Filed 7/30/26 In re J.F. CA2/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re J.F., a Person Coming B349035
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
Los Angeles County
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Super. Ct. No.
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 24CCJP01821B
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

F.F.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, George A. Turner, Jr., Judge. Affirmed.
Linda J. Vogel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, Eden Gharapet, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
 Father appeals from the juvenile court’s juvenile custody
order awarding sole legal and physical custody of J.F. to mother.
He contends the juvenile court did not apply the best interests of
the child standard; and substantial evidence did not support
finding granting mother sole legal custody was in J.F.’s best
interests. We find no abuse of discretion and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Father and mother, who are not married, are the parents of
J.F. (born April 2014). They lived with mother’s daughter A.G.
(born December 2010) in an apartment also shared with maternal
aunt and uncle. Father’s appeal concerns only J.F.
1. Sustained petition and events leading up to it
On August 14, 2024, the juvenile court sustained—as
amended by interlineation—a petition the Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed on
behalf of J.F. (and his older half sister A.G.) under Welfare and
Institutions Code1 section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b)(1). The
sustained a-1 and b-1 counts alleged: father “has physically
abused mother” in J.F.’s home and in J.F.’s and A.G.’s presence;
on May 24, 2024, father was arrested for intimate partner battery
after—in the children’s presence—he threw a coffee mug at
mother, pulled her hair, and pushed her to the ground, and A.G.
intervened “by pulling father’s shirt from behind”; on May 5,
2024, father kicked mother’s back;2 in 2021, father tried to choke

1 Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code unless stated otherwise.
2 The record is ambiguous as to when the incident involving
father kicking mother in the back occurred. It is recounted in the
jurisdiction report as having taken place in May 2014, along with

2
mother, “causing [A.G.] to intervene by pulling . . . father away
from . . . mother”; and “on prior occasions,” father struck mother
with his fists and slapped and pushed her in the children’s
presence. The sustained b-2 count alleged that, during the May
24 incident, father also “grabbed and pulled” maternal aunt’s
hair, and pulled her out of the house, “causing [J.F.] to
intervene.” The sustained b-3 count alleged father “is a recent
and current abuser of alcohol, which renders . . . father incapable
of providing regular care of [J.F.],” and during the May 24
incident, “and on prior occasions,” father was “under the
influence of alcohol in the children’s home and in [their] presence,
and while [J.F.] was in . . . father’s care and supervision.”3
According to the police report, on May 24, 2024, police were
called to J.F.’s home for domestic battery. On the way, they took
father—who was walking away from the home—into custody.
The officers “observed that [father] was drunk.” Police
interviewed mother. She said she and father argued when she
returned to the home that evening. Father threw a mug in front
of her on the floor then grabbed her by the hair and pushed her
on the floor. Mother yelled for someone to call the police. Mother
said she wasn’t injured but feared father. She told police “there
[had] been numerous prior incidents of [d]omestic [v]iolence that
were never reported.” Maternal aunt told police she had been in

father’s detention for battery. Elsewhere, that same report states
that the incident occurred in May 2024.
3 The court dismissed the a-2 count based on the same
allegations as the b-2 count. DCFS dismissed the petition’s
failure to protect allegations against mother after reaching a
settlement with her. Mother submitted to the jurisdiction of the
court.

3
the bedroom when she heard mother and father arguing. She
heard the mug break, stepped out of the room, and saw father
holding mother by the hair. As maternal aunt tried to call 911,
father grabbed her hair, pulled her outside of the apartment, and
threw her cell phone on the floor, breaking it. J.F. and A.G. told
police father “is drunk every day, and normally drinks beer and
tequila.” They said they’d seen domestic violence between
mother and father at least 10 times. The children confirmed
mother’s statements. They said both mother and maternal aunt
“fled the house,” and father chased after them. After father
smashed maternal aunt’s phone, J.F. called the police. The police
report noted that, at the station, father said, “ ‘I didn’t do
anything[.] I never hit her.’ ” He admitted he was drinking but
said “he never put his hands on” mother.
Father has a criminal history. He was stopped for DUI
three times: he was arrested in February 2024 and August 2021;
and in May 2016, he was detained and released for lack of
sufficient evidence. He also was detained and released for lack of
sufficient evidence for intimate partner battery in May 2014 and
sentenced to 36 months’ probation for “[h]it and [r]un property
damage” in February 2016. Mother also had called police to the
family home in July 2020. Father had returned to the shared
home drunk, and banged on the door until he got in. Mother and
the children were in mother’s bedroom when he entered, and
father removed J.F. from the bedroom and took him into the
living room. Mother “grabbed” J.F. from father and took him and
A.G. outside to call the police. Father wasn’t arrested, as police
advised that he had not committed a crime. The officer advised
mother to get a restraining order, but she declined. She said they
were not together; father just lived in the same home and slept in

4
the living room. The officer “recommend[ed] alcohol
rehabilitation and parenting classes for . . . father.”
On May 29, 2024, the court issued a temporary restraining
order protecting mother, J.F., and A.G. from father. The order
allowed father to have contact with his children “only during
court-ordered contact or visits” and contact with mother only to
communicate about the children for court-ordered visits. The
court allowed father to have unmonitored overnight visitation
with J.F. from Friday afternoon to Sunday morning beginning on
May 31. The order granted sole legal and physical custody of J.F.
to mother. The order was set to expire at the end of a hearing
scheduled for June 24, 2024.4 On June 3, mother went to court to
try to “drop all charges on father since [J.F.] wanted to see
father.” The court told her she’d have to make that request at the
June 24 hearing. Mother trusted J.F. in father’s care. She told
the social worker she did not think there was any need for
monitored visits.
DCFS interviewed father on June 5 about the May 24
incident, and he again denied “any past or present intimate
partner violence.” Father confirmed he had pending DUI charges
but denied having any substance use issues. He did not
understand why he had been pulled over for DUI in the past,
stating, “unfortunately it was his turn to get pulled over.” Father
would not agree to drug or alcohol testing unless ordered by the
court.
On June 7, 2024, the court granted DCFS’s request for an
order to remove J.F. from father, which DCFS served the same
day. J.F. was released to mother. At the initial June 26 hearing,

4 As DCFS notes, the record does not state whether the
restraining order was extended at that hearing.

5
the court detained J.F. from father and ordered J.F. remain
released to mother under DCFS’s supervision. The court ordered
monitored visits for father at a minimum of nine hours per week.
During the dependency investigator’s (DI) investigation,
both children confirmed the petition’s allegations. A.G. told the
DI that, on May 24, she could tell father “was drunk by the way
he was acting.” She said, “ ‘He always starts fights when he is
drunk.’ ” A.G. said father wasn’t able to walk straight and had
slurred speech. She said she had “witnessed [father] slap, punch,
grab, and kick” mother in the past. A.G. couldn’t describe a
specific incident for the DI, but said, “ ‘He usually hits my mom
when he is drunk and he is drunk a lot.’ ” During the incident,
when A.G. grabbed father’s shirt “to get him to stop going after”
mother, father pushed A.G. away. J.F. saw A.G. try to stop the
fight and father push her away.
J.F. agreed father was drinking on May 24. When asked,
he told the DI, “ ‘YES! He was drunk. He always drinks. . . .
When my dad drinks he is mean, he smells like alcohol, he can’t
talk right and his eyes are always red.’ ” J.F. said when father
“comes over he is ‘usually drunk.’ ” It made J.F. “sad to see his
dad drunk and it also scare[d] him because he worries that he is
going to hurt someone in his family.” J.F. confirmed he had told
the police he had witnessed at least 10 domestic violence
incidents between parents. He explained the “ ‘fights usually
start because my dad is drunk.’ ” Like A.G., J.F. also had seen
father “slap, kick, and choke” mother.
J.F. reported that father had struck him approximately 30
times in the past, including once with a “charger cable” on his leg,
causing him to bleed. J.F. said that the most recent time that
father hit him was around two months prior. A.G. corroborated

6
J.F.’s statement. A.G. also said father hit her in the past,
including with a shoe, charging cable, and a belt, with the last
incident occurring about one or two years prior.
Mother also said father was drunk on May 24—he “ ‘reeked’
of alcohol.” She said father’s drinking had “been a significant
concern” for the past 10 years but usually he would come home
and sleep. Father’s drinking had “greatly increased” in the past
two to three years, however. Mother was concerned that father
was not taking his DUIs seriously. She also told the DI that
father was diabetic, and his drinking affected his health. Mother
said “father’s physical aggression towards her ha[d] been
happening for years.” He previously had kicked her in the back
and she had called the police although it did not result in any
criminal charges. She said father also had punched, slapped, and
grabbed her on other occasions. Mother admitted the children
had witnessed some domestic violence incidents, and A.G. had
tried to intervene. Mother was tired of father’s drinking and
wanted her family to feel safe.
Maternal aunt also confirmed the allegations about the
May 24 incident. Although she had seen father intoxicated, that
was the first time she had seen him become violent while drunk.
Maternal aunt “stress[ed]” she did not always participate in
family gatherings because she worked so much and did not know
the extent of father’s drinking.
Father denied the allegations. He admitted he was
drinking on May 24 but denied hitting or touching anyone. He
denied he was drunk. He said he accidentally knocked the mug
over; he did not throw it. He said he told mother “there was no
need to call the police and he tried to grab the phone from
mother’s hand.” He said the phone fell, he grabbed it, and it fell

7
again, causing it to break. He denied throwing the phone and
breaking it or that he pulled mother’s or maternal aunt’s hair.
He denied ever punching, grabbing, slapping, kicking, or pulling
mother’s hair in the past or physically harming her. When asked
if he had hit the children in the past, father said he spanked
them on the bottom when they were younger but “ ‘that was
several years ago,’ ” and if the children claimed otherwise it was
because they had been “ ‘coached by their mom.’ ” He also denied
using any objects to discipline the children corporally or ever
leaving marks or bruises on the children from spankings.
Father told the DI he only drinks alcohol once a month and
at social gatherings “but never drinks to get drunk.” As for his
DUIs, father told the DI, “ ‘The one time I decided to drink in
excess those days and it was my bad luck and I got pulled over.’ ”
He acknowledged he drinks “but wanted to make it clear that he’s
not an ‘alcoholic’ and perhaps needs to pace himself when he
drinks because he is not a big person.”
At the August 14 adjudication hearing, when the court
sustained the amended petition, the court noted the children’s
statements were consistent with mother’s and maternal aunt’s.
The court found J.F. “quite credible,” and father’s representations
“not credible.” The court continued the disposition hearing to
August 28.
By August 28, father had begun an 18-month DUI class
and participated in five sessions of a parenting program. He was
living with paternal grandmother. Father had had three 8-hour
visits with J.F., monitored by maternal uncle. J.F. enjoyed and
wanted to continue his visits with father. He confirmed father
did not drink alcohol during the visits. The court detained J.F.
from father and ordered J.F. remain released to mother. The

8
court ordered nine hours of monitored visitation a week for
father, and gave DCFS discretion to liberalize his visits. Father’s
case plan included participation in a full drug/alcohol program
with aftercare, random and on-demand drug/alcohol testing, a 52-
week domestic violence program, and individual counseling to
address case issues, including: “healthy relationships;
insight/self-reflection re DV issues; child safety/parenting; impact
of DV and substance abuse on kids & families.”
2. Review period
On February 6, 2025, DCFS reported father had been
actively participating in his case plan. Father consistently
visited J.F. on Saturdays and Sundays. The monitor said father
was caring and loving, and J.F. said he enjoyed the visits. As of
December 2024, father also was picking up J.F. at least once
during the week for an hour or two. On January 27, 2025, DCFS
liberalized father’s visits to unmonitored due to his progress in
his case plan and consistent visitation. DCFS noted mother,
father’s monitor, and J.F. “are in agreement with such
liberalization.” As of March 4, 2025, those visits were “going
well.” Mother had no concerns.
Father also had been testing negative for drugs/alcohol and
was attending AA sessions. He was participating in a multiple
offender, 18-month DUI program. Father “remain[ed] in denial
regarding his alcohol use from [his] past,” however. DCFS stated
“father continues to think it was bad luck that he got the DUI’s.”
Father’s domestic violence coordinator told DCFS that father “is
also in denial regarding the domestic violence relationship with
the mother.” He “admitted to having disagreements and
discussions but never any violence.”

9
 DCFS assessed the risk to J.F. for future “abuse/neglect” as
moderate due to father’s “continued denial of allegations.” DCFS
noted father “continue[d] to minimize his alcohol use even after
his third DUI.” He also continued “to deny physical altercations
during past domestic violence incidents.” DCFS recommended
the court continue services.
At the March 13, 2025 section 364 review hearing, Father’s
counsel asked the court to return J.F. to father’s custody or,
alternatively, to begin overnight visits. Minors’ counsel noted
that, although father had been participating in his programs, he
still denied domestic violence, admitting only to arguing with
mother. The court commended father for “the work that he’s
doing.” The court believed, however, “there does need to be a
little bit further insight before we change any of the previous
court orders.” The court continued the matter for another three
months.
In its May 28, 2025 status review report, DCFS stated
mother had completed a 16-week parenting program and a 26-
week domestic violence support group. She said “she thought she
would have to live in a domestic violence relationship all of her
life to protect her children. However, she now . . . [had] a new
sense of freedom due to not being controlled by . . . father.”
Father was enrolled and participating in his court-ordered
programs. Father’s unmonitored visits with J.F. had been going
well. He continued to test negative and made up tests he missed
when he had to drive back from Bakersfield where he worked.
Father was progressing in his alcohol awareness program and
continued to attend AA group sessions. On May 19, 2025, the
social worker spoke with father’s domestic violence group
facilitator. The facilitator said father “was initially in denial of

10
the domestic violence and kept quiet during many sessions.” She
spoke to father directly to improve his participation. The
facilitator said “father is making slow progress and is now
admitting to some of the emotional abuse but not yet the
physical.” In her progress report of the same date, the facilitator
stated father “is more aware of [the] abusive/violent behavior and
gradually accepting responsibility over own actions. [Father] is
learning about socialization and core beliefs, communication
skills improvement emphasizing listening, self-control[,]
especially in upsetting situations, and assertiveness vs.
aggressiveness.” She recommended continued participation.
DCFS also reported a new incident. Mother had told the
social worker father had some of her and A.G.’s things but
wouldn’t return them. The social worker spoke to father to try to
arrange to pick the items up from him. According to mother,
father then “showed up” at her workplace and “accused her of
being petty” for reporting the situation to the social worker.
Mother said father “used foul language toward her in a public
setting at her place of employment.” When the social worker
asked father about it, he denied this behavior and only admitted
to “purchasing food items from mother’s employment.” The
report noted the social worker had encouraged father “numerous
times to take his programs seriously and try to make changes,” so
the “cycle” would not repeat with his child. Father, however,
continued “to deny any wrongdoing.” Father now admitted he
“did have a problem” with alcohol and was addressing it in his
program, but denied “his drinking influenced his behavior at
home.”
DCFS considered father to be only in partial compliance
with his case plan, however, because he had “not demonstrated

11
consistent changes in behavior as he continue[d] to deny any
domestic violence.” The report stated father said he didn’t know
“why any of the parties involved, including the children, made
any negative comments as this never happened.” He continued to
deny the events of May 24, 2024, and said he “ha[d] never tried to
control . . . mother and has not mistreated her in any way.”
DCFS acknowledged father had “made substantial progress
since the initial stages of this case,” but stated “there is more
room for growth.” DCFS “expected” father would “be able to
make the necessary changes in his life in order to be a better
father and partner in the future.” The report noted father “is
able to verbalize that he had problems with his alcohol use but
does not directly correlate that to the trauma with the mother
and his child.” Father had said he would continue to participate
in his court-ordered programs and wanted to be “a better father”
to J.F.
Because father was out of the home—and parents no longer
wanted to be in a relationship—DCFS assessed J.F.’s risk for
future abuse or neglect as low. DCFS recommended the court
terminate its jurisdiction, award mother sole legal and physical
custody of J.F., and grant father unmonitored visits.
On June 6, 2025, the court continued the matter and—at
father’s counsel’s request—ordered DCFS to interview father
about mother’s new allegations. Instead of interviewing father
about the alleged incident at mother’s work, the social worker
interviewed father on June 26 about the allegations in the
sustained petition. Father again denied the petition’s
allegations. He denied having had any “physical altercation[s] or
domestic violence incidents” with mother and was “unsure why
everyone is lying.” He denied “ever letting any argument become

12
a physical altercation with . . . mother.” Father also denied any
physical abuse toward the children, and stated that he would
“never hit the children.” He also denied having “an alcohol use
problem.” He denied that the children ever saw him intoxicated
and didn’t know why they and mother said he “drank a lot.” With
respect to his three DUIs, father still said that on the days he
drank “he had the bad luck of getting caught.”
The same day, the social worker also spoke to mother. She
said there had been “no recent incidents” with father. J.F. had
had one overnight visit with father and “appeared happy” to have
spent that time with father and his family. She had no concerns
with J.F. spending time with father.
The court held the continued review hearing on July 11,
2025. Father’s counsel initially noted the social worker did not
interview father about mother’s recent allegations, as the court
had ordered. Counsel asked the court to allow father to testify to
show mother’s allegations were “not . . . remotely accurate.” The
court said it would read the report “in the light most beneficial”
to father.
Counsel argued that, although father had denied physical
domestic violence, “it’s not a legal requirement that a person
admit something in order to get their child back.” Counsel also
noted father had been charged with battery and “would be
potentially exposing himself to criminal liability if he admitted
domestic violence to the social worker.” Counsel stated father
had been staying away from mother, except when he went to her
workplace “in frustration, based on her mischaracterization of
events, and that he did not use foul language, but he was upset at
her. That’s one incident in over a year.” Counsel argued, “I don’t
think one time venting at a parent is enough to show that my

13
client . . . continues to be a batterer.” Counsel noted father’s
progress letter from his therapist5 stated they had been working
on father’s “emotional regulation” and “complex relational
dynamics”—“key” areas “to improving his relationship with the
mother so that . . . there’s not that type of escalation of tension
and behavior that the court was concerned about at the
disposition hearing.” In his domestic violence class, father also
had admitted to emotional abuse of mother. Counsel argued it
was “significant that someone would admit to emotional abuse.
That’s an important component of domestic violence. It shows
my client taking accountability.” Counsel argued the absence of
any incidents of domestic violence since the case began showed
father had “separated from mother emotionally, is not trying to
be involved in her life anymore. He’s not trying to control her in
any way. He just wants to be in his son’s life.”
Counsel also noted father consistently tested negative for
alcohol leading DCFS to allow father to have overnight visits
with J.F. J.F. was happy to go to those visits. Counsel argued
father had “ameliorated the situation enough . . . in regards to
domestic violence and alcohol abuse.” He asked the court to find
DCFS had not proved J.F. would be at substantial risk if
returned to father’s custody.
J.F.’s counsel asked the court to close the case with custody
to mother and a written schedule for unmonitored overnight

5 For the June 6 hearing, father had submitted a May 22,
2025 progress letter from his therapist confirming he had
participated in 22 individual therapy sessions since September
2024. They had “addressed a wide range of issues related to the
incident.” The court admitted the letter into evidence for the
July 11 hearing.

14
visits for father. Counsel “applaud[ed] . . . father for engaging in
his services and getting to the point to have overnight
unmonitored visitation with [J.F.],” but argued father lacked
“insight”—he still had not “own[ed] up to anything,” having
claimed his past DUIs were “bad luck,” and had not “admitt[ed]
to anything” with respect to domestic violence. Counsel argued
father’s statements showed “he is not really gaining anything
from the services. He is doing them, but I think the issue is
whether or not return would be appropriate at this time. I think
overnights are appropriate. They just started . . . about three
weeks ago. They’ve been going well.” Counsel argued closing the
case “would be appropriate,” as mother had completed her case
plan, had been “forthcoming to DCFS,” and had done everything
DCFS had asked of her. Counsel continued, “And given the
history of this relationship, I think sole legal custody would be
appropriate.”
Mother’s counsel noted there had been no concerns with
J.F.’s unmonitored visits with father or with the overnight visits
that began more recently. Counsel said “mother’s torn between
wanting to be protective and just following what [DCFS] wants
from her and also understanding that [J.F.] does have a good
relationship with his father.” Accordingly, mother submitted the
issues of terminating jurisdiction and legal and physical custody
to the court.
DCFS’s counsel noted the court had been “very clear” in
March that it “needed to see a level of insight into the case
issues” before the court would return J.F. to father’s care.
Counsel argued, “There’s a difference between the father having
denied for legal reasons and what the father said.” Counsel noted
the last minute information report stated father “not only denies

15
the allegation, he calls the mother and the children liars. The
issue at the initial assumption of jurisdiction was the intertwined
issue of domestic violence and alcohol, the fact that the father
was utilizing alcohol and engaging in domestic violence while
under the influence of alcohol. However, when he was
interviewed, the father denies ever having an issue with alcohol
despite having three DUIs. . . . The father indicates that he
doesn’t understand why the children and the mother state he
drank a lot, indicating he drank rarely, denies having a problem
with alcohol, and denies having any issues as to why this court
took jurisdiction.” Counsel noted father had participated in 72
AA “courses,” but had “gained absolutely no insight as to the
alcohol issue.” Counsel similarly noted that, despite having
participated in 27 domestic violence classes, father denied any
physical violence even though the court had sustained the a-1
count and ordered him to complete a 52-week program. Counsel
continued, “So the father has not even completed his domestic
violence program and has gained absolutely no insight into the
case issues, which is what the court warned him about in March.”
Counsel noted DCFS “understands the child is doing well
during the unmonitored visits, which is why they recently
liberalized the father’s visits to overnight visits. But at this time,
[DCFS] does not believe that it is safe to return [J.F.] to his
father because the father has not gained any insight as to . . .
why the petition was sustained and what the father needed to
address.” Father’s counsel objected to DCFS’s characterization of
the evidence, noting DCFS’s report stated father “told the social
worker that he had a problem with alcohol, just that he had not
connected it to issues in the home.” Counsel also noted father
had “acknowledged emotional abuse” in his domestic violence

16
program. Counsel thus argued “it’s mischaracterization . . . to
say my client has no insight whatsoever.”
After hearing argument, the court explained,
“[T]he narrow question here is whether or not the
conditions which would justify the initial assumption
of jurisdiction . . . exists, and, in this situation, I don’t
believe that they do. [¶] I think that at this point,
sort of despite limited insight from father, . . . I’m not
100 percent certain that this is a situation where
father, with another few months, would gain any
more insight, and we could be going on forever and
ever and ever. And I think that at this point, minors
can be safely maintained in the home of the mother,
and it seems like, despite the fact that they’re not
going to reconcile, that . . . mother is not in a
situation where she is trying to prevent any
visitation or connection. So I think that overnights
are going well, and I think that the parents are closer
together than we might suspect with regard to the
best interest of the minors.”
The court then heard father’s argument on the custody
order. He objected to sole legal custody for mother. Counsel
argued “it would seem cruel” that father—who was having
overnight visits—“could be so involved in his son’s life and not
even have the right to take part in important decisions. And it’s
highly unfair to have sole legal just because he does not admit
the allegations.” Counsel further argued there had been no
evidence since the case opened more than a year ago that father
had tried to control mother or had been violent or abusive.
Counsel argued father had been co-parenting with mother “with
more than passing grades.” Counsel continued, “It’s unjustified
to grant mother sole legal [custody] under these circumstances,
and it would be a disservice to [J.F.] to keep his father out of his

17
life in that way.” If the court were not inclined to make “an equal
joint legal custody order,” counsel alternatively asked for joint
custody with mother to have tie-breaking authority. Mother then
could “have the final say” if she were “worried about” father
“trying to be controlling in some way.”
After stating it had “take[n] into account” father’s counsel’s
argument, the court said it still was granting sole physical and
legal custody to mother based on father’s “lack of insight.” The
court also allowed father to have unmonitored visits and
overnights “at a rate of four times per month” that was “basically
every weekend.” The court stayed termination of jurisdiction
pending receipt of the juvenile custody order. On July 18, 2025,
the court entered the juvenile custody order giving mother sole
physical and legal custody of J.F. and ordered father “shall have
a minimum of nine hours unmonitored visits per week and four
overnight visits per month.” The court terminated its
jurisdiction. Father appealed.
DISCUSSION
Father contends the juvenile court failed to apply the best
interests of the child standard in awarding sole legal custody to
mother, and substantial evidence did not support a finding that
an award of sole legal custody to mother was in J.F.’s best
interests.6

6 Father states his appeal is from the custody award
granting mother sole legal and physical custody of J.F. Father
makes no argument that the juvenile court erred in granting
mother sole physical custody, however. He thus has forfeited the
issue, and we do not consider it. (Swain v. LaserAway Medical
Group, Inc. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 59, 72.)

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1. Father’s notice of appeal
Father’s notice of appeal—filed September 16, 2025—states
he appeals “from the findings and orders of the court” made on
“July 11, 2025 . . . regarding child custody.” DCFS argues
father’s notice of appeal was untimely and appealed only the
orders made at the July 11 hearing, not the juvenile custody
order entered July 18. As father asserts, the orders announced
July 11 were stayed, and the appealable final judgment—the
juvenile custody order—was not entered until July 18, 2025. The
custody order also was not effective until the court issued it on
form JV-200. (§ 362.4, subd. (e) [requiring the Judicial Council to
“adopt forms for any custody . . . order issued under” the statute];
Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.700(b) [juvenile custody order entered
on termination of jurisdiction “must be prepared” on form JV-
200].)
We liberally construe father’s notice of appeal as from the
July 18, 2025 custody order, finding no prejudice to DCFS. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.405(a)(3); see also In re Joshua S. (2007) 41
Cal.4th 261, 272 [notice of appeal is liberally construed if it is
clear what appellant was trying to appeal from and respondent is
not prejudiced].) Construing the notice of appeal from the July
18, 2025 order, its filing 60 days later on September 16, 2025,
was timely. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.406(a)(1).)
2. Applicable law and standard of review
“Section 362.4 governs the termination of juvenile court
jurisdiction and related orders. The statute authorizes a juvenile
court to make ‘exit orders’ regarding custody and visitation
upon terminating dependency jurisdiction over a child.” (In re
J.M. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 95, 112 (J.M.), citing § 362.4,
subd. (a); In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 203 (Chantal

19
S.).) Exit orders “become part of the relevant family law file”—or
may be used to open a file—“and remain in effect in the family
law action ‘until modified or terminated by subsequent order.’ ”
(In re T.S. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 503, 513 & fn. 3 (T.S.); § 362.4,
subds. (b), (c).)
“When making a custody determination under
section 362.4, ‘the court’s focus and primary consideration must
always be the best interests of the child.’ ” (T.S., supra, 52
Cal.App.5th at p. 513; accord, J.M., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at
p. 112.) “The court must be guided by the totality of the
circumstances and issue orders that are in the child’s best
interests.” (J.M., at p. 112, citing Chantal S., supra, 13 Cal.4th
at p. 201.) “Because juvenile dependency proceedings arise
when children are subject to or at risk of abuse or neglect,
‘[t]he presumption of parental fitness that underlies custody law
in the family court just does not apply. . . . Rather the juvenile
court, which has been intimately involved in the protection
of the child, is best situated to make custody determinations
based on the best interests of the child without any preferences
or presumptions.’ ” (J.M., at p. 112, quoting In re Jennifer R.
(1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 704, 712 (Jennifer R.) [no presumption
of joint custody at termination of jurisdiction]; accord, Chantal S.,
at p. 206.)
“ ‘Joint legal custody’ means that both parents shall share
the right and the responsibility to make the decisions relating to
the health, education, and welfare of a child.” (Fam. Code,
§ 3003.) “ ‘Sole legal custody’ means that one parent shall have
[that] right and . . . responsibility . . . .” (Id., § 3006.)
We review custody orders issued under section 362.4 for an
abuse of discretion. (J.M., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 113; see In

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re Nicholas H. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 251, 265, fn. 4 [court has
broad discretion to make custody orders when it terminates
jurisdiction].) “We will not disturb the juvenile court’s decision
‘ “ ‘unless the trial court has exceeded the limits of legal
discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd
determination.’ ” ’ ” (J.M., at p. 113; see also In re Stephanie M.
(1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 319 [“ ‘ “When two or more inferences can
reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no
authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.” ’ ”].)
“A court abuses its discretion in making a child custody order if
there is no reasonable basis on which it could conclude that its
decision advanced the best interests of the child” or “if it applies
improper criteria or makes incorrect legal assumptions.” (In re
Marriage of Fajota (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1487, 1497, italics
omitted; see also In re C.B. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 102, 123
[“When applying the deferential abuse of discretion standard, ‘the
trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence
. . . .’ ”].)
3. The court did not abuse its discretion by awarding
sole legal custody to mother
Father first argues the court did not distinguish between
physical and legal custody and “treated insight . . . as the sine
qua non standard” to determine custody “in lieu of the best
interests of the child standard.” We disagree. The juvenile court
may not have used the phrase “in the best interest of the child,”
but it was not required to state its reasons for making the
custody order. (Jennifer R., supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 713;
contra In re N.M. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1090, 1095 (N.M.)
[reversing order where there was no explicit finding that sole
custody was in the child’s best interest and the record reflected

21
that the court relied on improper considerations].) We can infer
the court implicitly found it would not be in J.F.’s best interests
for father to make joint parenting decisions with mother due to
the totality of the circumstances, including father’s lack of insight
into his behavior that led to J.F.’s removal, including his
continued denial of his history of both alcohol abuse and his
treatment of mother and the children. Correspondingly, we can
infer the court found it was in J.F.’s best interests for mother to
have sole custody—both legal and physical. (See In re. J.S.
(2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1069, 1078 [“Ordinarily . . . appellate
courts will indulge all reasonable inferences favorable to the
judgment” absent a requirement that the court make express
findings].)
Father also argues the court “making [f]ather’s failure to
admit past physical violence dispositive of whether it was in
J.F.’s best interest that [f]ather participate in decisions about
J.F.’s medical care, education, and similar life decisions was
error, based on pure conjecture.” Again, we disagree. First, we
can infer the court did not base its decision solely on the fact
father did not admit he had engaged in physical violence.
Second, substantial evidence supports the court’s implied finding
that its sole custody award to mother was in J.F.’s best interests.
We acknowledge father had made progress in his alcohol
abuse treatment program and there were no signs that he had
been drinking since DCFS became involved. Father asserts he
admitted in May 2025 that he had a problem with alcohol that he
was addressing in his program. By the time of the section 364
hearing, he also had begun to make “slow” progress in his
domestic violence program, admitting to some “emotional abuse”
of mother.

22
 However, father had yet to recognize—after more than a
year—his aggression toward mother and J.F. constituted
domestic violence, the connection between his violent conduct and
his alcohol use, and the negative effect it all had on J.F. Even in
admitting he had a problem with alcohol, for instance, father
denied “that his drinking influenced his behavior at home.”
Rather, father’s “admission” was to a past problem relating to his
“multiple DUI’s.” Moreover, father repeatedly—even as late as
June 2025—denied all of the petition’s allegations, denied ever
having a physical altercation with mother, denied the children
ever saw him intoxicated, said everyone was lying, and chalked
up his DUIs to bad luck. Yet J.F.—whom the court had found
very credible—consistently stated he had seen domestic violence
between father and mother many times—usually when father
was drunk; and it made him both sad and scared to see father
drunk because he worried father would hurt someone. J.F. even
was able to describe what father was like when he was drunk: he
was mean, smelled like alcohol, could not talk right, and his eyes
were red. A.G. corroborated J.F.’s statements, and both children
reported having seen father slap, kick, and choke mother in the
past. Both children also corroborated each other’s statements
that father previously disciplined them by striking them with
objects, resulting in injury at least for J.F.
The court reasonably could conclude that, given father’s
lack of insight into—or even acknowledgement of—his behavior,
it would not be in J.F.’s best interest to require father and mother
to communicate and coordinate regarding significant decisions
related to J.F.’s health, education and welfare.7 This conclusion

7 Father asked us to take judicial notice of the Los Angeles
Superior Court’s on-line parenting vendor resource list in reply to

23
is additionally supported by the most recent incident between
father and mother, where the evidence indicated that the parents
had an unresolved conflict regarding some personal property,
mother shared this conflict with DCFS, and father went to
mother’s place of employment to confront her. Although the court
arguably could have awarded parents joint legal custody, and
given mother tie-breaking authority in the event father
disagreed, father hasn’t demonstrated the court acted outside the
bounds of reason by instead awarding mother sole legal custody.
(See In re Matthew M. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1186, 1195 [“We do
not inquire whether substantial evidence would have supported a
different order, nor do we reweigh the evidence and substitute
our judgment for that of the juvenile court.”].)
Father relies on N.M., supra, 88 Cal.App.5th 1090. There,
the trial court expressly granted the mother sole legal custody
because it did not want “ ‘to reward’ ” the father, “who had
refused to participate meaningfully in the case plan.” (Id. at
p. 1095.) The reviewing court concluded “[t]his was an abuse of
discretion because an exit order must serve the best interests of
the children, not reward or punish one parent or another for
failing to comply with the case plan.” (Ibid.) Here, there is no
indication the juvenile court awarded mother sole legal custody to
punish—or to not reward—father for his lack of insight, or that

DCFS’s argument that joint legal custody could lead to
“altercations and discord.” Father argues “the list shows
resources are available to facilitate parents engaging in shared
parenting.” DCFS did not file an opposition to father’s request.
We now take judicial notice of the existence of the resource list on
the court’s website. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subds. (c), (d), 459,
subd. (b).) We conclude the existence of those online tools did not
require the court to grant joint legal custody here.

24
the court otherwise relied on any improper basis for rendering its
decision.
Father also notes he had been making parenting decisions
for J.F. “for the entirety of J.F.’s life,” and mother did not oppose
joint legal custody. But the court was required to focus on J.F.’s
best interests based on the totality of his specific circumstances.
(J.M., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 112; see also M.L. v. Superior
Court (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 520, 528 [“Once the juvenile court
sustains the allegations of the dependency petition, the court has
an independent obligation to determine the best interests of the
child.”]) It did that. Considering those circumstances, we cannot
find the court acted arbitrarily in granting sole legal and physical
custody to mother or that the evidence did not support its
decision.

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 DISPOSITION
We affirm the juvenile court’s order.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

OCHOA, J.*

We concur:

ADAMS, Acting P. J.

HANASONO, J.

* Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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