Filed 6/18/26 In re M.H. CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

B347388
In re M.H. et al., Persons Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 24CCJP01744B–D)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

GABRIELA P.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Debra L. Losnick, Judge. Affirmed.
Laura D. Pedicini, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
 Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louis,
Assistant County Counsel, and Jessica Buckelew, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗

Gabriela P. (mother) appeals the juvenile court’s order
granting sole physical custody of her three youngest children to
Jose R. (father) and granting her monitored visitation with the
children three times a week for three hours. Mother contends the
court improperly focused on mother’s noncompliance with her
case plan, rather than the best interests of the children, and
improperly delegated authority over visitation to father. We find
no error and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Mother and father are the parents of M.H. (born August
2015), M.P. (born October 2017), and J.P. (born August 2019).1
Mother also has a teenaged son, A.P., and an adult daughter.
In 2017, the Los Angeles County Department of Children
and Family Services (DCFS) received a referral alleging
“emotional abuse” between mother and father, which it closed as
“inconclusive.” Between July 2016 and January 2024, DCFS
received five referrals alleging that mother abused alcohol or
drugs. DCFS closed four of these referrals as “inconclusive” and
one as “unfounded.” Three of the referrals alleged that mother

1 The juvenile court found father to be the children’s
presumed father. Mother initially stated that father is the
biological father of all three children, but later claimed he is not
the biological father of M.P. and J.P. M.P. and J.P.’s alleged
biological father was not involved in the dependency proceedings
and the juvenile court made no other parentage findings.

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drove with one or more of her children in the car while she was
under the influence of alcohol.
In April 2024, DCFS investigated the family after receiving
a report that mother and father were involved in a physical
altercation, during which mother scratched father’s arm and
broke the window of his car. The incident occurred when father
came to mother’s home to drive the children to school. After
undergoing voluntary drug testing, mother tested positive for
cocaine. Mother denied using cocaine. Mother had also been
arrested for driving under the influence (DUI) in 2023 and was
on probation, which she failed to disclose to the investigating
social worker. Mother said “the DUI occurred due to issues with
father.”
DCFS filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code
section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b)(1), alleging that mother’s
violent conduct towards father and her abuse of alcohol and
cocaine endangered the children’s physical health and safety, and
father had failed to protect the children.2 DCFS recommended
that the children remain in mother’s home and that mother
participate in individual counseling, parenting classes, a
domestic violence program, and a substance abuse rehabilitation
program. DCFS also asked the court to order mother to submit to
random drug and alcohol testing.
At the June 20, 2024 initial hearing, the juvenile court
found a prima facie case existed, but services were available to
prevent the children’s detention.

2 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code. DCFS included A.P. in the petition, but this
appeal does not concern him. We discuss only the facts relevant
to the other minor children.

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 In July 2024, mother tested positive for cocaine a second
time. When social workers questioned mother about the positive
drug test, she denied any substance use, then “deflected and
began to attribute her current circumstances to [a] family friend.”
In August 2024, DCFS filed an application pursuant to
section 385 to detain the children from mother and place them
with father, which the juvenile court granted.
In an interview for the detention report, mother claimed
she had completed a drug and alcohol program in connection with
her DUI case. However, the service provider stated that it could
not release letters of completion to DCFS “ ‘because [mother]
never finished.’ ” Mother continued to deny that she used drugs
and stated she would not enroll in services unless ordered to do
so by the court.
At the August 19, 2024 hearing on the section 385
application for detention, the juvenile court found there were no
reasonable means of protecting the children without removing
them from mother’s home. The court ordered the children
released to father. It observed that mother was “in the apparent
[throes] of relapse,” which she was “actively denying.” The court
further indicated that “mother’s substance use is a likely driver
in what gave rise to [the] petition.”
At the September 13, 2024 jurisdiction and disposition
hearing, the juvenile court sustained the petition. The court
ordered mother to participate in weekly random drug and alcohol
testing, a 12-step program, a full substance abuse program, a 52-
week domestic violence program, a parenting program, and
individual counseling. It also ordered monitored visitation for
mother three times a week.

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 In the six-month status review report, the social worker
stated that she had difficulty communicating with mother, as
mother’s phone was often disconnected or she would change her
number. Mother was not cooperative with the social worker’s
attempts to meet and “would get defensive.” Although mother
had enrolled in a substance abuse treatment program, the service
provider reported that mother was “struggling with attendance”
and was “in denial about her drug use.” Mother claimed to have
“transportation issues,” but declined the service provider’s offers
of transportation assistance. Over the course of approximately
one month, mother tested positive for cocaine, THC,
methamphetamines, and alcohol. When asked about the positive
test results, mother was “dismissive.” In January 2025, the
treatment program discharged mother due to her noncompliance
and poor attendance. Mother had not completed weekly drug
testing with DCFS or enrolled in a domestic violence program.
Mother did not visit the children for over two months. When
mother began visiting them, she arrived late to visits or left
early, cancelled at the last minute, and failed to show up without
notice.
The social worker reported that father was providing the
children with a safe, stable, and loving home environment. A
service provider stated that father was “very cooperative,” “fully
engaged in [family preservation] services,” “receptive to tips . . .
[and] continue[d] to make progress,” and shared a “close
relationship” with the children. Father had also recently started
individual counseling. M.H. stated that she felt safe in father’s
home and enjoyed being there.
At the March 21, 2025 review hearing, the juvenile court
ordered further services for mother and father.

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 In an interview for the next status review report, “[m]other
was being evasive and was not being truthful with [the social
worker] regarding her place of residence.” Mother claimed both
that she was still residing in Los Angeles and that she had moved
to New York. Mother failed to attend another visit with the
children without providing notice, which upset M.H. However,
father reported that mother called the children on a regular
basis. While enrolled in a second substance abuse treatment
program, mother tested positive for cocaine, THC, and alcohol.
The service provider stated that mother’s “participation was very
spotty and was not really consistent,” which he attributed to the
fact that “mother was in a toxic, co-dependent relationship with
her partner (name not given) which would affect mother’s
concentration in class, attendance[,] and cause mother anxiety.”
Mother enrolled in a third treatment program after moving to
New York but missed multiple sessions. When the service
provider attempted to contact mother regarding a missed session,
mother’s phone number was disconnected.
Father continued to provide the children with a safe,
stable, and loving home environment. He and the children
appeared to have a strong bond, and the social worker described
father as “nurturing, patient and attentive” and “very active with
the children’s educational and medical needs.” M.H. and M.P.
stated that they were doing well and felt safe in father’s home.
Father’s therapist reported that father had completed 14
counseling sessions and participated well. Father found the
counseling beneficial and “ha[d] learned how to identify the cycle
of domestic violence, how to verbally communicate without using
violence, [and] the negative effects that domestic violence has on

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children.” The social worker observed that the family had “made
significant progress” and met its goals.
At the June 27, 2025 status review hearing, the juvenile
court found that father had been meeting the children’s needs
and complying with his case plan. Mother’s compliance with her
case plan was “not very good.” The court rejected mother’s
request for additional time to participate in services and stated:
“Over the mother’s objection, I am going to close the case today
because conditions no longer exist. And that is because we have
a custodial parent that has complied with his family maintenance
and the children have done very well under his care.” The court
granted sole physical custody to father and joint legal custody.
The court ordered monitored visits for mother on the same
schedule she had during the pendency of the case (i.e., three
times a week for three hours).
On July 1, 2025, the juvenile court issued the written
custody and visitation order.
Mother timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. The Juvenile Court’s Custody and Visitation Order
Was Not An Abuse of Discretion
Mother contends the trial court abused its discretion in
granting sole physical custody to father because it improperly
focused on mother’s lack of compliance with the case plan rather
than the best interests of the children. She further contends the
visitation order was an abuse of discretion because it did not
specify who would monitor mother’s visitation, but “left it up to
the father, as the individual with sole physical custody, to
decide.” Mother claims this constituted an improper delegation of
visitation authority to father.

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 “When terminating its jurisdiction over a child who has
been declared a dependent child of the court, section 362.4
authorizes the juvenile court to issue a custody and visitation
order (commonly referred to as an ‘exit order’) . . . . When making
a custody determination under section 362.4, ‘the court’s focus
and primary consideration must always be the best interests of
the child.’ [Citations.]” (In re T.S. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 503,
513, fn. omitted.) We review the juvenile court’s exit order for
abuse of discretion and “will not disturb the order ‘unless the
court “ ‘ “ exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an
arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination.” ’ ” ’
[Citation.]” (In re N.M. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1090, 1094 (N.M.).)
We find no abuse of discretion in the court’s juvenile
custody order.3
A. Mother fails to establish that the juvenile court
based the custody order on improper factors
Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by
granting sole physical custody of the children to father based on
mother’s noncompliance with the case plan, rather than
considering the children’s best interests. We disagree.
Mother relies on N.M., supra, 88 Cal.App.5th 1090, which
is distinguishable. In that case, the juvenile court declined to
award joint legal and physical custody to the non-offending
father, who had not completed a case plan requiring drug testing
and a parenting course. (Id. at pp. 1092–1093.) When issuing its

3 Mother concedes that she failed to object to the custody and
visitation order below. Although mother’s arguments are
therefore forfeited, we exercise our discretion to resolve her
appeal on the merits. (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875,
887, fn. 7.)

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juvenile custody order, the juvenile court stated: “ ‘Did [father] do
his case plan? No, so I’m sorry. It’s not appropriate to reward a
parent who does nothing in this court, so I’m not going to make it
joint legal.’ ” (Id. at p. 1093.) The appellate court concluded
“[t]his was an abuse of discretion because an exit order must
serve the best interests of the children, not reward or punish one
parent or another for failing to comply with the case plan.” (Id.
at p. 1095.) It noted that the juvenile court had not made an
express best-interests finding and “no grounds appear[ed] for an
implied finding” that the father’s failure to complete the case
plan impacted the children’s interests. (Ibid.)
Here, the juvenile court did not suggest it was granting
father sole physical custody to avoid rewarding mother for her
noncompliance with the case plan. In the absence of evidence to
the contrary, we will not presume the juvenile court’s order was
based on improper considerations. (People v. Jones (2017) 3
Cal.5th 583, 616 [reviewing court presumes lower court knows
and applies correct statutory and case law].)
Further, N.M. did not hold that an order granting a parent
sole physical custody must be reversed in the absence of an
express best-interests finding. The juvenile court’s statement
that “the children have done very well under [father’s] care”
indicates that it considered the children’s best interests when
granting father sole physical custody. There are also ample
grounds for an implied best-interests finding. Unlike the father
in N.M., mother was an offending parent based on her violence
against father and her use of alcohol and cocaine.4 The court

4 Mother claims that the domestic violence at issue in the
petition was “mutual.” Although the petition described prior

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previously found that “mother’s substance use is a likely driver in
what gave rise to [the] petition.” Despite a DUI arrest and
multiple positive drug and alcohol tests, mother denied that she
had substance abuse issues and blamed others for her
circumstances. She failed to regularly participate in any
treatment program and did not enroll in a domestic violence
program. The record further indicates mother was in another
“toxic” relationship. Additionally, there were reports that mother
had previously driven the children while she was under the
influence.5 The juvenile court could reasonably conclude that
mother had not addressed the issues that led to the dependency
proceeding in a meaningful way, and the children would be at
continued risk of harm in her care. (See In re Gabriel K. (2012)
203 Cal.App.4th 188, 197 [“One cannot correct a problem one fails
to acknowledge.”].) In contrast, father had gained insight into
the dynamics of his relationship with mother and provided
stability to the children, who were doing well in his care.
The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in granting
sole physical custody of the children to father.

incidents where father pushed mother and grabbed her neck, it
alleged: “Such violent conduct on the part of the mother towards
[father] endangers the children’s physical health and safety . . . .”
(Italics added.) The juvenile court “sustained an (a) count,
showing that the mother was the perpetrator,” and ordered
mother’s case plan to address that sustained allegation.
5 Although this report was originally in a referral DCFS
found inconclusive, a witness interviewed in this case reported
the incident and said other people were also aware of mother
driving the children while she was impaired.

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 B. The juvenile court’s visitation order did not
improperly delegate authority to father
Mother also fails to establish that the juvenile court
improperly delegated visitation authority to father by failing to
specify a monitor.
“[T]he power to decide whether any visitation occurs
belongs to the court alone. [Citations.] When the court abdicates
its discretion in that regard and permits a third party, whether
social worker, therapist or the child, to determine whether any
visitation will occur, the court violates the separation of powers
doctrine.” (In re S.H. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 310, 317–318,
fn. omitted.) The juvenile court may delegate authority to a third
party “to decide the time, place, and manner in which visitation
will take place,” but should generally specify the frequency and
duration of visits. (In re M.R. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 269, 274;
but see In re S.H., at p. 319 [declining to “suggest[] either that
the juvenile court must always specify the frequency or length of
visits”].)
The juvenile court ordered monitored visitation for mother
three times a week for three hours. It did not delegate to father
the authority to determine whether visitation would occur or the
frequency or duration of mother’s visits with the children. To the
extent the exit order “left the [monitor] issue exclusively in the
father’s hands,” as mother claims, it is comparable to the order in
In re A.C. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 796. There, the juvenile
custody order provided that the father would choose the monitor
if the parents were unable to agree. (Id. at p. 800.) The Court of
Appeal concluded the order did not improperly give the father the
right to determine whether visitation would occur. (Ibid.) The
same is true here. Mother fails to cite any decision invalidating a

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visitation order because the juvenile court did not specify the
monitor or delegated that choice to the custodial parent.
Mother’s reliance on In re T.H. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1119
is misplaced. In T.H., the juvenile court granted supervised
visitation to the non-custodial father “but only upon the
‘agreement of the parents.’ ” (Id. at p. 1123.) The appellate court
observed that the language of the visitation order would permit
the custodial mother to “agree to only one visit a year or less
without violating the letter of the court’s order.” (Ibid.) The
order “effectively delegate[d] to mother the power to determine
whether visitation will occur at all,” even though the mother had
objected to the father having any visitation. (Ibid.) The juvenile
court had therefore “abused its discretion by framing its order in
a way that gave mother an effective veto power over that right.”
(Id. at p. 1124.)
We reject mother’s claim that the visitation order here is
similarly “illusory.” There is no indication in the record that
father ever objected to mother having visitation with the
children. He consistently brought the children to their visits on
time and facilitated phone calls between mother and the children
when mother moved to New York. Moreover, the order here did
not permit father to withhold his consent to the weekly visits.
There was no abuse of discretion.

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 DISPOSITION
The juvenile court order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

ADAMS, J.

We concur:

EGERTON, Acting P. J.

HANASONO, J.

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