Filed 6/26/26 P. v. Guerra CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F089861
Plaintiff and Appellant,
(Super. Ct. No. F19907205)
v.
TONY GUERRA, MODIFICATION OF OPINION
[NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]
Defendant and Respondent.
THE COURT:
On the court’s own motion, it is ordered that the following modification be made
to the opinion filed herein on June 2, 2026:
1. Delete the text, “Robert Mangano, Judge” from the caption and replace it
with the following text: “Francine Zepeda, Judge.”
There is no change in the judgment.
LEVY, A. P. J.
WE CONCUR:
SNAUFFER, J.
DE SANTOS, J.
Filed 6/2/26 P. v. Guerra CA5 (unmodified opinion)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F089861
Plaintiff and Appellant,
(Super. Ct. No. F19907205)
v.
TONY GUERRA, OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.
THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Robert
Mangano, Judge.
Stephanie L. Gunther, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Respondent.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Ivan P. Marrs, Charlotte
Woodfork, and Galen N. Farris, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
-ooOoo-
* Before Levy, Acting P. J., Snauffer, J. and DeSantos, J.
On March 26, 2025, the trial court granted defendant Tony Guerra’s motion to
suppress evidence and dismissed the case. The People appealed, arguing that the court
erred because the law enforcement officer’s initial contact with defendant was a
consensual encounter that did not trigger scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. We affirm.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
I. The Charges
On October 23, 2019, the District Attorney of Fresno County filed a complaint
charging defendant with possession of a controlled substance while armed with a firearm
(Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1, subd. (a); count 1); possession of a firearm by a felon
(Pen. Code,1 § 29800, subd. (a)(1); counts 2, 3 & 4); possession of ammunition by a
person prohibited from owning a firearm (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1); count 5); and possession
of a switchblade in a vehicle (§ 21510, subd. (a); count 6).
II. The Motion to Suppress
On March 18, 2025, defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence under
section 1538.5. According to defendant, he was in a parked vehicle when a sheriff’s
deputy detained him without reasonable suspicion that he was engaged in criminal
activity. At the time, he was on probation with search and seizure terms. The vehicle
was searched, and deputies found loaded firearms, ammunition, a switch blade, and
methamphetamine. Defendant asked the trial court to suppress all evidence in the case
because it was obtained as a result of the illegal detention.
The prosecutor opposed the motion. The prosecutor did not contend that the
deputy had reasonable suspicion to detain defendant. Instead, the prosecutor argued that
defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated because the contact started as a
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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consensual encounter, and the search was not conducted until after defendant told the
deputy that he was on probation with search and seizure terms.
III. The Evidentiary Hearing
On March 26, 2025, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion to
suppress. The arresting deputy, Joseph Cross, testified at the hearing.
On October 21, 2019, Cross was a patrol deputy at the Fresno County Sheriff’s
Office. At approximately 10:00 p.m., he was dispatched to a convenience store parking
lot because a witness had reported a suspicious vehicle. He located the vehicle and
parked near it. He did not block the vehicle from leaving or activate his red and blue
lights.
Cross approached the vehicle. Defendant was asleep inside. Cross knocked on
the driver’s side window to wake him up. When he knocked, he was positioned in such a
way that he did not block the door from opening. Cross exhibited for the trial court the
movement he made.
After defendant woke up, Cross told defendant that he was a sheriff’s deputy and
that he was responding to a call for service. Defendant identified himself and told Cross
that he was on felony probation with search and seizure terms.
Cross confirmed that defendant was on active probation with search and seizure
terms, and defendant’s vehicle was searched.
IV. The Trial Court’s Ruling
After receiving evidence and hearing argument, the trial court granted the motion
to suppress. It found that Cross detained defendant without reasonable suspicion. In
analyzing whether defendant felt free to leave the encounter, the court found, inter alia:
“[Defendant] [was] asleep, according to [Cross]. And I find it a
reach—he did get up … Cross did get up and show us how he knocked on
the window. Okay. I felt that he really had to stretch out of the way in
order for this defendant to actually open the door. So I didn’t really—I
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didn’t find much credence in that, that he made sure he could go out the
door.”
The trial court suppressed all evidence obtained as a result of the detention and
dismissed the case on its own motion.
V. The Appeal
On May 22, 2025, the People timely filed a notice of appeal. On appeal, the
People argue the trial court erred by granting the motion to suppress because Cross’s
initial contact with defendant was a consensual encounter, not a detention.
DISCUSSION
I. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
“The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the ‘right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures.’ ” (People v. McWilliams (2023) 14 Cal.5th 429, 437, fn. omitted.)
However, “[c]onsensual encounters do not trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny.
[Citation.] Unlike detentions, they require no articulable suspicion that the person has
committed or is about to commit a crime.” (In re Manuel G. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 805, 821.)
“ ‘ “[C]onsensual encounters” [citation], … are those police-individual
interactions which result in no restraint of an individual’s liberty whatsoever—i.e., no
“seizure,” however minimal—and which may properly be initiated by police officers
even if they lack any “objective justification.” ’ [Citation.] The Supreme Court has held
‘that the Fourth Amendment permits police officers to approach individuals at random in
airport lobbies and other public places to ask them questions … so long as a reasonable
person would understand that he or she could refuse to cooperate.’ [Citation.] ‘The
citizen participant in a consensual encounter may leave, refuse to answer questions or
decline to act in the manner requested by the authorities.’ [Citation.] ‘ “Only when the
officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, in some manner restrains the
individual’s liberty, does a seizure occur.” ’ ” (People v. Paul (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 832,
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838 (Paul).) “ ‘ “ ‘[I]n order to determine whether a particular encounter constitutes a
seizure, a court must consider all the circumstances surrounding the encounter to
determine whether the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person
that the person was not free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the
encounter.’ [Citation.] This test assesses the coercive effect of police conduct as a whole,
rather than emphasizing particular details of that conduct in isolation.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 838.)
“ ‘The test for the existence of a show of authority is an objective one and does not
take into account the perceptions of the particular person involved. [Citation.] The test is
“not whether the citizen perceived that he was being ordered to restrict his movement, but
whether the officer’s words and actions would have conveyed that to a reasonable
person.” ’ [Citation.] ‘This includes an examination of both an officer’s verbal and
nonverbal actions in order to “assess[] the coercive effect of police conduct as a whole,
rather than emphasizing particular details of that conduct in isolation.” ’ ” (Paul, supra,
99 Cal.App.5th at pp. 838–839.)
“In ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court must find the historical facts,
select the rule of law, and apply it to the facts in order to determine whether the law as
applied has been violated. [Citation.] We review the court’s resolution of the factual
inquiry under the deferential substantial evidence standard. The ruling on whether the
applicable law applies to the facts is a mixed question of law and fact that is subject to
independent review.” (People v. Ramos (2004) 34 Cal.4th 494, 505.)
II. Analysis
According to the People, “none of the ‘coercive hallmarks of a detention’ were
present” here. The People argue this case is similar to People v. Tacardon (2022) 14
Cal.5th 235 (Tacardon). In Tacardon, a law enforcement officer drove past a legally
parked vehicle which had smoke coming from the windows. (Id. at pp. 238–239.) As the
officer drove past, he saw three people inside the vehicle and made eye contact with
them. (Id. at p. 239.) He “made a U-turn, parked about 15 to 20 feet behind the
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[vehicle], and turned on his spotlight. He did not activate his siren or emergency lights or
issue any commands to the car’s occupants. He sat in his patrol car for 15 to 20 seconds
while he informed dispatch of his location. He then approached the [vehicle] at a
walking pace. He did not draw a weapon.” (Ibid.). The court held that when the officer
began approaching the vehicle on foot, the individual in the driver’s seat (the defendant)
was not detained because the officer’s “conduct up to this point conveyed none of the
coercive hallmarks of a detention.” (Id. at p. 247.) The court declined to decide whether
the contact became a detention at a later point in time. (Id. at pp. 255–256.)
Defendant, on the other hand, argues that this case is similar to Paul, supra, 99
Cal.App.5th 832. In Paul, a law enforcement officer saw a parked vehicle with its lights
on. (Id. at pp. 835–837.) The officer stopped his patrol car alongside the vehicle, and his
partner illuminated the vehicle with a flashlight. (Ibid.) There was one occupant (the
defendant), who was on the phone with a family member. (Ibid.) The officer then
backed up and parked in the middle of the street, with the headlights on. (Ibid.) The
officer approached the driver’s side door on foot, while his partner simultaneously
approached the passenger’s side door. (Ibid.) Both illuminated the vehicle with a
flashlight. (Ibid.) After a brief conversation, the defendant admitted he was on parole.
(Ibid.)
The court held that the defendant was detained prior to his conversation with the
officers based on several factors. (Paul, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 839.) First, the
officers positioned their bodies in such a way that the defendant could not exit the vehicle
through either door or drive away. (Id. at pp. 839–840.) Second, the officers, who
approached from different sides of the vehicle, shined their flashlights into the vehicle’s
windows from close range. (Id. at pp. 839–840.) Finally, “the officers approached [the
defendant] while he was talking on his phone inside a legally parked vehicle with the
windows rolled up. [The defendant] could not reasonably decline to interact with the
officers without suspending or ending his phone conversation and at least engaging in a
6.
brief conversation with them. The circumstances would lead an objectively reasonable
person [to] believe that the officers required their attention and that they could not simply
depart.” (Id. at p. 840.)
Neither case is directly on point (nor could we find a case that is). Tacardon was
focused on conduct that occurred, at the latest, as the officer began to approach the
defendant’s vehicle. (Tacardon, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 247.) And if we also focused
only on conduct that occurred as Cross began to approach defendant’s vehicle, we would
agree with the People that no detention occurred. Cross did not block defendant’s vehicle
with his vehicle, nor did he activate his emergency lights (or even a spotlight). Also, he
did not rush toward defendant’s vehicle or draw his gun. However, as discussed below,
relevant conduct occurred after Cross reached defendant’s vehicle, and Tacardon is not on
point as to the effect of that conduct.
As to Paul, it is not directly on point because that case involved two officers who
approached from different sides of the defendant’s vehicle and who both shined their
flashlights into the vehicle. (Paul, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 835.) Here, there was
only one officer, and he did not use a flashlight.
However, Paul does have relevant similarities to our case. First, as in Paul, Cross
prevented defendant from leaving the vehicle by blocking the door with his body.2
Second, while defendant was not on a phone call, he was asleep in his legally parked
vehicle, at night, with his window up. Cross subsequently woke defendant from his
slumber by knocking on the window. Given this factual background, like in Paul, “[t]he
2 The People repeatedly refer to Cross’s testimony that he was not blocking the door
as a reason to find defendant was not detained. However, the trial court specifically
found that this testimony, which included Cross exhibiting for the court how he knocked
on the window, was not credible. The People do not argue this finding is unsupported by
substantial evidence or otherwise explain why we should reject the finding. Accordingly,
we defer to the court’s factual finding. (People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186, 1215
[under the substantial evidence standard, “ ‘[w]e do not reweigh evidence or reevaluate a
witness’s credibility’ ”].)
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circumstances would lead an objectively reasonable person [to] believe that the officer[]
required [his] attention and that [he] could not simply depart.” (Paul, supra, 99
Cal.App.5th at p. 840.)
Moreover, Cross was admittedly conducting an investigation into a report of a
suspicious vehicle.3 This, in and of itself, is not relevant. (Tacardon, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 242.) However, Cross also told defendant he was “responding to a call for service.”
This is relevant. Given that Cross had just woken defendant from his slumber, and that
defendant did not place the call for service, Cross’s statement would have placed an
objectively reasonable person on alert that Cross might be investigating him specifically,
which would lead that reasonable person to conclude that Cross required his attention and
he could not simply depart. (See, e.g., Wilson v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 777,
790–791; People v. Linn (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 46, 58, 65.)
Accordingly, while this is a close case, given the deferential standard of review we
apply to the trial court’s factual findings, that Cross woke defendant from his slumber
while he was legally parked with his window up, that Cross was blocking the vehicle’s
door when he woke defendant, and that Cross’s statement would have placed an
objectively reasonable person on alert that Cross might be investigating him specifically,
we affirm the trial court’s ruling.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
3 The People appear to assert that Cross may have been conducting a wellness
check, not an investigation. However, this assertion is not supported by evidence in the
record. In fact, Cross specifically stated that he “knocked on the window due to that
being the only vehicle that matched the description [of the suspicious vehicle], and being
advised that the vehicle was still currently there.”
8.
