Filed 6/18/26 Ruiz v. Espinoza CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
REBECCA RUIZ, as Trustee, etc., B341375
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 22STPB09113)
MARIA ESPINOZA,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Gus T. May, Judge. Affirmed.
Chhokar Law Group, David G. Greco, and Kristen A.
Friedman for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Bewley, Lassleben & Miller and Leighton M. Anderson for
Defendant and Respondent.
Appellant Rebecca Ruiz (Ruiz) and respondent Maria
Espinoza (Espinoza) were both named as beneficiaries under the
terms of a restated trust that includes a no contest provision.
Following the trustor’s death, Espinoza filed a response to and
partial joinder in another party’s petition to remove Ruiz as
trustee and invalidate the trust, but after a threat of sanctions
and communications with opposing counsel, Espinoza filed a
“supplement” to her response and joinder to clarify she was not
contesting the trust’s validity. Ruiz asked the probate court to
nonetheless enforce the no contest provision against Espinoza,
and the court declined—reasoning that Espinoza had abandoned
any contest the response and joinder might be read to present
without using the “machinery of the law” in a manner triggering
the no contest provision. We consider whether the order denying
Ruiz’s petition for instructions to enforce the no contest provision
against Espinoza is appealable and, if so, whether the probate
court erred in declining to enforce the no contest clause against
Espinoza.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Estate Planning
In 1998, Michael J. McGill (Michael) and his wife Sandra
M. McGill (Sandy) (collectively, the McGills) executed the “McGill
Family Living Trust” (the original trust). Under the terms of the
original trust, the trust estate, including the McGills’ Whittier
home, was to be distributed to their only child M.M. upon the
second trustor’s death.1 The original trust contained a no contest
1
Neither Ruiz nor Espinoza was named as a beneficiary of
the original trust.
2
provision: “If any beneficiary under this trust in any manner,
directly or indirectly, contests this trust or any of its provisions,
any share or interest in Trustors’ estate given to that contesting
beneficiary under this trust is revoked and shall be disposed of in
the same manner provided herein as if that contesting
beneficiary had predeceased Trustors without issue.” The
original trust also provided that either of the trustors could
revoke the trust.
Following M.M.’s death in 2012, the McGills amended the
original trust and made Sandy’s niece Vanessa Cabral (Vanessa)
the beneficiary. Under the amendment, if Vanessa predeceased
the McGills, the estate would pass to Sandy’s sister Sharon
Halpern (Halpern).2 At the same time of the amendment, Sandy
executed a Uniform Statutory Form Power of Attorney
appointing Michael as her agent, which vested him with the
power to conduct, among other things, “[e]state, trust, and other
beneficiary transactions.”
Nearly a decade later, in April 2021, after Sandy’s health
had entered a period of physical and psychiatric decline, Michael
revoked the original trust and replaced it with the “M & S McGill
Family Trust.” In connection with establishing the M & S McGill
Family Trust (the new trust), Michael obtained a Certificate of
Independent Review certifying Michael was counseled by an
attorney about bequests to Ruiz and Espinoza provided for in the
new trust and the attorney found the proposed transfers were
“not the product of fraud, menace, duress, or undue influence.”
2
Neither Ruiz nor Espinoza was named as a beneficiary of
the amended original trust.
3
Under the new trust document, Ruiz—who was described
as a “family friend”—was named as the only successor trustee.
In addition, Michael named Ruiz the trust’s principal beneficiary
following Sandy’s death. The new trust also provided, however,
that if Michael predeceased Sandy, Espinoza (who had worked as
the McGills’ housekeeper since 2012 and as Sandy’s caregiver
since 2020) would inherit the family home if she moved in and
cared for Sandy, or she would be paid $4,500 a month as a
caregiver if she did not move in.
Like the original trust, the new trust contained a no contest
provision: “If any beneficiary of this trust . . . [¶] Directly
contests or otherwise objects without probable cause in any court
to the validity of [the new trust] . . . then the right of such
beneficiary to take any interest given to him or her under this
trust . . . shall be determined as it would have been determined
had such beneficiary predeceased me without surviving issue.” A
“direct contest” was defined as “a contest that alleges the
invalidity” of the new trust based on a number of grounds,
including “[m]enace, duress, fraud, or undue influence.”
The following month, Michael executed a restatement of
the new trust, the material terms of which were identical to its
predecessor. (For simplicity, our use of the term new trust
includes the trust as restated.) In June 2022, a little over a year
after creating the new trust, Michael died. Two months later,
Ruiz, as successor trustee, provided written notice to Espinoza
and others that they could not bring an action to contest the trust
more than 120 days from the date of that notice.
4
B. Halpern Contests the New Trust’s Validity
In September 2022, a month after Ruiz’s notice, Halpern
(Sandy’s sister) filed a verified petition seeking instructions
regarding the original trust’s revocation and the new trust’s
validity; she also sought to remove Ruiz as trustee. Halpern
alleged, among other things, that the new trust was invalid
either because of Ruiz’s undue influence or Michael’s incapacity.
Halpern more specifically alleged that Ruiz had been
absent from the McGills’ lives beginning with M.M.’s passing in
2012 and continuing to 2020. At that time, as the McGills’ health
began to fail, Ruiz increasingly inserted herself into their lives,
limiting who could have access to them. Over time, Ruiz
allegedly came to “control and influence” Michael’s mind and
actions. Halpern alleged further that Ruiz took advantage of
Michael’s “trust and confidence” by convincing him to leave the
bulk of the trust estate to her through the execution of the new
trust. Then, after Michael died, Halpern alleged Ruiz
“administered the [n]ew [t]rust solely for her benefit.” Among
other things, Halpern alleged Ruiz failed to pay Espinoza the
$4,500 per month she was entitled to receive under the new trust
as Sandy’s caregiver.
Ruiz responded by filing a verified objection to Halpern’s
petition. She maintained there was no undue influence and
explained she and M.M. were “best friends growing up” and she
and the McGills became “especially close” after M.M.’s death such
that they came to treat each other as a “second family.” As
evidence of her closeness with the McGills, Ruiz stated Sandy in
2018 appointed Ruiz as her healthcare agent—with Michael as
the first alternative. Ruiz denied misusing or misallocating trust
assets and she maintained that all payments owed to Espinoza as
5
Sandy’s caretaker had been paid (but she advised no further
payments to Espinoza would be made because she had
terminated Espinoza’s services for “medically and physically
neglecting” Sandy).
C. Espinoza’s Response to and Joinder in Halpern’s
Petition, and Ruiz’s Vigorous Reaction
In April 2023, Espinoza filed a verified “Response and
Joinder of Beneficiary/Responding Party” (the Response) that
“join[ed] in the request for relief by . . . Halpern . . . to the extent
herein stated.” The Response articulated Espinoza’s interest in
the matter (pursuant to Probate Code section 1043, which allows
an “interested person” to file a pre-hearing response or objection)
as an interest in contesting Ruiz’s “wrongful[ ] terminat[ion of
Espinoza’s] employment in violation of the trust provisions” that
“ma[de] express provision for [Espinoza] to provide ongoing, in-
home personal care, attention and support to [Sandy]. . . .”
After paragraphs of factual allegations, including an
allegation that Michael recorded a video before his death stating
his wishes concerning bequests to Espinoza and Ruiz, Espinoza
joined in Halpern’s allegations of standing to bring her
(Halpern’s) petition for instructions, declined to join Halpern’s
allegations that Michael lacked capacity to revoke the original
trust, and specifically requested the court to make instructions
“regarding the validity of the provisions of the [new trust]
relating to [Sandy’s] care including the provisions related to (i)
the intended compensation to [Ezpinoza] for such care, and (ii)
the interest in the real property of the trust that [Michael]
transferred to [Espinoza], or as apparently transferred to her as
6
the Court may determine.”3 In addition, Espinoza joined in
Halpern’s request that Ruiz be removed as trustee (for asserted
breaches of fiduciary duty to the new trust’s beneficiaries,
including herself and Sandy) and asked the court to order Ruiz to
provide an accounting.4 Espinoza further joined in certain
allegations in [Halpern’s] petition seeking instructions on the
validity of the new trust, and she specifically “join[ed] in the
claim for relief in the Petition with respect to the invalidity of any
and all provisions favoring Ruiz[ ] on the grounds stated in the
Petition and further based on the presumption of fraud or undue
influence (Probate Code § 21360 et seq.).”5
3
Elaborating, Espinoza asserted the court’s instructions
should include a statement of her “right to the payments
specified” and “her right (and the right of [Sandy]) for [Espinoza]
to resume providing in-home care, attention, and
companionship . . . .”
4
The probate court would later suspend Ruiz as successor
trustee following an evidentiary hearing. The court appointed an
interim successor trustee and ordered Ruiz to provide an informal
accounting of the new trust’s income and expenditures.
5
Espinoza’s response included a prayer for relief of sorts at
the end asking the court to (1) order Ruiz removed as trustee and
appoint Halpern in her place, (2) order Ruiz to provide an
accounting of all assets and expenditures, (3) order Ruiz to
restore “to the trust estate of any existing or valid trust . . . all
money, property or other assets obtained, used, acquired or
expended by Ruiz or for her benefit,” (4) determine Espinoza’s
right to the specified payments for caring for Sandy, and (5) for
“instructions to said trustee regarding the validity and
effectiveness of the trust and other instruments executed or made
7
Ruiz reacted to Espinoza’s Response with a flurry of
litigation activity, all premised on the idea that the Response
should be considered an untimely trust contest. As we will
describe in more detail, Ruiz served (but did not file) a motion for
sanctions, she filed a motion for summary adjudication, she filed
a petition for instructions to enforce the no contest provision
against Espinoza (the filing at issue in this appeal), and she filed
a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
1. Motion for sanctions
Two months after the Response’s filing, Ruiz served but did
not file a motion for sanctions.6 The proposed sanctions motion
argued Espinoza’s Response was a trust contest that was filed
outside the applicable 120-day period for the filing of such
contests.
Through an exchange of correspondence thereafter, counsel
for Espinoza and Ruiz debated the merits of the sanctions
motion. Espinoza maintained the Response was not meant to
contest the validity of the new trust—as that was the only trust
document in which Espinoza was named as a beneficiary—but
rather a “middle-ground” position between Halpern’s petition to
by Michael . . . in about April or May, 2021, including the
effectiveness, if any, of purported donative transfers to . . . Ruiz.”
6
Ruiz’s sanctions motion invoked the provisions of sections
128.5 and 128.7 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Those sections
require a party moving for sanctions to provide the responding
party with a 21-day “safe harbor” period to withdraw or correct
the challenged action or tactic before filing the sanctions motion.
(Code Civ. Proc. §§ 128.5, subd. (f)(1)(B), 128.7, subd. (c)(1).)
8
wholly invalidate the new trust and Ruiz’s position to the
contrary. As a “[c]ure,” Espinoza offered to stipulate to the
following: “the Response is not intended to be, and should not be
construed to be, an independent contest of the validity of the
[new] trust or any of its provisions; and that the Response is only
intended to express the views and contentions of [Espinoza] on
the matters alleged in [Halpern’s] Petition.”
Ruiz disputed Espinoza’s contention that the Response was
not a trust contest, arguing the substance of the pleading and its
practical effect showed it was and emphasizing it sought different
relief from the relief sought by Halpern. Ruiz also rejected
Espinoza’s proposal to clarify her response and joinder, and
thereby “cure” the issue for which sanctions were requested,
because Ruiz believed the proposal was “essentially an effort to
withdraw a trust contest in the hopes that . . . Espinoza’s
untimely trust contest d[id] not result in her being disinherited
under the no contest clause.”
Shortly after the exchange of attorney correspondence, and
without an agreement among counsel on a “cure,” Espinoza
unilaterally filed on July 25, 2023, a supplement to her earlier
Response (the First Supplement). The First Supplement
reasserted her request to remove Ruiz as trustee (and alleged
additional facts in support of that request) but explained the
“removal of the trustee for breaches of impartiality or loyalty is
independent of the challenge to the validity of the [new trust]
documents alleged in [Halpern’s] Petition. [Espinoza’s] interest
in the trust is solely as a beneficiary of the [new trust] documents
(including the unilateral revocation of the [old trust]). Contrary
to self-serving allegations by the trustee, . . . [Espinoza] does not
seek to invalidate any of the [new trust] documents, since they
9
are the only source of the trustor’s . . . donative provisions in
[Espinoza’s] favor.” The First Supplement elaborated:
3. Among other things, the new trust
provides for income to be paid to [Espinoza] and for
her to have a right of occupancy of the residence
while she would continue to provide care, support
and companionship to the surviving spouse and one
of the original settlors of the trust, [Sandy]. Without
notice and without cause, the trustee benefitted her
own interests as the residuary beneficiary of the new
trust by (i) terminating all such payments to
[Espinoza]; and (ii) excluding [Espinoza] from the
residence and from any contact or communication
with [Sandy].
4. The purported basis for the exclusion—
that [Espinoza] allegedly caused injuries to [Sandy]
in providing in-home assistance of a non-medical
nature—is fabricated in the sense that any symptoms
actually suffered by [Sandy] were in existence at the
time that [Espinoza] was working faithfully together
with [Michael] to provide in-home care to [Sandy]
under the supervision of a professional medical team
of physicians and nurses. If called to testify, the in-
home care nurses (LVNs) would testify very favorably
regarding the value of [Espinoza’s] ministrations to
[Sandy], showing the false allegations by the trustee
to be intended maliciously and in the trustee’s
personal interests.
10
5. The trustee has further refused to restore
possession to [Espinoza] of a motor vehicle for which
she ([Espinoza]) is the registered owner, the vehicle
having been given to [Espinoza] by the now-deceased
settlor . . . during his life.
6. In addition, the trustee has self-
interestedly asserted that the challenge to the
validity of the . . . new trust by . . . Halpern
represents a trust contest by [Espinoza] that could (if
lacking in probable cause) be contrary to the no-
contest provision of the trust as challenged by
[Halpern]. In support of that argument (not yet
alleged in any pleadings or papers on file with the
Court), the trustee has alleged that [Espinoza’s]
existing Response and Joinder reflects such a contest.
7. This supplement therefore expressly
disclaims any such contest to the validity of the trust
or any provisions, while acknowledging that such a
contest exists as a consequence of the Petition by
[Halpern].
8. The provisions of the [new trust]
documents in favor of [Espinoza] are independent of
the donative transfers to Ruiz. [Espinoza] has no
interest in whether the donative transfers to Ruiz
stand or fall, whether or not evidentiary
presumptions of fraud or undue influence (Probate
Code §21360 et seq.) apply. [Espinoza] has never
11
intended to seek relief on that issue and disclaims
any intention to do so.
9. That assurance has been communicated
to the trustee. Despite that, the trustee is
attempting to leverage the trustee’s (erroneous)
argument by offering an agreement on behalf of the
trust not to pursue a no-contest/forfeiture defense
against [Espinoza], if [Espinoza] would agree to
withdraw any support for, or cooperation with,
Halpern’s petition to remove the trustee and to be
appointed as the conservator . . . . (Underlining in
original omitted.)
A few weeks thereafter, Espinoza filed a second supplement
to her Response. The second supplement addressed various
procedural and discovery-related issues, but did not materially
depart from the First Supplement’s substantive allegations.
2. Motion for summary adjudication
In the meantime, Ruiz had on July 10, 2023, moved for
summary adjudication on the question of whether the Response
was a timely filed trust contest. The motion argued Espinoza’s
Response was a direct contest that sought different relief than
Halpern’s trust contest and lacked probable cause due to its
belated filing. The motion was focused solely on whether the
Response was an untimely trust contest and did not argue any
consequence—specifically, disinheritance under the new trust’s
no contest provision—should flow from the resolution of that
question.
12
Espinoza opposed the motion. Among other things, she
argued the Response was not untimely and was not an action to
contest the new trust or any of its provisions; the Response’s “sole
purpose” was to “preserve . . . the donative provisions and other
instructions” made for Espinoza’s benefit. Espinoza also offered
to expressly “disclaim any invalidating trust contest” above and
beyond the disclaimer included in her First Supplement that had
by then already been filed.
The probate court held a hearing and denied the motion for
summary adjudication on procedural grounds (summary
adjudication of the issue presented could not be had and Ruiz, in
any event, had not obtained court permission to file the motion).
3. No contest petition
In August 2023, shortly after moving for summary
adjudication on Espinoza’s Response, Ruiz also petitioned for
instructions enforcing the new trust’s no contest provision
against Espinoza (the “no contest petition”). The verified no
contest petition contended that because Espinoza’s Response
sought relief different than that sought by Halpern’s petition, the
Response was an independent trust contest that lacked probable
cause because it was filed months beyond the statutory deadline.
Espinoza objected to the no contest petition. She argued
the primary purpose of the new trust was to provide for Sandy’s
care if Michael predeceased her and Ruiz contravened that
purpose by dismissing Espinoza as Sandy’s caregiver. Espinoza
also explained she was initially left “confused and uncertain” on
how to respond to Halpern’s petition: Ruiz’s allegations about her
abuse of Sandy “cut very deep,” but it would be “contrary to her
interests” to attack the validity of the new trust because she was
13
not a beneficiary of the original trust. Accordingly, the “focus and
intention of [the Response] was not to invalidate provisions
affecting Ruiz, but rather to shield the provisions benefitting
Espinoza from the breadth of Halpern’s attack—or, at least, to
attempt to do so.” (Underlining in original.) Espinoza reiterated
she did not intend to contest the new trust; she instead sought
only “the enforcement of [the new trust], and especially the
provisions favoring [her] and her ongoing care for [Sandy].”
Espinoza maintained her Response, as clarified by her First
Supplement, “did not . . . seek to invalidate any trust provision”;
it only “commented on claims, issues[,] and contentions asserted
by Halpern.”
4. Motion for judgment on the pleadings
Before the no contest petition was heard, Ruiz additionally
moved for judgment on the pleadings with regard to her no
contest petition and again asserted Espinoza’s Response was an
untimely trust contest. Espinoza opposed this motion too. She
argued, among other things, that Ruiz’s motion improperly
sought relief identical to that sought in the motion for summary
adjudication and failed to discuss the “multiple affirmative
defenses” raised in her objection to the no contest petition.
The probate court denied the motion for judgment on the
pleadings.7 That left Ruiz’s no contest petition as the only matter
7
At the hearing on the motion, however, the probate court
asked the parties to later file supplemental briefs on issues it
considered relevant to a determination of the then still-pending
no contest petition: whether a party can “‘unring the bell,’” i.e.,
“amend [its] way out of [a trust contest]”; whether a party could
escape the consequences of filing a trust contest by having its
14
left for the court to resolve on the question of whether Espinoza
should be disinherited on no contest grounds.
D. The Probate Court Denies the No Contest Petition
In advance of the hearing on Ruiz’s no contest petition,
Espinoza argued in her supplemental brief that, when “[f]airly
read,” the Response was “not the commencement of any
proceeding or claim for relief,” but an effort to defend Michael’s
intentions “specifically in relation to the trust provisions
mandating [Sandy’s] continuing care by [her].” Espinoza
contended her pleading was “defensive in nature” and included
“statements of joinder” with Halpern’s petition only because they
“were in the nature of statements of non-opposition.” The only
goal of the Response was to “preserve” provisions in the new trust
favoring Espinoza.
Espinoza also argued that to the extent there was any
confusion about the Response’s purpose, her First Supplement
(filed during the 21-day safe harbor period following service of
the proposed sanctions motion) clarified she disclaimed any
contest of the new trust’s validity or the validity of the donative
transfers to Ruiz. In addition, Espinoza contended that because
she did not use the “machinery of the law” to thwart Michael’s
intent and because Ruiz, in light of Halpern’s contest, was not
prejudiced by the Response, the Response did not constitute a
attorney file a “motion saying, ‘It was my fault. I made a
mistake. Th[ose contest allegations] shouldn’t have been
included’”; and whether Espinoza had “standing to
challenge . . . Ruiz’s role . . . serving as trustee.”
15
true trust contest; at best, the Response was only a “‘paper
contest’ . . . ‘abandoned without action.’”
Ruiz’s supplemental brief disputed Espinoza’s contentions.
She argued the Response, as originally filed, was a direct trust
contest because Espinoza did not merely join Halpern’s petition
but also added an allegation about a legal presumption of fraud
that was not present in Halpern’s petition. Ruiz also disagreed
that a party could avoid the consequences of a direct contest by
attempting to withdraw it later, as such conduct would defeat the
purpose of a no contest provision. In Ruiz’s view, Espinoza’s First
Supplement to the Response may have shielded her from
sanctions but it did not protect her from disinheritance through
operation of the new trust’s no contest provision. In addition,
Ruiz maintained the sham pleading doctrine prevented Espinoza
from avoiding the effects of her Response by filing an inconsistent
supplement to it. Ruiz also maintained Espinoza’s Response was
not harmless because it prompted discovery-related litigation.
Espinoza filed a reply contending the Response could not
constitute a direct contest because it did not commence the
proceedings and did not seek any affirmative relief. She also
argued that even if the Response could be considered a trust
contest, it was not untimely because the applicable deadline
applies only to pleadings commencing an action; the Response, in
other words, was not untimely because Halpern’s earlier petition
had already disputed the validity of the new trust.
16
The probate court held a hearing on the no contest petition
in September 2024.8 The court found that when the Response
and the First Supplement were considered together, Espinoza did
not knowingly use the “machinery of law” to file a petition to
thwart Michael’s intent or gain an advantage. The court
observed that it would make “no sense” for Espinoza to attempt
to thwart Michael’s intent “because[,] of course[,] if the [new]
trust were invalidated, [Espinoza] is out of the picture entirely
[as a trust beneficiary].” (The court allowed, however, that if
Espinoza had waited longer than three months after filing the
Response to amend it with her supplement, the result “may” be
different.) Because the court found the Response, as clarified by
the First Supplement, was not a trust contest, it denied Ruiz’s no
contest petition without reaching the issue of whether the
Response had been filed without probable cause.9
II. DISCUSSION
We hold the probate court’s order denying the no contest
petition is appealable because the Probate Code expressly
authorizes appeals from orders determining which persons are
entitled to receive distributions. We further hold on the merits—
and strictly construing the no contest provision to avoid forfeiture
8
At the hearing, Ruiz’s attorney agreed with the probate
court that the issue of whether the Response was a trust contest
was “settleable” without an evidentiary hearing.
9
Although the court did not say at the hearing whether the
no contest petition was denied with or without prejudice, the
subsequent minute order stated the petition was denied “without
prejudice.”
17
(Prob. Code,10 § 21312; Burch v. George (1994) 7 Cal.4th 246, 254-
255)—that the probate court’s ruling was not error. Owing to
some clumsy drafting, it is unclear whether the substance and
practical effect of the Response alone was to impugn the validity
of the new trust; obviously, it did not join Halpern in seeking to
invalidate the new trust entirely because that was the only trust
document with bequests to Espinoza, and she maintains the
joinder was intended to accordingly limit any relief Halpern
might obtain on her petition and to allege facts supporting Ruiz’s
removal as trustee. But even if the Response by itself were
viewed as a trust contest, the trial court appropriately considered
the Response in tandem with the First Supplement—filed soon
thereafter and before Ruiz ever argued in court that the new
trust’s no contest provision should be enforced against
Espinoza—to correctly conclude the Response was just a paper
contest that was effectively abandoned such that it did not
warrant enforcement of the no contest provision.11
A. The Order Denying the No Contest Petition Is an
Appealable Order
As a general rule, an order dismissing a claim without
prejudice is not appealable because it is not a final determination
of the parties’ rights. (See, e.g., Kurwa v. Kislinger (2013) 57
Cal.4th 1097, 1106 [the result of “keeping the dismissed count
10
Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Probate Code.
11
In light of our disposition of this appeal, we (like the trial
court) need not consider whether the Response was brought
without probable cause.
18
legally alive” is that there is no finality for appealability
purposes]; accord, Gutkin v. University of Southern California
(2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 967, 975 [voluntary dismissal of
remaining claims without prejudice “could not have the legal
effect of a final judgment, and could not serve to expedite an
appeal” from interim orders].)
Probate proceedings can be an exception to this general
rule. “[U]nlike civil appeals, which generally are governed by the
‘one final judgment’ rule [citation], appeals can properly be taken
under the Probate Code from a variety of orders issued at
different junctures during the administration of a probate
estate.” (Godoy v. Linzner (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 765, 773-774;
see Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(10) [an appeal may be
taken “[f]rom an order made appealable by the Probate Code”];
Prob. Code, §§ 1300-1304 [identifying appealable orders].) As our
highest court has explained, “‘[t]he administration of a decedent’s
estate involves a series of separate proceedings, each of which is
intended to be final.’” (Estate of Callnon (1969) 70 Cal.2d 150,
156, quoting Estate of Loring (1946) 29 Cal.2d 423, 428; accord,
Meyer v. Meyer (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 983, 992.) Consequently,
a probate order may be appealable as a final order “even if it did
not fully dispose of every issue” before the probate court. (Godoy,
supra, at 774; Gridley v. Gridley (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1562,
1573-1574, 1586-1587 & fn. 6.)
The order denying Ruiz’s no contest petition is appealable
because the Probate Code provides that an appeal may be taken
from an order “[d]etermining heirship, succession, entitlement, or
the persons to whom distribution should be made.” (§ 1303, subd.
(f); Esslinger v. Cummins (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 517, 523 [“An
order determining the existence of a power, duty, or right under a
19
trust is appealable”]; see also Estate of Friedman (1979) 100
Cal.App.3d 810, 813 & fn. 2 [order determining that the filing of a
proposed petition would violate the no contest clause was
appealable because the order determined “‘heirship or the
persons to whom distribution should be made or trust property
should pass’”]; Estate of Black (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 582, 585 &
fn. 3 [same].) The probate court’s order denying the no contest
petition determined that by filing her Response (and the
supplements thereto) Espinoza did not jeopardize her beneficial
entitlements under the new trust and it did so conclusively and
on the merits—i.e., it did not leave unresolved or postpone for
future determination any issues related to the applicability of the
no contest provision to Espinoza’s supplemented Response.12
B. The Response at Most Was a “Paper Contest” That
Was Effectively Abandoned
“[A] no contest clause in a trust instrument ‘essentially acts
as a disinheritance device, i.e., if a beneficiary contests or seeks
to impair or invalidate the trust instrument or its provisions, the
beneficiary will be disinherited and thus may not take the gift or
12
That the words “without prejudice” were later added to the
record after the hearing does not alter our analysis as to the
order’s finality and appealability. Because the probate court
decided the no contest petition on the merits and did not—in
either its statements at the hearing or in its minute order—leave
unresolved any issue related to the petition, the addition of
“without prejudice” is reasonably read as clarifying that, in the
event Espinoza filed a further supplement to the Response that
once again appeared to challenge the validity of the new trust or
any of its provisions, Ruiz could file a new no contest petition.
20
devise provided under the instrument.’ [Citation.]” (Donkin v.
Donkin (2013) 58 Cal.4th 412, 422.) Such provisions “have long
been held valid in California.” (Ibid.)
A no contest clause is enforceable against a “direct contest
that is brought without probable cause.”13 (§ 21311, subd. (a)(1).)
A “‘[c]ontest’” is a “pleading filed with the court by a beneficiary
that would result in a penalty under a no contest clause, if the no
contest clause is enforced.” (§ 21310, subd. (a).) A “‘[p]leading’” is
defined as a “petition, complaint, cross-complaint, objection,
answer, response, or claim.” (§ 21310, subd. (d).) A “‘[d]irect
contest’ . . . alleges the invalidity of a protected instrument or one
or more of its terms, based on one or more of” certain enumerated
grounds, including “[m]enace, duress, fraud, or undue influence.”
(§ 21310, subd. (b)(4).)
A court’s application of a no contest clause to a proposed
action is informed by competing policy interests. On the one
hand, “[s]uch clauses promote the public policies of honoring the
intent of the donor and discouraging litigation by persons whose
expectations are frustrated by the donative scheme of the
instrument.” (Donkin, supra, 58 Cal.4th at 422.) On the other
hand, these interests are “[i]n tension with . . . the policy
interests of avoiding forfeitures and promoting full access of the
courts to all relevant information concerning the validity and
effect of a will, trust, or other instrument.” (Ibid.)
13
“[P]robable cause exists if, at the time of filing a contest,
the facts known to the contestant would cause a reasonable
person to believe that there is a reasonable likelihood that the
requested relief will be granted after an opportunity for further
investigation or discovery.” (§ 21311, subd. (b).)
21
Thus, determining “‘[w]hether there has been a “contest”
within the meaning of a particular no-contest clause depends
upon the circumstances of the particular case and the language
used.’ [Citations.] ‘[T]he answer cannot be sought in a vacuum,
but must be gleaned from a consideration of the purposes that
the [testator] sought to attain by the provisions of [his] will.’
[Citation.] Therefore, even though a no contest clause is strictly
construed to avoid forfeiture, it is the testator’s intentions that
control, and a court ‘must not rewrite the [testator’s] will in such
a way as to immunize legal proceedings plainly intended to
frustrate [the testator’s] unequivocally expressed intent from the
reach of the no-contest clause.’ [Citation.]” (Burch, supra, 7
Cal.4th at 254-255; see also § 21312 [“In determining the intent
of the transferor, a no contest clause shall be strictly construed”].)
Courts “look to the substance of th[e] petition and its ‘practical
effect’” and “are not bound by [the petition’s] label.” (Estate of
Stoker (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 236, 241; accord, Urick v. Urick
(2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1182, 1197.)
Precedent additionally observes that “the mere filing of a
paper contest, which has been abandoned without action and has
not been employed to thwart the testator’s expressed wishes,
need [not] be judicially declared a contest. But wherever an
opponent uses the appropriate machinery of the law to the
thwarting of the testator’s expressed wishes, whether he succeed
or fail, his action is a contest.” (Estate of Hite (1909) 155 Cal.
436, 443-444; see also Jacobs-Zorne v. Superior Court (1996) 46
Cal.App.4th 1064, 1076.)
Obviously, Espinoza’s Response is not expressly styled as a
“contest” of the new trust. That contest had been filed by
Halpern. Instead, Ruiz argued Espinoza’s Response should be
22
deemed a contest in substance and practical effect. But that
would be odd when considering, as we must, “‘the circumstances
of the particular case and the language used’” and the maxim
that no contest provisions must be strictly construed. (Burch,
supra, 7 Cal.4th at 254-255.) Only the new trust gave Espinoza
an interest in Michael’s estate: the family home to Espinoza upon
Sandy’s death (if she were an in-home caregiver) or $4,500
monthly payments (if she were not). Espinoza had no beneficial
interest under the terms of the original trust, and there is
accordingly no reason to construe her partial joinder in Halpern’s
petition as joining in Halpern’s effort to contest the validity of the
new trust. It is accordingly a close question whether, looking at
the Response in isolation, it is best read as a “middle-ground”
statement of position (albeit an inartfully articulated one) that
expressly disclaimed Halpern’s allegation that Michael had no
capacity to create the new trust; joined in Halpern’s allegations
that Ruiz was wrongfully withholding the $4,500 payments to
Espinoza; and joined only in the allegations that Ruiz had
exercised undue influence, should be removed as trustee, and at
most the donative provisions in her favor should be invalidated
as a result (rather than the new trust entirely).
The trial court, however, viewed the Response in light of
the First Supplement filed soon thereafter and found that even if
the Response were deemed a trust contest, it was a contest that
had been effectively abandoned via the First Supplement without
invoking the appropriate “machinery of the law” to thwart
Michael’s intent.
That analytical approach is the right one. (Hite, supra, 155
Cal. at 443-444; Jacobs-Zorne, supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at 1076.)
The Response was filed in April 2023. When Ruiz’s attorney
23
surfaced his concern in the sanctions motion served (but never
filed) two months after the Response that it implicated the trust’s
no contest provision as drafted, Espinoza’s attorney promptly (on
July 10, 2023) offered to correct the record to disclaim any intent
to contest the trust’s validity. That offer was rejected, but
Espinoza corrected the record anyway by filing the First
Supplement in July 2023—which disclaimed any challenge to the
new trust’s bequests to Ruiz and which was filed before Ruiz took
the position in court that Espinoza should be disinherited by
operation of the no contest clause.14 The only thing of note that
transpired in the interim was (1) Ruiz’s motion to quash a third-
party subpoena served by Espinoza for Sandy’s medical records
(in an effort to disprove Ruiz’s assertions of substandard care)—
but that was relevant to the separate request to remove Ruiz as
trustee of the trust and to preserve the donative provisions of the
new trust in Espinoza’s favor, and (2) Ruiz’s procedurally
improper summary adjudication motion filed the same day as
Espinoza’s letter offering to correct the record.
Under the circumstances, Espinoza’s Response was at most
a paper contest that had been abandoned. Indeed, as the trial
court appeared to recognize, deeming Espinoza’s effort to explain
why the probate court should preserve the bequests she believed
she was owed under the terms of the new trust (and to express
support for removal of Ruiz as trustee for denying her those
bequests) as grounds to disinherit Espinoza is what would truly
thwart Michael’s intent.
14
Ruiz’s petition for instructions as to the new trust’s no
contest clause was filed on August 15, 2023.
24
DISPOSITION
The order denying the no contest petition is affirmed.
Espinoza is awarded costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
BAKER, J.
We concur:
HOFFSTADT, P. J.
MOOR, J.
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