Filed 6/18/26 De Leon v. The Metro. Water Dist. of So. Cal. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
MELANIE DE LEON, D087939
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2024-
01428207-CU-PT-CJC)
THE METROPOLITAN WATER
DISTRICT OF SOUTHERN
CALIFORNIA et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Sally Wu, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.)
Affirmed.
Aly & Bove, Brooke L. Bove and Mohammed W. Aly, for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Marcia L. Scully, Betty L. Kuo Brinton and Elliot H. Min, for
Defendants and Respondents.
Melanie De Leon was injured in a vehicle collision involving The
Metropolitan Water District of Southern California. Under the Government
Code, De Leon can only file suit against Metropolitan, a public entity, if she
first presented a written claim to Metropolitan and Metropolitan acted on or
was deemed to have rejected her claim. (Gov. Code, § 945.4.)
De Leon’s counsel failed to discover Metropolitan was a public entity
until it was too late to timely present De Leon’s injury claim. (See § 911.2,
subd. (a).) De Leon presented a late claim, which Metropolitan returned
without action due to its untimeliness. (See § 911.3.) De Leon subsequently
applied to Metropolitan for leave to present a late claim. (See § 911.4.)
Metropolitan did not act on her application within 45 days, thereby denying
it. (See § 911.6(c).)
De Leon petitioned the trial court for relief from the claim presentation
requirement. (See § 946.6.) The trial court denied her petition. De Leon
appeals, arguing the court abused its discretion in denying her petition due to
the excusable neglect of her attorney. Finding no abuse of discretion, we
affirm.
I.
De Leon was driving on the freeway when her car hit the rear of
Metropolitan’s car, which was being driven by one of its employees. When
petitioning for relief to file suit for her injuries resulting from the collision,
the issue was whether De Leon’s counsel’s failure to timely present her claim
to Metropolitan was due to excusable neglect. De Leon asserted it was. In
particular, she alleged she had been diligent in retaining counsel, and her
counsel had otherwise been diligent in investigating and pursuing her claim.
The trial court disagreed. It found De Leon did not show by a
preponderance of the evidence that despite reasonable diligence her counsel
could neither discover Metropolitan was a public entity, with whom a claim
needed to be filed directly, nor any contact information for Metropolitan to
ask. The court further found De Leon’s counsel was not reasonably diligent
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in its investigation. The court thus denied De Leon’s petition.
II.
De Leon argues the trial court abused its discretion likening her case to
cases granting relief. She also contends the court considered a theory not
presented by the parties when it noted Metropolitan’s public entity status
could be found in the Water Code. She further asserts Metropolitan failed to
establish prejudice resulting from the late presentation of her claim.
Metropolitan responds De Leon failed to demonstrate excusable neglect
and, therefore, it did not have to prove prejudice, and the court did not abuse
its discretion in referencing the Water Code.
We agree the court did not abuse its discretion. Instead, the trial court
reasonably concluded De Leon failed to show her counsel’s failure was due to
excusable neglect.
A.
We review decisions to grant or deny a petition seeking relief from the
claim presentation requirement for abuse of discretion, although we
scrutinize more carefully an order denying relief than an order granting
relief. (Bettencourt v. Los Rios Community College Dist. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 270,
275-276.) A decision denying relief is an abuse of discretion only if it exceeds
the bounds of reason or contravenes uncontradicted evidence. (County of
Alameda v. Superior Court (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 619, 624.)
A trial court shall relieve a petitioner from the claim presentation
requirement if the petitioner shows by a preponderance of the evidence “[t]he
failure to present the claim was through mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect[,] unless the public entity establishes that it would be
prejudiced in the defense of the claim if the court relieves the petitioner.”
(§ 946.6(c)(1).)
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“Excusable neglect is that neglect which might have been the act of a
reasonably prudent person under the circumstances.” (Department of Water
& Power v. Superior Court (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1288, 1296.) When
excusable neglect is claimed based on ignorance of a fact or failure to act on
it, the petitioner “‘must show by a preponderance of the evidence that in the
use of reasonable diligence, [the petitioner] could not discover the fact or
could not act upon it.’” (N.G. v. County of San Diego (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th
63, 74.) “In determining whether an attorney’s error constitutes excusable
neglect, the courts also consider the attorney’s overall diligence or lack
thereof.” (Bettencourt, 42 Cal.3d at p. 278.)
B.
De Leon was injured in the collision on June 6, 2023, giving her until
December 6 to timely present her claim to Metropolitan. (§ 911.2(a).) Within
one week of the collision, she retained her counsel. On June 29, she
submitted an amendment to the California Highway Patrol report that
documented the collision. The Highway Patrol report listed Metropolitan as
the owner of the other vehicle involved in the collision. Even assuming
De Leon and her counsel did not obtain the report and discover
Metropolitan’s ownership until the date of the request to amend the report,
that left them more than five months to discover Metropolitan was a separate
public entity and timely present De Leon’s claim.
During that time, De Leon’s insurance carrier received a letter via
email from a third-party claims administrator company. The company
represented Metropolitan for purposes of its demand for damages against
De Leon. De Leon’s insurance carrier sent the letter to her counsel. Counsel
emailed the third-party company, attaching a letter of representation for
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De Leon. However, neither the email nor the letter asked about
Metropolitan’s public entity status, and counsel received no response.
De Leon’s counsel searched Metropolitan’s website for its status as a
public entity but allegedly found no clarity. The collision occurred in the city
of Santa Ana within the County of Orange, and counsel stated Metropolitan’s
website indicated 26 agencies purchased water from Metropolitan, including
cities and water agencies “mostly in Los Angeles County.” Counsel submitted
claims to the City and County of Los Angeles and State of California,
uncertain of their relation to the collision, but received no response before the
time for presentation lapsed.
As De Leon’s deadline drew near and ultimately passed, counsel had
received no confirmation of Metropolitan’s public entity status, and there is
no evidence counsel conducted any further investigation to obtain clarity
before it passed.
De Leon’s counsel could have but did not contact Metropolitan before
the time for presentation lapsed. De Leon’s counsel declared he conducted
“[a] thorough review of [Metropolitan’s] website” and found “no contact
information” for Metropolitan, suggesting the lack of contact information was
the reason counsel could not contact Metropolitan sooner. But at all relevant
times, Metropolitan’s webpage included a “Contact Us” page accessible to the
public from a drop-down menu. That page included phone numbers, e-mail
addresses, and a mailing address for Metropolitan. And the letter forwarded
to counsel from De Leon’s insurance carrier stated it was sent via email to
the insurance carrier and that Metropolitan’s Risk Department Unit was
included in the email correspondence. Yet there is no evidence De Leon’s
counsel asked the insurer to share Metropolitan’s email address. Given the
uncertainty about Metropolitan’s public entity status, the trial court could
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conclude reasonably prudent counsel would have contacted Metropolitan to
further inquire before the time for presentation lapsed. (See Spencer v.
Merced County Office of Education (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1429, 1438-1439.)
When counsel sent De Leon’s untimely claim and subsequent
application to present a late claim to Metropolitan, counsel articulated
reasons for the untimely presentation that failed to mention any inability to
find Metropolitan’s contact information. Instead, counsel asserted they
“decided” to contact Metropolitan after the time for presentation had lapsed
because they had received no response from the third-party company,
suggesting counsel could have contacted Metropolitan earlier had they been
so inclined.
The trial court further noted counsel could have determined
Metropolitan’s entity status by consulting the Water Code. De Leon objects
to this reasoning, arguing this point was not raised by counsel and therefore
violates her right to due process. We disagree. The court’s point highlights
another of the possible steps counsel could have taken to be reasonably
diligent. It does not raise an alternative issue or legal theory. (See United
States v. Sineneng-Smith (2020) 590 U.S. 371, 376.)
De Leon’s case is distinguishable from the cases she relies on to argue
her counsel undertook diligent efforts to investigate whether and to whom a
claim needed to be presented. For example, in Kaslavage v. West Kern
County Water Dist. (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 529, the court found the petitioner’s
failure to discover the correct public entity excusable because the petitioner
hired an investigator who questioned four different public agencies in an
attempt to obtain information and spent part of two days inspecting the
injury site and official records of the assessor’s office. (Id. at pp. 535-536.)
Likewise, in Lawrence v. State of California (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 242,
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counsel’s presentation to the wrong public entity was excusable because
counsel had called the sheriff’s office, an “arm of the county government” who
advised, albeit incorrectly, the county was responsible for the sidewalk where
the petitioner had been injured, and counsel had further called several other
cities in the vicinity, who advised “‘they were [all] part of the County.’” (Id. at
pp. 244-246.) Conversely, over the course of five months, no similar diligent
efforts were shown here. That De Leon’s passenger was able to discover
Metropolitan’s contact information and present her claim to Metropolitan in
less than two months tends to show that, with reasonable diligence,
De Leon’s counsel could have done the same.
Accordingly, on this record, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying De Leon’s petition. Because De Leon failed to prove
excusable neglect, Metropolitan’s prejudice, or lack thereof, is immaterial.
(County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County (1971)
4 Cal.3d 545, 555.) We therefore need not remand this case for the trial court
to decide whether Metropolitan was prejudiced. (§ 946.6(c)(1); Tammen v.
County of San Diego (1967) 66 Cal.2d 468, 478.)
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III.
We affirm. Respondents are entitled to their costs on appeal. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a).)
CASTILLO, J.
WE CONCUR:
DATO, Acting P. J.
RUBIN, J.
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