Filed 6/24/26 P. v. Turgeon CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D085631
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. SCD303782)
v.
MARK LAWRENCE TURGEON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Albert T. Harutunian III, Judge. Affirmed.
Lindsey M. Ball, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Arlene Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Eric Swenson
and Tyler L. Krentz, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
A jury convicted Mark Lawrence Turgeon of committing one count of
arson and two counts of felony vandalism during an early morning crime
spree. On appeal, he contends one of his felony vandalism convictions is not
supported by substantial evidence, and the trial court erred in instructing the
jury with respect to that charge. He also asserts the trial court erred by
admitting hearsay testimony. We find no error and affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.
The Prosecution’s Case
In the early morning of June 7, 2024, Shawn Williams,
Gonzalo Mendoza, and Jose Villalvazo were working at Solar Turbines in
San Diego. Around 3:34 a.m., Turgeon entered the employee parking lot and
threw a rock at their cars, breaking windows in each of them. The incident
was captured on surveillance video. While reviewing the video later in the
morning, the Solar Turbine’s facility director noticed Turgeon had also
thrown a rock through a window at the facility.1
Around 4:45 that morning, San Diego Harbor Police received a report of
a fire in front of their headquarters. Officers responded to find a trash can
fully engulfed in flames and the fire spreading to nearby brush and a tree.
Port camera operators reported seeing Turgeon digging around in the trash
can about 15 minutes before officers responded to the fire.
Officers located Turgeon about one-half mile from Harbor Police
headquarters. He was carrying three lighters.
1 Clips from the surveillance video were admitted at trial as People’s
exhibits 2 and 3. Exhibit 2 relates to the vandalizing of the cars and exhibit 3
relates to the vandalizing of the building. Exhibits 2 and 3 were transmitted
to this court as part of the record on appeal.
2
II.
Conviction and Sentence
The People charged Turgeon with one count of arson (Pen. Code,2
§ 451, subd. (d)) for the fire at police headquarters (Count 1), one count of
felony vandalism (§ 594) for the broken building window at Solar Turbines
(Count 2), and one count of felony vandalism (ibid.) for the broken windows of
the three cars in the Solar Turbines parking lot (Count 3). The jury convicted
him on all three counts. In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found he
previously suffered a conviction constituting both a serious felony (§§ 667,
subd. (a)(1), 668, 1192.7, subd. (c)) and a strike (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 668,
1170.12). The court sentenced Turgeon to a total prison term of six years and
eight months.
DISCUSSION
I.
The Evidence Supported Aggregation of the Damages for Purposes of Count 3
As noted, the jury convicted Turgeon of felony vandalism in Count 3 for
the combined damage he caused to the three cars owned by Williams,
Mendoza, and Villalvazo. Here, Turgeon presents two related challenges to
this conviction: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for
felony vandalism absent aggregation of the damage caused to each of the
cars, and (2) the evidence did not support the jury instruction permitting the
jury to aggregate damages because Turgeon did not damage the cars
pursuant to a single general impulse, intention, and plan. We reject both
contentions.
2 Further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3
A. Standards of Review for Instructional Error and Sufficiency of the
Evidence
“A trial court must instruct the jury on every theory that is supported
by substantial evidence, that is, evidence that would allow a reasonable jury
to make a determination in accordance with the theory presented under the
proper standard of proof.” (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1206.)
“There is no instructional error when the record contains substantial
evidence in support of a guilty verdict on the basis of the challenged theory.”
(People v. Jantz (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1283, 1290.) Although we review a
trial court’s decision to issue an instruction de novo (Cole, at p. 1206), the
standard is “essentially the same” as that applicable to a sufficiency of the
evidence claim (People v. Nelson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 513, 550).
“In considering a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we review the whole
record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine
whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Collins
(2025) 17 Cal.5th 293, 307 [cleaned up]; Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S.
307, 319.) “Reversal on this ground is unwarranted unless it appears that
upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to
support [the conviction].” (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331 [cleaned
up].)
B. The Evidence Presented at Trial Is Sufficient to Support the
Aggregation Instruction and Turgeon’s Conviction on Count 3
If an act of vandalism causes $400 or more in damage, it is a “wobbler”
that may be charged as either a felony or a misdemeanor. (§ 594, subd. (b)(1);
Robert L. v. Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 894, 906, fn. 14; see id. at
4
p. 902, fn. 9 [defining “wobbler”].) “[M]ultiple instances of misdemeanor
vandalism can be aggregated to form a single felony, unless the ‘evidence
shows that the offenses are separate and distinct and were not committed
pursuant to one intention, one general impulse, and one plan.’ ” (In re
Arthur V. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 61, 69 (Arthur V.)3; see id. at pp. 65–69
[recognizing holding of People v. Bailey (1961) 55 Cal.2d 514 that multiple
takings can be aggregated to support a single charge of grand theft and
applying Bailey to vandalism]. Even “where a defendant engages in
vandalism that causes damage to the property of more than one victim,
aggregation of the damages amounts is appropriate when the damage did not
result from separate and distinct criminal acts and was inflicted pursuant to
a single general impulse, intention or plan.” (People v. Carrasco (2012)
209 Cal.App.4th 715, 717 (Carrasco).)4
At trial, Williams testified he submitted an insurance claim and paid a
$50 deductible to have his windshield replaced. Mendoza had his windshield
replaced for $160. And Villalvazo had his window replaced for $350. The
trial court instructed the jury on how to consider these respective costs in
relation to the single count of felony vandalism charged in Count 3, as
follows: “Damage resulting from multiple acts of vandalism may be
3 Disapproved on other grounds by People v. Whitmer (2014) 59 Cal.4th
733, 740–742 (Whitmer) [a defendant may be convicted of multiple counts
“based on separate and distinct acts of theft, even if committed pursuant to a
single overarching scheme”].
4 Disapproved on other grounds by Whitmer, supra, 59 Cal.4th at
pp. 740–742 [a defendant may be convicted of multiple counts “based on
separate and distinct acts of theft, even if committed pursuant to a single
overarching scheme”].
5
aggregated to equal $400 or more if the acts were part of a single general
impulse, intention, and plan.” Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
issuance of this instruction, as well as Turgeon’s resulting conviction, because
a reasonable trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that
Turgeon damaged all three cars pursuant to a single general impulse,
intention, and plan.5
The surveillance video from Solar Turbines shows Turgeon entering the
employee parking lot where Williams, Mendoza, and Villalvazo parked in
adjacent parking stalls. He first approached Williams’s car and threw a rock
at the windshield. The rock bounced off Williams’s windshield toward a
nearby planter. Turgeon immediately retrieved the rock, walked to
Mendoza’s car, and threw the rock at the windshield. The rock bounced off
Mendoza’s windshield and landed near the driver’s side of Villalvazo’s car.
Without pause, Turgeon retrieved the rock from the ground and threw it
through Villalvazo’s driver’s window. The entire incident lasted less than a
minute.
It is clear from the video that Turgeon damaged the three cars in a
continuous scheme. He progressed immediately from one car to the next and
caused damage in the same manner and with the same rock. No evidence
was presented at trial to suggest Turgeon’s intent in causing damage differed
from car to car or victim to victim. It is reasonable to conclude from this
evidence that Turgeon damaged the cars pursuant to a single general
impulse, intention, and plan. (See Carrasco, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 718–721 [finding aggregation of damages appropriate where, following an
5 In so finding, we need not consider the testimony underlying Turgeon’s
evidentiary error claim.
6
argument with his mother, defendant broke a window in a home owned by
his father and then broke windows in his mother’s car, which was parked
nearby]; Arthur V., supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 69 [finding aggregation of
damages appropriate where defendant committed multiple acts against a
single victim that “occurred within a very brief time period [and] in the same
approximate location”].)
Turgeon asserts his case is distinguishable from Carrasco and
Arthur V. and, instead, is more like In re David D. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 304.
We are not persuaded. In David D., the court held it was erroneous to
aggregate multiple acts of misdemeanor vandalism to support a single felony
charge where the defendant “spent an evening” tagging 34 separate
properties “throughout” the city. (Id. at p. 310.) The court reasoned that,
under these circumstances, “each tagging incident clearly represent[ed] a
separate offense affecting a different victim.” (Id. at p. 311.) This is not
analogous to the situation here where Turgeon vandalized three cars parked
in adjacent parking stalls in quick succession.6
II.
The Admission of Testimony Regarding Repair Quotes Was Harmless
In addition to the victims’ testimony discussed above regarding their
actual costs for repairs, the prosecutor elicited at trial testimony from
Williams, Mendoza, and Villalvazo regarding quotes they obtained for
repairs. Specifically, Williams testified that a company quoted him “around
6 Because we find the damages at issue in Count 3 can properly be
aggregated, and that, based on such aggregation, the evidence is sufficient to
support Turgeon’s conviction for felony vandalism in Count 3, we do not
address his argument that the evidence failed to show he caused $400 or
more of damage to any of the cars individually.
7
$1,600.” Mendoza testified repair shops in San Diego quoted him “about 400,
plus installation, which was 2- to 300 more.” Villalvazo testified that a car
dealership in San Diego quoted him “like $400 for the window, and 100-and-
something for the service fee.”
Turgeon argues that the trial court erred by admitting this testimony
because it was inadmissible hearsay. However, he concedes that, if the jury
was properly permitted to aggregate the damage caused to all the cars, the
admission of the hearsay testimony was not prejudicial. The People do not
argue the testimony was properly admitted but, rather, contend its admission
was harmless given evidence that the actual cost of the repairs to the three
cars, when aggregated, met the threshold for felony vandalism. As we have
explained, we find the jury could have aggregated the damage to all the cars
to convict on a single count of felony vandalism and that the damage to the
cars, when aggregated, is sufficient to support Turgeon’s conviction on Count
3. Thus, as Turgeon concedes, any error in allowing the testimony about the
quotes was harmless. (People v. Valencia (2021) 11 Cal.5th 818, 840
[admission of nontestimonial hearsay is subject to harmless error review
under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, which asks if it is reasonably
probable defendant would have received a more favorable result absent the
error].)
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
DO, J.
WE CONCUR:
O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.
CASTILLO, J.
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