Filed 6/17/26 Emery v. Marovic CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

K.C. EMERY,

Plaintiff and Appellant, G065657

v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2022-
01267207)
MARIO MAROVIC et al.,
OPINION
Defendants and Respondents.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Theodore R. Howard, Judge. Affirmed.
K.C. Emery, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Bremer Whyte Brown & O’Meara, Rick Peterson and Lindsey J.
Wells; Law Offices of Lisa J. Jackson and Lisa J. Jackson for Defendants and
Respondents.

* * *

The dispositive issue raised by this appeal is whether
plaintiff/appellant K.C. Emery was a lodger or a tenant at the Stag Hotel,
which is owned and/or operated by defendants/respondents McFadden Place,
LLC (MFP), Mario Marovic, and Rosy Marovic (collectively, Defendants).
Emery alleged that Defendants had denied her various rights afforded to
tenants under the Civil Code and the Code of Civil Procedure by treating her
as a lodger. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that Emery was at
all times a lodger, and judgment was entered in Defendants’ favor.
The appellate record in this matter does not include the
reporter’s transcript of trial, court minutes of the trial, or the exhibits
presented at trial. Based on the limited record presented to us, we conclude
the trial court did not err by finding that Emery was a lodger, not a tenant.
We therefore affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Our recitation of facts is short because the appellate record does
not include a reporter’s transcript and the clerk’s transcript is limited to the
register of actions, Emery’s complaint and second amended complaint, the
statement of decision and related minutes, the judgment, the notice of
appeal, and the designation of record on appeal.
In April 2018, Emery entered into a lodging agreement (the
lodging agreement) with MFP for room No. 8 at the Stag Hotel in Newport
Beach. The lodging agreement terminated after 30 days but could be renewed
for additional 30-day periods.
The lodging agreement includes the following provision:
“TRANSIENT OCCUPANCY: Unless otherwise superseded by the laws of
this [s]tate, the Lodger acknowledges that he/she is not a tenant but merely a
lodger occupying the Room on a transient basis. The parties specifically
acknowledge and agree that their legal relationship is that of hotel and guest
and that it is not the intention of the parties to create a lease within the

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meaning of the laws of this [s]tate.” The lodging agreement also includes the
following related provision: “NO LANDLORD/TENANT RELATIONSHIP:
Unless otherwise superseded by the laws of this [s]tate, the parties
acknowledge and agree that the legal relationship between MFP and the
Lodger is that of a hotel and guest and that it is not the intention of the
parties to create a lease within the meaning of the laws of this [s]tate. No
landlord-tenant relationship is intended to be created by this Agreement.”
In March 2019, Emery and MFP entered into a pet addendum to
the lodging agreement in order to permit Emery to keep a dog on the
premises. The pet addendum refers to Emery as “Tenant.”
In June 2022, Emery filed a complaint against Defendants. In
April 2023, she filed a second amended complaint which asserted causes of
action for (1) breach of warranty of habitability, (2) negligent maintenance,
(3) violation of unfair business practices act, (4) private nuisance, (5) violation
of Civil Code section 52.1, (6) intentional or reckless infliction of emotional
distress, (7) breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (8) negligence,
(9) slander, (10) libel, (11) violations of federal law, and (12) violations of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.). The
causes of action all arose out of Emery’s occupation of room No. 8 at the Stag
Hotel. Emery alleged she was “a former Tenant” of the Stag Hotel and refers
to herself throughout the complaint as “Plaintiff” or “Plaintiff/Tenant.”
A bench trial commenced on January 21, 2025. At the conclusion
of Emery’s case-in-chief, Defendants made an oral motion for judgment under
Code of Civil Procedure section 631.8. The court granted the motion as to
Mario Marovic and Rosy Marovic on the first, third, and seventh causes of
action, as to Rosy Marovic on the fourth and twelfth causes of action, and as
to all Defendants on the sixth cause of action.

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 At the end of trial, the court found in favor of Defendants on all
remaining causes of action. In a statement of decision, the court explained
that Emery’s claims were based on the notion that Emery was a tenant, and
not a lodger: “Plaintiff’s theories of recovery against the remaining
Defendants rests on her contention that she is a ‘tenant’ who has the rights
given to such under the provisions of Chapter 2 of the California Civil Code.
The basis for much of Emery’s complaints against her landlord is her
argument that since she lived o[n] these premises for about 3-1/2 years she
was a ‘tenant’ under the law and thus entitled to protections found in C[ivil]
C[ode] sec[tion] 1940 et seq. The evidence is uncontradicted that 125
McFadden Place was known as ‘The Stag Hotel,’ and the evidence is it was so
permitted and licensed by the City of Newport Beach.” (Italics omitted.)
On the central issue of the status of Emery’s occupancy, the court
found: “The Court finds that Emery was always during her residency a
lodger. The distinction between a lodger and a tenant is crucial in Emery’s
context. A lodger has only the right to use the premises, subject to the
landlord’s retention of control and the right of access, whereas a tenant has
exclusive possession of the premises as we are reminded in Stowe v. Fritzie
Hotels (1955) 44 Cal.2d 416, 421. . . . MFP employees have the right to enter
Emery’s Room to make inspections and ‘provide necessary services.’ Such
provisions imply that the landlord retains control over the premises, meaning
she had no right to have a locking deadbolt as she has maintained. As a
‘lodger’ Emery was not entitled to demand deadbolts, locking mail receptacles
or some of the other rights she was asserting.”
Judgment was entered on April 18, 2025. Emery timely appealed
the judgment.

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 DISCUSSION
I.

Forfeiture of Issues, Arguments, and Factual Assertions Not
Supported by Record Citations
Rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) of the California Rules of Court (rule
8.204(a)(1)(C)) requires any “reference to a matter in the record” to be
supported by “a citation to the volume and page number of the record where
the matter appears.” As Defendants point out, Emery’s appellate briefs do not
provide citations to the clerk’s transcript to support factual assertions as
required by rule 8.204(a)(1)(C).
We exercise our discretion to disregard passages of Emery’s
appellate briefs that do not comply with rule 8.204(a)(1)(C). (Ragland v. U.S.
Bank National Assn. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 182, 195; Doppes v. Bentley
Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 990.) We also deem to be forfeited
any issue, argument, or factual assertion that is not supported by accurate
citations to the record. (United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019)
36 Cal.App.5th 142, 156; Alki Partners, LP v. DB Fund Services, LLC (2016)
4 Cal.App.5th 574, 589.)
We understand that Emery is representing herself in this appeal.
Self-represented litigants are, however, held to the same standards as
attorneys. (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 985 [“requiring or
permitting exceptional treatment of parties who represent themselves would
lead to a quagmire in the trial courts, and would be unfair to the other
parties to litigation”]; see id. at pp. 984–985; Kobayashi v. Superior Court
(2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 536, 543.)

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 II.

The Trial Court Did Not Err by Finding
That Emery Was a Lodger
Emery’s principal argument on appeal is, as it was at trial, that
she was a tenant, not a lodger, and therefore was entitled to protections
afforded tenants under Civil Code section 1940 et seq. and under the now
repealed COVID-19 Tenant Relief Act of 2020 (the Tenant Relief Act; Code
Civ. Proc., former section § 1179.01 et seq., repealed by Stats. 2021, ch. 27,
§ 19). Emery argues the trial court erred by using incorrect definitions of the
terms “hotel,” “hotel guest,” and “lodger” to find that she was a lodger.
“The chief distinction between a tenant and a lodger lies in the
character of possession. A ‘tenant’ has exclusive legal possession of premises
and is responsible for their care and condition. A ‘lodger’ has only the right to
use the premises, subject to the landlord’s retention of control and right of
access to them. To make one a tenant, as respects an owner’s liability for
injuries sustained by occupant on the premises, he must have exclusive
possession and control. [Citations.] When premises are under the direct
control and supervision of the owner and rooms are furnished and attended to
by him, he or his servants retaining the keys to them, a person renting such a
room is a lodger and not a tenant. [Citation.] The word ‘apartment’ in its
usual and ordinary connotation signifies that its occupant acquire exclusive
possession and is a tenant rather than a roomer.” (Stowe v. Fritzie Hotels,
Inc. (1955) 44 Cal.2d 416, 421–422.)
Whether an occupant is a tenant or a lodger is a mixed question
of law and fact based on the character of the possession granted. (Edwards v.
Los Angeles (1941) 48 Cal.App.2d 62, 67.) Criteria to be considered in
addressing that issue include: (1) who has direct control over the premises;

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(2) who retains the keys and has access to the premises; (3) who is
responsible for maintaining, cleaning, and caring for the premises; (4) who
has responsibility for furnishing light, water, heat, and telephone services;
(5) whether the building is divided into separate apartments, each with
rooms and kitchen; (6) whether the premises are offered fully furnished;
(7) the number of persons permitted to occupy the premises; (8) whether rent
is the same without regard to the number of occupants; and (9) the minimum
required length of occupation of the premises. (Roberts v. Casey (1939) 36
Cal.App.2d Supp. 767, 772–773; Fox v. Windemere (1916) 30 Cal.App. 162,
164–165; see Friedman et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Landlord-Tenant (The
Rutter Group 2025) ¶ 2:38, p. 19.)
In the statement of decision, the trial court found that “Emery
was always during her residency a lodger.” Nothing in the statement of
decision suggests the trial court used incorrect definitions of “hotel,” “hotel
guest,” or “lodger.” Citing Stowe v. Fritzie Hotels, Inc., supra, 44 Cal.2d at
page 421, the court found that provisions in the lodging agreement implied
that MFP retained control over the premises.
To the extent Emery is making a sufficiency of the evidence
argument, she has not met her burden on appeal of demonstrating the trial
court erred by finding she was a lodger, not a tenant. (Jameson v. Desta
(2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609.) As we have mentioned, the appellate record does
not include a reporter’s transcript from the trial. The statement of decision
does mention Emery’s testimony on several topics but concludes that “Emery
was not credible on significant portions of her testimony.” The trial exhibits
have not been transmitted to us, and the clerk’s transcript does not include
court minutes which might indicate which exhibits were admitted at trial.
Thus, the only evidence in the record on the issue of the nature of Emery’s

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occupation of room No. 8 are the lodging agreement and the pet addendum,
which we assume were admitted into evidence at trial.
The lodging agreement emphasized it did not create a
landlord/tenant relationship and that Emery was a lodger. Emery was
identified in the agreement as “Lodger” who was to occupy a “[r]oom” at the
“Stag Hotel.” (Italics added.) Emery agreed to pay a “Lodging Fee,” not rent,
and Emery acknowledged she was “not a tenant but merely a lodger
occupying the Room on a transient basis,” her legal relationship with MFP
was “that of hotel and guest,” and “it [is] not the intention of the parties to
create a lease within the meaning of the laws of this [s]tate.” A separate
provision again confirmed that “the parties acknowledge and agree that the
legal relationship between MFP and the Lodger is that of a hotel and guest
and that it is not the intention of the parties to create a lease within the
meaning of the laws of this [s]tate. No landlord-tenant relationship is
intended to be created by this Agreement.”
Other provisions of the lodging agreement support the conclusion
it did not create a landlord/tenant relationship. The lodging agreement
granted the occupant the right to “occupy and use the Room as a dwelling
unit” and does not grant the occupant the right of possession. The lodging
agreement provided that “[t]he Lodger is subject at all times to all of the
Hotel’s rules and regulations.” Only one person was permitted to reside in the
room without the hotel’s consent, and the hotel could terminate the lodging
agreement if the lodger allowed persons “not registered in writing with MFP
to occupy the room.” The lodger had to give the hotel notice before being
absent from the room for 21 days or more. If the lodger was absent from the
room for seven days or more and did not pay the lodging fee, the room could
be deemed abandoned and the hotel could gain occupation of it. The lodging

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agreement reserved to the hotel the right to request that the lodger vacate
the room and transfer to a different room. MFP’s employees had the right to
enter the room “to make inspections and provide necessary services,” and, in
the event of an emergency, could enter the room without the lodger’s consent.
The lodging agreement includes a provision requiring the lodger to “conduct
him/herself and require other persons in the room . . . to conduct themselves
in a manner that will not disturb other guests.”
In addition, the trial court found that the Stag Hotel was licensed
and permitted as a hotel by the City of Newport Beach. Emery has not cited
evidence in the appellate record to show this finding was incorrect.
The lodging agreement includes a provision requiring the lodger
to keep the room “clean and sanitary” and to “dispense of all rubbish,
garbage, and other waste in clean, safe and sanitary manner.” The pet
addendum refers to Emery as a tenant. While those provisions would support
a finding that Emery was a tenant, they do not make Emery a tenant as a
matter of law. The lodging agreement and pet addendum, read together, can
reasonably be interpreted as making Emery a lodger.
Emery also argues the trial court denied her tenant protections
by misinterpreting Civil Code section 1940, subdivision (a) and Revenue and
Taxation Code section 7280. The trial court did not err. Civil Code section
1940, subdivision (a) states that the various tenant protections found in
division 3, part 4, title 5, chapter 2 of the Civil Code apply to “all persons who
hire dwelling units located within this state.” Civil Code section 1940,
subdivision (b) states that the term “ ‘persons who hire’ ” does not include
those falling within either of two exceptions. The first exception is for
“[t]ransient occupancy in a hotel, motel, residence club, or other facility when
the transient occupancy is or would be subject to tax under [s]ection 7280 of

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the Revenue and Taxation Code.” (Civ. Code, § 1940, subd. (b)(1).) The second
exception is for “[o]ccupancy at a hotel or motel where the innkeeper retains a
right of access to and control of the dwelling unit” and that hotel or motel
provides or offers certain identified services to the residents. (Id.,
subd. (b)(2).)
Emery’s occupancy of room No. 8 at the Stag Hotel falls within at
least the first exception. Revenue and Taxation Code section 7280 grants
local governments authority to “levy a tax on the privilege of occupying a
room or rooms, or other living space, in a hotel, inn, tourist home or house,
motel, or other lodging unless the occupancy is for a period of more than 30
days.” (Id., subd. (a).) There is no evidence in the appellate record to suggest
that the Stag Hotel was anything other than a hotel, motel, or other lodging.
The term of the lodging agreement was not more than 30 days. The lodging
agreement has a provision stating the lodger agreed to pay a lodging fee of
$1,800 per month “all taxes included.”
Emery argues that because MFP agreed to allow her to renew the
lodging agreement, as the agreement permitted, for additional 30-day
periods, she became a tenant. Emery cites no legal authority for that
proposition. While we do not rule out the possibility that renewal of a lodging
agreement to extend beyond 30 days might, under the circumstances of each
case, create a landlord/tenant relationship, neither do we conclude the
renewal of a lodging agreement does so as a matter of law. The appellate
record, which lacks a reporter’s transcript of the trial, provides no evidence
which might support a finding that, under the circumstance of this case,
renewal of the lodging agreement made Emery a tenant of MFP.
Emery contends she was not a lodger because MFP did not
provide or offer all of the services to residents identified in Civil Code section

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1940, subdivision (b)(2). Section 1940, subdivision (b) is written in the
alternative. Because, as we have concluded, Emery’s occupancy was exempt
under subdivision (b)(1) of section 1940, it is not necessary for it also to be
exempt under subdivision (b)(2).
Emery argues she was not a lodger under the definition provided
by Civil Code section 1946.5. Subdivision (c) of section 1946.5 states: “As used
in this section, ‘lodger’ means a person contracting with the owner of a
dwelling unit for a room or room and board within the dwelling unit
personally occupied by the owner, where the owner retains a right of access to
all areas of the dwelling unit occupied by the lodger and has overall control of
the dwelling unit.” Subdivision (d) of section 1946.5 states “[t]his section
applies only to owner-occupied dwellings where a single lodger resides.”
Emery is correct that she was not a “lodger” under section 1946.5, subdivision
(c) because the Stag Hotel was not an owner-occupied dwelling. But section
1946.5 concerns only notices of termination, and permits termination upon
30-day notice under section 1946 instead of the 60-day notice of section
1946.1. (Civ. Code, § 1946.5, subd (a); see id., §§ 1946, 1946.1, subd. (b).) The
definition of lodger in section 1946.5 is not universally applicable.
Emery claims that Defendants tried to “circumvent” Civil Code
section 1940.1 by drafting the lodging agreement to identify her as a lodger.
Section 1940.1, subdivision (a) states: “No person may require an occupant of
a residential hotel, as defined in Section 50519 of the Health and Safety
Code, to move, or to check out and reregister, before the expiration of 30 days
occupancy if a purpose is to have that occupant maintain transient occupancy
status pursuant to paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) of Section 1940. Evidence
that an occupant was required to check out and reregister shall create a
rebuttable presumption, which shall affect solely the burden of producing

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evidence, of the purpose referred to in this subdivision.” Section 1940.1 does
not apply to Emery because she was not required to check out of and
reregister at the Stag Hotel for the purpose of renewing the lodging
agreement. Section 1940.1 does not say that if the occupant is not required to
check out and reregister then the occupant becomes a tenant.1
Finally, Emery contends Defendants denied her relief under the
Tenant Relief Act which, she claims, entitled her to pay only 25 percent of
rents due from March 1, 2020, through October 1, 2021. By its terms, the
Tenant Relief Act applied only to “tenant[s],” “rental debt,” and “payment of
rent” (Code Civ. Proc., former § 1179.03, subds. (a), (b), as amended by Stats.
2022, ch. 13, § 1) and excludes persons, such as Emery, “whose occupancy is
described in subdivision (b) of Section 1940 of the Civil Code” (id., former
§ 1179.02, subd. (h)(2), as amended by Stats. 2021, ch. 27, § 14). Emery
asserts that Mario “extorted” $26,362.50 from her and that he received
$9,357.84 from the State of California as tenant COVID-19 relief. Emery
provides no record citations to support those assertions, and so we shall
disregard them. (Ragland v. U.S. Bank National Assn., supra, 209
Cal.App.4th at p. 195.)

1 Health and Safety Code section 50519, subdivision (b)(1) defines

the term “ ‘[r]esidential hotel’ ” to exclude a building with six or more
guestrooms or efficiency units which are used primarily by “transient guests
who do not occupy that building as their primary residence.” The Stag Hotel
has eight units and there is no evidence in the record to support the
proposition that those units are primarily used as the occupants’ primary
residences.

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 DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents may recover costs on
appeal.

SANCHEZ, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

GOODING, J.

SCOTT, J.

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