Filed 6/17/26 Estate of Chambi CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
B339564
Estate of EBENEZER CHAMBI, (Los Angeles County
Deceased. Super. Ct. No.
20STPB08472)
EBENEZER HOWARD CHAMBI,
Petitioner and Respondent,
v.
ANA VILMA ESCALANTE,
Objector and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Ruben Garcia, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Grace White and Grace White, for Objector
and Appellant.
Kowal Law Group, Timothy M. Kowal, Teddy T. Davis, and
Ryan Merker, for Petitioner and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
Appellant Ana Vilma Escalante appeals from a judgment
entered against her following a bench trial in a probate matter.
Because Escalante has not established any basis for reversal, we
affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
Ebenezer Venero Chambi (decedent) died in August 2020.
Decedent had transferred title to three parcels of real property
(the properties) to Escalante, with whom decedent was in a
romantic relationship. During probate proceedings, decedent’s
son, Ebenezer Howard Chambi (Chambi), petitioned the court to
transfer the properties from Escalante to the estate, for
declarations of constructive and resulting trusts, for an equitable
lien, and for conversion of personal property.
After a four-day bench trial, the court issued a 41-page
statement of decision. It found that “overwhelming” evidence
established that decedent intended to retain the properties as his
own. The court specifically cited evidence that decedent had
made plans to use or develop each of the properties. It further
found that decedent transferred title to the properties to
Escalante as a formality out of fear of the Internal Revenue
Service, which had seized decedent’s property in the past. The
court therefore determined that Chambi had overcome, by clear
and convincing evidence, the presumption that Escalante was the
2
owner of the properties. (Evid. Code, § 662.)1 The court entered
judgment in favor of Chambi on all causes of action.
Escalante timely appealed from the judgment.
DISCUSSION
Escalante held legal title to the properties at issue,
meaning there was a presumption that she was “the owner of the
full beneficial title. This presumption may be rebutted only by
clear and convincing proof.” (§ 662.) On appeal, Escalante
challenges the trial court’s finding that this presumption was
rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. We review the trial
court’s factual findings for substantial evidence, bearing in mind
the elevated standard of proof. (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020)
9 Cal.5th 989, 1005.) We conclude that Escalante has not
established any basis for reversal.
I. Escalante has not established that the trial court
abused its discretion in resolving evidentiary
objections
Escalante first argues that the trial court’s findings are
unsubstantiated because the court relied on inadmissible
testimony. “We review the trial court’s decision to admit or
exclude evidence for abuse of discretion.” (People v. Dworak
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 881, 895 (Dworak).) Here, we find no abuse.
As a threshold matter, Escalante fails to support her
evidentiary challenges with reasoned argument. For example,
Escalante asserts that the court erred by admitting certain
testimony under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule,
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Evidence Code.
3
but she fails to explain why the challenged testimony does not
fall within that exception. This “conclusory assertion of legal
error . . . results in forfeiture of the claim.” (Siskiyou Hospital,
Inc. v. County of Siskiyou (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 14, 39.)
Escalante also fails to cite anything in the record establishing
that the trial court actually relied on any of the challenged
testimony in rendering its judgment. (Hernandez v. First
Student, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 270, 277 (Hernandez)
[appellant’s burden is to support arguments with record
citations]; Cal. Rules of Court., rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) [same].) If the
court did not rely on any improper testimony, any error in
admitting that testimony was harmless. (F.P. v. Monier (2017)
3 Cal.5th 1099, 1108 [reviewing court may not set aside judgment
based on nonprejudicial error].)
In any case, having reviewed the portions of the record
cited by Escalante, we find no abuse of discretion. Escalante first
asserts that the court erred by considering the testimony
reflected at pages 44 through 50 of the reporter’s transcript. But
the trial court sustained Escalante’s objection to this testimony.
And, as noted above, Escalante has not identified anything in the
record establishing that the court relied on that testimony in
reaching its decision.
Next, Escalante challenges the testimony at pages 52
through 53, 338 through 339, and 341 of the reporter’s transcript.
Escalante objected to this testimony as hearsay. The trial court
overruled her objections, reasoning that although the testimony
described decedent’s out-of-court statements, it was not
inadmissible as hearsay because it described his then-existing
state of mind. (§ 1250.) We find no abuse of discretion. In each
excerpt, the witness testified about the decedent’s future plans,
4
which fits within the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule.
(Dworak, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 905–907; § 1250 [state of mind
exception encompasses “statement of intent” or “plan”].)2
Finally, Escalante argues that the testimony reflected in
the reporter’s transcript at pages 79 and 81 constitutes hearsay.
Escalante raised no objection below; indeed, her own counsel
elicited this testimony. By failing to object, Escalante forfeited
any challenge to its admissibility on appeal. (§ 353 [judgment
will not be reversed for erroneous admission of evidence absent a
timely and specific objection]; In re Cheryl E. (1984) 161
Cal.App.3d 587, 603 [“A party on appeal cannot successfully
complain because the trial court failed to do something which it
was not asked to do”].) Escalante also challenges the testimony
on page 334 of the reporter’s transcript. Although Escalante
initially objected to that testimony, at page 337 of the transcript,
she withdrew her objection. Having done so, Escalante cannot
challenge the testimony on appeal.
2 We deny Chambi’s motion to dismiss and for monetary
sanctions. Chambi argues that Escalante’s appeal is frivolous
because it does not raise any meritorious issues. “[A]n appeal
should be held to be frivolous only when . . . any reasonable
attorney would agree that the appeal is totally and completely
without merit. [Citation.] However, any definition must be read
so as to avoid a serious chilling effect on the assertion of litigants’
rights on appeal. Counsel and their clients have a right to
present issues that are arguably correct, even if it is extremely
unlikely that they will win on appeal. An appeal that is simply
without merit is not by definition frivolous and should not incur
sanctions.” (In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637,
650.) Because Escalante’s hearsay arguments are colorable, we
conclude that her appeal is not so obviously meritless as to
warrant sanctions.
5
II. Escalante forfeited any substantial evidence
challenge to the trial court’s ruling
Escalante also argues more generally that the trial court’s
section 662 finding was unsupported by substantial evidence. We
conclude that Escalante forfeited this challenge.
“[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that
a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and
the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the
record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court
committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment.”
(Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609 (Jameson).) In
an “appeal challenging sufficiency of the evidence, appellant’s
opening brief must set forth all the material evidence on point,
not merely state facts favorable to appellant.” (LA Investments,
LLC v. Spix (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 1044, 1061 (LA Investments).)
An appellant must also “provide adequate record citations” to
support any challenge to a trial court’s ruling. (Hernandez,
supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 277.) Relatedly, “ ‘ “if the record is
inadequate for meaningful review, the appellant defaults and the
decision of the trial court should be affirmed.” ’ [Citation.]”
(Jameson, at p. 609.)
Escalante forfeited any substantial evidence challenge
because her briefing failed to fairly discuss the evidence
supporting the trial court’s ruling. “When appellant’s opening
brief states only favorable facts, ignoring evidence favorable to
respondent, the appellate court may treat the substantial
evidence issues as waived and presume the record contains
evidence to sustain every finding of fact.” (LA Investments,
supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 1061; Rayii v. Gatica (2013) 218
Cal.App.4th 1402, 1408 [“An appellant who fails to cite and
6
discuss the evidence supporting the judgment cannot
demonstrate that such evidence is insufficient.”].) Escalante’s
opening brief does not acknowledge or address the evidence
supporting the judgment. For example, in finding the section 662
presumption rebutted, the court expressly relied on the trial
testimony of Esther Herold and trial exhibits 2 and 21. And in
resolving one disputed fact relevant to the section 662 analysis,
the trial court found Escalante’s testimony incredible and
expressly credited a different witness, Antonio Rios. Escalante’s
appellate briefing does not mention Herold, Rios, or exhibits 2
and 21, and it does not acknowledge or dispute the court’s finding
that Escalante was not credible.3 These omissions are fatal to
Escalante’s substantial evidence challenge. (LA Investments, at
p. 1061.)
Escalante’s opening brief also failed to include adequate
record citations. The only citations to the record, aside from the
evidentiary challenges described above, point to two excerpts of
Escalante’s own trial testimony. But the trial court repeatedly
and expressly rejected her testimony as incredible. We will defer
to the trial court’s credibility findings, particularly since
Escalante failed to challenge those findings in her appellate
briefing. (Niko v. Foreman (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 344, 365.)
Aside from her own testimony, Escalante fails to cite to the
record even once to support her substantial evidence challenge.
“The appellate court is not required to search the record on its
own seeking error. If a party fails to support an argument with
3 Escalante challenges part of Rios’s testimony, at page 341
of the reporter’s transcript, as hearsay. As we have discussed,
the court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Escalante’s
objection to that testimony.
7
the necessary citations to the record, the argument will be
deemed waived.” (LA Investments, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p.
1061; see also Hernandez, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 277
[appellant’s burden is to support arguments with record
citations]; Cal. Rules of Court., rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) [same].) For
this additional reason, we reject Escalante’s challenge as
forfeited.
Relatedly, we deny Escalante’s motion to correct her
opening brief to include additional citations to the record. The
motion was filed simultaneously with Escalante’s reply brief. It
is accompanied by a declaration from Escalante’s counsel
asserting that she “made a mistake and forgot” to include record
citations. The motion itself includes no argument or analysis. It
simply quotes Code of Civil Procedure section 473, which gives
the trial court discretion to permit a party to amend a pleading
when it is in the furtherance of justice. Even assuming that this
is the correct standard for correcting an appellate brief, courts
typically grant such relief only “if no prejudice to the opposing
party will ensue.” (Zamora v. Clayborn Contracting Group, Inc.
(2002) 28 Cal.4th 249, 258.) Here, Chambi argues that it would
be inequitable to allow the proposed corrections, and we agree.
Chambi was forced to respond to an opening brief that included
virtually no record citations, and it would prejudice Chambi to
permit Escalante to correct that deficiency at this late date.
(Ibid.) For this same reason, we decline to consider the record
citations in Escalante’s reply brief. By introducing new record
citations for the first time in her reply, Escalante deprived
Chambi of “opportunity to address [the] specific documents” on
which her arguments rely. (Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v.
Torres Construction Corp. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 480, 510.)
8
Finally, even if we were inclined to overlook the deficiencies
we have already discussed, we would still conclude that
Escalante forfeited her claims by providing an inadequate
appellate record. (Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 609.) The only
documents included in the clerk’s transcript are the judgment,
the final statement of decision, the notice of entry of judgment,
the notice of appeal, and the notice designating the record on
appeal. The record does not include any trial exhibits or closing
briefs, both of which the trial court expressly considered in its
statement of decision.4 And although Escalante provided a
reporter’s transcript, she failed to designate the first day of trial.
The statement of decision relied on Chambi’s testimony, but the
reporter’s transcript of the second trial day begins with Chambi’s
resumed testimony, meaning at least some of his testimony was
omitted from the record on appeal. Escalante asserts in her reply
that an appellant may designate whatever portions of the record
he or she wishes. While perhaps true, an appellant must also
provide an adequate record, particularly in a substantial evidence
challenge. Because the appellate record does not include all of
the evidence on which the trial court relied, we must presume
that the judgment was supported by substantial evidence. (LA
Investments, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 1062.)
4 Escalante designated all trial exhibits to be included in the
clerk’s transcript, but these were omitted, and Escalante did not
take any steps to augment the appellate record to include them.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a)(1)(A) [party may move to
augment record with documents filed below].)
9
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is awarded his costs
on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
HANASONO, J.
We concur:
EGERTON, Acting P. J.
ADAMS, J.
10
