Filed 6/24/26 P. v. Chance CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Butte)
THE PEOPLE, C102908
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 24CF00018)
v.
ORDER MODIFYING
ANTHONY ALAN CHANCE, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
[NO CHANGE IN
JUDGMENT]
THE COURT:
It is ordered that the opinion filed in this case on June 16, 2026, be modified as follows:
1. On page 4, the first full paragraph reads, “Defendant claims the trial court
erred in imposing the middle term because his youth was a factor in mitigation, requiring
imposition of a presumptive low term pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), and
when imposing the middle term, the court relied on aggravating factors that were not
admitted by defendant or proven beyond a reasonable doubt in violation of defendant’s
Sixth Amendment rights” and is replaced to read as follows:
Defendant claims the trial court erred in imposing the middle term because his
psychological childhood trauma was a factor in mitigation, requiring imposition of
a presumptive low term pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), and when
imposing the middle term, the court relied on aggravating factors that were not
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admitted by defendant or proven beyond a reasonable doubt in violation of
defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights.
There is no change in the judgment.
BY THE COURT:
\s\
KRAUSE, Acting P. J.
\s\
BOULWARE EURIE, J.
\s\
WISEMAN, J.1
1 Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
2
Filed 6/16/26 P. v. Chance CA3 (unmodified opinion)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Butte)
THE PEOPLE, C102908
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 24CF00018)
v.
ANTHONY ALAN CHANCE,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Anthony Alan Chance pled guilty to arson and vandalism of religious
property, and the trial court imposed the middle term of four years in state prison for
arson. At sentencing, the trial court found that defendant had experienced psychological
childhood trauma but determined the lower term was not in the interest of justice because
other aggravating factors warranted imposition of the middle term. Defendant contends
the trial court relied on aggravating factors that were not admitted by defendant or proven
beyond a reasonable doubt when imposing the middle term sentence in violation of his
Sixth Amendment rights. We will affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In December 2023, Paradise Police Department officers arrived at a church in
response to a 911 call reporting an alarm and a loud crash. Officers saw broken glass and
a rock near the front door. They also saw a “mist emanating from inside the church” and
smelled chemicals and burning. The officers entered the kitchen and saw and extinguished
a fire.
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Shortly after, police dispatch received a call from a taxi driver who indicated his
passenger, later identified as defendant, admitted to breaking the glass door, starting the
fire, and wanted to surrender to the police at the church. Defendant arrived at the church,
and the officers arrested him. After being transported to the police station, defendant
admitted to officers that he broke the glass door with a rock, entered the church, and
started the fire. He also claimed it was “God’s plan,” that “God had been talking to him
for a long time,” “God wanted locked churches to be burned,” and that he was a
“messenger.”
Defendant had a prior history with the Paradise Police Department. Three days
before the fire incident, officers conducted a welfare check on defendant at a hotel after his
friend and aunt both reported to the police that defendant was being told by “ ‘God’ to kill
his friends” and that he would “do whatever God [told] him to do, no matter who it hurts.”
The officers contacted defendant at the hotel and determined he was calm and in good
spirits.
Later that night, a hotel employee reported to police that defendant was “acting
strange” and had stated, “The church is going to catch fire.” When the officers returned
later that night, defendant was at the church and said, “God told him the church was going
to burn down if the doors were locked” and that he was the “ ‘chosen one’ ” to carry out
“God’s plans.” Defendant put post-it notes on the church that advised the same. When
defendant refused to leave the church, the officers arrested him for trespassing and released
defendant the following day. The day before the fire incident, officers again went to the
hotel because defendant had returned and was making more statements “about God telling
him to do things.” The officers again cited defendant for trespassing and released him the
same day.
In January 2024, a complaint charged defendant with arson of a structure (Pen.
Code, § 451, subd. (c))2 and vandalism of religious property (§ 594.3, subd. (a)). As to
2 Undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.
2
the arson count, the complaint alleged the arson was caused by use of a device designed to
accelerate the fire or delay ignition (§ 451.1, subd. (a)(5)). The complaint also alleged a
prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subd. (b)-(j), 1170.12).
In November 2024, defendant pled no contest to both counts. Pursuant to the plea
agreement, the trial court struck the other allegations. At sentencing, the trial court
indicated it would impose the middle term after considering the probation report,
defendant’s record of conviction, and a letter he wrote. Defense counsel asked the trial
court to grant probation or alternatively impose the lower term, citing defendant’s mental
health as a mitigating factor under section 1170.
The trial court denied defendant’s request for probation. As to its selection of the
appropriate sentence, the court explained: “The [d]efendant did stipulate to the existence
of aggravating factors. In reviewing California Rules of Court[, rules] 4.421 and 4.423,
this [c]ourt does find the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
circumstances. Pursuant to Penal Code 1170[, subdivision] (b)(6), I do recognize that the
[d]efendant has experienced psychological childhood trauma including, but not limited
to, abuse, neglect, exploitation or sexual violence. I did take that information into
account. And because of the existence of this factor, pursuant to Penal Code Section
1170[, subdivision] (b)(6), this [c]ourt does have to consider imposition of the lower
term.”
In aggravation, the trial court found defendant’s prior convictions as an adult were
increasing in seriousness and nature; the manner in which defendant committed the crime
indicated planning, sophistication or professionalism; the crime involved the damaging of
a church resulting in over $5,000 in restitution; and defendant “engaged in conduct that
indicates a serious danger to society.” In mitigation, the court found defendant may have
been suffering from a mental or physical condition that significantly reduced his
culpability; defendant’s prior performance on probation had been satisfactory; and
defendant acknowledged wrongdoing relatively early in the proceedings.
After balancing the aggravating and mitigating factors, the trial court found “that
imposition of the lower term wouldn’t be in the interest of justice because there are
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aggravating factors that warrant the imposition of the middle term.” The court sentenced
defendant to an aggregate prison term of four years eight months, comprised of a middle
term of four years for arson, and eight months (one-third the middle term) for vandalism
of religious property.
Defendant filed a timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
Defendant claims the trial court erred in imposing the middle term because his
youth was a factor in mitigation, requiring imposition of a presumptive low term pursuant
to section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), and when imposing the middle term, the court relied
on aggravating factors that were not admitted by defendant or proven beyond a
reasonable doubt in violation of defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights.
As an initial matter, the People claim defendant both forfeited and waived his
claim. The People argue that defendant forfeited this issue by not objecting at
sentencing. We disagree. At sentencing, counsel argued that defendant should be
sentenced to the lower term or probation. Because defendant objected to the middle term
sentence at the sentencing hearing, he did not forfeit his claim. (People v. Scott (1994)
9 Cal.4th 331, 351.)
As to the waiver, the People contend defendant waived his claim based on his plea
form where he admitted certain aggravating factors were present and that the trial court
could rely on the probation report during sentencing. Although defendant made these
admissions, as discussed infra, defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to have the factors in
aggravation proven beyond a reasonable doubt was not implicated when the trial court
imposed the middle term rather than the lower term under section 1170, subdivision
(b)(6). (§ 1170, subd. (b)(1)-(3), (b)(5)(6); People v. Sarmiento-Zuniga (2025)
108 Cal.App.5th 1216, 1223-1224 (Sarmiento-Zuniga).) As such, defendant did not
waive his claim.
Turning to the merits, we independently interpret the statute at issue. (People v.
Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 961.) When interpreting a statute we must determine the
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Legislature’s intent to effectuate the purpose of the law. (People v. Reynoza (2024)
15 Cal.5th 982, 989-990.) Our first task it to “examine the statutory language giving it a
plain and commonsense meaning.” (Id. at p. 989.) If the statutory language is clear, we
generally must follow its plain meaning. (Ibid.)
Here, “[t]he plain language and statutory context of Penal Code section 1170,
subdivision (b) are clear the Legislature did not intend to impose evidentiary or proof
requirements or restrictions on the imposition of a middle term sentence. (Compare Pen.
Code, § 1170, subd. (b)(1) with Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (b)(2), (b)(6).) In imposing a
middle term sentence, all that section 1170 requires is that the court apply the Judicial
Council’s sentencing rules and that the court state the facts and reasons for imposing the
middle term on the record at the time of sentencing. (§ 1170, subds. (a)(3), (b)(5), (c);
see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.401 et seq. [felony sentencing rules].)” (Sarmiento-
Zuniga, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1223-1224.)
Defendant acknowledges People v. Bautista-Castanon (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 922,
People v. Hilburn (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 189, and Sarmiento-Zuniga, supra,
108 Cal.App.5th 1216 as authority holding the Legislature did not intend to impose
evidentiary or proof requirements or restrictions on the imposition of a middle term
sentence. Nevertheless, defendant argues these cases were decided incorrectly. We
disagree.
The limitations on the trial court’s sentencing discretion to impose upper term
sentences, as set forth in section 1170, subdivision (b)(1) and (2), does not apply to the
court’s discretion under section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), the provision at issue here.
(Bautista-Castanon, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at pp. 928-929; People v. Hilburn, supra,
93 Cal.App.5th at pp. 202-205; Sarmiento-Zuniga, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1223-
1224.) At sentencing, the trial court found defendant had experienced childhood trauma
(§ 1170, subd. (b)(6)). As such, it was required to impose the lower term unless it found
“that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances that
imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice.” (Ibid.) The
trial court made this finding.
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Nor has defendant established that the trial court’s choice to impose the middle
term fell “outside the bounds of reason under the applicable law and the relevant facts.”
(Sarmiento-Zuniga, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at p. 1226.) The court considered the
probation report, defendant’s record of conviction, and defendant’s letter. The court then
balanced the mitigating factors against the aggravating factors, expressly stating each
factor it considered and found the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors
such that it was not in the interests of justice to impose the lower term. Accordingly,
defendant’s claim fails.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
\s\
KRAUSE, Acting P. J.
We concur:
\s\
BOULWARE EURIE, J.
\s\
WISEMAN, J.*
* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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