Filed 6/18/26 In re G.G.Q. CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re G.G.Q., a Person Coming B346318
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
_____________________________ (Los Angeles County
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Super. Ct. No.
DEPARTMENT OF 24CCJP00958B)
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

VICTORIA O.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Tara L. Newman, Judge. Affirmed.
 Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Diane N. Nicola, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Catrina Griffin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.

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The juvenile court asserted dependency jurisdiction over
infant G.G.Q., and removed the infant from both parents’
custody. The infant’s mother now challenges the sufficiency of
the evidence supporting that assertion as well as the sufficiency
of the evidence supporting the court’s finding that reasonable
efforts had been made to prevent the need for removal. We reject
both challenges and affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts
A. The family
Victoria O. (mother) and Jose G.Q. (father) have one child
together—G.G.Q. (born December 2024). Mother has another
child, Logan A. (born March 2023), with another man. Father
also has another child, Christopher G. (born February 2017), with
another woman.1 Mother is currently 21 years old; father is 30.
B. Violence and control in the household
Father has verbally or physically abused mother as well as
Logan or Christopher on at least three occasions. In February
2024, father struck mother in the face, cutting her lip; he also
scratched Logan’s face. In March 2024, he pulled mother’s hair,

1 Logan and Christopher are the subjects of separate
dependency proceedings that are not part of this appeal.

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pushed her, and threw her onto the bed where Logan was sitting;
in the same incident, he grabbed Logan, threw an empty
Gatorade bottle at Logan, spat on him, and caused a bruise to
Logan’s eye. In May 2024, father struck mother with an open
hand all over her body, and hit Christopher in the chest with an
open hand. Mother did not report any of these incidents to law
enforcement.
Father refers to mother as “a bitch” and calls her “stupid”
and “dumb.” He controls mother’s access to family and friends.
He only allows mother to contact family or friends using his cell
phone, and only he knows the code to access it. As a result,
mother has been isolated from her family and friends.
Mother has acknowledged that her relationship with father
is “toxic,” but has no intention of ending the relationship because
“she loves him.” She blamed father’s violence toward Logan as
due to father being jealous of the infant; mother initially denied
any violence after March 2024, but then admitted that the May
2024 incident occurred after being confronted about it, and
thereafter immediately recanted that admission. Father felt that
his relationship with mother was “good,” that mother had only
“accused him” of domestic violence, and that he was the victim of
persecution by social workers. Father also had instructed
Christopher “‘not to say anything’” when asked about the May
2024 incident Christopher witnessed.
C. Exertion of juvenile dependency jurisdiction
over Logan
In May 2024, the juvenile court exerted dependency
jurisdiction over Logan, finding that the February 2024 and
March 2024 incidents placed Logan “at risk of serious physical
harm” (thereby warranting jurisdiction under Welfare and

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Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1)).2 The court also
removed Logan from mother’s custody, and ordered her to
participate in a domestic violence support group for victims, as
well as individual counseling to address issues in the case,
including co-dependency and the impact of domestic violence on
children. The court also issued a stay-away order prohibiting
contact between father and Logan. At Logan’s six-month review
hearing in November 2024, the juvenile court found that mother
had only partially complied with her court-ordered reunification
plan.
D. Birth of G.G.Q.
In December 2024, mother gave birth to G.G.Q.
II. Procedural Background
On January 29, 2025, and soon after learning of G.G.Q.’s
birth, the Department filed a petition seeking to have the
juvenile court exert dependency jurisdiction over G.G.Q. Similar
to the petition in Logan’s case, the petition alleged that the
February 2024 and March 2024 incidents placed G.G.Q. at
“substantial risk of serious physical harm” (thereby warranting
jurisdiction pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j)). The
petition more specifically alleged two sets of otherwise identical
allegations under subdivision (b) and (j)—namely, (1) one set
based on father’s “physical abuse” “against mother” (and
“mother’s” consequent “failure to protect” G.G.Q.) and (2) another
set based on father’s “physical abuse” of Logan (and “mother’s”
consequent “failure to protect” G.G.Q.).
On March 20, 2025, the juvenile court held a jurisdiction
and disposition hearing. The court sustained the above-

2 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.

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enumerated counts.3 The court then removed G.G.Q. from both
parents, finding that leaving G.G.Q. in the parents’ home would
create substantial danger to G.G.Q’s physical and emotional well-
being, and that “the Department . . . made reasonable efforts to
prevent removal but there are no services available to prevent
further detention.” The court ordered family reunification
services for mother and father, as well as monitored visits with
G.G.Q.
Mother timely filed this appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. Exertion of Jurisdiction Over G.G.Q.
Mother argues that the juvenile court’s exertion of
dependency jurisdiction over G.G.Q. is not supported by the
record.
As a threshold matter, the Department urges that we need
not address mother’s challenge because it is moot. Specifically,
the Department contends that mother’s opening brief challenges
only the sufficiency of the evidence underlying the set of
allegations pertaining to father’s physical abuse against mother,
and that mother’s failure to attack the set of allegations
pertaining to father’s physical abuse of Logan means that there is
an independently sufficient basis to sustain jurisdiction, such
that any relief we might grant on appeal would not affect the
juvenile court’s jurisdiction over G.G.Q. (See In re D.P. (2023) 14

3 The Department had also alleged that the history of
domestic violence and physical abuse of Logan warranted
jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (a), but the court
struck those allegations because G.G.Q. “was not born and/or at
risk of suffering serious physical harm inflicted non-accidentally
during [the February and March 2024] incidents.”

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Cal.5th 266, 283 [“‘“[A]s long as there is one unassailable
jurisdictional finding, it is immaterial that another might be
inappropriate”’”].) We reject this argument. Both sets of
allegations rest on the same factual premise (that is, the
February 2024 and March 2024 incidents), and mother’s
arguments on appeal address whether G.G.Q. remains at risk of
physical harm due to those incidents; consequently, mother is
effectively and necessarily challenging all of the allegations,
regardless of whether she specifically mentioned the allegations
pertaining to the physical abuse of Logan.4
Section 300, subdivision (b) authorizes the exertion of
dependency jurisdiction where a child “has suffered, or there is a
substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm
or illness, as a result of” “[t]he failure or inability of the child’s
parent . . . to adequately supervise or protect the child.” (§ 300,
subd. (b)(1)(A).) Section 300, subdivision (j), authorizes the
exertion of dependency jurisdiction over a child if (1) “[t]he child’s
sibling has been abused or neglected” and (2) “there is a
substantial risk that the child will be abused or neglected.” (§
300, subd. (j); In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 774.) We review
the juvenile court’s finding of jurisdiction for substantial
evidence. (I.J., at p. 773.) In so doing, we review the record in
the light most favorable to the court’s findings, drawing all
reasonable inferences from the evidence to support those
findings. (Ibid.)
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s exertion

4 Father’s failure to appeal the jurisdictional finding leaves
jurisdiction intact. Although the Department noted that father
did not appeal, it does not seek a finding of mootness on that
basis.

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of jurisdiction over G.G.Q. under subdivisions (b) and (j) of
section 300. There is sufficient evidence that Logan was abused
or neglected because he was exposed to domestic violence—and
himself the victim of such violence—during the February 2024,
and March 2024 incidents. Exposing a child to domestic
violence can constitute a failure to protect a child from the risk of
serious physical injury under subdivision (b). (E.g., In re
L.O. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 227, 238; In re R.C. (2012) 210
Cal.App.4th 930, 941.) There is also sufficient evidence that
G.G.Q. is at substantial risk of being exposed to domestic violence
(and hence abused or neglected). Mother and father continue to
reside together; father continued to engage in domestic violence
in May 2024 notwithstanding the classes he attended regarding
domestic violence; mother continues to be isolated (and
unwilling—and perhaps unable—to contact police if subjected to
domestic violence), and both parents have minimized or refused
to acknowledge past incidents of domestic violence. (In re
A.F. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 283, 293 [‘“[D]enial is a factor often
relevant to determining whether persons are likely to modify
their behavior in the future without court supervision’”].) In
other words, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s
finding that the same dynamic that gave rise to domestic violence
during the February 2024 and March 2024 incidents persists, as
that dynamic resulted in further violence in May 2024. Although
G.G.Q. (unlike Logan) has yet to be physically harmed by father’s
domestic violence and by mother’s failure to protect her from that
violence, a juvenile court “need not wait until a child is seriously
abused or injured to assume jurisdiction.” (In re Kadence P.
(2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1376, 1383, disapproved on another
ground in In re N.R. (2023) 15 Cal.5th 520, 560, fn. 18.)

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 Mother resists this conclusion. She argues that there was
but a “single incident” of domestic violence, and that no further
domestic violence incidents have been reported. This argument
misstates the record, which supports a finding of three prior
incidents of domestic violence. Mother urges that both she and
father attended classes and counseling; this is true, but the
record also establishes that neither parent recalled the content of
the classes, that the teachers and counselors found the parents
resistant to the teachings, and that the parents continue to deny
or minimize father’s past abuse. Mother notes that G.G.Q. is
otherwise “well cared for” and asserts that parents’ failure to be
“forthcoming” about the prior incidents translates into, at most, a
“speculative” risk of harm. But Logan was also otherwise well
cared for at the time he was physically assaulted by father; what
is more, the law establishes that minimization and denial are
relevant to assessing risk, and in conjunction with the other
evidence adduced in this case, are sufficient to establish that
G.G.Q. remains at substantial risk of serious physical harm.
II. Reasonable Efforts to Prevent Removal
Mother argues that the juvenile court’s finding that
reasonable efforts were made to prevent removal is not supported
by the record.
Upon exerting dependency jurisdiction over a child, a
juvenile court may also remove the child from her parent if it
finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) “[t]here is or
would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety,
protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the [child] if the
[child] were returned home,” and (2) “there are no reasonable
means” short of removal “by which the [child’s] physical health
can be protected.” (§ 361, subd. (c)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, rule

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5.695(c)(1) [required findings for removal].) To effectuate the
second requirement, “[t]he court shall make a determination as to
whether reasonable efforts were made to prevent or to eliminate
the need for removal of the [child] from their home.” (§ 361, subd.
(e).) For these purposes, the Department’s efforts need only be
“reasonable under the circumstances” and “based on the
particular circumstances of a case”; they need not be “perfect” or
“‘the best that might be provided in an ideal world.’” (In re H.E.
(2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 710, 725; In re Amy M. (1991) 232
Cal.App.3d 849, 856; Katie V. v. Superior Court (2005) 130
Cal.App.4th 586, 598-599.) To provide a means of appellate
review, “[t]he court shall [also] state the facts on which the
decision to remove the [child] is based.” (§ 361, subd. (e).)
Because the court’s “reasonable efforts” finding is part of its
overall ruling on removal, our role is a limited one: We ask only
“whether substantial evidence” “supports the [finding],” and do so
viewing “the record in the light most favorable to th[at finding].”
(In re A.E. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 820, 826.)
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding,
by clear and convincing evidence, that reasonable efforts were
made to eliminate the need to remove G.G.Q. from her home.
The Department continued to offer mother and father classes
aimed at addressing the domestic violence between the parents
and the risks arising therefrom (which, if effective, would have
obviated the need for either parent to move away), the
Department explored whether mother could move to a shelter
with G.G.Q., and the Department explored whether father could
move out of the family home so that mother could remain there
with G.G.Q. The classes did not obviate the risk to G.G.Q.
because, as noted above, neither father nor mother recalled the

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content of the classes nor modified their behavior; father
prohibited mother from moving to a shelter; and father refused to
move out of the family home.
Mother resists this conclusion. She argues that the
Department did not consider whether to have father move out of
the family home, but this argument ignores that the Department
did explore this possibility. She relatedly argues that the
Department did not consider that father was beginning to allow
mother to access a phone more often and took the incident where
it observed father controlling mother’s access to the phone “out of
context,” but the court was within its discretion to credit the
Department’s firsthand observations over mother’s counsel’s
representations. Mother argues that the parents engaged in
classes and other services, but this argument ignores that these
activities did not meaningfully change the parents’ behavior (and
thus did not reduce the risk of harm to G.G.Q. that would have
prevented the need for removal). Mother argues that there is no
evidence that the parents violated the safety plan (which was to
have a violence-free home) because they have not had another
domestic violence incident since May 2024, but this does not show
that the Department’s efforts were unreasonable. Mother argues
that the juvenile court did not state a factual basis for its finding
that the Department made reasonable efforts to prevent removal,
but section 361 requires no such specific finding and the Rules of
Court implementing that statute only require the juvenile court
to make one of two findings regarding the Department’s
“reasonable efforts”: “Reasonable efforts have been made to
prevent removal” or “Reasonable efforts have not been made to
prevent removal.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.695(d).) The court
did so here. No further factual elucidation is required, so

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mother’s complaint that this finding is “boilerplate” is of no
moment. And even if it were, the court’s failure to set forth those
facts is harmless because the record contains the facts that
support the court’s finding.5

5 To the extent that mother’s contention that the juvenile
court did not “state on the record the reasoning behind a finding
that continued detention was necessary” is meant to be an
independent challenge to the trial court’s failure to explain the
basis for its removal ruling (as opposed to the failure to explain
the reasonable efforts finding), that contention lacks merit
because the court did explain why “the risk [to G.G.Q.] remains”
(and hence why continued detention is necessary)—namely,
because the parent’s relationship is “toxic,” because father
continues to “exhibit a controlling dynamic over [] mother,”
because mother “does not take any steps to remove herself from
the situation or protect herself,” such that father’s “violent
conduct” “endanger[s]” G.G.Q.

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 DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s jurisdiction and disposition orders are
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

______________________, P. J.
HOFFSTADT

We concur:

_________________________, J.
BAKER

_________________________, J.
KIM (D.)

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