Filed 6/25/26 P. v. Andrews CA1/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A173105
v.
MATTHEW LEE ANDREWS, (Humboldt County
Super. Ct. No. CR2401763)
Defendant and Appellant.

A jury convicted Matthew Lee Andrews of two counts of domestic
battery causing corporal injury (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)).1 On appeal,
Andrews challenges the sufficiency of the evidence that he was in a dating
relationship with the victim. He contends that without sufficient evidence of
a dating relationship, both counts should be reduced to simple battery. We
affirm.
BACKGROUND
I. Procedural History
The Humboldt County District Attorney charged Andrews by
information with second degree robbery (§§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c)) and two
counts of domestic battery causing corporal injury (§ 273.5, subd. (a)). Each

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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of the three charges involved the same victim. The information also alleged
Andrews had personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon in one of the
domestic batteries (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)), and it alleged four aggravating
factors.
Before submitting the case to the jury, the superior court dismissed the
robbery count for insufficient evidence pursuant to section 1118.1 and the
corpus delicti rule. The jury found Andrews guilty of both domestic battery
counts, found true that he had personally used a dangerous or deadly
weapon, and found not true the alleged aggravating factors. The court
sentenced Andrews to four years in prison. Andrews timely appealed.
II. The Evidence at Trial
A. The September 27, 2023 Incident
On September 27, 2023, Kammi Loyd was working the night shift at
the Grove, a housing facility owned by the nonprofit Arcata House
Partnership. Near the Grove was an encampment known as “the pit.”
Around 9:40 p.m., Loyd heard “whimpering, kind of someone seeming in
distress” coming from the direction of the pit. She also heard a woman’s voice
say loudly, “ ‘I’ve been fucking stabbed.’ ” The woman repeated the statement
about having been stabbed at least five times. Loyd testified that the woman
sounded “very distressed,” and Loyd said she “could tell that she was
hyperventilating.”
Loyd called 911 and then encountered the woman, referred to at trial
as Jane Doe, outside the Grove. Doe was clutching the top of her forearm,
and her sleeve was bloody. Doe told Loyd that she had been stabbed. After
administering aid, Loyd asked Doe who had stabbed her, and Doe responded,
“ ‘My boyfriend.’ ” Loyd then asked for his name, and Doe identified Matthew
Andrews. Loyd testified that Doe “kept repeating the same thing over and

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over[,] that she couldn’t believe this was done to her by him.” Doe was later
transported to the hospital, where she received eight staples and three
sutures to close the wound.
Three days later, Officer Jared Ault of the Arcata Police Department
arrested Andrews at the pit. When Officer Ault made contact with Andrews,
Andrews and Doe were both inside a tent. Officer Ault testified that it
appeared as though they both lived in the tent. Doe told Officer Ault that the
incident had occurred while she and Andrews were fighting over a blanket
and that it was an accident.
Several months later, Loyd saw Doe walking near the Grove with a
man. Loyd’s coworker commented that Doe was “ ‘with her boyfriend,’ ” but
Loyd did not see who the man was.
B. The May 26, 2024 Incident
About eight months after the stabbing, on May 26, 2024, Doe called 911
from Carlson Park. She told the dispatcher, “My boyfriend punched me in my
eye,” and she identified her boyfriend as Matthew Andrews. Referring to
Andrews with multiple obscenities, Doe said that she wanted Andrews
arrested. Doe also said that she wanted a restraining order, commenting,
“I’m goin’ through with everything this time. Everything.” Officer Efrain
Sanchez, who responded to the 911 call, testified that Doe was “very
distraught” and “crying” when he encountered her. He also observed “a red
mark on her left cheek that was raised, much redder than the right side of
her face.”
On June 3, 2024, Officer Cameron Neff arrested Andrews at an
encampment in Carlson Park. Andrews explained to Officer Neff that about
one week earlier, he had taken $16 from Doe’s wallet, that Doe had been

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upset, and that he “didn’t mean to but [he] punched her in the eye.” Andrews
added that he paid $20 back.
Doe did not testify at trial. The defense presented no evidence.
DISCUSSION
Andrews’ only argument on appeal is that there was insufficient
evidence for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he was in a
dating relationship with Doe, an element of the domestic battery counts, and
that those counts should be reduced to simple battery as a result.
“In evaluating a claim regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, we
review the record ‘in the light most favorable to the judgment below to
determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which
is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v.
Westerfield (2019) 6 Cal.5th 632, 712 (Westerfield).) “ ‘We presume in support
of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier of fact reasonably could
infer from the evidence. [Citation.] If the circumstances reasonably justify
the trier of fact’s findings, reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply
because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a
contrary finding.’ ” (Id. at pp. 712–713.) “ ‘ “ ‘This standard applies whether
direct or circumstantial evidence is involved.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Zgurski (2021)
73 Cal.App.5th 250, 261, quoting People v. Thompson (2010) 49 Cal.4th 79,
113.)
Section 273.5 provides: “A person who willfully inflicts corporal injury
resulting in a traumatic condition upon a victim described in subdivision (b)
is guilty of a felony.” (§ 273.5, subd. (a).) Among other categories of
relationships, subdivision (b) includes “someone with whom the offender has,
or previously had, a[] . . . dating relationship, as defined in paragraph (10) of

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subdivision (f) of Section 243.” (§ 273.5, subd. (b)(3).) That provision, in turn,
defines “ ‘[d]ating relationship’ ” as “frequent, intimate associations primarily
characterized by the expectation of affectional or sexual involvement
independent of financial considerations.” (§ 243, subd. (f)(10).) This
definition “does not require ‘serious courtship,’ an ‘increasingly exclusive
interest,’ ‘shared expectation of growth,’ or that the relationship endures for a
length of time,” but it does contemplate something more than “ ‘a casual
relationship or an ordinary fraternization between [two] individuals in a
business or social context.’ ” (People v. Rucker (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1107,
1117.)
Andrews argues that there is insufficient evidence of a dating
relationship. Specifically, he argues that Doe’s references to him as her
boyfriend, together with evidence that they were seen together up to four
times between September 2023 and May 2024, does not satisfy the statutory
definition, particularly where there is “no evidence of any physical intimacy
and scant evidence of emotional intimacy.” Drawing all reasonable
inferences in favor of the verdict, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient
for the jury to find that Andrews and Doe were in a dating relationship.
The Fourth District’s opinion in People v. Upsher (2007) 155
Cal.App.4th 1311 (Upsher) is instructive. Similar to Andrews’ arguments
here, Upsher contended that his references to the victim as “ ‘my lady
friend’ ” or “ ‘my girl’ ” were insufficient to infer a dating relationship,
including because there was no evidence of the duration of the relationship or
“what they expected of one another.” (Id. at p. 1321.) Our colleagues held
that the evidence of a dating relationship was sufficient. (Id. at p. 1323.) The
victim was at Upsher’s house at 4:30 a.m., and when a security guard
confronted Upsher during the incident, Upsher responded that the guard

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should mind his own business, “permitting the jury to reasonably infer that
the matters between Upsher and [the victim] were private, personal matters,
not events between social acquaintances in an ordinary context.” (Id. at
pp. 1323, 1316.) Both Upsher and the victim were highly emotional,
including yelling obscenities, during the incident. (Id. at p. 1323.) An officer
testified that “Upsher called out to [the victim] using a nickname, ‘You’re
going to do me like this, Tecia,’ indicating familiarity between the two and
Upsher’s feeling of betrayal.” (Ibid.) Finally, Upsher referred to the victim
as “ ‘my lady friend’ ” and “ ‘my girl,’ ” and he testified that he communicated
with her daily. (Ibid.)
Here, Doe referred to Andrews as her boyfriend immediately following
both incidents, which occurred eight months apart. The jury could
reasonably have inferred Doe had interpreted the term “boyfriend” as it is
commonly understood: “a frequent or regular male companion in a romantic
or sexual relationship” (Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, “boyfriend”
[as of June 10,
2026]), or a “male with whom a person has a romantic or sexual relationship;
a male partner or lover” (Oxford English Dictionary, “boyfriend” (noun,
sense 2) [as of June 10, 2026]).
Doe’s consistent references to Andrews as her boyfriend thus supported the
existence of a dating relationship as defined by the Legislature. (See Upsher,
supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 1323 [evidence of dating relationship included
defendant’s references to victim as “ ‘my girl’ ” and “ ‘my lady friend’ ”].)
There also was evidence that Doe repeatedly expressed shock that
Andrews had stabbed her, from which the jury reasonably could have
inferred that Doe felt betrayed by someone with whom she had an intimate,

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trusting relationship. (See Upsher, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 1323
[expression of feeling of betrayal evidence of dating relationship].)
Similarly, Doe was highly emotional following the second incident,
referring to Andrews as a “piece of shit” and a “motherfucker” during the 911
call that was played to the jury. (See Upsher, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1323 [evidence of dating relationship where both parties were highly
emotional and shouting obscenities during incident].) Doe also said she
wanted a restraining order, commenting that she was “goin’ through with
everything this time,” which the jury could have viewed as evidence Doe’s
relationship with Andrews was more than that of a casual acquaintance.
Specifically, the jury could have inferred from these comments that Doe did
not pursue charges or a restraining order against Andrew after the first
incident because she still trusted and felt safe with him, but that that was no
longer true after the second incident. Andrews suggests Doe instead was
upset due to her injuries or the property disputes, but where “different
inferences can be drawn from undisputed facts, we must accept the lower
court’s inference” unless it is “rebutted by clear, positive and uncontradicted
evidence.” (M.A. v. B.F. (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 559, 570 (M.A.).) Andrews has
not met that standard here.
Officer Ault’s testimony that it appeared Doe and Andrews lived
together in the tent further supports the existence of a dating relationship.
Andrews makes two related attacks on this testimony. First, he argues that
“there is absolutely no evidence to support” the conclusion that Doe and
Andrews lived together. That is not so. Although it was limited, there was
evidence supporting Officer Ault’s conclusion. The jury heard evidence that
Doe and Andrews were fighting over a blanket at 9:40 p.m. before the
stabbing, which is consistent with them living together. Officer Ault also

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testified that he found Andrews and Doe together in the tent three days after
the stabbing, which is consistent with cohabitation.
Second, Andrews contends that because Officer Ault did not testify to
the facts underlying his opinion, the jury was required to reject the opinion as
“purely speculative.” But, as Andrews concedes, Evidence Code section 800
permits lay opinion testimony that is “(a) [r]ationally based on the perception
of the witness; and [¶] (b) [h]elpful to a clear understanding of his testimony.”
“For example, testimony that another person was intoxicated [citation] or
angry [citation] or driving a motor vehicle at an excessive speed [citation]
conveys information to the jury more conveniently and more accurately than
would a detailed recital of the underlying facts.” (People v. Chapple (2006)
138 Cal.App.4th 540, 547 (Chapple).)
Andrews does not dispute that Officer Ault personally observed the
interior of the tent or contend that forming an opinion about whether Doe
and Andrews lived there required specialized knowledge. (See People v.
Phillips (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 643, 682 [subject matter of lay opinion must be
“ “ ‘one of such common knowledge that men of ordinary education could
reach a conclusion as intelligently as the witness” ’ ”].) Instead, he asserts
that the opinion is of no value because Officer Ault did not describe specific
observations supporting his opinion. He cites no authority requiring specific
observations. Moreover, such a requirement would conflict with the Supreme
Court’s observation in Chapple that lay opinion testimony is useful precisely
because it “conveys information to the jury more conveniently and more
accurately than would a detailed recital of the underlying facts.” (Chapple,
supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 547.) Officer Ault’s testimony that Doe and
Andrews appeared to live together thus supports the finding of a dating
relationship.

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 Finally, there was circumstantial evidence from which the jury
reasonably could have inferred that Doe and Andrews held themselves out to
the community as boyfriend and girlfriend. Loyd testified that several
months after the first incident, when she and a coworker saw Doe walking
with a man, the coworker commented that Doe was “with her boyfriend.”
Andrews correctly observes that Loyd did not identify Andrews as the man
walking with Doe. Still, a jury reasonably could have found the evidence
tended to support the existence of a dating relationship, given that Doe
referred to Andrews as her boyfriend in the months before and after the
sighting Loyd described and the lack of any evidence Doe dated anyone else
during that time.
Andrews argues that the record here contains less evidence of a dating
relationship than M.A., supra, 99 Cal.App.5th 559, where our colleagues in
the Fourth District affirmed the trial court’s finding of no dating relationship.
In M.A., the trial court determined that a “ ‘friends with benefits’ ”
relationship did not constitute a dating relationship under Family Code
section 6210, which uses the same definition as Penal Code section 243,
subdivision (f)(10). (M.A., at p. 562.) The evidence included that M.A. and
B.F. saw each other in person eight times over 19 months; that while some of
their encounters were sexual, they did not spend time together after having
sex; that B.F. often declined M.A.’s invitations to get together; and that M.A.
sent B.F. messages on social media, to which he often responded with a single
word. (Id. at pp. 563–565, 571.)
Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the judgment, the Fourth
District held that substantial evidence “permitted the court to reasonably
draw an inference that M.A. and B.F. had a casual relationship marked by
brief, sporadic sexual ‘hook ups,’ lacking the ‘emotional and privacy aspects’

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[citation] or the ‘emotional and affectional involvement’ [citation] that mark
frequent, intimate associations.” (M.A., supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at pp. 571,
576.) That does Andrews little good here, where Doe described Andrews as
her boyfriend, the record contains no suggestion the relationship was
anything other than what Doe said it was,2 and—contrary to M.A.—we must
draw inferences in favor of the existence of a dating relationship. (See
Westerfield, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 712.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

TUCHER, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

PETROU, J.
RODRÍGUEZ, J.

2 Andrews argues for the first time in his reply brief that the disputes

over the blanket and $16 constitute “financial considerations,” bringing the
relationship outside the definition of “frequent, intimate associations
primarily characterized by the expectation of affection or sexual involvement
independent of financial considerations.” (§ 243, subd. (f)(10), italics added.)
We need not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief.
(Sierra Club v. City of Orange (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 523, 548.) Even if we
were to consider this one, Andrews cites no authority for the proposition that
a single dispute about money would remove a relationship from the statutory
definition of dating relationship—an outcome we find unlikely.

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