Filed 7/30/26 Karrass v. Carey CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

GARY KARRASS, as Trustee, B344608
etc.,
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. 24SMCV03529)
v.

ELIZABETH CAREY,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Michael E. Whitaker, Judge. Affirmed.

Law Offices of Mark Henry Shafron and Mark Henry
Shafron for Plaintiff and Appellant.

No appearance by Defendant and Respondent.

_____________________________
 The trial court dismissed appellant Gary Karrass’s
unlawful detainer complaint because it found defective the notice
to cure violation of covenant or quit. We affirm.
On July 23, 2024, plaintiff landlord Karrass, as trustee of
the Gary Karrass Trust dated March 14, 2011, filed a complaint
for unlawful detainer against defendant Elizabeth Carey. At
issue was Carey’s possession of a single family dwelling in Santa
Monica, California. Karrass and Carey had entered into a
written lease by which Carey agreed to pay a monthly rent of
$8,500. Karrass alleged he served Carey with a 3-day notice to
cure violation of covenant or quit. The alleged period of
compliance expired on July 17, 2024. Carey did not comply.
Karrass alleged he served the notice on Carey on July 12, 2024.
The notice to cure violation of covenant or quit (the Notice)
was attached as Exhibit 2 to the form complaint. It stated:
“[Y]ou were given notice on June 24, 2024, that Landlord was
intending on entry of the hereinafter described residence on July
9, 2024 to make repairs dictated by the Department of Building
and Safety pursuant to an Order to comply (Exhibit ‘A’ hereto)
issued, as a result of a complaint you filed, to make the repairs
dictated therein. One of the repairs dictated was the replacement
of a stairway handrail; although Landlord’s staff person
presented himself on July 9, 2024 to undertake that handrail
installation, you interfered with that work, indeed you prevented
him from installing the handrails that go up to your office and
you told Landlord’s staff person that he could not move furniture,
cover furniture, or do anything else in order to complete his work.
The Order to Comply has a complete date of August 1, 2024. [¶]
NOTICE IS FURTHER GIVEN that within three (3) days
(excluding Saturdays, Sundays and holidays) after service of this

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Notice upon you, you are required to permit Landlord’s staff
person to enter the hereinafter described residence to install the
handrails required by the Order to Comply and to do nothing to
interfere with that effort, or to quit and deliver up possession of
hereinafter described residence, to the Landlord . . . .” The Notice
also stated that if Carey refused to permit Karrass to enter the
residence to “install the handrails required by the Order to
Comply,” he would declare the lease forfeited and institute legal
proceedings against her to recover possession of the dwelling and
“to recover rents and damages as provide[d] for by law.”
(Boldface and capitalization omitted.) Karrass later notified
Carey on July 15, 2024 that the repairs would be done on July 17,
2024. Karrass alleged Carey refused to allow the repairs to
proceed on July 17, prompting the filing of the unlawful detainer
complaint.
As stated in the Notice, an Order to Comply from the City
of Los Angeles with a compliance date of August 1, 2024, was
attached as Exhibit A to the Notice and it was incorporated into
the unlawful detainer complaint. The Order to Comply stated:
“An inspection has revealed that the property . . . listed above is
in violation of the Los Angeles Municipal Code (L.A.M.C.)
sections listed below. You are hereby ordered to correct the
violation(s) and contact the inspector listed in the signature block
at the end of this document for a compliance inspection by the
compliance date listed above.” The Order to Comply listed three
violations:
• “Lighting in the upstairs bathroom is in need of general
maintenance and repair.”
• “Smoke alarms are missing or disabled.”
• “Missing handrail on stairs. [¶] You are therefore ordered

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 to: provide the missing handrail leading to the upstairs.”
Karrass filed a Plaintiff’s Mandatory Cover Sheet and
Supplemental Allegations—Unlawful Detainer on July 23, 2024.
The pleading confirmed that Karrass sought possession of
residential, not commercial, property and that the action was not
based, in whole or in part, on any alleged default in payment of
rent or other charges.
Carey filed an answer denying the allegations of the
complaint, raising several affirmative defenses, and specifically
addressing the notice to cure violations or quit. Among other
things, she alleged the Notice was based on a breach of covenant
but it did not specify what she must do to cure the breach and did
not give her three days to cure the breach as required by Code of
Civil Procedure section 1161, subdivision (3); she in fact
committed no breach; the facts stated in the Notice were untrue;
and the Notice was not property served upon her.
On October 2, 2024, both parties appeared before the trial
court and waived jury trial. Court trial began on December 18,
2024. It resumed and ended on December 20, 2024.
The testimony at trial was that on July 9, 2024, the repair
date alleged in the Notice, Karrass sent a worker who installed
the handrail ordered by the City of Santa Monica. The worker
who did the installation testified that he was told to install three
handrails. He installed two on the staircase going up the stairs;
Carey did not interfere with his work. It was only when he began
to move her furniture to prepare the premises for installation of a
third handrail in a different location did Carey tell him to stop
and leave the premises.
Karrass’s property manager also testified. She
acknowledged that the Order to Comply required installation of

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one (singular) handrail. The property manager made a unilateral
decision to have handrails installed that day on all stairs, not just
the one handrail required by the Order to Comply.
At the conclusion of the evidence, Carey moved to dismiss
the complaint on the grounds that the handrail installation
mandated by the Order to Comply was completed on July 9, 2024
without Carey’s interference in any way. She argued she was
unable to comply with the Notice because the handrail
installation in the Order to Comply, which was attached to the
Notice, was completed on July 9, 2024, three days before she was
even served with the Notice on July 12, 2024. Carey moved to
dismiss the complaint “based upon the reading of the order to
comply as singular.”
The trial court asked counsel: “How does one receiving the
3-day notice make that determination as to what to cure?
[¶] . . . [¶] You would agree with me that the notice from the city
is singular. It is a ‘handrail to the upstairs.’ [¶] And it’s
uncontroverted that the evidence in the record thus far is that
two handrails were installed on July 9th. And the record reflects
that the 3-day notice was served after that; right? [¶] So in a
sense, what’s the tenant to determine what is to be cured when
she received a 3-day notice when the order that’s attached to the
3-day notice is singular in nature, it is a handrail needed
upstairs. It’s ambiguous as to what upstairs was meant. [¶]
There’s no determination by anyone from the plaintiff’s side to
contact the city to get clarification as to what was meant in that
order. [¶] Am I correct thus far?” Karrass countered by insisting
that the Notice was “very specific. It’s the handrail that was
sought to be installed and was not allowed to be installed–very
specific which one that is.”

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 The trial court responded: “But the 3-day notice also refers
to the city’s order, does it not? [¶] . . . [¶] The summary nature of
unlawful detainer proceeding requires strict compliance with the
notice provisions. This notice is ambiguous to a tenant. [¶] What
should I cure when it’s referencing an order . . . that’s attached in
reference to the 3-day notice says ‘handrail.’ Handrail. [¶] And
we know handrails were installed on July 9th. So the ambiguity
is when the three-day notice is served on the tenant, what is the
tenant supposed to cure at that time when handrails were
installed on July 9th, which therefore seems to comply with the
order that’s attached and referred to [in] the 3-day notice. [¶] I
think your 3-day notice is defective on its face. That’s the
problem here. [¶] . . . [¶] I understand the point that plaintiff is
making that it then, upon receipt of the notice from the city to
cure a defect undertook to cure all of the issues that it felt . . .
was a potential problem in terms of having handrails on every
elevation in the home that didn’t have one. [¶] I can understand
why the plaintiff then took that step. However, it doesn’t detract
from the ambiguity in the 3-day notice. That’s the problem here.
It’s a poorly-crafted 3-day notice.” “[Y]ou have to read it in
context, You’re reading it in isolation. You’re reading it as
though there’s no attachment and there’s no order that’s
referenced in your 3-day notice. [¶] . . . I am just calling balls and
strikes here. It is an ambiguous 3-day notice in terms of what is
the tenant supposed to cure upon receipt when—again, I’m
repeating myself– when on July 9, handrails—plural—[were]
installed, leading upstairs. [¶] . . . [¶] If you did not reference the
order and attach it, then maybe you would have an argument
that this is not ambiguous. You are right the landlord has a right
to make repairs and to enter the property upon proper notice as

6
required by the code. That is not lost on me. But the problem is
that it’s ambiguous because of how it’s crafted.”
The trial court granted Carey’s motion to dismiss the
complaint pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 631.8. The
trial court entered judgment in favor of Carey and against
Karrass “due to the defective 3-Day Notice at issue.”
The court denied Karrass’s post-judgment motion to tax
costs and granted Carey’s request for costs in the amount of
$2,454.92. On March 28, 2025, the trial court granted Carey’s
opposed motion for attorney fees and awarded her $69,560 in
fees. That same day, the trial court entered a Second Amended
Judgment which included the awards of costs and fees. Karrass
appeals.
DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Law
“The Unlawful Detainer Act governs the procedure for
landlords and tenants to resolve disputes about who has the right
to possess real property.” (Stancil v. Superior Court (2021)
11 Cal.5th 381, 394.) Given the need for quick, peaceful
resolutions of unlawful detainer actions, the statutory procedures
must be strictly adhered to, including the stringent requirements
for service, notice, and filing deadlines. (Id. at pp. 394–395; see
Coyne v. De Leo (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 801, 805.) The statutory
requirements in unlawful detainer proceedings must be followed
strictly. (Eshagian v. Cepeda (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 433, 457.)

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 Unlawful detainer actions are authorized and governed by
Code of Civil Procedure section 1161 et seq. A plaintiff may file
an unlawful detainer complaint under section 1161, which
specifies the circumstances under which a tenant of real property
is guilty of unlawful detainer. (Dr. Leevil, LLC v. Westlake
Health Care Center (2018) 6 Cal.5th 474, 478.) A tenant may be
guilty of unlawful detainer if the tenant fails to perform
conditions or covenants of the lease or agreement under which
the property is held. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1161, subd. (3).)
A valid three-day notice to quit is a prerequisite to an
unlawful detainer action. (City of Alameda v. Sheehan (2024)
105 Cal.App.5th 68, 75.) “The notice’s purpose is to inform the
tenant of the breach so the tenant can rationally choose whether
to cure the breach and retain possession, quit the property, or
contest the allegations.” (Lee v. Kotyluk (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th
719, 731.) The primary concern is providing the tenant with the
opportunity to cure and retain possession. (Ibid.)
B. Standard of Review
In an appeal from an unlawful detainer judgment, we
review the trial court’s findings of fact to determine whether they
are supported by substantial evidence. (Palm Property
Investments, LLC v. Yadegar (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1419, 1425.)
Under the substantial evidence standard of review, we must
consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party, giving it the benefit of every reasonable
inference, and resolving conflicts in support of the findings. (ASP
Properties Group, L.P. v. Fard, Inc. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1257,
1266 (ASP).) It is not our task to weigh conflicts and disputes in
the evidence; that is the province of the trial of fact. (Ibid.) Our
authority begins and ends with a determination as to whether, on

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the entire record, there is any substantial evidence, contradicted
or uncontradicted, in support of the judgment. (Ibid.)
Even in cases where the evidence is undisputed or
uncontradicted, if two or more different inferences can reasonably
be drawn from the evidence this court is without power to
substitute its own inferences or deductions for those of the trier of
fat, which must resolve such conflicting inference in the absence
of a rule of law specifying the inference to be drawn. (ASP,
supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 1266.) To be substantial, the
evidence must be of ponderable legal significance, reasonable in
nature, credible, and of solid value. (Ibid.) However, substantial
evidence is not synonymous with any evidence. (Ibid.) The
ultimate test is whether it is reasonable for a trier of fact to make
the ruling in question in light of the whole record. (Ibid.) To the
extent the trial court drew conclusions of law based upon its
findings of fact, we review those conclusions of law de novo. (Id.
at pp. 1266–1267.)
As in all appeals, we must presume the unlawful detainer
judgment is correct, indulge all intendments and presumptions in
favor of the trial court, and only reverse if the appellant meets its
burden of establishing prejudicial error. (See Hall v. Municipal
Court (1974) 10 Cal.3d 641, 643.) We review the result in the
unlawful detainer action, not the trial court’s reasons. The
judgment must be affirmed if it is correct on any legal basis.
(Espinoza v. Shiomoto (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 85, 100.)
C. Analysis
1. The Notice was Defective
On appeal, Karrass argues that the language of the lease
and Civil Code section 1954 entitle him to enter the premises to

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make needed repairs “whether they be singular or plural.”
Karrass also repeats his argument that the Notice was not
ambiguous as it refers to “ ‘handrails leading up to the office.’ ”
(Italics omitted.) He also argues that the specific repairs to be
performed by a landlord are not required by law to be set out in
detail.
Some of that may be true, but as the trial court recognized
(and appellant ignores), eviction notices are strictly construed.
The complaint incorporated the Notice, and the Notice
incorporated the Order to Comply in its text and as an
attachment. It is reasonable to believe that Karrass was telling
Carey to allow the repairs required by the Order to Comply to be
completed. The undisputed testimony was that she did so. That
there may have been other repairs the landlord wanted to
accomplish at the same time is immaterial; the Notice told Carey
she would be subject to eviction if she did not allow the repairs to
go forward as mandated by the Order to Comply. By the time she
received the Notice, however, those repairs had been successfully
completed. There was nothing more for her to do under the
Notice Karrass gave her.
The trial court was correct to read the Notice in context,
that is, with reference to the Order to Comply attached to it and
incorporated by reference. We agree the Notice was defective in
that it apprised Carey of an obligation to cure a covenant
violation, that is, not allowing repairs to be made, when no
violation existed because repairs that seemingly conformed with
the Order to Comply had already been made.

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 2. The Trial Court Correctly Found That Carey Did Not
Fail to Mediate the Dispute
Karrass next contends that the trial court awarded Carey
attorney fees, ignoring provisions of paragraph 35A of the lease
which state: “Housing Provider and Tenant agree to mediate any
dispute or claim arising between them out of this Agreement, or
any resulting transaction, before resorting to court action. . . . If,
for any dispute or claim to which this paragraph applies, any
party commences an action without first attempting to resolve
the matter through mediation, or refuses to mediate after a
request has been made, then that party shall not be entitled to
recover attorney fees, even if they would otherwise be available to
that party in any such action.”
Paragraph 35B immediately following the mediation
provision states: “The following matters are excluded from
mediation: (1) an unlawful detainer action[.]”
With no citation to authority, Karrass appears to contend
that because he offered to mediate, the specific exclusion of
unlawful detainer actions from mediation does not apply. We
disagree. The plain language of paragraph 35B controls this
issue, that is, mediation is not required for unlawful detainer
actions. Alternatively we conclude that Karrass has forfeited this
issue by failing to cite any legal authority to support his
contention. (City of Santa Maria v. Adam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th
266, 287 [we may and do disregard conclusory argument not
supported by pertinent legal authority].)
Further, Karrass’s contention that he asked Carey to
participate in mediation of the issue of repairs is not factually
supported by the record. Karrass contends that he, through
counsel, asked Carey to participate in mediation via an email

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sent on April 23, 2024. The email from Karrass’s counsel tells
Carey that Karrass “has no unresolved issues regarding repairs
at your premises.” It then goes on to ask Carey to participate in
mediation “[r]egarding all other issues.” Carey replied by email
dated April 29, 2024, that “[m]ediation was refused to me in
June.” Karrass’s counsel responded the same day: “Putting aside
that there may have been a request to mediate back in June
2023, which supposition is not conceded but simply stated for the
purposes of this e-mail, the issues my client wishes to mediate
involve the end of the lease which occurred in February 2024 and
you[r] refusal to execute the new lease that was presented to you
in February 2024, and as such could not logically have been the
source of the purported Request for Mediation dating back in
June 2023.” Carey responded that the landlord was issued a
compliance order from the Los Angeles Housing Department so
when could she expect repairs to be made. At that point
Karrass’s counsel stated that his client had already offered to
mediate repair issues but Carey had declined to mediate.
Karrass’s counsel’s last email stating that Karrass had
previously offered to mediate repairs misstated Karrass’s position
in his two prior emails—that he had no “unresolved issues
regarding repairs” but would mediate “all other issues” and that
he wanted to mediate Carey’s refusal to execute a new lease.
Karrass cannot now claim he offered to mediate repair issues
given his stated offer that specifically excluded repair issues. We
conclude Karrass failed to carry his burden to establish Carey’s
refusal to mediate issues raised in the unlawful detainer
complaint and that Karrass had actually proposed mediation of
those same issues. The trial court did not err in concluding that
there was neither a request to mediate nor a refusal to mediate

12
the issues underlying the unlawful detainer action before
“resorting to court action.”
3. The Attorney Fees Cap Was Not Mutual
The trial court awarded Carey $69,560 in reasonable
attorney fees and $2,454.92 in costs. Karrass contends these
awards violated paragraph 36 of the lease: “In any action or
proceeding arising out of this Agreement, the prevailing party
between Housing Provider and Tenant shall be entitled to
reasonable attorney fees and costs collectively not to exceed
$1,000.” He acknowledges that Addendum No. One to the lease
also provides: “Paragraph 36, Attorney’s fees to be modified as
follows: In the event of a dispute, Tenant shall be responsible for
its own attorney’s fees and all associated costs. In the event
Landlord prevails in such dispute, Tenant shall be responsible for
Landlord’s attorney’s fees and all associated costs. In no event
shall Landlord be responsible for Tenant’s attorney fees and all
associated costs.”
Karrass argues that because the Addendum No. One
violates public policy and is contrary to the language of Civil
Code1 section 1717, it is invalid. He contends the severance
provision of the lease dictates that “If any provision of this
Agreement is held to be ineffective or invalid, the remaining
provisions will nevertheless be given full force and effect.”
Karrass argues then that paragraph 36’s limitation of fees and
costs to $1,000 should be given full force and effect.

1 Statutory references are to the Civil Code.

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 Karrass provides no legal authority whatsoever for his
contention that the superseded limitation of fees and costs in
paragraph 36 is necessarily resurrected if Addendum No. One is
invalid. As a result, we deem the contention forfeited. (City of
Santa Maria v. Adam, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 287 [we may
and do disregard conclusory argument not supported by pertinent
legal authority].)
Were we to reach the merits, however, we would affirm the
trial court’s award of fees and costs. We review a determination
of the legal basis for an award or denial of attorney fees de novo,
as a question of law. (Brown Bark III, L.P. v. Haver (2013)
219 Cal.App.4th 809, 821.) Section 1717 permits parties to a
contract to agree how to allocate attorney fees. “The primary
purpose of section 1717 is to ensure mutuality of remedy for
attorney fee claims under contractual attorney fee provisions.”
(Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 610.) It “was enacted
to establish mutuality of remedy where contractual provision
makes recovery of attorney’s fees available for only one party
[citations] and to prevent oppressive use of one-sided attorney’s
fees provisions.” (Reynolds Metals Co. v. Alperson (1979)
25 Cal.3d 124, 128.) Thus, “[c]ourts have recognized that section
1717 has this effect in at least two distinct situations. [¶] The
first situation in which section 1717 makes an otherwise
unilateral right reciprocal, thereby ensuring mutuality of
remedy, is ‘when the contract provides the right to one party but
not to the other.’ [Citation.] In this situation, the effect of section
1717 is to allow recovery of attorney fees by whichever
contracting party prevails, ‘whether he or she is the party
specified in the contract or not’ (§ 1717, subd. (a)).” (Santisas, at
pp. 610–611.)

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 We conclude section 1717 does not void Addendum No.
One’s unilateral allotment of fees. It merely instructs courts to
read its unilateral provisions as reciprocal. Read as reciprocal,
Addendum No. One is neither void nor superseded by a
resurrected paragraph 36. The trial court was correct to find
Carey the prevailing party and award her reasonable attorney
fees and costs without the amount limitation of superseded
paragraph 36.2
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Costs are awarded to defendant.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

STRATTON, P. J.

We concur:

WILEY, J.

SCHERB, J.

2 Carey’s motion to dismiss the appeal, filed May 18, 2026, is
denied.

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