Filed 7/9/26
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re the Marriage of B345397
CLAUDIA Z. MARTINEZ and
JUAN E. CAMOU. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
22STFL13678)
CLAUDIA Z. MARTINEZ,
Appellant,
v.
JUAN E. CAMOU,
Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Patricia A. Young, Judge. Affirmed.
Olsen & Olsen and Casey A. Olsen for Appellant.
No appearance for Respondent.
______________________________
In this marital dissolution case, appellant Claudia Z.
Martinez (Martinez) stipulated to a bifurcated trial on the
validity of a premarital agreement. Despite this stipulation and
her participation in several trial setting conferences, she waited
nearly eight months to invoke her rights under European
Beverage, Inc. v. Superior Court (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1213
(European Beverage) to have the same judge try all portions of a
bifurcated court trial.
We hold that parties have an affirmative obligation to
invoke European Beverage in a timely manner as necessary to
avoid undue delay and increased litigation costs in marital
dissolution cases. Because Martinez failed to do so, we affirm the
trial court’s order imposing $20,000 in sanctions under Family
Code section 271.1
BACKGROUND
Martinez and respondent Juan E. Camou (Camou) married
in 2004. In 2022, Martinez filed a petition for marital dissolution
and a request for order seeking temporary spousal support and
other relief. In his response to the request for order, Camou
provided a document written in Spanish, as well as an English
translation, purporting to be a premarital agreement.
At a hearing on March 15, 2023, the trial court suggested
that the parties discuss whether to bifurcate the validity of the
premarital agreement. Camou’s counsel stated: “That is what
[Martinez’s] counsel and I were going to raise. Counsel and I did
speak prior to this hearing, and I believe that counsel is in
agreement that we were just to stipulate to bifurcate that issue.”
1 All further statutory references are to the Family Code
unless otherwise indicated.
2
Martinez’s counsel did not dispute this representation. To the
contrary, Martinez’s counsel stated: “So at this point I don’t mind
coming back at a later time for determination as to whether we
are ready to . . . set the hearing for bifurcation, but I think it
should be several months down the road.”
Following a lengthy discussion, the trial court stated:
“Again, it sounds like the [premarital agreement] is kind of a big
issue, and it could change a lot of different things for the parties.
I think that is why I’m inclined to bifurcate that and address that
early.” Camou submitted to the court’s tentative, and Martinez
did not object.
The trial court set a trial setting conference “with regards
to bifurcation of [the] validity of the premarital agreement.”
Again, Martinez’s counsel did not object. Nor did Martinez’s
counsel raise the issue that, under European Beverage, supra, 43
Cal.App.4th at page 1213, a party is entitled to have the same
judge try all portions of a bifurcated court trial that depend on
weighing evidence and issues of credibility, absent a stipulation
or waiver.
The case was then reassigned to a different judge. On June
6, 2023, the trial court conducted a trial setting conference on the
validity of the premarital agreement. Martinez’s counsel
estimated that it would take “two or three days” and said, “I
would assume it’s going to go to a long cause judge for that.” The
court responded, “Right. It sounds like it.” However, when
Martinez’s counsel asked whether the court would send the case
to the supervising judge for reassignment to a long cause court,
the court said, “Why don’t we come back August 8th and see
where we are and go from there.” Martinez’s counsel did not
object to bifurcation or raise the European Beverage issue.
3
The case was again reassigned to a different judge. On
October 25, 2023, the trial court held another trial setting
conference. The court asked if the parties had a time estimate
regarding the duration of a bifurcated trial on the premarital
agreement. Martinez’s counsel mentioned anticipated witnesses
and exhibits, as well as various legal issues pertaining to the
validity of the agreement. Again, Martinez’s counsel did not
object to bifurcation or raise the European Beverage issue.
On November 7, 2023, the trial court held another trial
setting conference on “the bifurcated issue of the validity of the
premarital agreement.” Martinez’s counsel provided a minimum
two-day time estimate and requested that the case be transferred
to a long cause court. After the court ruled that the case did not
qualify for such a transfer, Martinez’s counsel stated “that all
issues need[ed] to be tried together so that the case w[ould]
qualify for a long cause referral . . . .” Martinez’s counsel
“expressly decline[d] to give a European Beverage waiver on
behalf of his client” (italics added) and rejected “a bifurcated trial
on the validity of the premarital agreement.”
Camou subsequently filed a request for order seeking
$20,000 in sanctions under section 271 because, among other
things, Martinez and her counsel reneged on their agreement to
bifurcate the validity of the premarital agreement and waited
until the hearing on November 7, 2023, to do so.
During the hearing on the request for sanctions, the trial
court entertained oral argument but declined to hold an
evidentiary hearing. The court explained that it would “not be
aided by testimony because it was present when the conduct
occurred and [had] reviewed the transcripts of the prior hearings
submitted by the parties.”
4
The trial court found that Martinez’s counsel was either
engaged in forum shopping or “just had no desire to move this
case forward in an expeditious manner.” The court found that
Martinez’s counsel agreed to bifurcate the trial and “acted in a
manner as though [he] agreed [to a European Beverage waiver,]”
but then refused to give the waiver after “several” trial setting
conferences. The court found that Martinez’s counsel was not
credible in claiming “surprise[] that a European Beverage waiver
would be required with bifurcation,” given that counsel had
practiced family law in Los Angeles County for, at that time, 38
years and was familiar with European Beverage waivers. The
court also observed that Martinez’s counsel invoked European
Beverage only after the court set trial in her own courtroom
instead of transferring the case to a long cause courtroom.
Accordingly, the trial court found that Martinez’s counsel
“engaged in conduct that frustrates the policy of the law to
promote settlement, and unnecessarily increased the cost of
litigation by refusing to give a European Beverage [w]aiver after
agreeing to a bifurcated trial on the validity of the [p]remarital
[a]greement and attending the [t]rial [s]etting [c]onference on
that issue, which was continued several times.” (Italics added.)
The court ordered Martinez to pay Camou $20,000 in sanctions,
at a rate of $750 per month, by having it deducted from her
spousal support payment.
This timely appeal followed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1,
subd. (a)(12) [appeal may be taken from an order directing
payment of sanctions in excess of $5,000]; George v. Shams-
Shirazi (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 134, 138–139 [an order awarding
sanctions under section 271 is appealable].)
5
DISCUSSION
I. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
“Section 271 ‘ “authorizes sanctions to advance the policy of
promoting settlement of litigation and encouraging cooperation of
the litigants” and “does not require any actual injury.” [Citation.]
Litigants who flout that policy by engaging in conduct that
increases litigation costs are subject to imposition of attorney fees
and costs as a section 271 sanction.’ [Citation.]” (In re E.M.
(2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 828, 850, fn. omitted.)
We review a sanctions order under section 271 for an abuse
of discretion. (In re Marriage of Hoch (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 80,
95.) Under this standard, we will uphold the order unless we
conclude that “ ‘considering all of the evidence viewed most
favorably in its support and indulging all reasonable inferences
in its favor, no judge could reasonably make the order.’
[Citation.]” (In re E.M., supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 850.)
“To the extent that we are called upon to interpret the
statutes relied on by the trial court to impose sanctions, we apply
a de novo standard of review. [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of
Feldman (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1479.) We also interpret
relevant court rules de novo. (In re A.H. (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th
1217, 1227.)
II. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing
sanctions under section 271. Martinez concedes that she
stipulated to bifurcate the validity of the premarital agreement.
Martinez also concedes that “a party wishing to have the
bifurcated issue tried with the remaining issues is required to
advise the court at the earliest opportunity that the party will not
give the court a European Beverage waiver.” We agree. Parties
6
have an affirmative obligation to invoke European Beverage in a
timely manner as necessary to avoid undue delay and increased
litigation costs in marital dissolution cases. This obligation
stems from section 271, which “imposes a ‘minimum level of
professionalism and cooperation,’ to effect the policy favoring
settlement of family law litigation—and a reduction of the
attendant costs. [Citations.]” (In re Marriage of Davenport
(2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1507, 1524.)
Here, Martinez waited until the trial setting conference on
November 7, 2023, to invoke her rights under European
Beverage, even though she had stipulated to bifurcation nearly
eight months earlier and failed to object when bifurcation was
discussed at three prior hearings. In doing so, Martinez led the
trial court and opposing counsel to believe that she would not
invoke her right to have one judge try the entire case. This
constitutes undue delay, warranting sanctions under section 271.
Moreover, the court was eminently reasonable in permitting
Martinez to pay the sanctions in installments by having them
deducted from her monthly spousal support payment.
Martinez resists the claim of undue delay, arguing that she
raised the issue at the “earliest opportunity” when the trial court
declined to transfer the case to a long cause courtroom and
classified the bifurcated issue as a short cause matter. We
disagree. As the trial court correctly noted, a European Beverage
waiver is still required in bifurcation of long cause family law
matters because there is “no guarantee that that judge would
have been the same judge to hear the rest of [the] matter.” The
court also reasonably concluded that Martinez’s counsel engaged
in gamesmanship. Given the heavy caseloads and frequency of
judicial reassignments in the Los Angeles County Superior Court,
7
it is not credible that an attorney practicing family law in the
jurisdiction for nearly 40 years would be surprised that a
European Beverage waiver is required when bifurcating issues,
even when a case is transferred to a long cause courtroom.2
Martinez also argues that the trial court erred in
classifying the validity of the premarital agreement as a short
cause matter and that the court was required to transfer any
matter exceeding five hours to the family law master calendar
court for assignment to a long cause court. Martinez is missing
the forest for the trees. The sanctions award is justified because
Martinez failed to raise the European Beverage issue in a timely
manner, after stipulating to bifurcation, for purposes of
gamesmanship. The propriety of the long cause threshold as a
general matter and the court’s decision not to transfer the case to
a long cause court are irrelevant.
In any event, Martinez is incorrect. She identifies no
statute, case, California Rule of Court, or local rule mandating
that any family law matter exceeding one day be transferred to a
long cause court. To the contrary, presiding judges and their
designees have authority to determine which cases should be
tried in which departments, given caseloads and judicial
availability. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 10.603(b)(1)(B), (c)(1)(D),
(d).) As the trial court noted, the supervising judge had set the
threshold at 15 hours, which fell within her discretion. California
Rules of Court, rule 5.393, which defines a “long-cause hearing”
as one exceeding one court day, does not limit the supervising
2 For the same reasons, European Beverage is sometimes
implicated in short cause cases in the Los Angeles County
Superior Court. Martinez notes that eight judges have handled
aspects of this single case.
8
judge’s discretion to assign cases or prohibit her from setting a
higher threshold.3
Finally, Martinez contends that the trial court erred in
denying her request for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of
sanctions. (See § 217, subd. (a) [requiring a trial court to hold an
evidentiary hearing on any motion brought under the Family
Code “absent a stipulation of the parties or a finding of good
cause”].) Here, the court found good cause not to hold an
evidentiary hearing because the conduct at issue either occurred
in the presence of the court or was documented in the transcripts
submitted by the parties. The court did not abuse its discretion.
(See In re Marriage of Hearn (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 380, 390
[standard of review]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.113.) The
propriety of the sanctions award is apparent from the transcripts
of the first three trial setting conferences and the minute order of
the fourth, as well as the respective dates of the conferences. The
court reasonably concluded that live testimony would be of no
assistance.
3 Nor are judges required to accept the parties’ trial
estimates. (California Crane School, Inc. v. National Com. for
Certification of Crane Operators (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 12, 19.)
9
DISPOSITION
The sanctions order is affirmed. The parties are to bear
their own costs on appeal.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.
GOORVITCH, J.
We concur:
CHAVEZ, Acting P. J.
RICHARDSON, J.
10
