Filed 6/18/26 P. v. Huerta CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D085301
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCN434544)
VICENTE HUERTA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Daniel F. Link, Judge. Affirmed.
Sylvia W. Beckham, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Vincent P.
LaPietra and Daniel Rogers, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
A jury convicted Vicente Huerta of second degree murder of Chelsea
Pacheco (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 1) and found true that he
personally discharged a firearm in the commission of the offense
(§ 12022.53(d)). After the jury reached its verdict, Huerta admitted to a
strike prior and a serious felony prior. The trial court sentenced Huerta to a
prison term of 55 years to life plus five years determinate, to run concurrent
to the sentence previously imposed on other counts that were adjudicated
earlier. (See People v. Huerta (Feb. 28, 2025, D083628) [nonpub. opn.
affirming 74 years to life in prison sentence imposed on count 2].)
On appeal, Huerta contends the trial court erred in declining to strike
the section 12022.53(d) firearm enhancement, which accounted for 25 years
to life of his count 1 sentence. Resolving this matter by memorandum
opinion (see generally People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847), we affirm.
I.
A.
The People argue Huerta, by failing to object, forfeited his claim of
sentencing error based on the court declining to strike the firearm
enhancement. Huerta disputes forfeiture applies because he claims defense
counsel “was not provided with a meaningful opportunity to address the
court’s reasons for declining to strike the enhancement.” We conclude
defense counsel had a meaningful opportunity to object, and thus the claim is
forfeited.
“[C]omplaints about the manner in which the trial court exercises its
sentencing discretion and articulates its supporting reasons cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal.” (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 356.) This
forfeiture rule encourages the prompt detection and correction of error,
reduces the number of unnecessary appellate claims, and ensures the fair
and orderly administration of justice. (Id. at p. 351.) But “there must be a
meaningful opportunity to object” for forfeiture to apply. (Id. at p. 356.)
At sentencing here, the trial court expressed it was “open to hearing
any comments from defense or prosecution.” The court gave its tentative
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ruling and then explained it would, “obviously, give detailed rulings. I never
give a final ruling until I hear fully from defense and prosecution.” After
announcing the sentence, including the reasons why it would not strike the
firearm enhancement, the court asked defense counsel if there was “anything
else?” Defense counsel responded, “No.”
Huerta’s attempt to avoid forfeiture is unavailing. He emphasizes
Supreme Court language about parties having an adequate opportunity to
object if, after “describ[ing] the sentence it intends to impose and the reasons
for the sentence,” the trial court then “considers the objections of the parties
before the actual sentencing.” (People v. Gonzalez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 745, 752,
italics added.) Huerta asserts the court here “conducted the sentencing
hearing without letting counsel interrupt while judgment was pronounced.”
He provides no record support for this claim, and we find none in our own
review of the sentencing hearing. In reply, Huerta claims the court “made
clear” that “after hearing from counsel, the court would ‘give a final ruling.’”
To the extent he is implying the court prohibited further input from counsel,
the record indicates otherwise. At the outset of sentencing, the court shared
it was “open to hearing any comments” from counsel. Critically, after giving
its reasons for declining to strike the firearm enhancement and the planned
sentence for count 1, the court expressly invited any further comments or
objections from defense counsel by asking, “Anything else?” In similar
circumstances, the Supreme Court concluded that “under the settled
precedent in Scott, the claim is forfeited on appeal.” (People v. Boyce (2014)
59 Cal.4th 672, 731.) So too here.
B.
Even if the claim were not forfeited, Huerta has not persuaded us the
trial court abused its discretion.
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Under section 1385(c), the court “shall dismiss an enhancement if it is
in the furtherance of justice to do so.” Evidence of certain mitigating
circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement unless
the court finds dismissal “would endanger public safety.” (§ 1385(c)(2).)
“Endanger public safety” means there is a likelihood dismissal “would result
in physical injury or other serious danger to others.” (Ibid.)
“Although the current dangerousness of the defendant is an
appropriate factor to consider, as it will have some bearing on whether
dismissing the enhancement would endanger the public, a crucial part of the
inquiry is how the dismissal of the enhancement will impact the length of the
defendant’s sentence.” (People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, 228.)
As a result, this public-safety inquiry “should also take into account that the
defendant’s release from prison is contingent on review by the Board of
Parole Hearings (and for murder convictions, by the Governor), who will have
the opportunity to assess the defendant’s dangerousness at that time.” (Ibid.)
We review for abuse of discretion the court’s determination that
dismissing Huerta’s firearm enhancement would endanger public safety.
(Gonzalez, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 225.)
Huerta contends the trial court abused its discretion in declining to
strike the firearm enhancement because it “focused entirely on historical
events” rather than conducting the required forward-looking inquiry. In
support, he points to the court’s statement that it had to find that Huerta “is
still a danger to society.” (Italics added.) Although the court first used the
present tense, it immediately clarified the proper standard by saying,
“Specifically, that if I dismissed the [section 12022].53(d), that public safety
would be in danger. If I dismiss the [firearm enhancement], which would
shave off 25 years to life giving him the possibility of being paroled earlier, I
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do very strongly feel that Mr. Huerta would be a danger to society.” The
court thus applied the proper forward-looking assessment of danger to society
and appropriately considered current dangerousness as a factor in that
assessment. Accordingly, the circumstances here differ from those in
Gonzalez, where the court imposed the firearm enhancement after concluding
the defendant “‘presently . . . does represent a danger to society.’” (Gonzalez,
103 Cal.App.5th at p. 227.) As a result, we discern no abuse of discretion on
this basis.
II.
We affirm.
CASTILLO, J.
WE CONCUR:
MCCONNELL, P. J.
KELETY, J.
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