Filed 6/18/26 P. v. Edwards CA4/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G064688
v. (Super. Ct. No. 04NF4451)
RAHEEM ABDUL EDWARDS, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of
Orange County, Lance P. Jensen, Judge. Affirmed.
Michaela Dalton, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General,
Daniel Rogers and Vincent P. LaPietra, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
In 2011, defendant Raheem Abdul Edwards was sentenced to life
in prison without parole after he was convicted of special circumstances
felony murder for participating in a burglary/robbery during which his
cohort, Robert Feeney, fatally shot the owner of a liquor store. In this appeal,
Edwards challenges the denial of his petition for resentencing following an
1
evidentiary hearing under Penal Code section 1172.6. Edwards contends
there is insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding he was a
major participant in the underlying felonies and acted with reckless
indifference to human life for purposes of the current felony-murder rule. We
disagree and affirm the court’s denial order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.
THE ORIGINAL TRIAL PROCEEDINGS
At Edwards’s trial, there were two sources of evidence about
what happened inside the liquor store during the fatal shooting, Edwards
himself, and a three-minute surveillance video. We start with the video,
which consisted of only images, without sound.
A. The Surveillance Video
The video shows Edwards and Feeney entering the Lucky 7
liquor store in Anaheim on the morning of December 15, 2000. They are
wearing beanie caps and gloves, and Haeng Shin Kim, the owner and only
other person in the store, is standing behind the checkout counter to their
1
That section originally was housed in Penal Code section
1170.95, but it subsequently was renumbered without substantive change as
Penal Code section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) For ease of reference,
we refer to the current provision. All undesignated statutory references are to
the Penal Code.
2
left. Posing as customers, Edwards and Feeney start taking items from the
store shelves and placing them on the checkout counter. But, around the one-
minute mark, Edwards walks to a storage area in the back of the store, out of
sight of the surveillance camera. Then Feeney briefly converses with Kim
before walking out the front door of the store.
With Feeney gone, Kim leaves the checkout counter and walks to
the back storage area, where Edwards went. Then Feeney reenters the store
and walks to the same area. At that point, all three men are out of sight of
the surveillance camera.
Twenty seconds later, Kim reappears from the back storage area,
crawling on his knees. He struggles to his feet and starts hobbling toward the
front of the store in front of the checkout counter. Edwards comes out from
the back storage area right after Kim and immediately goes behind the
checkout counter and starts taking money from the two cash registers. While
Edwards is rummaging through the registers, Kim falls to the floor and
starts crawling toward the front door. But before he gets there, Feeney
reemerges from the back of the store, moves quickly to Kim, and shoots him
in the back of the neck, leaving him motionless on the floor. This shot comes
about 10 seconds after Kim emerged from the back storage area on his knees.
After that, Feeney closes the front door and runs to the back of
the store, but Edwards stays behind the checkout counter and continues
taking money from the registers for another 15 seconds before joining
Edwards in the back. Fifteen seconds later, the two emerge from the back of
the store and hastily exit through the front door, stepping over Kim in the
process. They can be seen running from the store just over three minutes
from the time they initially entered it.
3
B. The Initial Investigation and Edwards’s Police Interview
The police were summoned, and upon arriving at the store, they
found Kim lying in a pool of blood just inside the front door. In addition to the
bullet wound to the back of his neck, Kim had a second bullet wound in his
lower back. He was pronounced dead at the scene. Investigators found six
.45-caliber shell casings in the store. One was by Kim’s body, and the others
were in the back of the store, where a storage area, a bathroom, and a small
office are located.
The police arrested Edwards in Michigan five years later, in
2005. After waiving his Miranda rights (see Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384
U.S. 436), Edwards told investigators he was living with Feeney and Feeney’s
mother at the time of the shooting. Edwards said he and Feeney were “like
brothers,” that they would “share everything,” and that Feeney would “tell
me everything.”
According to Edwards, he worked the graveyard shift at
Disneyland the night before the shooting. He got home around 7:30 a.m., just
as Feeney was coming out of their house. Feeney told Edwards he was going
to get some extra money and “do a robbery.” Edwards decided to go with him
because he did not want to have to answer to Feeney’s mother if something
bad happened to Feeney.
They ended up walking to the Del Monte area of Anaheim, which
was a couple of miles from their house. Along the way, Feeney mentioned
something about borrowing money from some guys he knew there. But when
they got there, Feeney started talking about robbing Kim’s liquor store,
which was located in that area. Knowing the store cashed checks, Feeney
figured Kim would have a lot of money on hand for that purpose because it
was a Friday.
4
Edwards agreed to assist in the robbery. The plan was for him to
lure Kim to the back of the store and distract him there so Feeney could steal
the money from the cash registers. Before entering the store, they surveilled
it from a bus stop across the street. They waited until the store was empty of
customers before embarking on their plan.
Upon entering the store, Edwards lured Kim to the back storage
area, as planned. Instead of hitting the cash registers, however, Feeney
walked to the back storage area as well. Describing events to the police,
Edwards said he was standing in the corner of the back storage area, trying
to distract Kim, when he heard several gunshots. Feeney then told him to
grab the money, so he darted behind the checkout counter and started taking
money from the cash registers. Then he ran for the front door, jumped over
Kim, and pulled his cap down as he left the store with Feeney.
Following the robbery, Edwards and Feeney split the loot, which
consisted of a few hundred dollars and some food stamps. Then they fled to
Las Vegas for about a week, before making it out to New York, where
Edwards has family.
Edwards told the police he did not have a gun during the robbery
and did not know Feeney was armed. Edwards admitted, however, that he
knew Feeney liked guns, had books on guns, and always wanted to be around
them. Edwards also said that he had seen Feeney with a gun on more than
one prior occasion.
C. Edwards’s Trial Testimony
At his 2011 trial, Edwards testified in greater detail about what
happened on the day back in 2000 when he and Feeney robbed Kim’s liquor
store. Contrary to what he said during his police interview, Edwards testified
that when he and Feeney set out for the Del Monte area that morning,
5
Feeney was just looking to borrow money from a friend; he did not say
anything about committing a robbery. However, Edwards could not
remember the name of the person from whom Feeney was hoping to borrow
money.
When they got to Del Monte, Feeney knocked on several doors in
an apartment complex, but no one he knew was around. Feeney and Edwards
then started getting nervous about staying in that area. They had not done
anything wrong up to that point, but they did not want to linger around the
apartment complex for fear of being arrested for trespassing. So, they walked
over to a bus stop and sat on a bench across the street from Kim’s liquor
store.
Eyeing the store, Feeney told Edwards he could steal the register
money if Edwards would lure Kim to the back of the store. Edwards thought
Feeney was joking at first, but when Feeney persisted with the idea, Edwards
told him, “I’m not doing that.” Edwards also offered to give Feeney some of
his own money, to dissuade Feeney from stealing money from the store, but
Feeney declined the offer.
For the next 30 minutes or so, they sat on the bench watching
customers going in and out of Kim’s store. Edwards told Feeney the store was
too busy to try to steal Kim’s money, and Feeney seemed to begrudgingly
agree. Sensing Feeney’s disappointment, Edwards offered to buy him some
cigars and liquor at the store, to make him feel better. Edwards testified
Feeney was on board with that idea. Despite all of Feeney’s talk about
stealing Kim’s money, Edwards believed he had successfully talked Feeney
out of the idea by the time they crossed the street and entered Kim’s store.
6
Upon entering the store, however, Edwards could not find the
2
particular kind of liquor Feeney liked. Therefore, Edwards went into the
back storage area to look for it, and Kim followed him. At that point,
Edwards realized Feeney might be able to steal the register money after all.
Although Edwards testified that was not the plan when they entered the
store, he decided to stall Kim in the back by asking him questions about his
inventory, to give Feeney time to steal the money.
But Feeney did not go for the money. Instead, he went into the
back storage area and started shooting. Despite being in that area himself,
Edwards testified he did not see Feeney at that time. Edwards also claimed
he had no idea Feeney had a gun, let alone that he would shoot Kim.
Edwards told the jury he was “shocked” when he heard he first shot go off.
Then several more shots rang out in rapid succession and everything seemed
to start happening very fast.
After Kim fell to the floor and started crawling out of the storage
area, Feeney shouted for Edwards to “grab the money.” Edwards testified
initially that he obeyed the command out of fear Feeney might turn the gun
on him. But, during his subsequent testimony, Edwards admitted he did not
really believe Feeney was going to shoot him; that was just something that
could have happened from a hypothetical standpoint if he did not follow
Feeney’s directive. In any event, Edwards ran out of the back room after Kim
crawled out and went directly to the cash registers.
Edwards testified he was so busy taking the money from the cash
registers he did not see Feeney shoot Kim a second time by the front door.
2
At trial, Edwards described the liquor as “white,” but he could
not remember what kind or brand it was.
7
After emptying the registers, Edwards joined Feeney at the back of the store
and gave Feeney the money. They were hoping to escape through the back
door, but it was locked, so they ran back through the store and, after stepping
over Kim’s body, left through the front door. Along the way, Edwards noticed
Kim was lying in a pool of blood. Edwards testified he felt bad for Kim, but he
did not try to help him or call 911 because he thought Kim was already dead.
During his testimony, Edwards claimed he was upset over the
situation and felt betrayed by Feeney for shooting Kim. But when he brought
up the prospect of calling the police, Feeney told him he would have to go to
jail too, so Edwards did not do that. Instead, he and Feeney stayed in the
area for about a week until they saw a report about the shooting on the news.
At that point, they went to Las Vegas and then took a bus to New York.
Edwards testified he fled with Feeney and shared the robbery loot with him
because he wanted Feeney to trust him. Fearing possible repercussions, he
did not want Feeney to think he might report him to the police.
Consistent with his pretrial police interview, Edwards testified
he knew Feeney was a gun enthusiast. However, although he told the police
he had seen Feeney with a gun on more than one occasion prior to the Kim
shooting, Edwards testified at trial he had only seen Feeney with a gun one
time before then, when Feeney had showed him a shotgun at their house.
Asked to explain this discrepancy, Edwards stated he “could have been
misinterpreted” during his police interview. Edwards also admitted he had
previously been convicted of a felony involving moral turpitude and that he
gave the police a false name when he was arrested in connection with this
case.
8
D. The Verdict and Sentence
The jury convicted Edwards of first degree murder and found
true the special circumstances allegations that he committed the murder
during the commission of a burglary and during the commission of a robbery.
The trial court sentenced him to life in prison without parole, and on direct
appeal, a panel of this court affirmed the judgment in its entirety. (People v.
Edwards (June 21, 2012, G045022) [nonpub. opn.], review denied Sept. 26,
2012, S204354.)
II.
THE RESENTENCING PROCEEDINGS
In 2019, seven years after his conviction was affirmed on appeal,
Edwards filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6. The
petition was based on changes to the felony-murder rule that had been
ushered in by Senate Bill No. 1437 the previous year. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015,
§ 4.) That bill narrowed the scope of the felony-murder rule such that an
accomplice to a felony during which death occurs can only be found liable for
murder if: (1) he was the actual killer, (2) he aided and abetted the actual
killer with the intent to kill, or (3) he was a major participant in the felony
and acted with reckless indifference to human life. (§ 189, subd. (e)(1)–(3);
Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 3.)
After finding Edwards made a prima facie showing for
resentencing, the trial court issued an order to show cause and set the matter
for an evidentiary hearing. Neither party offered any new evidence at the
hearing, and the matter was submitted on the record of conviction, including
Edwards’s police interview and the transcript of his trial. Considering all the
circumstances surrounding the shooting, the court found Edwards was a
major participant in the burglary/robbery and acted with reckless
9
indifference to human life. The court therefore denied Edwards’s petition for
resentencing.
The trial court made extensive factual and credibility findings in
conjunction with its ruling. Although Edwards testified Feeney never raised
the prospect of stealing money from Kim until they were sitting on the bus
bench across from Kim’s store, the court did not believe that because
Edwards told the police Feeney had mentioned doing a robbery about an hour
earlier, when they were still back at their house. And although Edwards
testified he had talked Feeney out of that plan and they entered the store
simply to buy cigars and liquor, the court was skeptical of that in light of
what transpired inside the store, i.e., Edwards lured Kim to the back storage
area, just as he and Feeney had talked about on the bus bench. In other
words, despite Edwards’s testimony to the contrary, the court found he was
knowingly and actively involved in the heist from the get-go.
In assessing Edwards’s culpability (and credibility), the trial
court also found it suspicious that Edwards and Feeney were wearing caps
and gloves when they entered the store. Considering as well how much time
they spent watching the store from the bus bench, the court found the heist
was preplanned, and Edwards “played a major role in deciding how and when
to commit the crime regardless of whether it was initially his idea.”
In addition, the trial court found Edwards knew Feeney was
armed when they entered Kim’s store. This finding was based on several
factors. First, Edwards told the police he and Feeney were very close friends
at the time of the robbery and shared everything with one another. Given
their tight relationship, the court found it not credible that Feeney did not
tell Edwards something as important as the fact he had a gun. The second
factor relates to Edwards’s testimony about why he and Feeney left the
10
apartment complex where Feeney was trying to borrow money and walked to
the bus stop across from Kim’s store. Edwards claimed it was simply because
they did not want to get arrested for trespassing. But given Edwards’s lack of
credibility on other matters, the court determined he was probably more
concerned the police would find Feeney’s gun if they did arrest him for
something.
Beyond that, the trial court questioned whether Edwards and
Feeney even went to the apartment complex before the robbery. Edwards
testified they went there looking for someone Feeney could borrow money
from. But the court doubted that because Edwards could not remember the
name of the person Feeney was trying to find, and Feeney declined Edward’s
offer of money while they were sitting on the bus bench prior to the robbery.
In Edwards’s defense, the trial court noted there was no evidence
he was armed during the robbery or that he supplied Feeney with the gun
Feeney used to shoot Kim.3 Nor was there any evidence Feeney had a history
of violence or that Edwards had any reason to suspect Feeney would use
deadly force during the robbery. However, the court found the location of the
bullet casings in the back of the store indicated Edwards was much closer to
Feeney at the time of the initial gunshots than Edwards let on during his
testimony.
In analyzing the major participant issue, the trial court also
found it significant that, after Feeney initially shot Kim, it was Edwards who
3
Based on Edwards’s pretrial statements to the police, the trial
court made a finding that Edwards had gifted Feeney a gun at some point
before the shooting. We agree with the parties there is insufficient evidence
to support this finding. However, because the timing of the purported gift was
unknown, the court did not rely on it as proof Edwards had supplied Feeney
with the gun he used to shoot Kim.
11
cleaned out the cash registers, albeit at Feeney’s request; Edwards did not
attempt to assist or protect Kim in any way. And following their escape,
Edwards shared the robbery money with Feeney and eventually fled the state
with him. Edwards testified he did so because he was afraid of what Feeney
might do to him if Feeney sensed he was not in his corner. But the trial court
found that testimony not credible given how close Edwards and Feeney were
at the time of the shooting.
Turning to the reckless indifference to human life requirement,
the trial court relied on many of the same factors it cited in finding Edwards
was a major participant in the underlying felonies. In particular, the court
found: (1) Edwards purposely lured Kim to the back of the store as part of a
preconceived plan; (2) Edwards made no effort to minimize the risk of
violence to Kim; (3) Edwards did not try to help Kim after Feeney initially
shot him, nor did he stop to see if Kim was still alive when he stepped over
Kim’s body to exit the store; and (4) although the entire incident lasted only a
few minutes, Edwards was heavily involved in the events that led to Kim’s
death.
The trial court also found: Edwards “testified that he was upset
by the shooting, but was able to go to sleep that night, work the next morning
and otherwise carry on with his life as if nothing had happened. This shows a
callousness [that] belies his youth, as he only sprang into action when he saw
the reports of the murder on the news and decided to leave town with
Feeney.” Despite the fact Edwards was only 20 years old at the time of the
shooting, the court found he would have understood Kim’s bullet wounds
required immediate medical attention and that failing to assist Kim or call
for help after he was shot could have lethal consequences.
12
All things considered, the trial court found Edwards’s attempt at
trial to minimize his involvement or to mitigate or excuse his behavior was
unconvincing and the evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt he was
guilty of murder under the current felony-murder rule.
DISCUSSION
Edwards contends there is insufficient evidence to support the
trial court’s ruling. As we explain below, however, there is overwhelming
evidence in the record to support the court’s finding Edwards was a major
participant in the underlying felonies. And although the evidence supporting
the reckless indifference requirement is not as strong, it is sufficient to
sustain the court’s order.
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When the trial court denies a resentencing petition following an
evidentiary hearing, we review the court’s order under the substantial
evidence standard. (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 988.) In doing so,
we assess the evidence “‘in the light most favorable to the prosecution and
presume in support of the [order] the existence of every fact the [court] could
reasonably have deduced from the evidence.’” (People v. Williams (2020) 57
Cal.App.5th 652, 663.) Although the evidence must be “reasonable, credible,
and of solid value” (People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314), we must
remember “‘it is the exclusive province of the [trial court] to determine the
credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a
determination depends.’” (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.) “‘“If
the circumstances reasonably justify the findings made . . . reversal of the
judgment is not warranted simply because the circumstances might also
13
reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.”’” (People v. Lucero (2019)
41 Cal.App.5th 370, 411.)
II.
THE MAJOR PARTICIPANT AND RECKLESS INDIFFERENCE REQUIREMENTS
The major participant and reckless indifference requirements
stem from a pair of United States Supreme Court cases, Enmund v. Florida
(1982) 458 U.S. 782 (Enmund) and Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137
(Tison). In those decisions, the high court considered under what
circumstances the death penalty could be imposed on a person “who aids and
abets a felony in the course of which a murder is committed by others but
who does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place
or that lethal force be employed.” (Enmund, supra, 458 U.S. at p. 797.)
Earl Enmund was just such a person. After hatching a robbery
plan, he drove his cohorts to the victim’s house and waited nearby while they
confronted the victim at gunpoint. When the victim’s wife appeared with a
gun of her own, the cohorts shot and killed her, as well as the intended
victim. Enmund then drove his cohorts from the scene and helped them get
rid of their guns. Focusing on Enmund’s conduct and culpability, the United
States Supreme Court determined that because he played a minor role in the
actual robbery and lacked the intent to kill, he could not be subjected to the
death penalty, even though the victims were murdered during the course of a
serious felony—armed robbery—that he planned and facilitated. (Enmund,
supra, 458 U.S. at pp. 798–801.)
In Tison, the defendants’ conduct was more egregious, although,
like Enmund, they too harbored no murderous intent. The defendants in
Tison were two brothers who sprang their father, Gary, and another
convicted murderer, Randy, from prison during an armed confrontation with
14
guards. Following the breakout, the group flagged down a car, captured its
occupants at gunpoint, and took their belongings. Then Gary and Randy shot
and killed them while the defendants looked on from a distance. The group
evaded authorities for several days but eventually was apprehended after a
shootout with the police. The question presented was whether the
defendants—nonkillers who lacked the intent to kill but were heavily
involved in the armed breakout and kidnapping for robbery—could lawfully
be put to death for the murders committed by Randy and their father. (Tison,
supra, 481 U.S. at pp. 138–141.)
The high court answered that question in the affirmative,
explaining the defendants’ “own personal involvement in the crimes was not
minor, but rather, as specifically found by the trial court, ‘substantial.’ Far
from merely sitting in a car away from the actual scene of the murders acting
as the getaway driver to a robbery [a la Enmund], each [defendant] was
actively involved in every element of the kidnaping-robbery and was
physically present during the entire sequence of criminal activity culminating
in the murder of the [victims] and the subsequent flight.” (Tison, supra, 481
U.S. at p. 158.) Equally important, the facts demonstrated the defendants
had reason to know lethal force might be used, yet they did nothing to
restrain the killers or aid the victims. (Id. at pp. 151–152.) The court found
their “reckless indifference to the value of human life [was] every bit as
shocking to the moral sense as an ‘intent to kill.’” (Id. at p. 157.)
In the wake of Tison, the California electorate passed Proposition
115, which amended section 190.2 to allow the felony murder special
circumstance to be applied to a person who was not the actual killer so long
as he acted “with reckless indifference to human life and as a major
participant” in the underlying felony. (§ 190.2, subd. (d); see Prop. 115, as
15
approved by the voters, Primary Elec. (June 5, 1990).) That amendment,
which amounted to a statutory codification of the Tison decision, was already
on the books when Edwards was convicted in 2011. However, it was not until
several years later, in People v Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks) and
People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark) that the California Supreme
Court fully examined the meaning of the terms “‘major participant’” and
“reckless indifference” to provide “a deeper understanding” of how they
should be applied in a given case. (Banks, at p. 801.)
The facts in Banks were akin to those in Enmund in that the
defendant served as the getaway driver for an armed robbery in which his
confederate shot and killed a person who resisted the robbery. In examining
the parameters of the major participation requirement, the Banks court
explained, “Tison and Enmund establish that a defendant’s personal
involvement must be substantial, greater than the actions of an ordinary
aider and abettor to an ordinary felony murder such as Earl Enmund. The
defendants’ actions in Tison . . . and Enmund . . . represent points on a
continuum. [Citation.] Somewhere between them, at conduct less egregious
than the Tisons’ but more culpable than Earl Enmund’s, lies the
constitutional minimum for death eligibility.” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p.
802.)
The Banks court then articulated several factors bearing on the
major participation requirement: “What role did the defendant have in
planning the criminal enterprise that led to one or more deaths? What role
did the defendant have in supplying or using lethal weapons? What
awareness did the defendant have of particular dangers posed by the nature
of the crime, weapons used, or past experience or conduct of the other
participants? Was the defendant present at the scene of the killing, in a
16
position to facilitate or prevent the actual murder, and did his or her own
actions or inaction play a particular role in the death? What did the
defendant do after lethal force was used?” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803,
fn. omitted.) The court stated, “No one of these considerations is necessary,
nor is any one of them necessarily sufficient. All may be weighed in
determining the ultimate question, whether the defendant’s participation . . .
was sufficiently significant to be considered ‘major’ [citations].” (Ibid.)
Applying these factors to the defendant’s actions in Banks, the
Supreme Court found his conduct failed to satisfy the major participant
requirement because he was not involved in planning the robbery, he did not
procure weapons for the shooter, neither he nor the other participants had
any history of violent crime, he was not present at the scene of the shooting,
and there was “no evidence he saw or heard the shooting, that he could have
seen or heard the shooting, or that he had any immediate role in instigating
it or could have prevented it.” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 805.)
The Banks court also addressed the mens rea requirement for the
felony murder special circumstance. While acknowledging there is an
inherent risk of death in all armed robberies, the court stated risk alone is
not enough to support a finding of reckless indifference. Rather, the evidence
must establish the defendant engaged in conduct that is “‘“known to carry a
grave risk of death.”’ [Citations.] The defendant must be aware of and
willingly involved in the violent manner in which the particular offense is
committed, demonstrating reckless indifference to the significant risk of
death his or her actions create.” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 801, italics
added.) The California Supreme Court found that standard was not met in
Banks because, unlike the situation in Tison, there was no evidence the
defendant “knowingly conspired with accomplices known to have killed
17
before. Instead, as in Enmund, [the fatal shooting] was apparently a
spontaneous response to armed resistance from the victim.” (Id. at p. 807.)
In Clark, the Supreme Court further elaborated on the reckless
indifference requirement. Clark planned and organized the closing-time
robbery of an Orange County computer store and was orchestrating events
from his car in the parking lot when the mother of one of the victims
unexpectedly entered the store. An accomplice in the store promptly shot her
dead, leading to Clark’s conviction for special circumstances felony murder
under aiding and abetting principles. Without deciding whether Clark was a
major participant in the underlying robbery, the Supreme Court noted there
is significant overlap between the major participant requirement and the
reckless indifference requirement, “‘for the greater the defendant’s
participation in the felony murder, the more likely that he acted with
reckless indifference to human life.’” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 615.)
This overlap was further elucidated when the court articulated
the factors it considered pertinent to the reckless indifference analysis,
namely, “the defendant’s knowledge of weapons, and the use and number of
weapons; the defendant’s proximity to the crime and opportunity to stop the
killing or aid the victim; the duration of the offense conduct, that is, ‘whether
a murder came at the end of a prolonged period of restraint of the victims by
defendant’; the defendant’s awareness his or her confederate was likely to
kill; and the defendant’s efforts to minimize the possibility of violence during
the crime.” (In re Miller (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 960, 973, quoting Clark, supra,
63 Cal.4th at pp. 618–623.) As it did in enunciating the major participant
factors in Banks, the Supreme Court in Clark made clear none of these
factors were necessary, or necessarily sufficient, to satisfy the reckless
indifference requirement in a given case. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 618.)
18
On balance, however, the Supreme Court concluded those factors
militated against a finding Clark acted with reckless indifference. The court
found it significant the sole gun used in the robbery held a single bullet and
was carried by an accomplice, not Clark. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 619.)
In addition, although Clark was nearby at the time of the shooting, he was
not physically present at the scene, rendering him unable to prevent it. (Ibid.)
Furthermore, there was no evidence Clark ordered the shooting or wanted it
to occur. (Id. at pp. 619–621.) In fact, the evidence suggested the opposite in
that Clark planned the robbery to take place after the store was closed (ibid.),
and he thought the gun was unloaded (id. at p. 613). The Supreme Court
determined those circumstances warranted reversal of the special
circumstance findings because, at bottom, there was nothing about the
planning and nature of the robbery “that elevated the risk to human life
beyond those risks inherent in any armed robbery.” (Id. at p. 623.)
Further refining the meaning of reckless indifference, the
California Supreme Court recently explained in People v. Emanuel (2025) 17
Cal.5th 867 (Emanuel) that this element “encompasses both subjective and
objective elements. [Citations.] ‘As to the subjective element, “[t]he defendant
must be aware of and willingly involved in the violent manner in which the
particular offense is committed,” and he or she must consciously disregard
“the significant risk of death his or her actions create.”’ [Citations.] ‘As to the
objective element, “‘[t]he risk [of death] must be of such a nature and degree
that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct and the
circumstances known to him [or her], its disregard involves a gross deviation
from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the
actor’s situation.’”’ [Citations.]
19
“‘The degree of risk to human life is crucial to the analysis.’
[Citation.] . . . ‘“Awareness of no more than the foreseeable risk of death
inherent in any [violent felony] is insufficient” to establish reckless
indifference to human life; “only knowingly creating a ‘grave risk of death’”
satisfies the statutory requirement.’ [Citations.] . . . [P]articipation in a
‘“garden-variety armed robbery,”’ i.e., one in which the only factor supporting
a reckless indifference finding is that a participant was armed with a gun, is
insufficient without more to establish reckless indifference.” (Emanuel,
supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 884.)
In Emanuel, our Supreme Court noted the defendant’s youth has
also been recognized as a pertinent factor in determining whether he acted
with reckless indifference to human life for purposes of the current felony-
murder rule. (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 885, fn. 6.) A finding of
reckless indifference cannot stand if the defendant’s age precluded him from
possessing the experience, perspective, and judgment to adequately
appreciate the risk of death posed by his criminal activities. (In re Moore
(2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 434, 454.)
III.
ANALYSIS
A. The Major Participant Requirement
Contending he played only a minor role in the burglary/robbery
that led to Kim’s death, Edwards argues his involvement in the crimes was
no greater than that of an ordinary aider and abettor. We disagree. The
record shows Edwards was actively involved in the underlying felonies from
start to finish.
Edwards told the police he agreed with Feeney to divert Kim’s
attention in the back of the store so Feeney could steal the register money.
20
And that is just what Edwards did when he entered the store. As Edwards
admitted at trial, he was trying to stall Kim in the back storage area when
Feeney initially shot Kim. Edwards testified the shooting was not part of
their plan, and he was shocked when he heard the first shots go off. But
rather than abandoning the plan at that point, Edwards jumped into action
and carried out an essential component of the robbery—taking the register
money—while Feeney fired a second bullet into the back of Kim’s neck.
Following that second shot, Feeney ran to the back of the store,
leaving Edwards free to check on Kim or even flee the store if he really was
shocked and appalled by Feeney’s barrage of gunshots. Instead, Edwards
stayed behind the checkout counter and continued cleaning out the registers,
demonstrating his commitment to the deadly heist. Edwards also fled with
Feeney and shared the spoils of the robbery with him.
Unlike Feeney, Edwards did not personally inflict any harm on
Kim during the incident. But like the defendants in Tison, who were found to
be major participants in the kidnapping/robbery at issue in that case,
Edwards “was actively involved in every element of the [burglary/robbery]
and was physically present during the entire sequence of criminal activity
culminating in the murder of [Kim] and the subsequent flight.” (Tison, supra,
481 U.S. at p. 158.) As such, there is ample evidence to support the trial
court’s finding Edwards was a major participant in those felonies.
B. The Reckless Indifference Requirement
The sufficiency of the evidence on the reckless indifference
requirement is a closer issue. As we explained above, to satisfy this
requirement, the prosecution must prove the defendant was willingly
involved in the violent manner in which the underlying felony was committed
and consciously disregarded the significant risk of death his conduct created.
21
(Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 884.) “[P]articipation in a ‘“garden-variety
armed robbery,”’ i.e., one in which the only factor supporting a reckless
indifference finding is that a participant was armed with a gun, is
insufficient without more to establish reckless indifference.” (Ibid., italics
added.)
In this case, however, there is more. Based on the trial court’s
factual findings, Edwards was not only heavily involved in the
burglary/robbery, he knew Feeney was armed. This was a reasonable
inference from the evidence because Edwards told the police he and Feeney
were very close and shared everything with each other. In his police
interview, Edwards also admitted he knew Feeney liked guns and he had
seen Feeney with a gun on more than one prior occasion. Under these
circumstances, and given that Edwards’s trial testimony was suspect for
other reasons noted by the trial court, the court was justified in rejecting
Edwards’s claim that he did not know Feeney was armed when they entered
Kim’s liquor store.
As discussed above, Edwards also played a key role in the
burglary/robbery by luring Kim to the back of the store and then raiding the
cash registers after Feeney initially disabled Kim with a bullet to his lower
back. These facts stand in stark contrast to those in Emanuel, where the
defendant was unaware his cohort was armed and he actually tried to defuse
the situation by urging his cohort to leave the scene with him after they were
met with unexpected resistance during their intended robbery. (Emanuel,
supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 885–896.) Although the California Supreme Court
overturned a reckless indifference finding under those circumstances,
Edwards’s culpability far exceeds that of the defendant in Emanuel in terms
22
of both his mental state and his level of participation in the underlying
felonies.
Granted, the robbery in this case unfolded quickly after Feeney
opened fire in the back storage area. But Edwards still had a reasonable
opportunity to alter the course of events after the initial shots. Even if he did
not know Feeney was armed going in and had no reason to suspect Feeney
might shoot Kim while they were in the store, there was no excuse for
Edwards’s callous indifference to Kim once he realized Kim was wounded
from the initial volley of gunshots.
At trial, Edwards testified his own safety became an issue at that
point because Feeney could have shot him had he not complied with Feeney’s
directive to grab the money. But Edwards admitted that was simply a
hypothetical possibility and he did not really believe in the moment that
Feeney was going to shoot him. So, in reality there was nothing stopping
Edwards from attempting to aid Kim or trying to restrain Feeney from
further violence.
Alternatively, Edwards could have simply run out the front door
of the store if he was truly shocked by what Feeney had done and wanted no
further part in the plan. Instead, Edwards dashed out of the back room just
behind Kim and ran straight to the cash registers. This shows Edwards was
aware of and willingly involved in the violent manner in which the
burglary/robbery was perpetrated. (Compare People v. Guiffreda (2023) 87
Cal.App.5th 112 [insufficient evidence of reckless indifference to human life
where the subject robbery was a spontaneous crime of opportunity, the
defendant had no reason to suspect lethal force might be used, and the
defendant quickly left the scene once she saw her cohorts using such force].)
23
We recognize only about 10 seconds elapsed from the time Feeney
initially shot Kim in the back of the store until the time Feeney shot Kim in
the back of the neck near the front of the store. Yet, “although the
opportunity for intervention may have been brief,” Feeney “made [his]
intentions clear, affording [Edwards] ‘the time to observe and react before
the’” final shot was fired. (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 892, discussing In
re Loza (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 38, 53 [reckless indifference to human life
found where the defendant did not try to restrain his codefendant after the
codefendant “demanded money from the clerk while counting down from five
and threatening to shoot”] and In re McDowell (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 999,
1014–1015 [reckless indifference to human life found where the defendant
failed to intervene after codefendant fired warning shot a few seconds before
fatally shooting robbery victim].)
Of course, there is no way of knowing if Kim would have survived
if Edwards had reacted differently to the situation. However, in assessing the
blameworthiness of Edwards’s actions following the initial volley of shots,
“The focus should not be on the ultimate efficacy of his actions” in terms of
being able to aid Kim or restrain Feeney from further violence, “but on what
his actions reveal about his mental state.” (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at
p. 891.) By choosing to raid the cash registers instead of trying to deescalate
or remove himself from the situation, Edwards made his indifference to Kim’s
life clear. (See Tison, supra, 481 U.S. at pp. 151–152 [reckless indifference
found where defendants failed to assist the victims after the shooting and
instead chose to assist the killers in their continuing criminal activity];
People v. Douglas (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 1, 4–10 [reckless indifference found
where defendant continued stealing money after codefendant shot and
wounded clerk during robbery].)
24
Edwards did tell the police he and Feeney waited until there
were no customers inside Kim’s store before going inside to carry out their
plan. This suggests they may have timed their actions to mitigate the risk to
others, akin to the defendant in Clark, who planned to rob a retail store with
his associates after it was closed. But it is equally likely Edwards and Feeney
timed the heist to avoid being confronted or identified by potential customers
inside the store. In any event, Edwards testified the store was very busy
when he and Feeney were casing it from the bus bench across the street.
Despite their efforts to avoid entering the store while other customers were
present, there was no assurance others would not enter the store while the
heist was underway and be swept up in the deadly violence that occurred
during their crimes.
Another potentially mitigating circumstance is Edwards’s age. As
the trial court recognized, Edwards, like Feeney, was only 20 years old at the
time of the robbery. It is now well established that, compared to older adults
who commit crimes, juvenile and young adult offenders are considered less
culpable because they often lack maturity and have “‘“an underdeveloped
sense of responsibility”’; they ‘are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative
influence and outside pressures, including peer pressure’; and their
characters are ‘not as well formed.’” (Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48,
68, quoting Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 569–570; see also People
v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262, 266 [discussing why juvenile offenders
have greater prospects for reform compared to older offenders].)
But, according to Edwards, he went along with Feeney on the
morning of the robbery to look after him, not because Feeney pressured him
to do so. Edwards, who was a working adult at the time, even tried to reason
with Feeney (including offering to give Feeney some of Edward’s own money)
25
in an attempt to talk him out of stealing from Kim’s store. There is nothing to
suggest Edwards’s age precluded him from understanding the deadly risks
associated with carrying out the heist. (Compare People v. Keel (2022) 84
Cal.App.5th 546, 560–562 [reversing reckless indifference finding absent
evidence the subject robbery was planned or the 15-year-old defendant had
any idea it would actually take place]; People v. Ramirez (2021) 71
Cal.App.5th 970, 991–992 [15-year-old defendant lacked the experience and
maturity to appreciate the grave risks associated with his criminal actions];
In re Moore, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at pp. 451–455 [holding similarly in the
case of a 16-year-old defendant].)
Considering the totality of the circumstances, there is substantial
evidence to support the trial court’s finding Edwards acted with reckless
indifference to human life in helping Feeney carry out the burglary/robbery.
It is not just that Edwards affirmatively assisted Feeney during the crimes
by luring Kim to the back of the store and emptying the cash registers.
Equally important is that Edwards failed to make any effort to assist Kim or
call for help after Kim was shot by Feeney. Because Edwards’s actions and
inaction during the burglary/robbery demonstrate he was recklessly
indifferent to Kim’s life, there is no reason to disturb the trial court’s finding
to that effect.
In coming to this conclusion, we recognize Edwards testified he
was an unwitting accomplice who only went along with the burglary/robbery
because he was afraid of Feeney. But the trial court rejected that testimony
because it was inconsistent with Edwards’s statement to the police, and it
was not credible given how close Edwards and Feeney were at the time of the
robbery. As a reviewing tribunal, we cannot second-guess the court’s
26
credibility determination. (People v. Jackson (2014) 58 Cal.4th 724, 749;
People v. Baker (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 463, 469.)
For all these reasons, we conclude there is substantial evidence to
support the trial court’s ultimate finding that Edwards committed murder as
defined under the current felony-murder rule. No cause for reversal has been
4
shown.
DISPOSTITION
The trial court’s postjudgment order denying Edwards’s petition
for resentencing is affirmed.
GOODING, J.
WE CONCUR:
SANCHEZ, ACTING P. J.
DELANEY, J.
4
In the trial court, the prosecution argued Edwards was also
ineligible for resentencing on the alternative theory he directly aided and
abetted Feeney in murdering Kim. Like the trial court, we decline to consider
that argument, due to the strength of the prosecution’s felony-murder theory.
27
