Filed 6/26/26 P. v. Taylor CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)

THE PEOPLE, C103060
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 23FE021274)
v.

A'DRE EUGENE TAYLOR,
Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant A’Dre Eugene Taylor appeals the trial court’s denial of his application
for pretrial mental health diversion under Penal Code, section 1001.36.1 Defendant
contends the court’s finding that the People overcame the statutory presumption that his
mental health diagnosis was a significant factor in the commission of the offenses was
not supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, its denial of his application on that
basis was an abuse of discretion. We agree. As a result, we conditionally reverse the
judgment and remand with instructions for the trial court to find defendant eligible for
diversion and hold a hearing to determine defendant’s suitability for diversion. If the
court determines defendant is suitable for diversion, it may grant his application. If the
court determines defendant is not suitable, defendant’s convictions and sentence shall be
reinstated.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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 BACKGROUND
Between April 29, 2023, and May 2, 2023, the Sacramento Police Department
received reports of four robberies committed by a group of what were believed to be
minors. Three of the victims were robbed near ATM machines and the fourth while
sitting in his car. In two of the robberies the suspects used pepper spray to subdue the
victims. In another one, the suspect who robbed the victim brandished a knife. Based on
their investigation, police identified defendant, an unhoused 19 year old, as one of the
suspects.
The People charged defendant with four counts of second degree robbery.
(§ 211.) The complaint alleged that defendant suffered a prior conviction for robbery,
which was a serious and violent felony. (§§ 1192.7, subd. (c), 667, subds. (b)–(i),
1170.12.) The complaint also alleged defendant was ineligible for imprisonment in
county jail because of a prior or current serious or violent felony conviction (§§ 1170,
subd. (h)(3), 667.5(c), 1192.7(c)) or because he is required to register as a sex offender.
Defendant applied for pretrial mental health diversion. (§§ 1001.35, 1001.36.)
His application included a report of a mental health evaluation conducted by a mental
health counselor on July 9, 2024. Defendant was diagnosed with posttraumatic stress
disorder (PTSD), major depressive disorder with psychotic features, and alcohol use
disorder.
The People opposed defendant’s application, arguing that defendant was ineligible
for diversion because clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that his mental health
disorder was not a significant factor in the commission of the robberies. And even if
defendant was eligible, they argued he was not suitable for diversion because he posed an
unreasonable risk of danger to the public.
At the hearing on defendant’s application, defense counsel noted that instability
had been a constant in defendant’s life. He went into foster care at age six, where he
experienced “much abuse at the hands of those protectors in foster care.” He did not

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receive consistent mental health treatment and began experiencing hallucinations at age
11.
Defense counsel also pointed out that defendant was “unable to care for himself in
any significant way” and could not live independently. His “intellectual disability, his
need for Special Ed all through school make him incapable of being the leader in any of
these things. He is so compromised that the only way he can survive is to follow along
and go along with the people who plan and execute these robberies.”
The People restated their objection to diversion based on a lack of nexus and
dangerousness. The People noted that defendant was “quite capable of committing
robberies.” They argued that “[i]t is simply impossible to believe that PTSD or
depression caused [defendant] and his cohorts to disguise themselves with masks over
their faces, arm themselves with knives or pepper spray, plan these robberies at the
ATMs where they know people will be getting cash and in somewhat a vulnerable
position, and then take that money from them. They are obviously coordinated and
planned out.” The People also argued that defendant’s “criminality and dangerousness is
escalating” which should also lead the court to find that he “poses an unreasonable risk of
danger as well.” The record before the court indicated that defendant admitted to three
section 288 violations when he was a minor.
The trial court denied diversion finding defendant to be ineligible. Before doing
so, the court found that the record would not support a finding that defendant posed an
unreasonable risk of danger “as defined within the statute.” The court then determined
that defendant was ineligible for diversion because “clear and convincing evidence”
rebutted “the presumption as to the nexus between the underlying diagnoses and the
commission of these four robberies in concert with other individuals and having been on
probation for the same conduct.” The court further explained that evidence defendant
committed the robberies “in concert with other individuals” and was on probation
“clearly shows there was a plan in place … to target ATM machines …. I don’t need to

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find him to be the thought leader or the planner of all of this to still find that he knew
fully what he was doing. And it was not operating under the influence of mental illness
or other diagnoses. That’s not what was happening here.”
After the trial court denied defendant diversion, defendant pled no contest to three
counts of robbery and admitted the special allegation. The court sentenced defendant to
an aggregate term of 10 years in prison. It imposed the mandatory minimum fines and
fees and ordered restitution for two of the victims.
Defendant obtained a certificate of probable cause and filed a timely notice of
appeal.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his
application for mental health diversion because substantial evidence did not support its
finding that the People provided clear and convincing evidence to rebut the statutory
presumption that defendant’s mental disorder was a significant factor in his commission
of the offenses. The People now concede the court’s finding that defendant’s mental
disorder was not a significant factor in the commission of the offense is not supported by
substantial evidence. However, they ask us to uphold the trial court’s order denying
defendant’s application because, contrary to the court’s contrary finding, “overwhelming
evidence” established that defendant poses an unreasonable risk of danger to public
safety.
I. Standard of Review and Legal Principles
We review a trial court’s ruling on an application for mental health diversion for
an abuse of discretion and its factual findings for substantial evidence. (Lacour v.
Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 391, 401 (Lacour).) A court abuses its discretion
when it applies the wrong legal standard or bases its decision on findings that are not
supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 449

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(Moine).) “By definition, ‘substantial evidence’ requires evidence and not mere
speculation.” (People v. Ramon (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 843, 851.)
In reviewing a trial court’s finding that a fact has been proven by clear and
convincing evidence, the question before us is whether the record “contains substantial
evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable that the
[disputed] fact was true.” (Lacour, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 401.) To answer that
question, we review the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and
“give due deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated the credibility of
witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the
evidence.” (Id. at p. 402.)
The Legislature enacted sections 1001.35 and 1001.36 to authorize trial courts to
grant pretrial mental health diversion to defendants “diagnosed with qualifying mental
disorders.” (Gomez v. Superior Court (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 671, 677 (Gomez).) To be
eligible for mental health diversion, a defendant must meet two requirements. (Lacour,
supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 400.) First, the defendant must have been diagnosed within
the past five years with a mental disorder identified in the most recent edition of the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. (Ibid.; § 1001.36, subd. (b)(1).)
Second, the defendant’s mental disorder must be a significant factor in the commission of
the offense. (Lacour, at p. 400; § 1001.36, subd. (b)(2).)
To ensure that diversion applies as broadly as possible, the Legislature amended
section 1001.36 to include a presumption that a defendant’s mental disorder diagnosis
was a significant factor in the commission of the offense if the diagnosis occurred within
the past five years. (Siam v. Superior Court (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 67, 80; § 1001.36,
subd. (b)(2).) Once the presumption is established, to overcome it, the People must prove
by clear and convincing evidence that defendant’s mental disorder was not a motivating,
causal, or contributing factor in defendant’s commission of the offense. (§ 1001.36,
subd. (b)(2); Gomez, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 688.)

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 Even if a defendant meets the eligibility requirements, before the court can grant a
defendant diversion, the court must also find the defendant suitable for diversion using
the four criteria outlined in section 1001.36, subdivision (c). Specifically, the court must
find that (1) a qualified mental health expert has determined the defendant’s symptoms
would respond to mental health treatment; (2) the defendant has consented to diversion
and waived the right to a speedy trial; (3) the defendant has agreed to comply with
treatment as a condition of diversion, and (4) the defendant will not pose an unreasonable
risk of danger to public safety if treated in the community. (§ 1001.36, subd. (c); Lacour,
supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at pp. 400-401.)
Even after finding a defendant eligible and suitable for diversion, however, a trial
court may exercise its “residual discretion” to deny diversion. (Sarmiento v. Superior
Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 896.) “But this ‘residual’ discretion must be exercised
‘ “consistent with the principles and purpose of the governing law.” ’ [Citations.] That
purpose includes a strong legislative preference for treatment of mental health disorders
because of the benefits of such treatment to both the offending individual and the
community.” (Gomez, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 679, quoting Sarmiento, at pp. 892-
893.)
II. Analysis
A. Nexus
In 2024, a mental health professional diagnosed defendant with “PTSD, major
depressive disorder with psychotic features,” and “alcohol use disorder.” Defendant’s
diagnosis established a presumption that his mental health disorder was a significant
factor in the commission of the robberies. (Gomez, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 678;
§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(2).) At the hearing, defense counsel also referenced information in
the evaluation indicating defendant’s mental disorders made “him incapable of being the
leader.” She explained that “[h]e is so compromised that the only way he can survive is
to follow along and go along with the people who plan and execute these robberies.”

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 In response, the People argued that “it [was] simply impossible to believe that
PTSD or depression caused [defendant] and his cohorts” to plan the robberies, which
were “obviously coordinated and planned out.” The People offered no evidence, and the
trial court did not identify any, establishing by clear and convincing evidence, that
defendant’s mental disorder was not a motivating, causal, or contributing factor to
defendant’s commission of the offenses. (Gomez, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p 688.)
Their speculation about the cause of the robberies is not substantial evidence. (People v.
Ramon, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p 851.)
Despite the lack of evidence, the court found that the presumption was rebutted.
The court stated that it did not have to find that defendant was the “thought leader” to
conclude that “he knew fully what he was doing” and that he “was not operating under
the influence of mental illness or other diagnoses.”
To be sure, the trial court was not required to determine that defendant was a
“thought leader” or planner to find that the presumption was overcome by clear and
convincing evidence. But it was required to identify clear and convincing evidence that
established defendant’s mental health disorder was not a motivating, causal, or
contributing factor in defendant’s participation in the robberies with the individuals who
may have been the “thought leaders” in planning the robberies. (Lacour, supra,
110 Cal.App.5th at pp. 403-404.) Beyond speculating that defendant was not operating
under the influence of his mental illness or other diagnoses, the court did not identify any
such evidence.
As we have held, “the absence of evidence proving that [defendant’s] mental
disorder was a factor in the commission of the [robberies] is not substantial evidence
supporting a finding by clear and convincing evidence that [defendant’s] mental disorder
was not a factor in the commission of the offenses.” (Gomez, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at
p. 688, quoting Lacour, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 404.) By finding the presumption
was overcome even though the People offered no evidence that would establish that

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defendant’s mental disorder was not a motivating, causal, or contributing factor to
defendant’s commission of the offenses, the trial court “effectively shifted the burden to
[defendant] to affirmatively prove that his mental disorder contributed to the offenses.”
(Lacour, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 404.) That is not the showing the statute requires.
(§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(2).)
For these reasons, we accept the People’s concession that the trial court’s finding
that clear and convincing evidence rebutted the statutory presumption is not supported by
substantial evidence. “ ‘A court abuses its discretion when it . . . bases its decision on
express or implied factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence.’ ”
(Siam v. Superior Court, supra, 118 Cal.App.5th at p. 81.) Because substantial evidence
does not support the trial court’s finding that the presumption was overcome, it abused its
discretion in denying defendant diversion based on that finding. (Ibid.; Moine, supra,
62 Cal.App.5th at p. 449.)
B. Unreasonable Risk of Danger
The People contend that we should still affirm the trial court’s order denying
defendant diversion because “overwhelming evidence” established that defendant poses
an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety despite the trial court’s contrary finding.
Defendant contends that the trial court’s finding that defendant did not pose an
unreasonable risk of danger is supported by substantial evidence and should be upheld.
We review the trial court’s factual findings for substantial evidence. (Lacour,
supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 401.) “ ‘A substantial evidence inquiry examines the record
in the light most favorable to the judgment and upholds it if the record contains
reasonable, credible evidence of solid value upon which a reasonable trier of fact could
have relied in reaching the conclusion in question. Once such evidence is found, the
substantial evidence test is satisfied. . . .’ ” (People v. Armstrong (2016) 1 Cal.5th 432,
450 (Armstrong).)

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 In reviewing the trial court’s finding that defendant did not pose an unreasonable
risk of danger to public safety, the specific question we consider is whether substantial
evidence supports the trial court’s finding that defendant was not likely to commit a
super-strike offense if granted diversion. (Gomez, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 690;
Moine, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 450 [“a trial court necessarily must find the defendant
is ‘likely to commit a super-strike offense’ ” to deny diversion on the basis that defendant
posed an unreasonable risk of danger]; see § 1170.18, subd. (c) [defining unreasonable
risk of danger to public safety as unreasonable risk defendant will commit a super-strike
offense].)
We reject the People’s argument that the record contains “overwhelming
evidence” that defendant posed an unreasonable risk of danger to the public if he were
granted diversion. The record before the trial court included all the information the
People highlight in their brief about defendant’s criminal history, including his admission
to the section 288 violations. However, the record also included information about
defendant’s mental health history, his mental health diagnoses, the abuse he experienced
as a child, that his admission to the section 288 violations occurred when he was still a
minor, and the treatment plan to address defendant’s mental health issues. The record
contained no evidence that defendant committed a section 288 offense or super-strike
offense as an adult.
Considering the entire record and given the high bar for finding that a defendant
poses an unreasonable risk of danger, the trial court found defendant would not pose “an
unreasonable risk to public safety as defined within the statute.” Meaning that he was not
likely to commit a super-strike offense if granted diversion. (Gomez, supra,
113 Cal.App.5th at p. 690; Moine, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 450.) “ ‘ “ ‘An appellate
tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in substituting its judgment for the judgment
of the trial judge.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377.) Because the
record contains substantial evidence to support that finding, we do not disturb it.

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 The cases the People ask us to consider--People v. Superior Court (Taylor) (2026)
118 Cal.App.5th 1153, review denied, May 27, 2026 (Taylor), and People v. Nelson
(Mar. 5, 2026, B342722), review denied and opinion ordered nonpublished June 10,
2026, S296167--do not compel a different result.
Since the People filed their notice of new authorities, our Supreme Court
depublished Nelson. Except in limited circumstances not applicable here, it is improper
to cite or rely on unpublished opinions. (People v. Gray (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 285,
292, fn. 15, citing Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a) & (b).) Therefore, we do not
address Nelson.
Regarding Taylor, we caution that “[w]hen we decide issues of sufficiency of
evidence, comparison with other cases is of limited utility, since each case necessarily
depends on its own facts.” (People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 516.) In Taylor, the
court of appeal reversed the trial court’s order granting diversion because “no expert nor
any other evidence suggested that [defendant] would not pose an unreasonable risk of
danger to public safety if granted diversion.” (Taylor, 118 Cal.App.5th at p. 1167, italics
added.) The evidence in the record indicated “if defendant left a facility and fail[ed] to
take his medication, [both of which he had a history of doing,] he would be at risk of
engaging in violent behavior.” (Ibid.) The record also supported a reasonable inference
that defendant would “abandon aspects of the mental health regimen experts testified
were crucial for him not to pose an unreasonable danger to the public, with potentially
catastrophic consequences.” (Id. at p. 1168.) To the contrary, the record in Taylor
contained no evidence to support the finding that the defendant in that case would not
pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if granted diversion. (Id. at
p. 1167.)
Here, in contrast, the record supports the trial court’s finding that defendant would
not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. (Armstrong, supra, 1 Cal.5th at
p. 450.) Defendant has not committed a super-strike offense as an adult. Moreover,

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defendant’s demeanor and his intellectual functioning support an inference that he did not
plan the robberies and that he is so compromised intellectually that he cannot care for
himself and follows along just to survive. Taken together, the trial court could have
concluded that defendant would not pose “an unreasonable risk to public safety.” Our
substantial evidence inquiry ends there. (Ibid.)
Because we conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that
defendant would not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, we affirm its
finding. (Armstrong, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 450.) We note, however, that the court did
not determine defendant’s suitability for diversion using all four criteria listed in section
1001.36, subdivision (c) after it decided that he was ineligible for diversion. As we are
remanding for a hearing on defendant’s suitability, we direct the court to determine
whether defendant is suitable based on the three remaining criteria in subdivision (c).
DISPOSITION
We conditionally reverse the judgment and remand for a further hearing on
defendant’s suitability for diversion. If the court determines that defendant is suitable for
diversion, it may grant defendant’s application. If the court determines defendant is not
suitable, defendant’s convictions and sentence shall be reinstated.
/s/

WISEMAN, J.
We concur:
/s/
KRAUSE, Acting P. J.
/s/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.

 Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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