Filed 6/24/26 P. v. Bunton CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE, H053511
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. C2206518)
v.
RICO RASHABB BUNTON,
Defendant and Appellant.
Rico Rashabb Bunton was convicted of attempted second degree robbery. The
trial court sentenced him to 16 months in prison.
Bunton appealed, and we appointed counsel to represent him. Counsel filed an
opening brief stating the case and the facts, but raising no issues. We advised Bunton of
his right to file written argument on his own behalf, but received no response.
We have reviewed the full appellate record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25
Cal.3d 436 (Wende), with particular attention to certain evidentiary rulings that counsel
noted in the fact section of the opening brief. (See also People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th
106 (Kelly).) We conclude that there is no arguable issue for appeal and affirm the
judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Offense
One morning in March 2022, Kevin Aguilar went to a tattoo shop. He was
wearing a jacket and shoes from luxury designer brands, along with three gold chains and
gold earrings. Aguilar arrived early for his tattoo appointment, and because the tattooist
had not arrived, Aguilar stepped out of the shop to let his mother know he had arrived
safely.
While Aguilar was on the phone, he saw a man nearby looking at his jewelry. The
man lunged for the chains, pulled at them, and punched Aguilar three times in the face,
knocking him to the ground. In addition, when Aguilar would not let go of his chains, the
man tried to grab Aguilar’s phone.
The attacker walked away, returned to grab hold of Aguilar, left for a second time,
and got into a nearby car. Aguilar ran into the tattoo shop and discovered his face was
bloodied and one eye blackened. Broken pieces of his jewelry lay on the ground outside,
though he later recovered all of them.
Two eyewitnesses, David Trinh and Humberto Vargas, saw the attack. Trinh gave
police a 17-second video he had taken showing part of the incident. Vargas gave police a
photo of the attacker’s license plate, and a surveillance video showing a masked man
getting into a silver sedan.
Police put out a warrant for the license plate, and just over a week later a police
officer pulled Bunton over. An investigator searched the car and found documents
belonging to Bunton and a gaiter-style face mask. The rental company confirmed that
Bunton had rented the vehicle.
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B. The Trial
1. The Charge
The district attorney charged Bunton by information with one count of attempted
second-degree robbery in violation of Penal Code sections 211 and 664.
2. Motions in Limine
Before trial, the prosecution filed a motion in limine concerning out-of-court
statements by Bunton. The prosecution argued that the statements were inadmissible
hearsay unless the prosecution offered them against Bunton. (See Evid. Code, § 1220
[exempting statements “offered against the declarant” from the general prohibition
against hearsay].) The trial court agreed, adding that “if he [Bunton] wants to make
statements, he’s got to testify.”
3. The Evidence
The case went to trial in May 2023, and over the course of two days the
prosecution presented testimony from Aguilar, the two eyewitnesses, and several police
officers.
Aguilar did not identify Bunton as his attacker and also acknowledged that he did
not identify Bunton at the preliminary hearing. However, Aguilar described the attempt
to rob him of his gold chains. In so doing, Aguilar said that he told his attacker, “ ‘Dude,
you got the wrong dude. Like, why you coming after me?’ ” On cross-examination,
defense counsel asked Aguilar if he made these statements in response to the attacker
telling him, “ ‘You’re the dude that killed my uncle.’ ” The court sustained a hearsay
objection.
On the next day of trial, defense counsel put her objection to the trial court’s
hearsay ruling on the record. Defense counsel argued that the attacker’s statement was
not hearsay because it was not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted—that
Aguilar killed the attacker’s uncle—and also that the statements fell under, among other
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things, the spontaneous statement exception to the prohibition against hearsay. The trial
court rejected this argument, asserting that “you are not, as a defense attorney, allowed to
bring in statements of your client without him testifying” and that, “if you want to make
that assertion that that’s the reason for this attack . . . put your client on the stand and let
him tell the jury that . . . .”
In addition to presenting testimony from Aguilar, the prosecution presented
testimony from the two eyewitnesses to the attempted robbery. Trinh testified that he saw
the two men fighting near the tattoo shop. According to Trinh, at one point the attacker
approached Trinh’s car with a gaiter-style mask pulled down around his neck. However,
Trinh could not clearly recall the attacker’s face. Trinh also authenticated the 17-second
video that he had taken showing part of the attack.
Vargas, the other eyewitness, testified that he saw the fight while he was on his
way to work in a store near the tattoo shop. Vargas provided police with a photo of the
attacker’s license plate and surveillance video from the store where he worked.
The prosecutor also presented testimony from several police officers. Detective
Timothy Minkel testified about investigating the crime scene and interviewing Aguilar
and other witnesses. Defense counsel attempted to elicit statements from Aguilar about
the attacker’s use of a mask and from another witness about the appearance of the man
who got into the silver sedan, but the trial court sustained the prosecution’s hearsay
objections. Detective Christopher Santistevan also testified. After Bunton was
apprehended, Santistevan found in the rental vehicle Bunton had been driving documents
belonging to Bunton and a gaiter-style mask matching Trinh’s description of the attacker.
Santistevan also confirmed with the rental company that Bunton had contracted for the
vehicle.
Finally, the prosecution presented testimony from Robert Durr, an employee of the
rental company that owned the attacker’s getaway car. Durr confirmed the authenticity of
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Bunton’s rental agreement for the car. When the prosecutor asked when the rental took
place, the court stopped the questioning because the rental agreement “speaks for itself.”
After the prosecution rested, the defense likewise rested without presenting any
witnesses.
In closing, the prosecutor emphasized that Bunton “matches the description of the
person in the videos that I’ve presented to you.” Defense counsel in turn emphasized that
none of the witnesses had identified Bunton and, alternatively, argued that there was no
evidence that the attacker intended to deprive Aguilar of his gold chains and therefore no
attempted robbery.
4. The Verdict
After deliberating for just under three-and-a-half hours, the jury found Bunton
guilty as charged of attempted second degree robbery.
5. The Sentence
In June 2025, Bunton was sentenced to 16 months of imprisonment, with credit for
33 days of custody and 32 days of good time. The court waived fines and fees, and it
entered a general order of restitution.
Bunton filed a timely notice of appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
We have reviewed the entire record under Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436, and Kelly,
supra, 40 Cal.4th 106, with particular attention to the evidentiary rulings counsel noted in
his brief.
Counsel’s brief pointed out that the trial court sustained the prosecution’s hearsay
objection to Bunton’s question whether the attacker accused Aguilar of killing his uncle.
Although it is unclear that Bunton was seeking to present evidence of this accusation to
prove the truth of the matter asserted, we need not consider whether the ruling was proper
because any error was harmless. Even if the trial court abused its discretion in excluding
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testimony concerning the attacker’s accusation, that error would provide grounds for
reversing Bunton’s conviction only if he demonstrated a reasonable probability of a more
favorable result absent the error. (See People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 52; People v.
Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) Bunton cannot satisfy this burden based on the
attacker’s alleged accusation. Although the alleged accusation suggests that the attacker
may have had a motive to do something besides, and perhaps much worse than, attempted
robbery, the evidence of attempted robbery was nonetheless overwhelming: Aguilar
testified that he noticed a man staring at Aguilar’s chains, this man lunged at the chains,
and when Aguilar would not let go, the man tried to grab his phone. In addition, while
Bunton’s counsel suggested that she planned to use the attacker’s accusation to argue that
Bunton was not the attacker, she did not explain how the accusation would do so, and we
have found nothing in the record suggesting that the accusation would have led the jury
to find that Bunton was not the attacker, especially in light of the video of the incident
and the evidence that Bunton rented the car used by the attacker and was found in the car
a week after the incident.
Counsel’s brief also highlights the trial court’s ruling preventing defense counsel
from eliciting testimony from Detective Minkel, the officer who interviewed Aguilar,
about a comment by Aguilar about the attacker’s use of a mask. Defense counsel
contended that this was a spontaneous statement excepted from the prohibition against
hearsay. The trial court rejected this contention, reasoning that the statement in question
was not spontaneous because Aguilar made it while the police interviewed him after the
incident. As the spontaneous statement exception applies only to statements “made
spontaneously while the declarant was under the stress of excitement” (Evid. Code,
§ 1240), we see no arguable basis for contending that the trial court abused its discretion
in making this ruling. Although the stress of an event may persist for some time after it
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concludes, nothing in the record suggests Aguilar remained under the stress of the attack
within the meaning of the hearsay exception during the later questioning.
Defense counsel also asked Detective Minkel about another witness’s description
of the man who got into the silver sedan in which Aguilar’s attacker left the scene of the
attempted robbery. In response to another hearsay objection from the prosecution,
defense counsel contended that the description was being offered to show the statement’s
effect on the detective. However, the trial court ruled that “the effect on [Minkel] has no
bearing on anything in this case.” We see no basis for arguing that the trial court abused
its discretion in making this ruling.
In addition to reviewing the trial court’s hearsay rulings, we have examined the
rest of the record, including the trial as well as the sentencing. We find no arguable basis
for appeal in these matters and therefore conclude that appellate counsel has complied
fully with his responsibilities. (Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 441.)
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
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____________________________
BROMBERG, J.
WE CONCUR:
____________________________________
GREENWOOD, P. J.
____________________________________
DANNER, J.
People v. Bunton
H053511
