Filed 6/25/26 P. v. Castaneda CA4/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G064765
v. (Super. Ct. No. 22CF0308)
MARCOS ALFREDO CASTANEDA, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Larry Yellin, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
Michael C. Sampson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant
Attorney General, Christopher P. Beesley and Michael D. Butera, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
A jury convicted defendant Marcos Alfredo Castaneda of six
counts of engaging in a lewd or lascivious act with a minor under the age of
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14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)). The jury also found true defendant
committed these offenses against more than one victim (§§ 667.61, subds.
(j)(2), (e)(4)). The jury further found true aggravating factors that the victims
were particularly vulnerable and that defendant took advantage of a position
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of trust. The court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 25 years to
life in state prison.
Defendant contends the court misunderstood the scope of its
sentencing authority and did not realize it could impose a different sentence.
He alternatively argues his life sentence constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment.
For the reasons post, it is not clear if the court understood the
scope of its sentencing authority. The record is ambiguous as to whether the
court found the sentence constitutionally permissible or believed it was
obligated to impose the sentence regardless of any constitutional concerns.
We accordingly reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 2017, defendant and his wife lived in an apartment next to the
victims, A. Doe and V. Doe. The victims were eight-year-old twin sisters, and
their mother operated a business with defendant’s wife. The victims’ mother
would take the victims to defendant’s apartment so she and defendant’s wife
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All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
The jury found defendant not guilty of two counts of engaging in
a lewd or lascivious act with a minor under the age of 14 (§ 288, subd. (a)).
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could work. While at defendant’s apartment, the victims usually played with
defendant’s grandson.
A. Doe testified defendant offered cookies to her and V. Doe to get
them to follow him to the bathroom. Once inside the bathroom, defendant
would sit down on the toilet, grab the victims by the waist, and place them on
his lap. A. Doe testified defendant would then kiss her for a couple minutes
while touching her face. She felt defendant’s tongue inside her mouth and his
hand rubbing her thigh. When asked how often defendant kissed her, A. Doe
indicated it was more than once. When later asked how often defendant
kissed her in the bathroom, A. Doe testified it was one time. She also testified
defendant kissed V. Doe on the mouth and that she and V. Doe did not sit on
defendant’s lap at the same time. Finally, she noted her mother was in the
kitchen while they were in the bathroom.
V. Doe similarly testified defendant would tell her and A. Doe
that he had cookies in his closet. After they went to the closet to get the
cookies, defendant would grab their hands and take them to the bathroom.
Defendant would close the bathroom door, sit on the toilet, grab them by the
waist, place them on his lap, and kiss them both. V. Doe did not remember if
defendant used his tongue but believed the kissing felt dry. She testified
defendant would “keep, like, touching us by the waist and kissing us.” She
also recalled defendant’s hand resting on her thighs. When asked how often
defendant took her to the bathroom to kiss her, V. Doe testified it happened
multiple times during that summer. V. Doe further recalled defendant kissed
her while he sat on his bed.
A few years later in 2022, V. Doe told her mother what defendant
had done. Their mother confronted defendant who told her that she had given
him permission to “make love to them.”
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When speaking to the police, defendant initially denied any
inappropriate contact with the victims. He reported the victims’ mother owed
money to his wife and was intentionally causing trouble for him and his
family. But he later admitted he and the victims kissed on three occasions in
the bathroom. He claimed the victims kissed him over his objections. He
further reported the victims would go into his room, remove their underwear,
and ask him to make love to them. He reiterated that their mother told him
he could have sex with the victims if he discharged her debt to his wife.
DISCUSSION
Defendant asserts the court misunderstood the scope of its
authority to not impose a life sentence that amounted to cruel and unusual
punishment. He accordingly requests we remand the matter so the court may
exercise its sentencing discretion at a new sentencing hearing. Defendant
alternatively argues his life sentence is disproportionate to his crimes and is
therefore cruel and unusual under the state and federal constitutions.
As discussed post, it is not clear if the court understood the scope
of its sentencing authority. We therefore reverse and remand for further
proceedings.
I.
RELEVANT BACKGROUND
At the sentencing hearing, defendant argued a life sentence
under section 667.61 (the “One Strike” law) would constitute cruel and
unusual punishment given the nature of his offenses. He also requested the
court exercise its discretion under section 1385 to strike the enhancement
triggering his life sentence.
After hearing the parties’ arguments, the court commented: “I
don’t find that [section 667.61] is cruel and unusual, and so I don’t think I
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have any choice but to give the sentence that I’m about to give.” The court
then agreed with defendant’s counsel that the Legislature did not
contemplate specific factual scenarios when it enacted the One Strike law.
But the court emphasized the Legislature enacted a statute mandating
certain punishment for sexual offenses involving multiple victims under the
age of 14 years old. The court noted: “[W]e do have an impact on multiple
victims under that age, both by incident and by the results and the demeanor
that we have seen, both in testimony at trial and even today as the victim
impact statements were given. So I don’t think it is cruel and unusual . . .
when you have multiple victims.”
The court then stated: “If I had discretion . . . I . . . wouldn’t have
imposed the sentence. [¶] I would have intended, if I was given the free reign
discretion by statute, which would have been 12 years. I would have gone to a
one third the mid after giving a middle term sentence on a single count which
would have gotten me to 12 years.” The court added that the prosecutor
previously “gave a non-life sentence offer to a prior attorney” before trial. The
court “wish[ed]” defendant’s counsel represented him at that time “because
[the court believed] the course would have been different.”
The court ultimately concluded it did not believe section 667.61
was “a cruel and unusual statute because there is multiple victims under the
age of 14.” The court accordingly sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of
25 years to life in state prison.
II.
APPLICABLE LAW
The One Strike law mandates a sentence of 15 or 25 years to life
for certain designated sexual offenses committed under specified aggravating
circumstances. As relevant here, a lewd or lascivious act (§ 288, subd. (a)) is a
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qualifying sexual offense. (§ 667.61, subd. (c)(8).) The default sentence “is 15
years to life if the jury has found the crime was committed under one of the
circumstances listed in subdivision (e) of the One Strike law, among which is
the multiple victim circumstance. (§ 667.61, subds. (b), (e)(4).)” (In re Vaquera
(2024) 15 Cal.5th 706, 713.) But if multiple victims are under the age of 14
years old, the sentence is 25 years to life. (§ 667.61, subd. (j)(2).) A court
“shall not strike any allegation, admission, or finding of any of the
circumstances specified in subdivision . . . (e) for any person who is subject to
punishment under” the One Strike law. (§ 667.61, subd. (g).)
The One Strike law was enacted “‘to ensure serious and
dangerous sex offenders would receive lengthy prison sentences upon their
first conviction . . . where the nature or method of the sex offense “place[d]
the victim in a position of elevated vulnerability.”’” (People v. Williams (2024)
17 Cal.5th 99, 117–118.) The Legislature “target” those who “prey[] on
women and children, cannot be cured of . . . aberrant impulses, and must be
separated from society to prevent reoffense.” (People v. Wutzke (2002) 28
Cal.4th 923, 929–930.) “Almost all of the enumerated crimes involve the use
of force or fear.” (Id. at p. 930.) Defendants convicted of sexual offenses
against multiple victims ‘are [also] among the most dangerous’ from a
legislative standpoint.” (Id. at pp. 930–931.)
Where, as here, a defendant contends a sentence constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment, “[t]he judicial inquiry commences with great
deference to the Legislature.” (People v. Martinez (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 489,
494.) “Yet legislative authority remains ultimately circumscribed by the
constitutional provision forbidding the infliction of cruel or unusual
punishment.” (In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 414, superseded by statute on
another ground as stated in In re Palmer (2021) 10 Cal.5th 959.) As pertinent
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here, article I, section 17, of the California Constitution proscribes “[c]ruel or
unusual punishment.” A prison sentence violates this proscription “if ‘it is so
disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the
conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.’” (People v.
Christensen (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 781, 806.)
Courts use a three-part test to determine if a particular sentence
is disproportionate to the offense for which it is imposed. (People v.
Christensen, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 806.) First, courts consider “the
nature of the offense and/or the offender, with particular regard to the degree
of danger both present to society.” (In re Lynch, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 425.)
Second, courts compare the challenged punishment with punishments
imposed for more serious crimes in the same jurisdiction. (Id. at p. 426.)
Finally, courts compare the challenged punishment with punishments
imposed for the same offense in other jurisdictions. (Id. at p. 427.)
III.
THE COURT’S SENTENCING AUTHORITY
As noted ante, “a mandatory punishment provided by law may
contravene constitutional principles and a court has the authority to
intervene under such circumstances to prevent an unconstitutional
punishment from being imposed.” (People v. Felix (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 994,
999.)
Here, it is not clear if the trial court was aware of its authority to
not impose a life sentence under the One Strike law assuming it found the
sentence amounted to cruel or unusual punishment. The court specifically
stated it would not have imposed the mandated sentence if it had discretion.
The court noted the prosecutor previously offered a non-life sentence, and the
court lamented that defendant’s counsel did not represent him during
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settlement discussions because the court believed a life sentence could have
been avoided. The court also suggested the Legislature likely did not
contemplate the specific factual scenario in the instant case. But the court
concluded: “I don’t find that that statute is cruel and unusual, and so I don’t
think I have any choice but to give the sentence.” (Italics added.) The court
later stated: “I don’t believe it is a cruel and unusual statute because there is
multiple victims under the age of 14.” (Italics added.) Given the court’s
indication that it viewed a different sentence as more appropriate, it is not
clear if the court merely found the statute was not cruel and unusual on its
face or if it found the administration of the sentence as applied to defendant
was not cruel and unusual punishment. Under these circumstances, remand
is appropriate.
Relying on People v. Hamlin (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1412
(Hamlin) and People v. Baker (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 711 (Baker), the People
argue remand is unnecessary because this court can determine de novo
whether defendant’s sentence constitutes cruel or unusual punishment.
These cases do not alter our conclusion. We agree the issue of whether a
sentence constitutes cruel or unusual punishment is a question of law for the
appellate court. But Hamlin and Baker do not involve uncertainty regarding
the trial court’s understanding of its authority. Here, the record does not
clearly reveal if the court recognized it had authority to intervene if it
believed the punishment was unconstitutional.
We accordingly remand the matter for the trial court to clarify
whether the mandated statutory sentence as applied to defendant constitutes
cruel or unusual punishment. If the court finds the mandated statutory
sentence is constitutional, it may impose the sentence. If the court finds the
mandated statutory sentence is unconstitutional, it may exercise its
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authority to impose a different sentence. In doing so, we express no opinion
as to whether the mandated statutory sentence is cruel or unusual
punishment as applied to defendant. The trial court is free to clarify its
holding on remand.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
SANCHEZ, ACTING P. J.
WE CONCUR:
DELANEY, J.
SCOTT, J.
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