Filed 7/22/26
CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION *

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

DEREK SKYLAR AUD, as B341254
Successor in Interest, etc.,
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct.
Plaintiff and Appellant, No. 22STCV21164)

v.

RRT ENTERPRISES, LP et al.,

Defendants and
Appellants.

APPEAL from a judgment and orders of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County, Stephanie M. Bowick, Judge. Affirmed in
part and reversed in part with directions.
Lanzone Morgan, Ayman R. Mourad, Elizabeth M. Kim,
and Christopher W. Petersen for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Ekpebe Law Group and Vona S. Ekpebe for Defendants and
Appellants Boardwalk West Financial Services, LLC, Shlomo
Rechnitz, and Rockport Administrative Services, LLC.

* Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1100 and
8.1110, this opinion is certified for publication with the exception
of parts B, D, E, and F of the Discussion.
 Greines, Martin, Stein & Richland, Alana H. Rotter and
Laura G. Lim for Defendants and Appellants Boardwalk West
Financial Services, LLC and Shlomo Rechnitz.
Gittler & Berg, Randy A. Berg and Marvin G. Fischler for
Defendant and Appellant RRT Enterprises, LP.

____________________________

INTRODUCTION

Betsy Jentz sued RRT Enterprises LP dba Country Villa
Wilshire Convalescent Center, Boardwalk West Financial
Services, LLC, Rockport Administrative Services, LLC, and
Shlomo Rechnitz (collectively, the defendants) for violating the
Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (Welf.
& Inst. Code, § 15600 et seq., 1 the Elder Abuse Act), violating the
rights of a resident or patient (Health & Saf. Code, § 1430,
subd. (b)), and negligence. The jury found in favor of Jentz and
awarded her $2,342,800. The trial court granted the defendants’
motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new
trial, conditionally reducing the verdict to $372,962.
In the published portion of this opinion we conclude the
trial court erred in granting the defendants’ motions for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict and conditionally granting the
defendants’ motion for a new trial unless Jentz accepted a
reduction in noneconomic damages from $1,837,032 to $250,000,
the maximum allowed under the Medical Injury Compensation
Reform Act (MICRA). We conclude Jentz’s causes of action were

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

2
based on Country Villa Wilshire’s acts and omissions as Jentz’s
custodian and caregiver, not as her health care provider. 2
Therefore, under Holland v. Silverscreen Healthcare, Inc. (2025)
18 Cal.5th 364 (Holland), which the Supreme Court decided
while this appeal was pending, MICRA’s cap on noneconomic
damages does not limit Jentz’s recovery.
In the unpublished portion of this opinion we conclude the
trial court did not err in (1) conditionally granting the
defendants’ motion for a new trial unless Jentz accepted a
reduction in economic damages to $69,812.19, the amount
Medicare and Medi-Cal paid for her medical care; (2) granting the
motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new
trial on whether Rockport or Boardwalk was engaged in a joint
venture with RRT; and (3) granting the motion for a new trial on
whether Rockport, Boardwalk, and Rechnitz were alter egos of
RRT. We also conclude any error in excluding evidence of
conversations between Rechnitz and Jentz’s grandnephew, Derek
Skylar Aud, 3 was harmless.

2 We refer to RRT Enterprises LP dba Country Villa Wilshire
Convalescent Center as RRT. We refer to the skilled nursing
facility as Country Villa Wilshire.
3 Jentz died while this appeal was pending. We granted
Aud’s motion to substitute him for Jentz. (See Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.36(a).)

3
 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Jentz Files This Action Against RRT and Others
Jentz filed this action in 2022 against RRT, Boardwalk, and
Rechnitz, later amending her complaint to add Rockport as a
defendant. RRT operated Country Villa Wilshire, a skilled
nursing facility, under a state-issued license. 4 Rechnitz was the
manager of RRT. Boardwalk and Rockport provided consulting
services to Country Villa Wilshire.
Jentz alleged that she was over the age of 65 and that,
before she moved to Country Villa Wilshire, she “was in excellent
physical condition and enjoyed running marathons.” After Jentz
fell and fractured her hip in November 2020 she was admitted to
Country Villa Wilshire “to receive custodial care and
rehabilitation services.” Jentz alleged that, though Country Villa
Wilshire assessed her as having a “high risk for falls,” Country
Villa Wilshire did not create a care plan to prevent her from
falling or provide her with “supervision, monitoring, and
assistance” with activities of daily living. As a result, Jentz
alleged, she suffered “from falls and injury, pressure sores,
infection, and poor nutrition, hydration, and hygiene.” Jentz
alleged she fell multiple times during her stay at Country Villa
Wilshire, with the worst fall occurring on October 4, 2021, when
she was found lying on the floor of the bathroom with fractures to

4 We take judicial notice of licenses the California
Department of Public Health issued to RRT. (See Evid. Code,
§§ 452, subd. (c), 459.)

4
her humerus, pubic ramus, and ischium. 5 Jentz alleged that her
injuries caused her quality of life to decline steeply, that her
“shoulder injury causes her severe pain and immobility,” and that
she “has become bedbound, which has caused her great
discomfort and emotional distress.” Jentz asserted causes of
action for elder abuse and neglect under the Elder Abuse Act,
violation of her rights as a resident or patient (Health & Saf.
Code, § 1430, subd. (b)), and negligence.

B. The Jury Returns a Verdict for Jentz
A jury found that RRT committed elder neglect or abuse,
but that RRT did not act with recklessness, oppression, fraud or
malice, as required to recover enhanced remedies under the Elder
Abuse Act. (See § 15657.) The jury also found RRT was
negligent. On Jentz’s causes of action for violating the Elder
Abuse Act and negligence the jury awarded her $452,618 in past
economic damages, $551,111 in past noneconomic damages, and
$1,285,921 in future noneconomic damages. The jury found RRT
violated Health & Safety Code section 1430 (resident’s rights)
132 times and awarded Jentz $53,150 in statutory damages. The
jury found that Rockport and Boardwalk were engaged in a joint
venture with RRT and that Rockport, Boardwalk, and Rechnitz
were alter egos of RRT. The jury also found RRT acted with
malice, oppression, or fraud, but the jury did not award any

5 The humerus is “the bone that runs from the shoulder to
the elbow.” (David v. Hernandez (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 692, 700.)
The pubic ramus and ischium are bones of the hip and pelvis.
(Daniels v. Astrue (M.D. Pa., Apr. 15, 2009, No. 4:08-CV-1676)
2009 WL 1011587, at p. 14; Powers v. Deatherage (C.D. Ill.,
Mar. 30, 2009, No. 02-1372) 2009 WL 856296, at p. 6.)

5
punitive damages. The trial court entered judgment. The court
granted in part Jentz’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs.
Jentz’s appeal from that order is pending. (See Aud v. RRT
Enterprises LP, Case No. B340727.)

C. The Trial Court Grants the Defendants’ Motions for
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and for a
New Trial
The defendants filed motions for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict and for a new trial. The trial court granted a motion
for new trial for all defendants on economic damages unless Jentz
accepted a reduction in damages from $452,618 to $69,812.19.
The court granted a motion by all the defendants for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, reducing Jentz’s noneconomic
damages from $1,837,032 to $250,000. The court also
conditionally granted a motion by Rockport, Boardwalk, and
Rechnitz for a new trial on the noneconomic damages award,
unless Jentz accepted a reduction in damages to $250,000.6 The
court granted motions by Rockport and Boardwalk for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial on the joint
venture claim, finding substantial evidence did not support the
jury’s verdict. Finally, the court granted a motion by Rockport,
Boardwalk, and Rechnitz for a new trial on the alter ego claim,
ruling alter ego “is an equitable issue to be determined by the
Court.” Jentz timely appealed from the judgment and the
various orders on the defendants’ posttrial motions, and the
defendants cross-appealed.

6 The court denied without explanation RRT’s motion for a
new trial on noneconomic damages.

6
 DISCUSSION

A. Applicable Law and Standards of Review
“‘“A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict may
be granted only if it appears from the evidence, viewed in the
light most favorable to the party securing the verdict, that there
is no substantial evidence in support. . . . As in the trial court,
the standard of review [on appeal] is whether any substantial
evidence—contradicted or uncontradicted—supports the jury’s
conclusion.”’” (Webb v. Special Electric Co., Inc. (2016) 63 Cal.4th
167, 192, brackets in original; see Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co.
(2011) 51 Cal.4th 764, 770; Doe v. County of Orange (2025)
113 Cal.App.5th 1276, 1284.) “In reviewing the evidence, we
draw all reasonable inferences in [the nonmoving party’s] favor
and disregard evidence that conflicts with any evidence which
supports the verdict.” (Doe, at p. 1284; see Lurner v. American
Golf Corp. (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 121, 132.) When the motion
“raises legal issues like the interpretation of a statute or the
application of law to undisputed facts, we review the trial court’s
ruling under a de novo standard of review.” (Lurner, at p. 133;
see Guzman v. NBA Automotive, Inc. (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 1109,
1114.)
The trial court may grant a new trial on certain grounds
“materially affecting the substantial rights” of a party, including
“[i]rregularity in the proceedings,” “[e]xcessive . . . damages,”
“[i]nsufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict” or the
verdict “is against law,” and “[e]rror in law.” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 657, subds. 1, 5, 6, 7.) We review an order granting or denying
a motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion. (Pomona Valley
Hospital Medical Center v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.

7
(2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 43, 59; see Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield
Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 859.) “We review the ruling
underlying the new trial order, however, ‘“under the test
appropriate to such determination.”’” (Pomona Valley Hospital,
at p. 59; see Aguilar, at p. 859.) When the trial court grants a
motion for a new trial because of an error in law, “[w]hether that
initial denial was an error in law is an issue we review de novo.”
(Pomona Valley Hospital, at p. 59; see Smith v. Magic Mountain
LLC (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1128, 1135.) We review the trial
court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. (Pilliod v.
Monsanto Co. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 591, 630; Mangano v. Verity,
Inc. (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 217, 222.)

B. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Conditionally
Granting the Motion for a New Trial on Economic
Damages
The jury awarded Jentz $452,618 in economic damages.
The defendants filed a motion for a new trial on the grounds the
award was excessive and unsupported by the evidence. The
defendants argued Jentz could not recover past medical expenses
more than the $69,812.19 Medicare and Medi-Cal paid for her
medical care. The trial court granted the motion under Code of
Civil Procedure section 657, subdivisions 5 and 6, and issued a
conditional order for a new trial unless Jentz consented “to a
remittitur in the reduced amount of $69,812.19 in economic
damages.”
Aud argues the trial court erred in ruling Jentz “did not
‘actually incur’ most of her medical expenses, despite the copious
amounts of evidence proving otherwise.” In his opening brief Aud
discusses the evidence, but he does not cite to the record. He

8
therefore forfeited the argument. (See Wentworth v. Regents of
University of California (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 580, 596 [“parties
forfeit arguments by failing to support statements in the
argument section of a brief with record citations”]; Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) [an appellate brief must “[s]upport any
reference to a matter in the record by a citation to the volume
and page number of the record where the matter appears”].)
Even if not forfeited, Aud’s argument is meritless. Code of
Civil Procedure section 657 provides that “‘on appeal from an
order granting a new trial upon the ground of the insufficiency of
the evidence . . . or upon the ground of excessive or inadequate
damages, . . . such order shall be reversed as to such ground only
if there is no substantial basis in the record for any’” of the
reasons stated by the trial court. (Lane v. Hughes Aircraft Co.
(2000) 22 Cal.4th 405, 411-412; see Baker v. American
Horticulture Supply, Inc. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1059, 1067.)
“The trial court . . . is in the best position to assess the reliability
of a jury’s verdict and, to this end, the Legislature has granted
trial courts broad discretion to order new trials. The only
relevant limitation on this discretion is that the trial court must
state its reasons for granting the new trial, and there must be
substantial evidence in the record to support those reasons.”
(Lane, at p. 412; see Baker, at p. 1068.)
Substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding
Jentz incurred only $69,812.19 in economic damages, the amount
Medicare and Medi-Cal paid for her medical care. A “plaintiff
may recover as economic damages no more than the reasonable
value of the medical services received and is not entitled to
recover the reasonable value if his or her actual loss was less.”
(Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions, Inc. (2011) 52 Cal.4th

9
541, 555 (Howell); see Corenbaum v. Lampkin (2013)
215 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1325-1326 [“Damages for past medical
expenses are limited to the lesser of (1) the amount paid or
incurred for past medical expenses and (2) the reasonable value
of the services.”].) Therefore, a “tort plaintiff’s recovery for
medical expenses . . . is limited to the amount ‘paid or incurred
for past medical care and services, whether by the plaintiff or by
an independent source . . . .’” (Howell, at p. 553; see Hanif v.
Housing Authority (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 635, 641.)
Where a medical provider “accepts as full payment,
pursuant to a preexisting contract with the injured person’s
health insurer, an amount less than that stated in the provider’s
bill,” the injured person may not “recover from the tortfeasor, as
economic damages for past medical expenses, the undiscounted
sum stated in the provider’s bill but never paid by or on behalf of
the injured person.” (Howell, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 548.)
A “Medi-Cal beneficiary may recover as damages from the
tortfeasor only the amount payable to the provider under
Medi-Cal.” (Id. at p. 553; see Olszewski v. Scripps Health (2003)
30 Cal.4th 798, 827 [“Because the provider may no longer assert
a lien for the full cost of its services, the Medicaid beneficiary
may only recover the amount payable under Medicaid as his or
her medical expenses in an action against a third party
tortfeasor.”].) 7
Aud argues that Jentz actually incurred more than
$496,497 in medical expenses billed by RRT, a hospital, and the

7 “Medi-Cal is California’s implementation of the federal
Medicaid program. [Citation.] The amounts paid by Medicaid
programs are ‘usually, if not always’ less than a provider’s
ordinary charges.” (Howell, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 553, fn. 3.)

10
rehabilitation center where she lived after the hospital stay. But
the evidence showed Medicare paid $54,000.45 and Medi-Cal paid
$15,811.74 to settle those charges, for a total of $69,812.19.
Under Howell Jentz is entitled to recover only that amount. Aud
does not address the authority limiting Jentz’s recovery to the
amounts Medicare and Medi-Cal paid Jentz’s medical providers.
Instead, he argues that Medicare and Medi-Cal “only helped pay
for a small portion” of Jentz’s bills and that Jentz “was legally
obligated to pay her medical bills.” Aud relies on Jentz’s medical
bills but cites no evidence or authority Jentz was responsible for
paying the difference between the amount billed and the amount
Medicare and Medi-Cal paid.
Aud selectively quotes from Qaadir v. Figueroa (2021)
67 Cal.App.5th 790, but that case does not support his argument.
In Qaadir the plaintiff “sought medical treatment for his injuries
from lien providers who did not accept his insurance plan.” (Id.
at p. 794.) The defendants argued the trial court erred in
admitting evidence of the lien providers’ unpaid medical bills.
(Ibid.) The court in Qaadir stated that, because the plaintiff
sought treatment outside his insurance plan, “the plaintiff,
rather than the health insurer, is the entity who is obligated to
pay.” (Id. at p. 804.) Therefore, the “uninsured plaintiff’s past
medical damages are limited to his or her prospective liability for
unpaid medical bills, i.e., the amounts he or she has incurred.”
(Ibid.) The court explained that, under Howell, supra, 52 Cal.4th
541, the amount “‘paid or incurred’” was “the actual amount that
fully satisfies the medical provider for services rendered.”
(Qaadir, at p. 804.)
Aud quotes the court’s statement in Qaadir that “the billed
amount is generally relevant because the plaintiff is financially

11
liable for it,” but he omits the context. The full statement is:
“The unpaid medical bill is a detriment proximately caused by
the tort only if a plaintiff has incurred the full amount of the bill.
Thus, even in the scenario where the billed amount potentially
exceeds its reasonable value, the billed amount is generally
relevant because the plaintiff is financially liable for it. Our
conclusion also comports with Pebley [v. Santa Clara Organics,
LLC (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1266], which held an unpaid medical
bill is relevant to prove economic damages for medical services
when: (1) the plaintiff is ‘uninsured,’ and (2) the ‘uninsured’
plaintiff is obligated to pay the medical bill.” (Qaadir v.
Figueroa, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 805, italics added.) In other
words, if an uninsured plaintiff is financially liable to a medical
provider for a billed amount, evidence of the billed amount is
relevant to prove economic damages. That was not the case here,
where Jentz was not uninsured, and her providers accepted
payment of a reduced amount from Medicare and Medi-Cal.
Aud also argues the trial court erred in relying on
Bermudez v. Ciolek (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1311 as authority on
whether Jentz actually incurred medical expenses, when
Bermudez instead addressed the requirement the plaintiff prove
the reasonable value of medical services. The trial court may
have cited the wrong portion of the court’s opinion in Bermudez
(the discussion of the reasonable value of the services rather than
the discussion of amount actually incurred) (see id. at p. 1335),
but the trial court correctly stated the legal standard prescribed
by the Supreme Court in Howell and properly applied that
standard to the evidence. And as discussed, substantial evidence

12
supported the trial court’s ruling Jentz incurred only $69,812.19
in economic damages. 8

C. The Trial Court Erred in Granting the Defendants’
Motions for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict
on Noneconomic Damages
The jury awarded Jentz $1,837,032 in noneconomic
damages on her causes of action for negligence and elder abuse.
The defendants filed motions to vacate, for a new trial, and for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict under MICRA, which caps
health care providers’ liability for noneconomic damages. (See
Civ. Code, § 3333.2.) The trial court granted all of the
defendants’ motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
reducing the amount of noneconomic damages from $1,837,032 to
$250,000 and conditionally granted the motion by Rockport,
Boardwalk, and Rechnitz for a new trial on the amount of
noneconomic damages unless Jentz accepted a reduction to
$250,000.

8 In their cross-appeal the defendants argue that, rather
than affirming the order granting a new trial on economic
damages, we should reduce Jentz’s damages to $69,812.19
because “a new trial could not result in any larger an award.” In
the cases the defendants cite, however, it was “futile to permit a
new trial” because “the allegations and proof, as a matter of law,
[were] legally insufficient to state or prove a cause of action.”
(Milton v. Hudson Sales Corp. (1957) 152 Cal.App.2d 418, 441;
see Adams v. City of Fremont (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 243, 261,
fn. 15 [where “allegations and proof of the plaintiff are
insufficient to establish liability,” the reviewing court may
reverse the judgment rather than affirm the order granting new
trial].) Jentz established liability; the issue for the new trial is
the amount of economic damages.

13
 1. Applicable Law

a. The Elder Abuse Act
“The Legislature enacted the Elder Abuse Act to protect
elders and other dependent adults from ‘gross mistreatment in
the form of abuse and custodial neglect.’” (Holland, supra,
18 Cal.5th at p. 376; see Delaney v. Baker (1999) 20 Cal.4th 23,
33 (Delaney).) As originally enacted in 1982, the Elder Abuse Act
focused on “reporting abuse and using law enforcement to combat
it.” (Id. at p. 33.) In 1991 amendments to the Elder Abuse Act,
“the focus shifted to private, civil enforcement of laws against
elder abuse and neglect.” (Ibid.) The Legislature added
section 15657, which provides, “in addition to all other remedies
otherwise provided by law,” for enhanced remedies where a
defendant commits elder neglect with “recklessness, oppression,
fraud, or malice.” (§ 15657; see Holland, at p. 376; Covenant
Care, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 771, 781.)9
“‘‘Neglect’ ” under the Elder Abuse Act is defined as ‘[t]he
negligent failure of any person having the care or custody of an

9 A plaintiff who proves recklessness, oppression, fraud, or
malice by clear and convincing evidence may also recover
attorneys’ fees and costs (§ 15657, subd. (a)), and a personal
representative of a decedent may recover damages for the
decedent’s pre-death pain and suffering, not to exceed the limit
under Civil Code section 3333.2. (See § 15657, subd. (b) [the
“limitations imposed by Section 377.34 of the Code of Civil
Procedure on the damages recoverable shall not apply”].)

14
elder[10] or a dependent adult to exercise that degree of care that
a reasonable person in a like position would exercise.’ [Citation.]
The Elder Abuse Act lists several examples of ‘neglect,’ including
the failure to: ‘assist in personal hygiene, or in the provision of
food, clothing, or shelter’; ‘provide medical care for physical and
mental health needs’; ‘protect from health and safety hazards’;
and ‘prevent malnutrition or dehydration.’” (Holland, supra,
18 Cal.5th at p. 376; see § 15610.57, subds. (a)(1), (b)(1)-(4).)

b. MICRA
The Legislature enacted MICRA in 1975 as a “‘“response to
a perceived crisis regarding the availability of medical
malpractice insurance”’ due to the high cost of coverage.”
(Holland, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 375; see Ruiz v. Podolsky (2010)
50 Cal.4th 838, 843.) “‘Accordingly, MICRA includes a variety of
provisions all of which are calculated to reduce the cost of
insurance by limiting the amount and timing of recovery in cases
of professional negligence.’” (Lopez v. Ledesma (2022) 12 Cal.5th
848, 856.) One of those provisions is Civil Code section 3333.2,
which (at the time Jentz filed this action) capped noneconomic
losses at $250,000 in “any action for injury against a health care
provider based on professional negligence.” (Civ. Code, § 3333.2,
former subds. (a), (b).) 11

10 An elder is any person 65 years or older residing in
California. (§ 15610.57.) Jentz was 84 years old when she moved
into Country Villa Wilshire.

11 For cases filed on or after January 1, 2023, the limit is
$350,000. (Civ. Code, § 3333.2, subds. (b)(1), (g).)

15
 c. Holland
While this appeal was pending the Supreme Court decided
Holland, supra, 18 Cal.5th 364, which addressed the interaction
between the Elder Abuse Act and MICRA’s arbitration provision.
(See Code Civ. Proc., § 1295.) In Holland the plaintiffs sued their
disabled son’s skilled nursing facility, asserting causes of action
for dependent adult abuse under the Elder Abuse Act, negligence,
violation of resident’s rights on behalf of their son (Health & Saf.
Code, § 1430), and wrongful death in their personal capacities.
(Holland, at p. 371.) The facility filed a motion to compel
arbitration based on an arbitration agreement signed by the son,
which stated the agreement was binding on the resident’s
representatives, family members, and heirs. (Id. at p. 372.) The
facility relied on the Supreme Court’s holding in Ruiz v. Podolsky,
supra, 50 Cal.4th at pages 849 to 850 that, if “a patient agreed to
arbitrate medical malpractice disputes in compliance with [Code
of Civil Procedure section 1295], the patient-provider agreement
may bind the patient’s heirs in a wrongful death action, even if
the heirs themselves never agreed to arbitration.” (Holland, at
p. 370.)
The trial court in Holland granted the motion to compel
arbitration of the three survivor causes of action, but denied the
motion to compel arbitration of the wrongful death cause of
action because the plaintiffs pleaded that cause of action as one
for elder abuse, not for professional negligence. (Holland, supra,
18 Cal.5th at p. 372.) In affirming the order denying the motion
to compel arbitration of the wrongful death cause of action, the
Supreme Court stated: “Not every claim of injury against a
health care provider qualifies as a claim of professional
negligence that comes within [Code of Civil Procedure]

16
section 1295. By its terms, [Code of Civil Procedure] section 1295
applies only to claims based on negligence in the provision of
medical services . . . .” (Id. at p. 378.)
The Supreme Court acknowledged “there is potential for
confusion ‘in the fact that some health care institutions, such as
nursing homes, perform custodial functions and provide
professional medical care.’” (Holland, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 379;
see Delaney, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 34.) Reviewing its previous
decisions concerning MICRA in the nursing home context, the
Supreme Court explained “only acts or omissions by a skilled
nursing facility in its capacity as a health care provider fall under
the banner of professional negligence. [Citation.] By contrast,
‘a failure to fulfill custodial duties owed by a custodian who
happens also to be a health care provider . . . is at most
incidentally related to the provider’s professional health care
services.’ [Citation.] The failure to provide basic necessities,
such as assistance in personal hygiene, food, hydration, or
clothing, are paradigmatic examples of a failure to fulfill
custodial duties. [Citations.] The same is true of a failure to
provide an adequate and habitable living space or protect from
routine safety hazards. [Citations.] Similarly, a failure of staff to
attend to, monitor, or assist a resident in obtaining appropriate
medical care generally falls on the custodial side of the line
because such omissions involve ‘not . . . the undertaking of
medical services, but . . . the failure to provide medical care.’”
(Holland, at p. 380; see Covenant Care, Inc. v. Superior Court,
supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 783; Delaney, at p. 34.)12

12 The Supreme Court in Holland stated the “challenge of
drawing a bright line in this context is part of what motivated the
court in Avila [v. Southern California Specialty Care, Inc. (2018)

17
 2. Because Jentz’s Causes of Action Were Based on
Custodial Neglect, MICRA Does Not Apply
Applying the principles the Supreme Court enunciated in
Holland, we conclude Jentz’s causes of action for negligence and
elder abuse arose out of Country Villa Wilshire’s acts and
omissions as Jentz’s custodian and caregiver, not as her health
care provider. Jentz’s primary argument at trial was that she fell
multiple times because Country Villa Wilshire’s staff did not
adequately supervise or assist her. Jentz presented evidence that
she could not call for help because the call light was frequently
out of reach or not working and that, when the call light did
work, it took 30 to 45 minutes for someone to respond. Jentz’s
expert testified Jentz’s falls were caused by “lack of supervision.”
Jentz argued Country Villa Wilshire should have offered to take
her to the bathroom every two hours, stationed a staff member
near her room, or installed an alarm to notify staff if Jentz got
out of bed. Country Villa Wilshire did not implement any of
these measures, Jentz argued, because it did not have enough
staff. Jentz suffered her most severe injuries (which may have
accounted for much of the $1.8 million the jury awarded in
noneconomic damages) on October 4, 2021 when, after no one
responded to her call, she got out of bed, went to the bathroom,
fell on the way back, and broke her arm and pelvis. Country
Villa Wilshire’s failure to assist Jentz in moving from her bed to

20 Cal.App.5th 835, 842], which asked whether ‘the primary basis
for the wrongful death claim sounds in’ medical malpractice or in
custodial neglect.” (Holland, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 382.) The
Supreme Court further stated “both parties in this case have
agreed that Avila states the correct rule, so we have no occasion
to further address the issue here.” (Ibid.)

18
the bathroom was a failure to fulfill custodial duties, not a failure
to provide medical care. (See Holland, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 380
[“failure of staff to attend to [or] monitor” a resident “falls on the
custodial side of the line”]; Covenant Care, Inc. v. Superior Court,
supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 785 [“[n]eglectful elder abuse . . . is ‘the
failure of those responsible for attending to the basic needs and
comforts of elderly or dependent adults . . . to carry out their
custodial obligations’”].)
Though Jentz’s falls, particularly the one on October 4,
2021, caused her most significant injuries, she also argued
Country Villa Wilshire committed custodial neglect in ways
unrelated to fall prevention. She presented evidence she
developed pressure ulcers (bedsores) because Country Villa
Wilshire failed to reposition her and clean contamination from
her skin. She also presented evidence that Country Villa
Wilshire did not provide adequate food and water and that no one
helped her eat after she broke her arm and could not move it.
(See Holland, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 380 [failure to assist with
personal hygiene, food, and hydration are “paradigmatic
examples” of failure to fulfill custodial duties].)
The defendants argue Aud forfeited his MICRA argument
by failing to support his factual assertions with citations to the
record and by failing to provide “any reasoned argument.” (See
Jogani v. Jogani (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 823, 840 [“We may treat
as forfeited any point that the appellant does not support with
reasoned argument and legal authority.”]; Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) [an appellate brief must “[s]upport any
reference to a matter in the record by a citation to the volume
and page number of the record where the matter appears”].) The
defendants also argue Aud “should not be permitted to develop an

19
argument for the first time in [his] reply brief, as that would
deprive [the defendants] of an opportunity to respond.” The
defendants are correct that Aud’s argument on this issue is
cursory and conclusory and that he violated rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) by
not citing the record. As the defendants anticipated, in his reply
brief Aud provided the missing record citations and developed his
argument more fully. But the Supreme Court decided Holland
after Aud filed his opening brief and before the defendants filed
their respondents’ briefs, and Aud was entitled in his reply brief
to make or more fully develop an argument based on that new
authority. In addition, because the defendants filed a cross-
appeal, they had the opportunity to, and did, respond to Aud’s
reply brief in their cross-appellants’ reply brief. We therefore
disregard Aud’s noncompliance with rule 8.204(a)(1)(C). (See
Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(e)(2)(C).)
On the merits the defendants argue Jentz’s causes of action
were based on professional negligence, not custodial neglect,
because the “gravamen of [Jentz’s] claim here was that the
facility failed to develop, implement, and modify a fall-avoidance
plan that was appropriate in light of her medical condition.” The
defendants contend “[f]all-risk assessments and fall-avoidance
plans, including diagnosing risk and determining appropriate
interventions, implicate the facility’s medical role, including its
medical staff’s expertise and judgment . . . .” The Supreme Court
addressed this issue in Holland, where the nursing facility
argued that, “because ‘[f]all protection and infection control are
ordinary and usual parts of medical professional services,’
allegations of harm from falls and infections necessarily fall on
the ‘medical’ side of the line.” (Holland, supra, 18 Cal.5th at
p. 381.) The Supreme Court rejected the argument, stating it

20
“sweeps too broadly. Certainly, in some cases, a claim of injury
from falls . . . might be based on negligence in prescribing or
executing a plan to address a resident’s medical needs. But in
other cases, the claim of injury might be based on a failure to
adequately supervise and render assistance to residents as they
undertake daily activities . . . . While the first sort of claim may
sound in professional negligence, the second sort of claim
generally does not.” (Id. at pp. 381-382.) 13
True, Jentz argued Country Villa Wilshire was negligent in
not creating a fall-prevention plan until 10 months after Jentz
was admitted and in not updating the plan after Jentz continued
to fall. But that did not transform Jentz’s claim into one “based
on negligence in prescribing or executing a plan to address [her]
medical needs.” (Holland, supra, 18 Cal.5th at pp. 381-382.)
Jentz did not claim Country Villa Wilshire’s medical staff was
negligent in assessing her fall risk. Indeed, when Jentz entered
the facility in December 2020, Country Villa Wilshire’s nursing
staff assessed her fall risk, concluded she was at a “high risk” for

13 In Holland the Supreme Court concluded that, because the
plaintiffs’ complaint did not sufficiently allege how the
defendant’s acts and omissions caused the death of the plaintiffs’
son, it was “impossible to assess whether plaintiffs’ wrongful
death claim is based on the negligent rendering of medical
services (in which case Ruiz[ v. Podolsky, supra, 50 Cal.4th 838]
applies), or instead on the facility’s nonmedical neglect (in which
case it does not).” (Holland, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 385.) The
Supreme Court directed the trial court to give the plaintiffs leave
to amend “before determining whether their wrongful death
claim falls within the scope of [Code of Civil Procedure]
section 1295 and thus must be ordered to arbitration.” (Ibid.)

21
falls, and recommended “implement[ing] high-risk fall
interventions.”
To the extent Jentz argued Country Villa Wilshire failed to
implement appropriate interventions to reduce Jentz’s risk of
falling, it was a failure to adequately supervise and assist her as
she undertook daily activities (see Holland, supra, 18 Cal.5th at
p. 382), such as walking to and from the bathroom. Jentz
claimed Country Villa Wilshire staff should have observed her
more closely, responded to her call light, taken her to the
bathroom regularly, and placed an alarm to notify staff when
Jentz got out of bed—all custodial and caregiving tasks. Put
differently, even if creating an appropriate plan implicated
medical staff’s expertise and judgment, Country Villa Wilshire
lacked the staff and custodial resources to implement the plan,
and it was that failure that caused Jentz’s injuries.
The defendants argue that Jentz came to Country Villa
Wilshire to “rehabilitate after surgery for a fractured hip” and
that the “gravamen” of her case was that Country Villa Wilshire
“failed to create and implement a fall-prevention care plan
appropriate for that medical condition.” They argue Jentz’s
expert testified Country Villa Wilshire should have created an
“individualized” plan for Jentz given her “particular medical
circumstances.” That Jentz arrived at Country Villa Wilshire
with a medical condition, however, did not transform Country
Villa Wilshire’s failure to perform custodial duties into a failure
to provide medical care. And the expert’s testimony about
“individualiz[ing] the care plan to fit the resident’s needs”
involved custodial duties, not medical care. Jentz’s expert stated
that, if a resident is getting up to use the bathroom without using
the call light, staff should learn what times of day the resident

22
needs to use the bathroom and then “individualize the toileting
schedule” for that resident. The expert also testified Country
Villa Wilshire staff should have helped Jentz find something she
liked to do outside her room “so that they could watch her.”
Flores v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hospital (2016)
63 Cal.4th 75, cited by the defendants, is distinguishable. In
Flores a hospital patient was injured when the rail on her
hospital bed collapsed. The Supreme Court held: “When a doctor
or other health care professional makes a judgment to order that
a hospital bed’s rails be raised in order to accommodate a
patient’s physical condition and the patient is injured as a result
of the negligent use or maintenance of the rails, the negligence
occurs ‘in the rendering of professional services’ and therefore is
professional negligence for purposes of” Code of Civil Procedure
section 340.5, the statute of limitations for professional
negligence under MICRA. (Flores, at p. 89.) Jentz’s injuries,
however, were not caused by anything a health care professional
ordered. In Holland the Supreme Court cited Flores for the
proposition that the “relevant question is whether the ‘injury
[was] suffered as a result of negligence in rendering the
professional services that hospitals and others provide by virtue
of being health care professionals: that is, the provision of
medical care to patients.’” (Holland, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 379.)
As discussed, Jentz’s injuries were the result of Country Villa
Wilshire’s negligence in providing custodial care, not medical
care.
Finally, the defendants argue “MICRA’s limit would apply
even if the conduct underlying [Jentz’s] claims could be
characterized as custodial neglect in addition to professional
negligence.” The defendants quote the following language from

23
the Supreme Court’s opinion in Delaney, supra, 20 Cal.4th 23 at
page 35: “[T]he Elder Abuse Act’s goal was to provide heightened
remedies for, as stated in the legislative history, ‘acts of egregious
abuse’ against elder and dependent adults [citation], while
allowing acts of negligence in the rendition of medical services to
elder and dependent adults to be governed by laws specifically
applicable to such negligence.” Because Jentz did not prove
“egregious abuse,” 14 the defendants argue, “[t]o the extent there
was any ambiguity, the conduct therefore falls on the professional
negligence side of the line” and MICRA’s limits apply. 15
Delaney does not support the defendants’ argument. The
issue in Delaney was “whether a health care provider which
engages in the ‘reckless neglect’ of an elder adult within the
meaning of section 15657 will be subject to section 15657’s
heightened remedies, or if section 15657.2[16] forbids the

14 As stated, the jury found RRT committed elder neglect or
abuse, but did not find RRT “acted with recklessness, oppression,
fraud, and/or malice as to Elder Neglect or Abuse” (as
section 15657 requires to recover enhanced remedies).

15 The trial court (which did not have the benefit of Holland)
accepted this argument, stating that, “if the jury found that the
neglect was not reckless, oppressive, fraudulent, or malicious
conduct, but instead found that the neglect was negligently
committed, then MICRA would apply to cap Plaintiff’s damages
at $250,000.”

16 Section 15657.2 states: “Notwithstanding this article, any
cause of action for injury or damage against a health care
provider, as defined in Section 340.5 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, based on the health care provider’s alleged
professional negligence, shall be governed by those laws which

24
application of section 15657 under these circumstances.”
(Delaney, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 27.) The Supreme Court
rejected the defendant nursing home’s argument the phrase
“‘based on . . . professional negligence’” in section 15657.2
“broadly exempt[ed] from the heightened remedies of
section 15657 health care providers who recklessly neglect elder
and dependent adults.” (Delaney, at p. 31.) Instead, the Supreme
Court held, if a health care provider commits elder neglect that
“is ‘reckless[ ],’ or done with ‘oppression, fraud or malice,’ then
the action falls within the scope of section 15657” and the
plaintiff can recover enhanced remedies. (Delaney, at p. 35.)
Delaney does not stand for the proposition a plaintiff who
proves a defendant committed neglect within the meaning of
section 15610.57, but does not prove the defendant acted with
recklessness, oppression, fraud, or malice (see § 15657), is subject
to MICRA. That is especially true in light of Holland, where the
Supreme Court relied on the distinction between the custodial
care and medical care a nursing home provides, not the mental
state of the defendant. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Holland
shied away from that aspect of Delaney, stating: “In Delaney, we
explained that the Elder Abuse Act ‘provides the way out’ of any
‘ambiguity’ between allegations of professional negligence and
neglect, in that . . . section 15657 reaches only ‘“‘acts of egregious
abuse” against elder and dependent adults’ and excludes ‘simple’
or ‘mere’ negligence in the rendition of medical services.
[Citation.] But returning to the subject in Covenant Care, we
never questioned that ‘health care provider and elder custodian
“capacities” are conceptually distinct.’” (Holland, supra,

specifically apply to those professional negligence causes of
action.” (Italics added.)

25
18 Cal.5th at p. 380, fn. 3; see Faiaipau v. THC-Orange County,
LLC (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 292, 307 [“whatever the continuing
vitality of Delaney’s mental states-based rationale when
determining whether the Elder Abuse Act’s heightened remedies
are available for a claim of neglect based on medical care,
Holland is clear that the type of conduct, not mental state,
determines whether a wrongful death claim is for professional
negligence or elder abuse for the purposes of arbitrability”].)

D. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Granting the Motion
for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict on Joint
Venture Liability
As discussed, the trial court granted motions by Rockport
and Boardwalk for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for
a new trial. The court ruled substantial evidence did not support
the jury’s findings that either Rockport or Boardwalk was
engaged in a joint venture with RRT.

1. Applicable Law
A joint venture is “‘an undertaking by two or more persons
jointly to carry out a single business enterprise for profit.’”
(Cochrum v. Costa Victoria Healthcare, LLC (2018)
25 Cal.App.5th 1034, 1053; see Simmons v. Ware (2013)
213 Cal.App.4th 1035, 1051.) “‘There are three basic elements of
a joint venture: the members must have joint control over the
venture (even though they may delegate it), they must share the
profits of the undertaking, and the members must each have an
ownership interest in the enterprise.’” (Cochrum, at p. 1053; see
Chambers v. Kay (2002) 29 Cal.4th 142, 151 [a “‘joint venture
exists where there is an “agreement between the parties under

26
which they have a community of interest, that is, a joint interest,
in a common business undertaking, an understanding as to the
sharing of profits and losses, and a right of joint control”’”].)
“‘“Whether a joint venture actually exists depends on the
intention of the parties.”’” (Simmons, at p. 1052; see Unruh-
Haxton v. Regents of University of California (2008)
162 Cal.App.4th 343, 370.) “Where a joint venture is established,
the parties to the venture are vicariously liable for the torts of the
other in furtherance of the venture.” (Cochrum, at p. 1053.)

2. Substantial Evidence Did Not Support the
Jury’s Finding RRT and Boardwalk Were
Engaged in a Joint Venture
Boardwalk was a management consultant company owned
by Rechnitz that provided financial consulting. The services
Boardwalk provided for Country Villa Wilshire included
reviewing projections and profit and loss statements and
arranging financing for Country Villa Wilshire from banks.
Boardwalk was not involved in the day-to-day operations of
Country Villa Wilshire.
Substantial evidence did not support the jury’s finding on
at least two of the three elements of a joint venture. First,
substantial evidence did not support the jury’s finding RRT and
Boardwalk each had an ownership interest in Country Villa
Wilshire. There was evidence that RRT was the licensee for
Country Villa Wilshire and that Rechnitz owned Boardwalk, but
no evidence Boardwalk owned Country Villa Wilshire. Aud
asserts “Country Villa and Boardwalk are owned and controlled
by one single individual, Shlomo Rechnitz,” but (assuming
“Country Villa” refers to RRT) the testimony Aud cites does not

27
say anything about ownership or Boardwalk; it says Rechnitz
controlled Country Villa Wilshire “through the management and
transfer agreement” to which Rechnitz’s company, West
Hollywood Healthcare & Wellness Centre, LP, was a party. 17
And even if Aud were correct that Rechnitz owned both RRT and
Boardwalk, to prove a joint venture between those two entities,
Jentz had to prove RRT and Boardwalk each had an ownership
interest in the enterprise (i.e. Country Villa Wilshire) (see
Cochrum v. Costa Victoria Healthcare, LLC, supra,
25 Cal.App.5th at p. 1053), not that RRT and Boardwalk had the
same owner. There was no evidence Boardwalk had an
ownership interest in Country Villa Wilshire.
Second, substantial evidence did not support the jury’s
finding RRT and Boardwalk agreed to share Country Villa
Wilshire’s profits and losses. The only evidence Aud cites on this
point is Rechnitz’s testimony about obtaining bank loans. Aud
argues Rechnitz “admitted . . . Boardwalk financed Country Villa
by obtaining bank loans on their behalf—a clear and definite
admission that the Defendants agreed to share the profits of the
Facility.” But Rechnitz did not say Boardwalk financed Country
Villa Wilshire; he testified he “did not say [Boardwalk] provide[s]
funding for the facilities. They deal with banks to get banks to
finance facilities.” When counsel for Jentz asked Rechnitz
whether he would “describe Boardwalk West Financial Services
as the purse for facilities such as Country Villa Wilshire,”
Rechnitz responded, “Not at all.”

17 There was evidence RRT and West Hollywood Healthcare
& Wellness Centre, a company Rechnitz owned, were licensed to
operate Country Villa Wilshire.

28
 Aud also argues that, because RRT and Boardwalk are both
owned by Rechnitz, 18 they “agreed to share the profits and losses
implicitly. It is not as if the profits and losses each entity owns
are independently reserved—all profits and losses are incurred
by Mr. Rechnitz, which is thereby shared by the entities he
owns.” Aud does not cite to anything in the record supporting his
assertion RRT and Boardwalk shared profits and losses. Nor
does he cite any legal authority for his theory a plaintiff may
prove “the essential element of an agreement among [joint
venturers] to share in the profits and losses of the alleged joint
venture” (Cochrum v. Costa Victoria Healthcare, LLC, supra,
25 Cal.App.5th at p. 1053) merely by showing the joint venturers
have a common owner.

3. Substantial Evidence Did Not Support the
Jury’s Finding RRT and Rockport Were
Engaged in a Joint Venture
Rockport was a management company that managed the
day-to-day operations of Country Villa Wilshire. Under a
consulting services agreement, West Hollywood Healthcare &
Wellness Centre (a licensee of Country Villa Wilshire) agreed to
pay Rockport 5.5 percent of its gross revenues as a consulting fee.
Aud cites evidence Rockport was extensively involved in
running Country Villa Wilshire: Rockport’s vice president of
operations, Lawrence Talebi, hired and supervised Country Villa
Wilshire’s administrator, Tina Brey; Brey requested budget
increases from Talebi; Brey needed Talebi’s approval to terminate
the employment of high-ranking management staff; Country

18 As discussed, there was evidence that Rechnitz owned
Boardwalk, but not that he owned RRT.

29
Villa Wilshire had to use policies and procedures provided by
Rockport; and a Rockport employee directed Brey to sign
Rockport’s consulting service agreement. But even if Rockport
had control over Country Villa Wilshire, substantial evidence did
not support the jury’s finding on the two other joint venture
elements.
First, substantial evidence did not support the jury’s
finding RRT and Rockport each had an ownership interest in
Country Villa Wilshire. Rockport was owned by Steven Stroll,
who formed Rockport after working at an accounting firm
Rechnitz had used. Rockport did not have an ownership interest
in Country Villa Wilshire.
Without citing to the record, Aud argues Country Villa
(which we again assume refers to RRT) and Rockport had “shared
ownership by Shlomo Rechnitz.” But Rechnitz did not own
Rockport, and even if he did, as discussed, the issue is whether
RRT and Rockport each had an ownership interest in the
enterprise (i.e., Country Villa Wilshire), not whether RRT and
Rockport had a common owner.
The only evidence Aud cites that Rockport had an
ownership interest in Country Villa Wilshire was Brey’s
testimony Rockport was Country Villa Wilshire’s “parent
organization.” Brey testified that, on a form informing the state
that Brey had become Country Villa Wilshire’s administrator, she
checked a box indicating Rockport was Country Villa Wilshire’s
parent organization. Brey testified it was her “understanding”
Rockport was the “parent organization.” But Brey’s testimony
was not substantial evidence Rockport owned Country Villa
Wilshire. Brey worked at Country Villa Wilshire (through a
staffing agency) for only six months. Several other witnesses

30
testified Rockport was a management consultant, a relationship
documented by a written consulting agreement. (See 65283 Two
Bunch Palms Building LLC v. Coastal Harvest II, LLC (2023)
91 Cal.App.5th 162, 168 [“‘[S]ubstantial evidence is not
synonymous with any evidence. [Citations.] “The ultimate test is
whether it is reasonable for a trier of fact to make the ruling in
question in light of the whole record.”’”].)
Second, substantial evidence did not support the jury’s
finding RRT and Rockport agreed to share Country Villa
Wilshire’s profits and losses. Aud argues “Country Villa and
Rockport implicitly agreed to share profits and losses through
their consulting services agreement.” But under the consulting
services agreement Rockport received a consulting fee of
5.5 percent of Country Villa Wilshire’s gross revenues, not a
share of Country Villa Wilshire’s profits (or losses). (See Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. v. 6354 Figarden General Partnership (2015)
238 Cal.App.4th 370, 394 [the “word ‘profit’ refers to the ‘excess of
revenues over expenditures in a business transaction’”].) West
Hollywood Healthcare & Wellness Centre’s agreement to pay
Rockport a consulting fee calculated as a share of gross revenues
was not an agreement to share profits and losses. (See Oakland
Raiders v. National Football League (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 621,
638 [“‘NFL teams are not engaged in a joint venture’”; though
they “‘share revenues, they do not share profits or losses’”]; see
also Simmons v. Ware, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at p. 1055
[plaintiff must show joint venturers “agreed to share in the
profits or losses of a single business venture as opposed to merely
showing that each of their success was entwined with the success
of the other”].)

31
 E. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Granting the
Defendants’ Motion for a New Trial on Alter Ego
Liability

1. Relevant Proceedings
Jentz proposed a special verdict question on alter ego
liability. The defendants objected, arguing alter ego was an
equitable issue to be decided by the trial court. The trial court
agreed “the case authority does appear to say that alter ego is an
equitable issue,” but suggested asking the jury to make advisory
findings of fact, such as unity of interest. The parties, however,
apparently did not submit any proposed findings of fact on the
issue. Over the defendants’ objection the trial court instructed
the jury on alter ego liability and submitted the issue to the jury.
The verdict form asked whether Rockport, Boardwalk, and
Rechnitz were alter egos of RRT; the jury answered “yes” for
each. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for a new
trial under Code of Civil Procedure section 657,
subdivisions 1 (irregularity in the proceeding) and 7 (error in
law), ruling the court, “over [the defendants’] objections, erred in
deciding that the jury was to decide the equitable issue of alter
ego.”

2. Alter Ego Liability Was an Equitable Issue for
the Court
To prevail on an alter ego theory, the plaintiff must show
“‘(1) that there be such unity of interest and ownership that the
separate personalities of the corporation and the individual no
longer exist and (2) that, if the acts are treated as those of the
corporation alone, an inequitable result will follow.’” (Mesler v.

32
Bragg Management Co. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 290, 300; accord, Angel
Lynn Realty, Inc. v. George (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 655, 663.)
Courts have applied the alter ego doctrine to organizational
forms other than corporations, including limited partnerships.
(See, e.g., Relentless Air Racing, LLC v. Airborne Turbine Ltd.
Partnership (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 811, 817-818.)
The alter ego “‘doctrine is essentially an equitable one and
for that reason is particularly within the province of the trial
court.’” (Zoran Corp. v. Chen (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 799, 811;
see Stark v. Coker (1942) 20 Cal.2d 839, 846; Webber v. Inland
Empire Investments (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 884, 908; Dow Jones
Co. v. Avenel (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 144, 147.) 19 Though the trial
court may “empanel an advisory jury to make preliminary factual
findings” on an equitable issue, those findings “are purely
advisory because, on equitable causes of action, the judge is the
proper fact finder.” (Hoopes v. Dolan (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 146,
156 (Hoopes); see Gonzalez v. Community Mortuary, Inc. (2026)
119 Cal.App.5th 1006, 1029 [“trial court judges are required to
decide equitable causes of action and defenses [citations],
although courts may seek assistance from an advisory jury to
resolve factual issues that underlie a decision or a ruling
involving equitable issues”]; A-C Co. v. Security Pacific Nat. Bank
(1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 462, 474 [“while a jury may be used for
advisory verdicts as to questions of fact” on equitable issues, “it is

19 Aud argues the defendants forfeited the issue by, among
other things, not complying with the trial court’s request to
submit alternative jury instructions on alter ego. There was no
forfeiture. The defendants consistently objected to Jentz’s
proposed jury instruction and verdict form on the ground alter
ego was an equitable issue for the court.

33
the duty of the trial court to make its own independent findings
and to adopt or reject the findings of the jury as it deems
proper”].) Because the trial court erred in submitting the issue of
alter ego liability to the jury, the court did not abuse its
discretion in granting the motion for a new trial.
Aud argues “California case law does not prevent juries
from determining the question of alter ego,” but he cites cases
merely mentioning that a jury made an alter ego finding.
Because none of those cases addressed whether the trial court
erred in submitting the issue to the jury, they are not authority
for the proposition a jury may decide alter ego liability over a
party’s objection. (See Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc.
(2024) 16 Cal.5th 478, 511 [“‘“cases are not authority for
propositions not considered”’”]; Geiser v. Kuhns (2022) 13 Cal.5th
1238, 1252 [same].)
Aud also argues the “trial court may not disregard the
jury’s finding of ultimate fact when determining equitable relief.”
Though “a judge is bound by a jury’s verdict rendered on legal
causes of action,” a jury’s factual findings on equitable issues are
only advisory. (Hoopes, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 156, italics
added; see Gonzalez v. Community Mortuary, Inc., supra,
119 Cal.App.5th at p. 1029.) If “an equitable cause of action is
erroneously submitted to a jury,” as happened in this case, the
“trial court is not bound by the jury’s verdict and must make its
own independent evaluation of the evidence.” (Hoopes, at p. 160.)
Hoopes, on which Aud relies, illustrates the distinction
between a jury’s findings on legal and equitable causes of action.
In Hoopes the operator of a truck rental business sued his
landlord and another tenant, who operated a restaurant,
claiming he was entitled to exclusive use of a parking lot.

34
(Hoopes, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at pp. 150-151.) The plaintiff
asserted causes of action for breach of contract, trespass, and
fraud. (Id. at p. 150.) The parties also raised equitable issues:
the plaintiff and the defendants sought declaratory and
injunctive relief, and the defendants asserted the defense of
equitable estoppel. (Ibid.) The trial court submitted the legal
causes of action to the jury and reserved the equitable issues.
(Ibid.)
The jury returned a special verdict for the plaintiff, finding
the plaintiff had exclusive right to the parking lot. (Hoopes,
supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 158.) In ruling on the parties’
requests for declaratory and injunctive relief, however, the trial
court rejected the jury’s finding and found “‘the intention of the
parties was that the parking lot be shared.’” (Id. at p. 159.) The
court in Hoopes held the trial court “erred in disregarding the
jury’s verdict when fashioning equitable relief. ‘[W]here the legal
issues are tried first, the judge cannot ignore the jury’s verdict
and grant equitable relief inconsistent with the jury’s findings.’”
(Ibid.)
In ruling on equitable estoppel, however, the trial court
was not bound by the jury’s verdict, because the “defense of
equitable estoppel was a distinct matter within the exclusive
province of the trial judge that raised legal and factual issues
undecided by the jury.” (Hoopes, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at
p. 155.) The trial court found that, because the plaintiff had
known for years the landlord also leased the parking lot to the
restaurant, the plaintiff was equitably estopped from claiming
exclusive right to the parking lot. (Id. at p. 161.) The court held:
“While the trial judge should have considered the equitable
defense first, and thus avoided an unnecessary jury trial, the

35
order of trial was within the court’s discretion and did not divest
the judge of his duty to determine applicability of equitable
estoppel.” (Id. at pp. 150-151.)
Aud argues Hoopes is distinguishable because it involved
“the defense of equitable estoppel—a doctrine clearly distinct
from that involved in our case.” But Aud does not explain why a
jury’s findings should be advisory for one equitable doctrine but
not another. (See Gonzalez v. Community Mortuary, Inc., supra,
119 Cal.App.5th at p. 1029 [jury may render advisory verdict on
“‘equitable issues’”]; Dow Jones Co. v. Avenel, supra,
151 Cal.App.3d at pp. 147-148 [“the ‘constitutional guaranty of
the right to a jury trial does not apply to actions involving the
application of equitable doctrines’”]; see also Judicial Council of
California v. Jacobs Facilities, Inc. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 882,
915 [“equitable issues retain their character, despite being raised
in the context of a legal claim,” and a “litigant has no
constitutional right to a jury determination of an equitable issue
merely because it is raised in the context of a claim at law”].)
Relying on Hoopes, Aud argues that, because “the factual
predicates for alter ego overlapped with [Jentz’s] legal claims for
elder abuse and negligence, the jury was properly tasked with
resolving them.” The court in Hoopes, however, did not hold a
jury could decide an equitable issue whenever the factual
predicates for that issue overlapped with the factual predicates
for a legal cause of action. Instead, the court in Hoopes stated “a
jury’s factual findings on legal causes of action should bind the
trial court when granting ancillary equitable remedies based on
the same facts.” (Hoopes, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 160.)
That was what happened in Hoopes: The jury made findings of
fact on the plaintiff’s legal causes of action for breach of contract,

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fraud, trespass, and nuisance, which, the court in Hoopes held,
bound the trial court in ruling on plaintiff’s request for ancillary
equitable remedies (declaratory and injunctive relief). (Id. at
pp. 158-159.)
And in any event, Aud does not explain how the factual
predicates for alter ego overlapped with the factual predicates for
elder abuse and negligence. In fact, there was no overlap.
Jentz’s causes of action for elder abuse and negligence rested on
RRT’s failure to provide adequate care for her at Country Villa
Wilshire. Alter ego, on the other hand, required the jury to
decide whether RRT and the other defendants had such a unity of
interest that their individual identities no longer existed or
should be disregarded, and whether injustice would result if the
acts of one were not treated as the acts of the other. 20

F. Any Error in Excluding Evidence of Rechnitz’s
Conversation with Aud Was Harmless

1. Additional Factual and Procedural Background
According to Aud, Rechnitz called him the night before Aud
was scheduled to testify. Rechnitz told Aud that, if Aud testified
the next morning, “things would get very nasty” for him and
Jentz. Rechnitz told Aud he was “very well connected” with the

20 Aud also argues that, “even if the court were to decide alter
ego liability, the weight of the evidence” (capitalization omitted)
shows Rockport, Boardwalk, and Rechnitz were alter egos of
RRT. Because the trial court did not err in granting the motion
for a new trial on alter ego liability, and because the trial court
has not yet tried the issue, we do not consider whether
substantial evidence would support a finding of alter ego.

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Los Angeles Police Department and political leaders and
“repeatedly discouraged” Aud from testifying in court. Rechnitz
told Aud that he had been sued many times, that he could “drag
cases out for years,” and that Jentz would die before she received
any judgment. Rechnitz stated: “‘I get it, we fucked up, I accept
full responsibility for [Jentz’s] injuries, but I think what the
attorneys are asking for is outrageous and ludicrous.’” Rechnitz
told Aud he wanted to make a “side deal that cuts the attorneys
out.” Rechnitz also said Country Villa Wilshire was “severely
understaffed” because his competitors kept stealing his staff by
offering higher salaries. When Aud said he needed to end the
call, Rechnitz said he would call back in 30 minutes with a deal
Aud could not refuse.
Rechnitz called back and offered to provide Jentz up to
$3 million in nursing home services if she returned to one of
Rechnitz’s nursing homes. Rechnitz also told Aud that his
private investigators learned Jentz liked basketball and that he
would give Jentz and Aud courtside seats at a professional
basketball game. Rechnitz said Aud “had better take his offer” or
Jentz would “‘be dead before anything resolved.’”
The trial court precluded counsel for Jentz from
questioning Rechnitz about these conversations. The court ruled
under Evidence Code section 352 that Rechnitz’s statements were
“more unduly prejudicial than probative” and under Evidence
Code section 1152 that Rechnitz made the statements in the
context of settlement discussions, “even if some of the
discussions, perhaps, got uncomfortable or heated.”

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 2. Excluding Evidence of Rechnitz’s Phone Calls
Did Not Prejudice Jentz
Aud argues that the trial court erred in excluding
Rechnitz’s telephone calls under Evidence Code sections 352 and
1152 and that Rechnitz’s statements to Aud were “probative of
Jentz’s joint venture and alter ego theories of liability.” Aud
contends: “Mr. Rechnitz’s statement that ‘we’ f-ed up goes
directly to alter-ego liability as it is a party admission, against
his interest, with a tendency to prove that all the Defendants are
engaged in not only a joint enterprise and venture, but that
Defendants have the same interest and are inequitably using the
corporate form to thwart a third party’s rights. Further, the fact
that Mr. Rechnitz called Mr. Aud under the apparent belief that
he could end this entire dispute tends to show a lack of distinct
entities.” Aud argues the evidence of those calls “bore directly on
disputed factual issues regarding alter ego liability, joint venture,
staffing, management decisions, and the underlying neglect.”
Any error in excluding evidence of Rechnitz’s statements to
Aud, however, did not prejudice Jentz: The jury found in favor of
Jentz on all her causes of action and on her joint venture and
alter ego claims. (See Huntsman-West Foundation v. Smith
(2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 1117, 1131 [“‘[A]n erroneous evidentiary
ruling requires reversal only if “there is a reasonable probability
that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have
been reached in the absence of the error.”’”]; see also Bjoin v.
J-M Manufacturing Co., Inc. (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 884, 900 [“It
is the appellant’s burden to establish that the error was
prejudicial.”].) It was the trial court that ruled against Jentz by
granting the defendants’ posttrial motions, and Aud does not
argue that, or explain how, allowing Jentz to cross-examine

39
Rechnitz about his conversations with Aud would have caused
the trial court to rule differently on those motions.
In his reply brief Aud argues that “the erroneous exclusion
of this call prevented the jury from hearing powerful evidence of
malice, oppression, and consciousness of wrongdoing.” Aud,
however, forfeited this argument by failing to raise it in his
opening brief. (See Gund v. County of Trinity (2020) 10 Cal.5th
503, 525 [arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are
forfeited]; Raceway Ford Cases (2016) 2 Cal.5th 161, 178 [“We
generally do not consider arguments raised for the first time in a
reply brief.”]; Mansur v. Ford Motor Co. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th
1365, 1387-1388 [“We will not consider arguments raised for the
first time in a reply brief, because it deprives [the respondent] of
the opportunity to respond to the argument.”].) Moreover,
assuming Rechnitz’s conduct during trial in January 2024 was
relevant to whether RRT acted with malice, oppression, or fraud
during Jentz’s stay at Country Villa Wilshire in 2020 and 2021,
Aud did not challenge the punitive damages finding (which was
in Jentz’s favor) or argue the evidence did not support the jury’s
award of $0 in punitive damages.

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 DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The
trial court is directed to vacate its order granting the motion by
RRT, Rockport, Boardwalk, and Rechnitz for motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict on noneconomic damages and to
enter a new order denying the motion. The trial court is also
directed to vacate its order conditionally granting the motion by
Rockport, Boardwalk, and Rechnitz for a new trial on
noneconomic damages and to enter a new order denying the
motion. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. The
parties are to bear their costs on appeal.

SEGAL, J.

We concur:

MARTINEZ, P. J.

FEUER, J.

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