Filed 7/27/26
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re X.A. et al., B350895

Persons Coming Under the (Los Angeles County
Juvenile Court Law. Super. Ct. No. 22CCJP00758)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

SARAH M.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Mark A. Davis, Judge. Affirmed.
Aida Aslanian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
 Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, and Veronica Randazzo, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________

Appellant Sarah M. (Mother) challenges for a second time
the juvenile court’s order under Welfare and Institutions Code 1
section 366.26 terminating her parental rights to minors X.A.
(born 2019) and E.A. (born 2021). In a prior appeal, we affirmed
the juvenile court’s finding that the beneficial relationship
exception to termination of Mother’s parental rights was
inapplicable. (In re X.A. (Jan. 31, 2025, B338604) [nonpub.
opn.].) But we conditionally reversed the parental rights
termination order because the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS) and a child welfare agency
in another county where the dependency case originated failed to
adequately inquire whether the children were “Indian children”
as defined in the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA; 25
U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related California law (Cal-ICWA;
§ 224 et seq.). (In re X.A., supra, B338604.)
Following remand, DCFS conducted extensive ICWA
inquiry. The juvenile court found no reason to believe the minors
were Indian children and reinstated the parental rights
termination order. Mother now appeals again. We reject her
claims that the ICWA-related inquiry is still inadequate and
affirm the order terminating Mother’s parental rights.

1 Unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

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 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Mother’s current challenge to the adequacy of ICWA-
related inquiry concerns only her blood relatives and not Father
or his ancestry. We thus confine our summary of the factual and
procedural background to the inquiry of maternal relatives.
A. Initial Inquiry and First Appeal
On October 29, 2021, the Kern County Department of
Human Services (KCDHS) filed a section 300 petition on behalf of
X.A. and E.A. asserting claims under section 300, subdivision (b).
Mother filed a document with the Kern County juvenile court
disclaiming any Native American heritage, and at the detention
hearing the court found no reason to believe the children were
Indian children. The record does not disclose any efforts by
KCDHS or the Kern County juvenile court beyond the receipt of
this form from Mother to inquire of maternal relatives whether
the children might be Indian children.
The Kern County court later ordered the case transferred
to Los Angeles County, and on March 9, 2022, the Los Angeles
County juvenile court accepted the transfer. DCFS repeatedly
asked Mother whether she had any Native American heritage,
and Mother denied any such heritage, but nothing in the record
indicates that DCFS or the juvenile court made the same inquiry
of any extended family members. (In re X.A., supra, B338604.)
Mother appealed following the termination of her parental
rights, contending KCDHS and DCFS failed to comply with their
duty of inquiry under ICWA and Cal-ICWA because they relied
entirely on the denials by Mother regarding possible tribal
affiliation. DCFS conceded this error, and we conditionally
reversed the order terminating parental rights pending DCFS’s

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and the juvenile court’s compliance with ICWA and related state
law. (In re X.A., supra, B338604.)
B. Inquiry Following the First Appeal of Maternal
Relatives
1. Mother
On February 26, 2025, DCFS called Mother to ask about
Native American ancestry and left a voice message requesting a
call back. Mother and DCFS then texted about whether Mother
had any ICWA-related information and if she could provide
contact information for other family members who could provide
information about any Native American ancestry. Mother did not
respond to this inquiry. DCFS accordingly called Mother again
and asked for a return call. None was received.
On March 3, 11, and 31, 2025, DCFS called Mother and left
voice messages asking for a return call to obtain information
about Native American ancestry. Mother did not respond.
On April 10, 2025, DCFS was unsuccessful in reaching
Mother by telephone. On April 24, 2025, DCFS called mother
and left a voice message asking for a return call. When Mother
called back, DCFS asked her if she had any information as to her
children having Native American ancestry and if there were any
family members who could provide such information. Mother
responded, “ ‘I don’t have any information right now.’ ” On
April 28, 2025, DCFS called Mother and left a voice message
asking for a return call to follow up on any Native American
ancestry information. Mother did not respond.
On May 1, 2025, DCFS texted Mother asking for her
current address and any information about Native American
ancestry. Mother responded by providing only her address. On
May 12, 2025, DCFS left Mother a voicemail requesting

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information about Native American ancestry; Mother did not
respond.
On May 13, 2025, DCFS reached Mother by telephone.
Mother claimed that her grandmother, maternal great-
grandmother (MGGM), “ ‘was Comanche,’ ” that Mother was a
registered Comanche tribal member but did not “ ‘know where
the tribe was at,’ ” the children were not registered, and Mother
did not know if MGGM was registered. Mother claimed to have
proof of her tribal registration. DCFS requested Mother provide
that proof. Mother never did.
At a court hearing on May 27, 2025, the juvenile court told
Mother that it would not further consider reunification of the
children with her and that the only remaining issue before the
court was ICWA compliance. Mother thereafter failed to appear
at all subsequent juvenile court hearings.
On June 5 and 12, and on July 2, 2025, DCFS called
Mother and left a voice message asking for a return call to obtain
information about Native American ancestry. Mother did not
respond.
2. Maternal Uncle Ruben D. and Aunt Jessica R.
(Prospective Adoptive Parents)
On March 3, 2025, DCFS spoke to maternal uncle and the
prospective adoptive father of X.A. and E.A., Ruben D., about
whether the children had Native American ancestry. Ruben
responded that he had been told MGGM had some Native
American ancestry, but he did not communicate with her and did
not know her whereabouts. Ruben disclaimed any knowledge
that MGM, he, or his siblings had any Native American ancestry.
DCFS also spoke to Ruben D.’s wife (and prospective
adoptive mother) Jessica R. on multiple occasions. Each time,

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she disclaimed knowledge of the children having Native
American ancestry or receiving such information from others.
3. Maternal Uncles Mario M. and Jose M.; Maternal
Aunt Isela M.
On March 10, 2025, maternal uncle Mario M. told DCFS
that MGGM had said her family was either Cherokee or Apache.
Mario M. stated neither MGM nor his siblings were registered
with any Native American tribe.
That same day, DCFS called maternal aunt Isela M. who
responded via text message. Isela recalled MGGM “ ‘saying we
had Native American heritage.’ ” Isela stated she did not have
MGGM’s contact information and directed DCFS to another
relative who might have it.
On April 24, 2025, maternal uncle Jose M. told DCFS that
MGGM was from Texas and had Apache ancestry, and that he
did not know of anyone else who would have additional
information on that topic.
4. MGM
On July 16, 2024, DCFS called MGM to ask if she had any
knowledge as to the children having Native American ancestry.
MGM did not answer the telephone.
On February 26, 2025, DCFS reached MGM by telephone.
MGM told the DCFS representative, “ ‘Don’t call or text me
again, I don’t have any information, it’s your fault I am not
seeing my grandchildren’ ” before ending the call.
On May 27, 2025, MGM attended a juvenile court hearing.
In response to court questioning, MGM acknowledged that she
refused to speak to DCFS during the February 26, 2025
telephone call. When the court asked about potential Native
American ancestry, MGM said, “From what I know, yes, we do on

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both my maternal and paternal grandparents.” MGM said both
her grandparents were born in New Mexico and she was trying to
get information from her mother (MGGM) “which is difficult.”
Mother said the tribes involved were “Comanche and Apache.”
The court ordered MGM to cooperate with DCFS when they
asked for more information.
On June 4 and 5, 2025, DCFS called MGM and left a voice
message asking to discuss Native American ancestry. MGM did
not respond.
On June 9, 2025, MGM texted DCFS that she would “be
working on getting both my grand mother[’]s [sic] birth
certificates asap as they were both apparently of American
Indian descent. So it appears anyhow[.] After gathering there
[sic] birth certificates from the [I]ndian census or from where
they were born we will then contact the Indian bureau to move
further but apparently our counselors [s]ay it may take months.
Comanche will allow up to [eight] generation[s] to register.
That’s all the information I have for now[.] And it’s all
questionable. If they as to face American Indian Oops [sic] this is
my mother[’]s birth certificate.” The record contains no
indication MGM attached a birth certificate to the message.
On June 11, 2025, DCFS contacted MGM to discuss her
text message but received no response.
On July 10, 2025, DCFS spoke with MGM. MGM stated “I
don’t have any more information, it[’]s not going further. I have
not obtained the birth certificates. The fact that my mother’s
family was [N]ative American but they are all dead. I am not
registered, neither is my sister nor [mother]. My mother,
[MGGM], was Spanish and Indian. My mom’s mom was Maria
R[.] married Manuel F[.]; she lived in New Mexico. My father’s

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mother, Manuela D[.], lived in El Paso, Texas. At this point, it
has been emotional trying to help my daughter with this issue.
The children are in a good home with Jessica and Ruben and why
fight it anymore.”
5. Maternal Great-aunt Nelly O.
On May 14, 2025, DCFS contacted maternal great-aunt
Nelly O. to inquire about Native American ancestry. DCFS
shared with Nelly that Mother had reported MGGM was from the
Comanche tribe. Nelly laughed when informed of Mother’s
statement, and said, “no, I think she was Aztec, I don’t know.”
Nelly denied having any information that MGGM had a Native
American background.
On June 5, 2025, DCFS spoke again with Nelly. She said
that the generation of relatives that preceded MGGM had all
passed away.
On July 10, 2025, Nelly told DCFS that she had not
received any additional information concerning family ancestry
beyond what she had already provided.
6. Maternal Grandfather (MGF) Joe M.
On May 12, 2025, DCFS phoned MGF and left a voice
message inquiring about Native American ancestry. MGF did
not respond.
7. MGGM
On February 26, 2025, DCFS reached MGGM by telephone.
The DCFS employee identified herself, the reason for her call,
and asked if they could meet to gather information on any
possible Native American ancestry. MGGM responded by
refusing to share any information about her family background
and refusing to meet with DCFS.

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 On April 24 and again on May 9, 2025, DCFS telephoned
MGGM and left a voice message inquiring about her knowledge
of potential Native American ancestry. MGGM did not respond.
8. Letters to Indian Officials
In a May 27, 2025 interim review report, DCFS informed
the court that it had sent ICWA notices by certified mail to the
following tribes: (1) Fort Still Apache Tribe, (2) Mescalero Apache
Tribe; (3) Apache Tribe of Oklahoma, (4) Jicarilla Apache Nation,
(5) San Carlos Apache Tribe, (6) Tonto Apache Tribe, (7) Yavapai-
Apache Nation, (8) White Mountain Apache Tribe, (9) Cherokee
Nation, (10) United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians in
Oklahoma, (11) Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, and
(12) Comanche Nation of Oklahoma. DCFS also sent notice to
the Bureau of Indian Affairs.
On July 11, 2025, DCFS informed the court it had received
the following responses (which it attached for the court’s review).
The Fort Still Apache, Mescalero Apache, and Tonto Apache
Tribes all stated that the children were not eligible for tribal
membership. The White Mountain Apache Tribe stated that
neither the children nor their parents were enrolled in the tribe.
The Yavapai-Apache Nation reported that the children were not
enrolled nor eligible for enrollment. The Comanche and
Cherokee Nations responded that the children were not eligible
for membership and that they did not intend to intervene in the
case.
DCFS later followed up with the tribes that had not yet
replied (in some cases multiple times). The Apache Tribe of
Oklahoma eventually responded that the children were not
eligible for enrollment. A representative of the Jicarilla Apache
Nation said the children and their parents were not eligible for

9
enrollment; the representative promised to send a confirming
email but none was received. The remaining tribes continued to
be nonresponsive.
C. The Juvenile Court Makes ICWA Findings and
Reinstates the Termination of Parental Rights
At a December 1, 2025 hearing, counsel for DCFS argued
the agency had made exhaustive efforts to comply with its ICWA-
related duties. Counsel for Mother was present (as noted
previously, Mother was not) and did not raise any concern that
the post-remand ICWA inquiry was somehow deficient. The
juvenile court found no reason to believe that X.A. or E.A. were
Indian children and reinstated the previous order terminating
Mother’s parental rights.
DISCUSSION
A. Forfeiture
DCFS initially contends that Mother forfeited her claims of
ICWA error by failing to identify for the juvenile court any of the
errors she now claims. DCFS acknowledges “[t]he generally
accepted rule . . . that the forfeiture doctrine does not bar
consideration of ICWA notice issues on appeal” (In re Alice M.
(2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1189, 1195), but contends a different rule
should apply in a second appeal following a prior ICWA-related
appeal and remand for ICWA compliance. Some cases have
endorsed such a forfeiture rule in second/subsequent appeals.
(E.g., In re Z.W. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 54, 63-67; In re N.M.
(2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 253, 269; In re Amber F. (2007) 150
Cal.App.4th 1152, 1155-1156; In re X.V. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th
794, 804-805.) At least one court has gone the other way. (In re
Alice M., supra, at pp. 1195-1197.) We need not reckon with this

10
rift. Regardless of Mother’s failure to identify any of the errors
she now claims in time for the juvenile court to address them, the
juvenile court did not err.
B. Standard of Review
We review for substantial evidence the juvenile court’s
factual finding that ICWA and Cal-ICWA do not apply. (§ 224.2,
subd. (i)(2).) “[T]he juvenile court’s fact-specific determination
that an inquiry is adequate, proper, and duly diligent is ‘a
quintessentially discretionary function’ [citation] subject to a
deferential standard of review.” (In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th
1112, 1141.) “ ‘On a well-developed record, the court has
relatively broad discretion to determine whether the agency’s
inquiry was proper, adequate, and duly diligent on the specific
facts of the case. However, the less developed the record, the
more limited that discretion necessarily becomes.’ ” (In re
Kenneth D. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1087, 1101-1102.)
C. Applicable Legal Principles
Congress enacted ICWA “ ‘to protect the best interests of
Indian children and to promote the stability and security of
Indian tribes and families by the establishment of minimum
Federal standards for the removal of Indian children from their
families and the placement of such children in foster or adoptive
homes which will reflect the unique values of Indian culture.’ ”
(In re Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1128-1129.) An “ ‘Indian
child’ ” is “[a]ny unmarried person who is under age 18 years of
age and who is either of the following: [¶] (A) A member or
citizen of an Indian tribe. [¶] (B) Eligible for membership or
citizenship in an Indian tribe and is a biological child of a
member or citizen of an Indian tribe.” (§ 224.1, subd. (b)(1).)

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 Under Cal-ICWA, the juvenile court and DCFS “have ‘an
affirmative and continuing duty’ in every dependency proceeding
to determine whether ICWA applies by inquiring whether a child
is or may be an Indian child.” (In re Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at
pp. 1131-1132.) “This continuing duty can be divided into three
phases: the initial duty to inquire, the duty of further inquiry,
and the duty to provide formal ICWA notice.” (In re D.F. (2020)
55 Cal.App.5th 558, 566.)
The initial inquiry includes asking the child’s family,
including extended family members, whether the child is, or may
be, an Indian child. 2 (§ 224.2, subd. (b)(1).) Extended family
members include adults who are the child’s “grandparent, aunt or
uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or
nephew, first or second cousin, or stepparent.” (§ 224.1, subd.
(c)(1).)
“Our Supreme Court has acknowledged that this duty of
initial inquiry does not require interviewing ‘every’ extended
family member; rather, where the juvenile court’s finding that
[DCFS] conducted an adequate inquiry and that ICWA does not
apply is ‘supported by sufficient evidence,’ conditional reversal is
not required ‘even if the agency did not inquire of everyone who
has an interest in the child.’ ” (In re Bella L. (2026) 117
Cal.App.5th 1284, 1290, citing In re Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at
pp. 1140-1141.)

2 Effective September 27, 2024, the Legislature amended
section 224.2 to require DCFS to conduct its initial inquiry of
extended family members upon its first contact with them. (Id.,
subd. (b)(1); Stats. 2024, ch. 656, § 3.) The instant matter was
pending both before and after this amendment.

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 The duty of further inquiry arises when the agency has
“reason to believe” that an Indian child is involved. (§ 224.2,
subd. (e); In re Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1132.) Reason to
believe is statutorily defined as “information suggesting that
either the parent of the child or the child is a member or citizen,
or may be eligible for membership or citizenship, in an Indian
tribe.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(1).) “Further inquiry includes
‘(1) interviewing the parents and extended family members;
(2) contacting the Bureau of Indian Affairs . . . and State
Department of Social Services; and (3) contacting tribes the child
may be affiliated with and anyone else that might have
information regarding the child’s membership or eligibility in a
tribe.’ ” (In re Claudia R. (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 76, 85; see
§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(A)-(C).)
D. The ICWA-related Inquiry Here Was Adequate
Mother claims the ICWA-related inquiry here was deficient
because (1) DCFS did not attempt to visit MGGM or other
relatives in person after they refused to provide information over
the phone, (2) DCFS improperly relied on MGM to make
additional investigation of MGGM’s potential ancestry, and
(3) only one attempt was made to contact MGF.
We reject these claims. DCFS needs to contact those
relatives “reasonably available to help the agency with its
investigation.” (In re Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1140.) It “is
not required to ‘cast about’ for information or pursue
unproductive investigative leads.” (In re D.S. (2020) 46
Cal.App.5th 1041, 1053.) The only living relatives it was

13
suggested might have tribal affiliation were MGGM and MGM. 3
MGM equivocated on whether to provide information and
indicated in any event that she would need to get it from MGGM.
DCFS followed up with MGM multiple times before MGM
indicated she would not provide any more information. But
DCFS did not rely solely on MGM. DCFS spoke directly to
MGGM, and she refused to provide any information and to meet
in person. Despite this, DCFS tried two more times to contact
MGGM; she failed to respond to that outreach as well. DCFS
also contacted other relatives to see if they had credible
information about MGGM’s ancestry and came up empty.
Nothing indicates that MGM and MGGM were anything
other than sincere in refusing to cooperate, and DCFS was not
required to stalk them in the vain hope they might change their
mind. The same holds true for Mother’s other relatives who
refused to answer or return phone calls or other outreach from
DCFS seeking information. Although DCFS only attempted once
to reach MGF, the fact is it did try to reach him, he did not
respond, and no one suggested he had Native American ancestry
or information about it. Instead, everyone contacted claimed any
such ancestry was on MGM’s side of the family.

3 In the period after the parental rights termination order
was conditionally reversed and before the court explained to her
that ICWA-related issues would not result in further
reunification efforts, Mother retreated from her prior denials of
any native ancestry and claimed she had written proof of
Comanche tribal enrollment. She never provided that
information, and the information received from the Comanche
tribe indicated Mother’s claim was false.

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 Mother also claims we should reverse because the notices
that DCFS sent to the tribes had certain deficiencies, and the
ICWA-030 notices themselves were not filed with the juvenile
court until after it had determined that ICWA and Cal-ICWA did
not apply. We reject these claims as DCFS was not required to
send those notices in the first place. Mother’s relatives made
statements that suggested the possibility the children had Indian
ancestry. But “[a] suggestion of Indian ancestry is not sufficient
under ICWA or related California law to trigger the notice
requirement.” (In re D.F., supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 571.)
Notice is required only “[w]hen there is reason to believe the child
is an Indian child” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2), italics added), meaning
“information suggesting that either the parent of the child or the
child is a member or citizen, or may be eligible for membership or
citizenship, in an Indian tribe” (id., subd. (e)(1)). The only
information provided to DCFS that met these criteria was
Mother’s claim that she was an enrolled member of the
Comanche tribe, and the juvenile court could reasonably conclude
this claim was not credible. For years before Mother made this
assertion, Mother consistently denied any Indian ancestry much
less tribal membership. In connection with trying to get
reunification services reinstated post-remand, Mother claimed to
be a Comanche tribal member but failed to provide information
demonstrating her enrollment despite multiple requests. Once
she learned reunification services would not be reinstated, she
disappeared. Mother’s full name and birthdate were provided to
the Comanche Nation, and it responded she was not an enrolled
member.
In sum, the juvenile court did not err in finding DCFS
undertook reasonable steps upon which the court could determine

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that X.A. and E.A. are not Indian children. Although “there
appears to be little incentive for parents to engage in [ICWA-
related gamesmanship] in the first instance” “to delay resolution
of a case or a minor’s permanency” (In re Dezi C., supra, 16
Cal.5th at p. 1149), this case demonstrates that such incentives
do exist following a conditional reversal where the only
remaining issue is ICWA. After remand for further inquiry,
Mother lied that she was an enrolled tribal member. The
individuals from whom she claimed Native American ancestry
made it difficult to gather information and unnecessarily
prolonged the process. Mother said nothing during the
proceedings about any alleged inadequacy in the inquiry of her
relatives and waited until this appeal to spring her purported
concerns, seeking to continue to forestall the reinstatement of the
parental rights termination order. All the while, X.A., E.A., and
the relatives with whom they have been placed have waited for
permanency.

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 DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order terminating Mother’s and
Father’s parental rights to the children X.A. and E.A. is affirmed.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

WEINGART, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

BENDIX, J.

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