Filed 6/18/26 Moussazadeh v. Integrative Surgical Associates Group CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

BOBBY BAKHTIAR B346388, B349540
MOUSSAZADEH et al.,
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct.
Cross-complainants and No. 24STCV18438)
Appellants,

v.

INTEGRATIVE SURGICAL
ASSOCIATES GROUP LLC
et al.,

Cross-defendants and
Respondents.

APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Joseph Lipner, Judge. Affirmed; dismissed.
Novian & Novian, Farhad Novian and Andrew B. Goodman
for Cross-complainants and Appellants.
Blank Rome, Arash Beral, Saam Takaloo, and Ryan Coy for
Cross-defendants and Respondents.
 INTRODUCTION

Bobby Bakhtiar Moussazadeh, M.D., and B Moussazadeh,
A Medical Corporation (collectively, Moussazadeh) appeal from
the trial court’s order granting a motion by Integrative Surgical
Associates Group LLC, Farnad Medical Corporation, and
Shahbaz Farnad, M.D. (collectively, Farnad) to strike
Moussazadeh’s cross-complaint under Code of Civil Procedure
section 425.16 (commonly known as an anti-SLAPP motion).1
Because Moussazadeh’s causes of action arose from statements
by Dr. Farnad made in connection with anticipated litigation and
were barred by the litigation privilege, we affirm the order
granting the special motion to strike. We dismiss Moussazadeh’s
appeal from a nonappealable order granting Farnad’s motion for
attorneys’ fees under section 425.16, subdivision (c).

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Farnad Sues Moussazadeh
Dr. Farnad owned and operated Integrative Surgical
Associates Group LLC (ISAG), a surgical center for outpatient
procedures, and provided anesthesia services through Farnad
Medical Corporation (FMC). Dr. Moussazadeh provided pain
management treatment, including injections, to patients who
were referred by personal injury attorneys.
In 2020 Dr. Farnad agreed to allow Dr. Moussazadeh to
treat patients at ISAG. The two doctors agreed Dr. Moussazadeh

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.

2
would submit bills under ISAG’s national provider identification
(NPI) number and tax identification number.2 The bills included
separate charges for Dr. Moussazadeh’s services, for ISAG’s
services, and, if necessary, for FMC’s anesthesia services.
Because Dr. Moussazadeh’s patients were personal injury
plaintiffs, he, ISAG, and FMC were paid “on a lien basis,”
meaning they were not paid until the patient received a judgment
in, or settlement of, the patient’s personal injury matter.
Dr. Farnad agreed to allow Dr. Moussazadeh to handle the billing
and to negotiate settlement of liens with the personal injury
attorneys. Dr. Moussazadeh agreed to pay ISAG advances
(which Dr. Moussazadeh characterized as “rent”) to cover some of
ISAG’s expenses, which would be credited to Dr. Moussazadeh
when lien payments were received.
In August 2023 Dr. Farnad, citing patient safety concerns,
revoked Dr. Moussazadeh’s privileges to treat patients at ISAG.
Dr. Farnad claimed that in December 2023 he received
documents showing Dr. Moussazadeh had billed insurance
companies for services he did not perform. After investigating,
Dr. Farnad discovered Dr. Moussazadeh had billed for other
services he did not perform. Dr. Farnad also discovered that, in
many cases, Dr. Moussazadeh did not pay Dr. Farnad for ISAG’s
and FMC’s shares of the fees.

2 NPI numbers “are unique identifiers issued by the Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services to healthcare providers such
as doctors and medical clinics.” (U.S. v. Gonzalez (6th Cir. 2014)
560 Fed.Appx. 554, 556; see In re Shapow (Bankr. C.D.Cal. 2019)
599 B.R. 51, 72 [an NPI is a “unique number required for a
health care provider to bill an insurance company”].)

3
 In December 2023 counsel for Dr. Farnad sent
Dr. Moussazadeh a demand letter. After several months of
negotiations the parties participated in mediation, but were
unable to settle their dispute.
In July 2024 ISAG and FMC filed this action against
Moussazadeh. In their operative first amended complaint they
alleged that Moussazadeh fraudulently billed for services
Dr. Moussazadeh never performed at ISAG and that
Moussazadeh embezzled millions of dollars from ISAG. ISAG
and FMC asserted causes of action for accounting, breach of
fiduciary duty, breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, goods and services rendered, money had
and received, open book account, unjust enrichment, conversion,
violation of Penal Code section 496 and Business and Professions
Code section 17200 et seq., and aiding and abetting.

B. Moussazadeh Files a Cross-complaint
In November 2024 Moussazadeh filed a cross-complaint
against ISAG, FMC, and Dr. Farnad. Moussazadeh alleged that,
after Dr. Farnad revoked Dr. Moussazadeh’s privileges to treat
patients at ISAG, Dr. Farnad urged him to refer his patients to
Dr. Farnad for treatment and offered to take over collecting liens.
Moussazadeh alleged that when Dr. Moussazadeh refused and
began treating patients at a different surgery center, Dr. Farnad
“began efforts to actively and maliciously poach Moussazadeh’s
business.”
Moussazadeh alleged Dr. Farnad contacted personal injury
attorneys with whom Dr. Moussazadeh worked and tried to
convince them to stop working with Dr. Moussazadeh and to send
their patients to Dr. Farnad instead. Moussazadeh alleged

4
Dr. Farnad defamed Dr. Moussazadeh by telling personal injury
attorneys that Dr. Moussazadeh was “defrauding insurance
companies for the National Basketball Association” and that
Dr. Moussazadeh “would tell patients that if they did not want an
actual injection, that they could come by [his] office and he would
purport to give them an injection.” Moussazadeh asserted causes
of action for defamation, intentional interference with prospective
economic advantage, and violation of Business and Professions
Code section 17200.

C. The Trial Court Grants Farnad’s Special Motion To
Strike Under Section 425.16
In January 2025 Farnad filed a special motion to strike
Moussazadeh’s cross-complaint. Farnad argued that the cross-
complaint was based on Dr. Farnad’s protected prelitigation
communications regarding Dr. Moussazadeh’s fraudulent billing
and insurance claims and that the litigation privilege barred all
of Moussazadeh’s causes of action.
The trial court granted the motion. On the first step of the
analysis under section 425.16, the court ruled Dr. Farnad’s
allegedly defamatory communications with personal injury
attorneys “occurred as part of the collective effort by [Farnad]
and [Moussazadeh] to resolve [Farnad’s] claims prior to [Farnad]
filing this lawsuit.” Therefore, the court ruled, Moussazadeh’s
cross-complaint arose from protected activity. On the second step
of the analysis, the court ruled Moussazadeh did not show a
probability of success because the litigation privilege barred his
causes of action. The trial court also granted Farnad’s motion for
attorneys’ fees and awarded Farnad $45,600.90 in fees and costs.

5
Moussazadeh timely appealed from the orders granting the
special motion to strike and the motion for attorneys’ fees.

DISCUSSION

A. Section 425.16
Section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1), states a “cause of action
against a person arising from any act of that person in
furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under
the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in
connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion
to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has
established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will
prevail on the claim.” Section 425.16, subdivision (e), provides an
“‘act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech
under the United States or California Constitution in connection
with a public issue’ includes: (1) any written or oral statement or
writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial
proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law”
and “(2) any written or oral statement or writing made in
connection with an issue under consideration or review by a
legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official
proceeding authorized by law.” “Section 425.16 ‘provides a
procedure for weeding out, at an early stage, meritless claims
arising from protected activity.’” (Newport Harbor Ventures, LLC
v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism (2018) 4 Cal.5th 637, 642;
see Clapkin v. Levin (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 222, 231.)
Courts follow a two-step process in evaluating special
motions to strike under section 425.16. “First, ‘the moving
defendant bears the burden of establishing that the challenged

6
allegations or claims “aris[e] from” protected activity in which the
defendant has engaged.’ [Citation.] Second, for each claim that
does arise from protected activity, the plaintiff must show the
claim has ‘at least “minimal merit.”’ [Citation.] If the plaintiff
cannot make this showing, the court will strike the claim.”
(Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009;
see Medallion Film LLC v. Loeb & Loeb LLP (2024)
100 Cal.App.5th 1272, 1283-1284.) We review de novo an order
granting or denying a special motion to strike under
section 425.16. (Bonni, at p. 1009; Clapkin v. Levin, supra,
119 Cal.App.5th at p. 231.)

B. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Granting Farnad’s
Special Motion To Strike Moussazadeh’s Cross-
complaint

1. Moussazadeh’s Cross-complaint Arose Out of
Protected Activity
“Section 425.16 protects litigation-related activity, i.e., ‘any
written or oral statement or writing made before a . . . judicial
proceeding’ or ‘in connection with an issue under consideration or
review by a . . . judicial body.’” (Cocoa AJ Holdings, LLC v.
Schneider (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 980, 991; see § 425.16,
subd. (e)(1) & (2).) A “statement or writing is ‘made “in
connection with”’ litigation under section 425.16(e)(2)—including
anticipated litigation—‘if it relates to the substantive issues in
the litigation and is directed to persons having some interest in
the litigation.’” (Bassi v. Bassi (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 1080,
1096; see Neville v. Chudacoff (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1255,
1266.)

7
 To determine whether a cause of action arises from
protected activity, we “‘consider the elements of the challenged
claim and what actions by the defendant supply those elements
and consequently form the basis for liability.’” (Bonni v.
St. Joseph Health System, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1009; see
Callister v. James B. Church & Associates, P.C. (2025)
108 Cal.App.5th 185, 193.) The elements of a defamation cause
of action are “‘(a) a publication that is (b) false, (c) defamatory,
and (d) unprivileged, and that (e) has a natural tendency to
injure or that causes special damage.’” (Taus v. Loftus (2007)
40 Cal.4th 683, 720; accord, Cocoa AJ Holdings, LLC v.
Schneider, supra, 115 Cal.App.5th at p. 997.) Moussazadeh
alleged Dr. Farnad made defamatory statements to personal
injury attorneys, including statements that Moussazadeh was
defrauding insurance companies and that Dr. Moussazadeh told
patients that, if they came to Moussazadeh’s office, “he would
purport to give them an injection.” The causes of action for
intentional interference with prospective economic advantage
and unfair business practices were based on the same allegations
as the defamation cause of action.
We also consider the evidence the parties submitted. (See
City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 79 [“In deciding
whether the ‘arising from’ requirement is met, a court considers
‘the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the
facts upon which the liability or defense is based.’”].)
Moussazadeh submitted the declaration of Dennis Behdadnia,
a personal injury attorney who referred clients to
Dr. Moussazadeh.3 Behdadnia stated that he spoke by phone

3 Moussazadeh submitted an unsigned declaration by
Behdadnia and sought an order under section 425.16,

8
with Dr. Farnad on March 5, 2024, that Dr. Farnad told
Behdadnia and his two partners that Dr. Moussazadeh “was
committing fraud and to be careful,” and that, after the
conversation, Behdadnia’s office has not referred any patients to
Dr. Moussazadeh. Behdadnia followed up with an email to
Dr. Farnad stating: “Pleasure speaking with you. Please forward
the list so we can take immediate action to preserve and
negotiate the liens for your facilities directly with you.” The next
day Dr. Farnad sent Behdadnia a list of Behdadnia’s clients who
were treated at Dr. Farnad’s facility and asked for “a case status
update” and documents. Dr. Farnad also asked Behdadnia to
inform him of any clients not on the list who were treated at
Dr. Farnad’s facility so Dr. Farnad could “ensure patients were
indeed treated at our facility for the dates of service reported.”
Dr. Farnad emailed Behdadnia again in July 2024, stating
that Behdadnia and Dr. Moussazadeh incorrectly told a relative
of Dr. Farnad that Dr. Farnad was “holding up” settlement
negotiations in the relative’s case. Dr. Farnad encouraged
Behdadnia “to move forward with [the] settlement without
entangling me further with your foggy relationship with
Dr. Moussazadeh.” Behdadnia stated he “interpreted
[Dr.] Farnad’s statement as accusing” Behdadnia and his
partners “of engaging in fraud with” Dr. Moussazadeh.
Dr. Farnad stated in his declaration that
Dr. Moussazadeh’s fraudulent billing put him at a “high risk of

subdivision (g), allowing Moussazadeh to take Behdadnia’s
deposition to verify the facts in the unsigned declaration. The
parties stipulated that, for purposes of the special motion to
strike, the facts in Behdadnia’s unsigned declaration were
accurate.

9
legal exposure and reputational harm” because all charges for
Dr. Moussazadeh’s work at ISAG were submitted under ISAG’s
NPI and tax identification numbers. Dr. Farnad also stated he
“retained counsel to prosecute [his] claims in 2023.” In addition,
Farnad submitted correspondence between the parties, including
a December 2023 letter counsel for Dr. Farnad sent
Dr. Moussazadeh stating Dr. Moussazadeh had engaged “in a
systematic scheme to defraud Dr. Farnad” and insurers. Counsel
for Dr. Farnad demanded, among other things, that
Dr. Moussazadeh “cease and desist negotiating or communicating
with patients’ counsel” about settling or resolving liens for
services performed at ISAG and that he “fully cede such right to
Dr. Farnad or his designees.” In the following weeks counsel for
Dr. Farnad sought information from Dr. Moussazadeh regarding
the status of liens for services provided at ISAG and the identity
of personal injury attorneys who represented Dr. Moussazadeh’s
patients.
On January 30, 2024 Dr. Moussazadeh’s attorney agreed to
the content of a letter to be sent to personal injury attorneys
(including Behdadnia) whose clients were treated at ISAG. The
letter stated: “It has recently come to the attention of
[Dr. Farnad, ISAG, and FMC] that certain information
regarding . . . claims submitted by Dr. Moussazadeh may have
contained erroneous information generated by his office about
specific procedures or dates of procedures undertaken at” ISAG.
The letter stated any communications regarding claims for
services provided by ISAG or FMC should be administered and
settled through Dr. Farnad’s office, not with Dr. Moussazadeh.
Counsel for Dr. Farnad attached a statement by counsel for
Dr. Moussazadeh confirming “Dr. Moussazadeh has no objection

10
to your exclusive communications with” Dr. Farnad’s office
regarding the claims.
The evidence showed Dr. Farnad made the allegedly
defamatory statements to personal injury attorneys while
investigating claims Dr. Moussazadeh submitted for services
performed at ISAG. Because Dr. Farnad’s statements related to
the substantive issues in his dispute with Dr. Moussazadeh, and
because the personal injury attorneys had an interest in that
dispute, the statements were made in connection with
anticipated litigation under section 425.16, subd. (e)(2). (See
Bassi v. Bassi, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 1096; Neville v.
Chudacoff, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 1266.) First, there is
little dispute that, when Dr. Farnad contacted Behdadnia in
March 2024, Dr. Farnad was seriously considering suing
Dr. Moussazadeh. (See People ex rel. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Rubin
(2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 493, 499 [prelitigation communications are
protected activity under section 425.16 “if those communications
are ‘relate[d] to litigation that is contemplated in good faith and
under serious consideration’”]; see also Geragos v. Abelyan (2023)
88 Cal.App.5th 1005, 1023 [“communications sent in anticipation
of litigation . . . constitute legitimate speech or petitioning
activity protected under” section 425.16].) In December 2023
Dr. Farnad retained counsel, who wrote a letter threatening
litigation against Dr. Moussazadeh and urging him “to seek
competent counsel.” Counsel for Dr. Farnad communicated with
Dr. Moussazadeh’s attorney throughout January and
February 2024, demanding information and threatening to sue if
Dr. Moussazadeh did not provide it. And in March 2024 the
parties signed a tolling agreement and discussed possible
mediators.

11
 Second, Dr. Farnad’s statements related to the substantive
issues in the litigation. Moussazadeh identified the following
defamatory statements (the first two in the cross-complaint and
the others in Behdadnia’s declaration): (1) Dr. Farnad told
personal injury attorneys that Dr. Moussazadeh was defrauding
the National Basketball Association’s insurance company;
(2) Dr. Farnad told personal injury attorneys that
Dr. Moussazadeh was billing for injections he did not give;
(3) Dr. Farnad told Behdadnia that Dr. Moussazadeh “was
committing fraud and to be careful”; and (4) in a letter to
Behdadnia, Dr. Farnad described Behdadnia’s relationship with
Dr. Moussazadeh as “foggy.” All of those statements related to
the substantive issues in Dr. Farnad’s litigation against
Dr. Moussazadeh, where Farnad alleged that Dr. Moussazadeh
“fraudulently billed for services” he did not perform at ISAG and
that he “secretly pocket[ed]” ISAG’s share of payments.
The email exchange between Dr. Farnad and Behdadnia
following their March 5, 2024 conversation provided context for
Dr. Farnad’s statements. Dr. Farnad asked Behdadnia for
information and documents regarding Behdadnia’s clients who
were treated at ISAG, including “facility and anesthesia related
claims, reports, and bills” and “lien negotiation documentation
and lien payments for facility/anesthesia services.” The
information and documents Dr. Farnad sought were relevant to
investigating whether Dr. Moussazadeh billed for services he did
not provide and whether Dr. Moussazadeh withheld Dr. Farnad’s
portion of lien payments. (See Trinity Risk Management, LLC v.
Simplified Labor Staffing Solutions, Inc. (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th
995, 1005 [company’s email to its insurance providers “asking for
documents and posing questions about the workers’

12
compensation insurance policy” “operated as an informal request
for information and documents” and was a communication “made
in preparation for or in anticipation of litigation”].)
In his March 6, 2024 email Dr. Farnad also asked
Behdadnia to “please ensure ALL lien negotiations and
settlement payments for [ISAG] and [FMC] are addressed
directly to me.” By asking Behdadnia to deal directly with
Dr. Farnad, not Dr. Moussazadeh, Dr. Farnad was attempting to
mitigate his losses by preventing Dr. Moussazadeh from taking
Dr. Farnad’s share of future payments.4 These emails reveal why
Dr. Farnad gave Behdadnia an explanation for his requests:
Dr. Farnad suspected Dr. Moussazadeh was committing fraud.
(See Neville v. Chudacoff, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1267-
1268 [company’s letter to customers accusing a former employee
of misappropriating trade secrets and suggesting the customers
not do business with the former employee arose from protected
activity because the letter “constituted an attempt to prevent
further misuse of [the company’s] proprietary information, and
thereby mitigate [its] “potential damage”].)
Third, the personal injury attorneys to whom Dr. Farnad
made the allegedly defamatory statements were “‘persons having
some interest in the litigation.’” (Bassi v. Bassi, supra,
101 Cal.App.5th at p. 1096.) Dr. Farnad accused
Dr. Moussazadeh of improperly collecting payments through lien
recoveries from settlements and judgments the attorneys
obtained for their clients. The personal injury attorneys were

4 On January 23, 2024 Dr. Farnad’s attorney sent
Dr. Moussazadeh’s attorney an email stating that
Dr. Moussazadeh “has been stealing our money even during the
last thirty days” and that it “just happened again last week.”

13
parties to the lien settlement transactions with Dr. Moussazadeh
and Dr. Farnad. Indeed, some of the attorneys were potential
witnesses. For example, Farnad alleged that an attorney for one
of Dr. Moussazadeh’s patients told Dr. Farnad that the attorney
gave Dr. Moussazadeh a $20,000 check for services performed at
ISAG, but that Dr. Moussazadeh never gave Dr. Farnad ISAG’s
share of that payment.
Neville v. Chudacoff, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th 1255 is
instructive. In that case a company fired an employee for
violating his employment agreement by misappropriating the
company’s customer lists and soliciting its customers. (Id. at
p. 1259.) The company’s attorney wrote its customers a letter
stating the former employee was violating his employment
agreement by contacting customers and suggested the customers
“have no further dealings” with the employee. (Id. at p. 1260.)
Several months later the company sued the former employee,
who filed a cross-complaint for defamation. (Ibid.) The court in
Neville affirmed an order granting the company’s special motion
to strike under section 425.16. The court held the company’s
letter “related directly to [the company’s] claims for breach of
contract and misappropriation of trade secrets” and “was directed
to [the company’s] current and former customers—persons whom
[the company] reasonably could believe had an interest in the
dispute as potential witnesses to, or unwitting participants in,
[the former employee’s] alleged misconduct.” (Neville, at
pp. 1267-1268.) Dr. Farnad could reasonably have believed the
personal injury attorneys in this case, like the customers in
Neville, had an interest in the dispute between Dr. Farnad and
Dr. Moussazadeh as potential witnesses to, or unwitting
participants in, Dr. Moussazadeh’s alleged misconduct. (See

14
Contemporary Services Corp. v. Staff Pro Inc. (2007)
152 Cal.App.4th 1043, 1051, 1055 [section 425.16 applied to the
defendant’s allegedly defamatory statements about the plaintiff
in an email to mutual customers, “who had some involvement in
the parties’ litigation”].)
Moussazadeh argues the trial court erred in relying on
prelitigation correspondence not identified in the cross-complaint
and concluding, based on that correspondence, Dr. Moussazadeh
“agreed to designate” Dr. Farnad “as the point [person] for
communication with the personal injury attorneys regarding the
allegedly faulty billing items.” Moussazadeh argues the “trial
court essentially redrafted Moussazadeh’s cross-complaint to
interpret it as including this correspondence.” The trial court did
not redraft anything. The court properly relied on the evidence
submitted by the parties, which (as discussed) provided context
for the defamatory statements Moussazadeh alleged in the cross-
complaint. (See Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019)
7 Cal.5th 871, 887 [on the first step of the analysis under
section 425.16 “courts must look beyond the pleadings to consider
any party evidentiary submissions as well”].)
Moussazadeh relies on two cases where courts held
statements were not sufficiently connected to litigation. Both
cases are distinguishable. In Paul v. Friedman (2002)
95 Cal.App.4th 853 a securities broker alleged an attorney
representing the broker’s former clients in an arbitration
conducted an “unreasonably intrusive” investigation into the
broker’s personal life and disclosed “embarrassing private facts
about [the broker] to clients and prospective clients.” (Id. at
p. 857.) We stated the “issues actually under review by the
arbitrators bore no relationship to the allegations in [the

15
broker’s] lawsuit.” (Id. at p. 868.) We held that, though the
attorney’s investigation and disclosure had a “remote” connection
to the arbitration, section 425.16 protects only those statements
or writings with “a connection to an issue under review in a
proceeding, and not merely to a proceeding.” (Paul, at pp. 866,
868.) Paul does not apply here, where Dr. Farnad stated
Dr. Moussazadeh was committing fraud—one of the key issues in
his dispute with Dr. Moussazadeh.
Bassi v. Bassi, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th 1080 is likewise
distinguishable. In Bassi the court affirmed the trial court’s
order denying an ex-wife’s special motion to strike her
ex-husband’s petition for a domestic violence restraining order.
(Id. at pp. 1087-1088.) The court held the ex-wife’s emails
describing the allegedly unethical behavior of the ex-husband’s
former family law attorney and stating the ex-husband’s
girlfriend worked for “mobsters” were “largely or wholly
composed of assertions and innuendo that bear no clear relation
to [the wife’s] anticipated RICO action.” (Id. at pp. 1098-1099.)
Here, despite Moussazadeh’s assertion Dr. Farnad’s “defamatory
statements to non-party personal injury attorneys offered no
information on any substantive issue in his ultimate Complaint,”
Dr. Farnad’s statements, as discussed, concerned one of the main
issues in the anticipated litigation: whether Dr. Moussazadeh
billed for services he did not provide.
Next, Moussazadeh argues Dr. Farnad’s statements
Dr. Moussazadeh was committing fraud were irrelevant to the
litigation because Farnad did not assert a cause of action for
fraud and fraud is not an element of any of Farnad’s causes of
action. Moussazadeh argues that the “gravamen” of Farnad’s
complaint “is that Moussazadeh allegedly was secretly pocketing

16
lien payments” and that Farnad did not allege Farnad was
“directly damaged” by Dr. Moussazadeh’s fraudulent billing.
Moussazadeh interprets section 425.16 too narrowly. (See Bassi
v. Bassi, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 1094 [section 425.16 “is to
‘be construed broadly’ in furtherance of its stated goals”].)
Section 425.16 protects a statement “‘if it relates to the
substantive issues in the litigation’” (Bassi, at p. 1096); the
statute does not require the statement to mention a cause of
action or an element of a cause of action. (See City of Costa Mesa
v. D’Alessio Investments, LLC (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 358, 373-
374 [trial court erred in ruling only those statements that
“included the word ‘litigation’” were “‘made in connection with
this litigation’”].) Dr. Moussazadeh’s allegedly fraudulent billing
was a substantive issue in Farnad’s litigation against
Moussazadeh, even though the complaint did not allege a cause
of action for fraud. Farnad alleged that Dr. Moussazadeh
“fraudulently billed for services” not performed and that the
fraudulent billing put “ISAG at significant risk and exposure”
and caused “irreparable harm to its reputation and goodwill.”
Farnad also alleged Moussazadeh made “false and fraudulent
insurance claims, utilizing ISAG’s national provider identifier
number.” Dr. Farnad’s statements, therefore, related to
substantive issues in the litigation.

2. Moussazadeh Did Not Show a Probability of
Success Because the Litigation Privilege Bars
Its Causes of Action
At the second step of the analysis under section 425.16 “the
burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the merit of the
claim by establishing a probability of success.” (Baral v. Schnitt

17
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384.) “The litigation privilege is ‘relevant to
the second step in the [section 425.16] analysis in that it may
present a substantive defense a plaintiff must overcome to
demonstrate a probability of prevailing.’” (Contreras v. Dowling
(2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 394, 415; see Flatley v. Mauro (2006)
39 Cal.4th 299, 323.) “‘“‘A plaintiff cannot establish a probability
of prevailing if the litigation privilege precludes a defendant’s
liability on the claims.’”’” (Osborne v. Pleasanton Automotive Co.,
LP (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 361, 382; see Optional Capital, Inc. v.
Akin Gump Strauss, Hauer & Feld LLP (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 95,
115.)
Under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), a “privileged
publication or broadcast is one made” in any “judicial
proceeding.” The litigation privilege applies “‘to any
communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings;
(2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to
achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that [has] some
connection or logical relation to the action.’” (Action Apartment
Assn., Inc. v. City of Santa Monica (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1232, 1241;
accord, Geragos v. Abelyan, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 1031.)
Prelitigation communications are privileged if they “relate[ ] to
litigation that is contemplated in good faith and under serious
consideration.” (Action Apartment Assn., at p. 1251; accord,
Medallion Film LLC v. Loeb & Loeb LLP, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1290; see Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 1024 [“‘“communications preparatory to or in
anticipation of the bringing of an action or other official
proceeding are within the protection of the litigation privilege”’”];
Flatley v. Mauro, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 322 [the “privilege has
also been held to apply to ‘statements made prior to the filing of a

18
lawsuit’”].) The litigation privilege “is ‘an “absolute” privilege,
and it bars all tort causes of action except a claim of malicious
prosecution.’” (Flatley, at p. 322; see Rusheen v. Cohen (2006)
37 Cal.4th 1048, 1063.)
The trial court correctly ruled the litigation privilege
barred Moussazadeh’s causes of action. As discussed, all of
Moussazadeh’s causes of action were based on Dr. Farnad’s
allegedly defamatory statements to personal injury attorneys
that Dr. Moussazadeh was committing fraud and billing for
services he did not perform. Dr. Farnad made the statements
during his investigation into Dr. Moussazadeh’s billing
improprieties, with the goals of obtaining information and
preventing Dr. Moussazadeh from misappropriating Dr. Farnad’s
share of future lien payments. Therefore, Dr. Farnad’s
statements were related to his dispute with (and future litigation
against) Dr. Moussazadeh and designed to achieve its objectives.
(See Hagberg v. California Federal Bank (2004) 32 Cal.4th 350,
361 [litigation privilege applies to “statements made prior to the
filing of a lawsuit, whether in preparation for anticipated
litigation or to investigate the feasibility of filing a lawsuit”];
Trinity Risk Management, LLC v. Simplified Labor Staffing
Solutions, Inc., supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1005, 1007 [litigation
privilege applied to a company’s emails to its insurance provider,
who was a potential witness and potential defendant, requesting
information and documents “relevant to [the company’s]
expressed belief that [its insurance providers] had committed
fraud in the sale of workers’ compensation insurance” to the
company].)
Relying on Rothman v. Jackson (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th
1134, Moussazadeh argues the litigation privilege does not apply

19
because Dr. Farnad’s defamatory statements “were not necessary
or useful steps in the litigation process and did nothing to serve
its purposes.” In Rothman the court held the litigation privilege
did not protect statements by a celebrity’s representatives during
a press conference that an attorney and his clients had
intentionally made false accusations against the celebrity to
extort money from him. (Id. at p. 1139.) The court stated: “In
sum, we hold that the litigation privilege should not be extended
to ‘litigating in the press.’” (Id. at p. 1149.)
Moussazadeh compares Dr. Farnad’s statements to the
“‘public mudslinging’ found to be unprotected in Rothman.”
Dr. Farnad, however, did not speak to the press, the public, or (as
in Rothman) “persons who—however curious they might be about
unsavory allegations concerning the private life of a particular
celebrity—have no legitimate connection with any litigation
which could be anticipated” between the attorney’s clients and
the celebrity. (Rothman v. Jackson, supra, 49 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1151.) Instead, Dr. Farnad spoke to personal injury attorneys
whose clients were treated at ISAG, for the purpose of
investigating Dr. Moussazadeh’s billing and preventing
Dr. Moussazadeh from misappropriating Dr. Farnad’s share of
future payments. The personal injury attorneys had a legitimate
connection with the dispute, and Dr. Farnad’s statements were
necessary, or at least useful, steps in the litigation process.
Moussazadeh also argues in passing that “statements to
nonparticipants in the action are generally not privileged under
Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b).” Though the litigation
privilege does not “encompass publication to the general public
through the press,” it does protect a “publication to nonparties
with a substantial interest in the proceeding.” (GetFugu, Inc. v.

20
Patton Boggs LLP (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 141, 153; accord,
Susan A. v. County of Sonoma (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 88, 94; see
Healy v. Tuscany Hills Landscape & Recreation Corp. (2006)
137 Cal.App.4th 1, 5-6 [litigation privilege protected a letter from
a homeowners association’s attorney to residents regarding
litigation between the association and a homeowner]; cf. Billauer
v. Escobar-Eck (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 953, 965 [“Communications
to nonparticipants or to persons with no substantial interest in or
connection to the proceeding are not privileged under Civil Code
section 47, subdivision (b).”]; Argentieri v. Zuckerberg (2017)
8 Cal.App.5th 768, 784 [“the litigation privilege will not protect
statements that are made to persons who lack a substantial
interest in the litigation”].)

C. The Trial Court’s Order Granting Farnad’s Motion
for Attorneys’ Fees Is Not Appealable
Moussazadeh argues that, because the trial court erred in
granting Farnad’s special motion to strike, the court also erred in
granting his motion for attorneys’ fees. We do not have
jurisdiction to hear an appeal from that order.
“An ‘appellate court generally lacks jurisdiction to decide
an appeal from an order unless the order is one that is expressly
made appealable by statute.’” (Clapkin v. Levin, supra,
119 Cal.App.5th at p. 238; accord, Meinhardt v. City of Sunnyvale
(2024) 16 Cal.5th 643, 652; see Griset v. Fair Political Practices
Com. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688, 696 [a “trial court’s order is
appealable when it is made so by statute”].) Section 425.16,
subdivision (i), states: “An order granting or denying a special
motion to strike shall be appealable under Section 904.1.” And
section 904.1, subdivision (a)(13), provides an appeal may be

21
taken from “an order granting or denying a special motion to
strike under Section 425.16.” Neither section 425.16 nor
section 904.1, however, authorizes an appeal from an order
granting or denying a motion for attorneys’ fees.
As we held in Doe v. Luster (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 139,
and reaffirmed in Clapkin v. Levin, supra, 119 Cal.App.5th 222,
an order denying a motion for attorneys’ fees under
section 425.16, subdivision (c), is not appealable. (Doe, at p. 142.)
In Doe we concluded the plain meaning of section 425.16,
subdivision (i), which authorizes an appeal from an order
granting or denying a special motion to strike, did not encompass
a ruling on “an interlocutory order granting or denying attorney
fees following the trial court’s ruling on a special motion to
strike.” (Doe, at p. 147.) We continue to follow Doe and decline to
follow cases concluding that, where a party appeals from an order
granting or denying a special motion to strike, section 425.16,
subdivision (i), also confers appellate jurisdiction over an order
granting or denying attorneys’ fees. (See, e.g., Gumarang v.
Braemer on Raymond, LLC (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 370, 387-388;
Baharian-Mehr v. Smith (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 265, 275.) The
problem with Gumarang and Baharian-Mehr is that the
statutory language does not support their conclusion. That it
might be more efficient to consider appeals from both orders at
the same time does not override the plain statutory language
making only one of the orders appealable.

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 DISPOSITION

The order granting Farnad’s special motion to strike under
section 425.16 is affirmed. Moussazadeh’s appeal from the order
granting Farnad’s motion for attorneys’ fees is dismissed.
Farnad is to recover its costs on appeal.

SEGAL, Acting P. J.

We concur:

FEUER, J.

STONE, J.

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