Filed 6/17/26 In re M.S. CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
B346375
In re M.S., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 25CCJP00731A)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
C.B.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Jean M. Nelson, Judge. Dismissed.
Mansi Thakkar, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, Jessica Buckelew, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
Appellant C.B. (father) appeals from juvenile court
jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders sustaining a
petition filed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 3001
and asserting dependency jurisdiction over minor child M.S. We
dismiss the appeal as moot.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In February 2025, the Department of Child and Family
Services (DCFS) received a report that father grabbed nonparty
mother’s arm and pushed her twice, causing an elbow sprain.
M.S. was present during the altercation but was not injured.
In March 2025, DCFS filed a section 300 petition alleging
that father’s conduct created a substantial risk that M.S. would
suffer serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally (§ 300,
subd. (a)), and that father’s failure to supervise or protect M.S.
created a substantial risk that the child would suffer serious
physical harm (id., subd. (b)(1)).2 The two counts were based on
identical factual allegations:
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.
2 The petition also alleged that mother’s conduct created
similar risks to the child. The juvenile court later struck mother
from the petition and declared her non-offending.
2
“[M]other . . . and father . . . have a history
of engaging in violent altercations in the
presence of the child. On 02/14/2025, the mother
pushed the father. The father grabbed the
mother’s elbow and forearm and pushed the
mother. The mother fell onto the couch, causing
the mother to sustain bruises to the mother’s
foot and shin. The mother sprained the radial
head of the mother’s left elbow. The ligaments
and tendons in the mother’s elbow became
inflamed. On September 8, 2022, the father
grabbed the mother’s arms and pushed the
mother. On a prior occasion, the father struck
an item out of the mother’s hand. On prior
occasions, the father grabbed the mother’s
wrists. In July 2024, the mother pushed the
father. On prior occasions, the father held the
mother by the mother’s arms.”
In May 2025, the juvenile court sustained the petition in its
entirety as to father. Father timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
“It is a fundamental principle of appellate practice that an
appeal will not be entertained unless it presents a justiciable
issue.” (In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1489 (I.A.).) “An
important requirement for justiciability is the availability of
‘effective’ relief—that is, the prospect of a remedy that can have a
practical, tangible impact on the parties’ conduct or legal status.”
(Id. at p. 1490.) “A case becomes moot when events ‘ “render[] it
impossible for [a] court, if it should decide the case in favor of
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plaintiff, to grant him any effect[ive] relief.” ’ ” (In re D.P. (2023)
14 Cal.5th 266, 276 (D.P.).)
As father concedes, “the validity of one [jurisdictional]
finding may render moot the parent’s attempt to challenge the
others.” (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 284, citing In re Alexis E.
(2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 451.) On appeal, father argues only
that exposing a child to domestic violence cannot support a
finding that the child is at risk of nonaccidental serious physical
injury, within the meaning of section 300, subdivision (a). Father
does not challenge the sustained (b)(1) count. He also does not
dispute that the evidence supports that he pushed mother in the
presence of M.S. Thus, even if we agreed with father and
reversed the (a) count, we would not conclude that the juvenile
court lacked jurisdiction over M.S., because the unchallenged
(b)(1) count independently supports dependency jurisdiction.
Accordingly, father’s appeal appears to be moot. (Alexis E., at
p. 451.)
Father argues that his appeal is not moot because it
challenges findings that are reportable for inclusion in the Child
Abuse Central Index (CACI). An appeal is not moot if the court
can provide effective relief. “For relief to be ‘effective,’ two
requirements must be met. First, the plaintiff must complain of
an ongoing harm. Second, the harm must be redressable or
capable of being rectified by the outcome the plaintiff seeks.”
(D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 276.)
We first consider whether father has identified an ongoing
harm. Agencies such as DCFS are required to forward reports of
child abuse or severe neglect to the California Department of
Justice for inclusion in the CACI. (Pen. Code, §§ 11169, subd. (a),
11165.9.) Severe neglect includes “those situations of neglect
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where any person having the care or custody of a child willfully
causes or permits the person or health of the child to be placed in
a situation such that their person or health is endangered as
proscribed by Section 11165.3 . . . .” (Id., § 11165.2, subd. (a).) In
turn, Penal Code section 11165.3 defines endangerment as “a
situation in which any person willfully causes or permits any
child to suffer, or inflicts thereon, unjustifiable physical pain or
mental suffering, or having the care or custody of any child,
willfully causes or permits the person or health of the child to be
placed in a situation in which his or her person or health is
endangered.”
Father argues that a parent severely neglects a child
within the meaning of Penal Code sections 11165.2 and 11165.3
by engaging in domestic violence in the child’s presence. We
assume without deciding that this is correct. Accordingly, we
conclude that father has identified an ongoing harm: that the
conduct described in the (a) count has been or will be reported for
inclusion in the CACI. (In re S.R. (2025) 18 Cal.5th 1042, 1053
(S.R.).)
We next consider whether this ongoing harm is “capable of
being redressed by a favorable court decision.” (D.P., supra, 14
Cal.5th at p. 277.) “[W]here a court reverses a jurisdictional
finding of severe child abuse for lack of sufficient evidence, an
individual may no longer be listed in the CACI.” (S.R., supra, 18
Cal.5th at p. 1055, citing Pen. Code, § 11169, subd. (a).) And, if
the parent remains listed in the CACI after such a reversal, he or
she may request a grievance hearing to seek removal. (S.R., at p.
1055, citing Pen. Code, § 11169, subds. (d), (e), & (h).) Thus,
reversal of jurisdictional findings describing conduct that is
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reportable for inclusion in the CACI could redress an ongoing
harm.
However, as we have discussed, father does not challenge
the (b)(1) count. Like the (a) count, the (b)(1) count alleged that
father engaged in domestic violence in the presence of M.S. The
court sustained those allegations and, in the (b)(1) count,
determined that father’s conduct created a substantial risk of
harm to the child. Accordingly, even if we reversed the (a) count,
the identical conduct described in the sustained (b)(1) count
would be reportable. Reversal would not redress father’s ongoing
harm, meaning we cannot grant him effective relief from
potential CACI inclusion. (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 283–
284.)
Father also contends that his appeal is not moot because
the challenged findings “may prejudice Father in future
proceedings.” However, “speculative future harm” is insufficient
to avoid mootness. (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 278.)3
Dependency matters focus on “the then prevailing circumstances
of parent and child.” (I.A., supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 1495.) In
any future dependency proceeding, the juvenile court would be
required to assess the then-existing circumstances to evaluate
the risk of harm to the M.S. Moreover, even assuming that the
subdivision (a) findings will adversely impact father in the
future, father has not identified any prejudice that stems solely
3 We reject father’s reliance on In re Daisy H. (2011) 192
Cal.App.4th 713, 715, for the proposition that an appeal is not
moot when the challenged jurisdictional findings “could have
severe and unfair consequences” in the future. (Id. at p. 716.)
Our Supreme Court has expressly disapproved of this aspect of
Daisy H. (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 278.)
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from those findings and not the identical (b)(1) findings. This
argument therefore fails for the same reason as father’s CACI
argument: even if we were to reverse the (a) count, the sustained
(b)(1) count would equally impact father in any future
dependency proceedings.
Relatedly, father notes that courts may exercise discretion
to consider the merits of a moot appeal when the challenged
finding “ ‘(1) serves as the basis for dispositional orders that are
also challenged on appeal [citation]; (2) could be prejudicial to the
appellant or could potentially impact the current or future
dependency proceedings [citations]; or (3) “could have other
consequences for [the appellant], beyond jurisdiction” [citation].’
[Citations].” (In re M.W. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1452.) As
we have discussed at length, father challenges only the (a) count
and not the (b)(1) count. And father has not identified any
dispositional order or future consequence that flows solely from
the (a) count and not the (b)(1) count. Thus, even assuming that
the subdivision (a) findings serve as the basis for any adverse
dispositional order, could impact father in the future, or might
have consequences beyond jurisdiction, the unchallenged findings
in the (b)(1) count—which are identical—would have the very
same effect. We therefore decline to exercise discretion to reach
the merits of father’s appeal.
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DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
HANASONO, J.
We concur:
EGERTON, Acting P. J.
ADAMS, J.
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