserts she was
deprived of due process because DCFS had deemed the referral inconclusive,
and mother “had no opportunity or ability to subpoena the hearsay declarant
the court relied upon.”
“‘In juvenile dependency litigation, due process focuses on the right to
notice and the right to be heard.’” (J.H. v. Superior Court (2018) 20
Cal.App.5th 530, 536–537.) Mother relies on In re Malinda S. (1990) 51
Cal.3d 368, which addressed the admissibility of hearsay relating to a
jurisdiction finding, and has been superseded by changes to section 355.
Mother’s argument ignores settled law regarding admissibility relating to
disposition.
“[I]t is settled that hearsay evidence, which would be inadmissible at a
jurisdiction hearing, may nevertheless be considered at a dispositional
hearing.” (In re Vincent G. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 238, 243.) “‘At the ...
dispositional phase, any relevant evidence including hearsay shall be
admitted pursuant to section 358, subdivision (b) to help the court determine
the child’s best interests.’” (In re Madison T. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1506,
1509, citing In re Corey A. (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 339, 347; see also In re
Jeanette V. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 811, 816.) Thus, mother did not have a
right of cross-examination at the disposition hearing. Moreover, even

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without the referral the juvenile court mentioned at the hearing, there was
ample evidence to support the court’s finding. Mother therefore has not met
her burden to demonstrate error in the court’s disposition order removing A.
from her care.
2. Father’s Contentions
Father contends the juvenile court erred at the disposition hearing by
keeping the case open rather than closing the case with an order granting
custody to father.
When a court orders removal of a dependent child from the custodial
parent, it must determine whether there is a noncustodial parent “who
desires to assume custody of the child.” (§ 361.2, subd. (a).) If the court
places the child with that parent, the court may choose one of three options: it
may grant custody to the second parent and terminate jurisdiction (§ 361.2,
subd. (b)(1)), it may “[o]rder that the parent assume custody subject to the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court and require that a home visit be conducted
within three months” (id., subd. (b)(2)), or it may “[o]rder that the parent
assume custody subject to the supervision of the juvenile court,” and order
services for one or both parents (id., subd. (b)(3)). Here, the juvenile court
chose the third option.
“Juvenile courts have ‘wide latitude’ in formulating reasonable
dispositional orders for the care, custody, support, and well-being of
dependents subject to their jurisdiction.” (In re A.F. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th
778, 785.) We review disposition orders denying a request for dismissal for
abuse of discretion; such an abuse occurs when the court’s determination is
arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd. (Id. at p. 786; In re Jaden E. (2014)
229 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1288.)

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 The court did not abuse its discretion by maintaining jurisdiction over
A. at the March 28, 2024 hearing. When the case was initiated in October
2023, father was not involved in A.’s life. A. was placed with father on
December 11. When the CSW spoke with father on January 19—nearly six
weeks after A. was placed with him—father said he was not interested in
having permanent custody of A., A. had not been enrolled in school, and
father said he did not know how to find medical or dental services for A.
Father eventually got A. enrolled in school and some school-based services in
New York. But father moved back to California less than a month before the
disposition hearing, resulting in another disruption in services for A. A major
focus of this case was that A. was not receiving the services required to
address his special needs, and at the time of the disposition hearing A. had
not received Regional Center services for eight months. Under these
circumstances, the court did not abuse its discretion in maintaining
jurisdiction to ensure that A.’s needs would be met.
Moreover, it appeared that A.’s relationship with mother could benefit
from ongoing reunification services, which could be provided by continued
jurisdiction. Despite mother’s struggles, the record makes clear that she
loved A., wanted to support him, and wanted to reunify with him. Thus, the
juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in finding that continued
supervision was warranted. (See, e.g., In re A.F., supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 785–786 [no abuse of discretion where juvenile court retained jurisdiction
over children at risk of harm]; In re Austin P. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1124,
1134 [denial of request to terminate jurisdiction under § 361.2 affirmed
where “substantial evidence showed a need for continuing supervision” over
the child].)

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 DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

COGLIATI, J.*
We concur:

MORI, Acting P. J. TAMZARIAN, J.
*Judge of the Santa Cruz Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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