Filed 6/29/26 P. v. Harrington CA1/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A172744
v.
VINCENT SHAWN HARRINGTON, (City and County of San
Defendant and Appellant. Francisco
Super. Ct. No. 24012603)

A San Francisco police officer detained defendant Vincent Harrington
because he was clutching at his waistline area and hunching over
suspiciously in a neighborhood known for frequent shootings. When
Harrington moved his hands toward his sweatshirt pocket during the
detention, the officer conducted a pat search and found a gun. After a
magistrate denied Harrington’s motion to suppress the gun, he pled no
contest to numerous firearm offenses. On appeal, Harrington reprises his
suppression claim, arguing that both the detention and the pat search were
unlawful. We affirm.

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 BACKGROUND
Harrington was charged by complaint with (1) possession of a firearm
by a felon (Pen. Code,1 § 29800, subd. (a)(1)); (2) illegal possession or
transportation of a machine gun (§ 32625, subd. (a)), carrying a loaded
firearm (§ 25850, subd. (a)), carrying a concealed firearm (§ 25400,
subd. (a)(2)), and possession of ammunition (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1)). The
complaint further alleged several aggravating factors and that the offenses
were committed while Harrington was on bail pursuant to section 12022.1,
subdivision (b). Harrington filed a motion to suppress evidence under section
1538.5. The magistrate held a combined preliminary hearing and evidentiary
hearing on Harrington’s motion to suppress.
I.
Evidence at the Preliminary Hearing
Officer Chris Leong testified that on July 8, 2024, he was working
under the Crime Gun Investigations Center (CGIC) of the San Francisco
Police Department. Officer Leong had been a police officer for 18 years and
received firearm training, including to identify concealed firearms. During
the nearly three years Officer Leong had been assigned to the CGIC, he had
participated in “well over dozens” of firearm abatement operations and made
“over dozens” of firearm-related arrests. To spot concealed firearms, he
testified that he was trained to look for “certain mannerisms,” such as a
subject “clutching [their] waistband,” “walk[ing] with one arm . . . to hold [the
firearm] in place,” “manipulat[ing] anything, [in] areas where weapons or
firearms typically are concealed” such as “hoodie pockets” and “front
waistband areas.” He also testified that “[t]ypically” a subject’s “movement

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless

otherwise indicated.

2
towards the lower body area . . . usually [is] a sign for [him] that [the subject
is] currently armed.”
Around 7:27 p.m. on July 8, 2024, Officer Leong was on assignment
with Sergeant Moran and another officer in an unmarked vehicle “doing
violence suppression” in a neighborhood that Officer Leong knew had high
gun violence. It was still daylight outside, and the officers were not
responding to any shooting or known criminal activity at that time. Officer
Leong heard Sergeant Moran announce that he was watching a person
walking across the street while gripping his waistband and who Sergeant
Moran believed was armed.2
“After [Sergeant] Moran made that comment, [Officer Leong] observed
a subject wearing a black hoodie walking across the street holding on to his
waistband area.” The subject—later identified as Harrington—was wearing
a black hooded sweatshirt with a large pocket on the front, and he was
walking with two other men in the opposite direction of the officers’ direction
of travel. “At a certain point,” Officer Leong observed Harrington “clutching
his waistband” and “[m]omentarily” stop while “kind of like leaning forward,
like, hunching over” before continuing to walk. Harrington did not
continuously clutch at or keep his hand on his waistband, as Officer Leong
also saw Harrington walk with both of his hands out and visible. Harrington
looked at the officers’ unmarked car as they drove by him.
Based on “[t]he fact that [Harrington] was holding his waistband area
and leaning forward,” Officer Leong believed Harrington was armed with a
concealed firearm. Officer Leong never saw a bulge in Harrington’s

2 Defense counsel objected on hearsay grounds, which the magistrate

overruled with the understanding that Officer Leong’s testimony regarding
Sergeant Moran’s statement was not offered “for the truth of the matter, but
to explain why [Officer Leong] did what he did.”

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waistband area. Officer Leong did not state that he observed Harrington
manipulate or grasp anything other than his waistband.
The driver of the officers’ vehicle turned and stopped behind the men,
and all three officers got out of the unmarked car. None drew their firearms
as they exited the vehicle and approached the three pedestrians. While
Officer Leong believed Harrington was armed, Officer Leong testified that he
did not have his “firearm at the low ready” because he “did not believe it was
in a threatening manner towards [him].”
Officer Leong ordered Harrington to put his hands up, and Harrington
complied. As Officer Leong approached Harrington, Officer Leong asked
“what he just placed in his pocket,” to which Harrington replied he had
“ ‘nothing.’ ” In the moment following his response, Harrington’s hands
dropped down to the level of the pocket area of his sweatshirt. Officer Leong
again ordered Harrington to put his hands up, which he obeyed.
Officer Leong then conducted a pat search on Harrington’s front
waistband area. He felt the butt of a firearm, so he lifted Harrington’s
sweatshirt and pulled out a handgun with an auto sear switch.
II.
The Magistrate’s Ruling
The magistrate denied the defense’s motion to suppress, finding that
Officer Leong conducted a lawful stop and a lawful search. The magistrate
began by stating that Officer Leong’s observations of Harrington provided
reasonable suspicion for a temporary detention, “whether . . . consider[ed] . . .
in conjunction with [Sergeant] Moran’s statement or not.” Specifically, the
magistrate determined that Officer Leong’s observation that “Harrington was
clutching his waistband” “tilt[ed] in favor of denying the motion to suppress.”

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The magistrate emphasized that Sergeant Moran and Officer Leong’s
observations were “essentially the same” and “essentially consistent.”
The magistrate also determined it was “fair to consider” that Officer
Leong and his unit were conducting an operation with the “purpose . . . to
arrest people or look for folks who were . . . concealing weapons.” The
magistrate further observed that Officer Leong stopped Harrington and not
the other two men walking with Harrington, stating “there must have been
something that caused Officer Leong to concern himself with [Harrington].”
Turning to the pat search, the magistrate said that “the fact that Mr.
Harrington, after being told to put his hands up and did not do that and put
his hand towards the area of his waistband, suggests to me that that gave the
officer reasonable suspicion to pat search.” The magistrate believed it was “a
very close call,” but it articulated two factors it found compelling: (1) Officer
Leong’s “explanations for why he decided to conduct the investigatory stop”;
and (2) the absence of evidence showing that Officer Leong or his partners
stopped or searched the two men Harrington was walking with. Accordingly,
the magistrate held Harrington to answer.
III.
Later Proceedings
The prosecution filed an information charging Harrington with the
same charges as in the complaint. Harrington moved to set aside the
information pursuant to section 995, arguing the magistrate erred by denying
his motion to suppress. The trial court denied the motion.
As part of a negotiated disposition, Harrington pled guilty to the
charges and admitted the aggravating factor that he was armed with a
weapon at the time of the offense. The trial court placed Harrington on
formal probation for a period of two years. As a condition of probation, the

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court ordered that Harrington serve one year in county jail with credit for
time served. The court suspended imposition of sentence, stayed counts 2–5
pursuant to section 654, and dismissed the on-bail enhancement allegations.
Harrington appealed.
DISCUSSION
Harrington contends that Officer Leong lacked reasonable suspicion to
detain him or to subsequently pat search him. We disagree.
I.
Standard of Review and Legal Principles
“ ‘On appeal from a section 995 review of the denial of a defendant's
motion to suppress, we review the determination of the magistrate at the
preliminary hearing.’ ” (People v. Wallace (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 82, 88.) In
doing so, we defer to the magistrate’s factual findings, express or implied,
when supported by substantial evidence, and we view the record in the light
most favorable to the challenged ruling. (People v. Smith (2010) 190
Cal.App.4th 572, 576; People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362.) “We
exercise our independent judgment to determine whether, on the facts found
and those which are undisputed, the search and seizure was reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment.” (Smith, at p. 576.)
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees
“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .” This right applies
to brief investigatory stops and frisks. (United States v. Cortez (1981) 449
U.S. 411, 417 (Cortez); Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 20.) “A detention is
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the detaining officer can
point to specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the
circumstances, provide some objective manifestation that the person detained

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may be involved in criminal activity.” (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224,
231 (Souza); Cortez, supra, 449 U.S. at p. 417.) Similarly, the detaining
officer may conduct a limited pat search for weapons only when articulable
facts give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the subject is armed and
dangerous. (In re H.M. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 136, 143; Terry, at p. 24.)
The reasonable suspicion standard is not susceptible to a bright line
rule against which we can measure the reasonableness of a detention.
(Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 238.) The detaining officer “must be able to
articulate something more than an ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion
or “hunch,” ’ ” but the level of suspicion required is “less than is necessary for
probable cause.” (United States v. Sokolow (1989) 490 U.S. 1, 7 [defining
probable cause as “ ‘a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime
will be found’ ”].) “ ‘Courts have used a variety of terms to capture the elusive
concept of what cause is sufficient to authorize police to stop a person. Terms
like “articulable reasons” and “founded suspicion” are not self-defining; they
fall short of providing clear guidance dispositive of the myriad factual
situations that arise. But the essence of all that has been written is that the
totality of the circumstances—the whole picture—must be taken into account.
Based upon that whole picture the detaining officers must have a
particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person
stopped of criminal activity.’ ” (Souza, at p. 230.)
“ ‘The idea that an assessment of the whole picture must yield a
particularized suspicion contains two elements, each of which must be
present before a stop is permissible.’ [Citation.] The first is that the
assessment must be based on all of the circumstances, including objective
observations, information from police reports, and ‘consideration of the modes
or patterns of operation of certain kinds of lawbreakers.’ [Citation.] From

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these data, the court said, a trained police officer could draw inferences “that
might well elude an untrained person.’
“ ‘The second element contained in the idea that an assessment of the
whole picture must yield a particularized suspicion is the concept that the
process just described must raise a suspicion that the particular individual
being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing.’ [Citation.] Stated another way,
there must be ‘some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is
about to be, engaged in criminal activity.’ ” (Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at
pp. 237–238, quoting Cortez, supra, 449 U.S. at p. 418.)
II.
The Investigatory Stop Was Lawful
Harrington argues that Officer Leong’s observations of him gripping his
waistband as he walked across the street and holding his waistband area as
he bent over were too thin to justify an investigatory stop. We disagree
because Officer Leong specified the salience of Harrington’s mannerisms
given his experience and expertise.
We first discuss the relevance of the factors considered by the
magistrate to the Fourth Amendment inquiry. The magistrate expressly
found: (1) Officer Leong observed Harrington “clutching his waistband”;
(2) Officer Leong’s unit’s purpose included looking for individuals carrying
concealed weapons; (3) Officer Leong did not indiscriminately detain all
individuals when he stopped Harrington. Officer Leong’s testimony supplies
substantial evidence for those findings, and—based on the second articulated
factor—we also find that the magistrate made implied findings that the
detention occurred in a high-crime area and that Officer Leong was trained in

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identifying concealed firearms based on an individual’s mannerisms and
manner of walking.3
A suspect’s “ [p]resence in an area of expected criminal activity’ ” is
relevant to whether the totality of the circumstances justify a detention.
(People v. Flores (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1032, 1044 (Flores).) “But ‘standing alone,
[it] is not enough to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion that the
person is committing a crime.’ ” (Ibid.; see Brown v. Texas (1979) 443 U.S.
47, 52 [“The fact that appellant was in a neighborhood frequented by drug
users, standing alone, is not a basis for concluding that appellant himself was
engaged in criminal conduct”].) Moreover, because “[t]he ‘high crime area’
factor is not an ‘activity’ of an individual” and is susceptible to abuse, courts
must be cautious before concluding that “a location’s crime rate transforms
otherwise innocent-appearing circumstances into circumstances justifying
the seizure of an individual.” (People v. Bower (1979) 24 Cal.3d 638, 645,
superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in People v. Lloyd (1992) 4
Cal.App.4th 724, 733.) With this in mind, Harrington’s presence in an area
known for gun violence is a relevant factor.
However, neither the “purpose” of Officer Leong’s CGIC assignment nor
the magistrate’s finding that the officers did not detain the two individuals

3 The magistrate also admitted Sergeant Moran’s statement to Officer

Leong that Harrington “was gripping his waistband,” which it understood as
not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted but “to explain why the
officer did what he did.” However, the magistrate suggested the admissibility
of Sergeant Moran’s statements was academic because his observations were
duplicative of Officer Leong’s and Officer Leong had reasonable suspicion
regardless of whether it considered Sergeant Moran’s statement. For the
same reason, we need not resolve the admissibility of Sergeant Moran’s
statement either.

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with Harrington are relevant here.4 Neither fact is an objective observation
or an inference based on objective data from which Officer Leong could have
developed reasonable suspicion that Harrington was engaged in criminal
activity. Moreover, the record shows that Officer Leong was in a high-crime
area and was trained in identifying concealed firearms because of his CGIC
assignment’s purpose. Therefore, considering his assignment’s “purpose”
would give those factors undue weight.
Officer Leong’s observation that Harrington “clutch[ed] his waistband”
is relevant to a reasonable officer’s suspicion. And Officer Leong observed
more than Harrington merely touching his waistband; Officer Leong watched
Harrington momentarily stop walking to bend or lean over while “holding his
waistband area.” Such conduct is probative of an officer’s reasonable
suspicion when considered in light of the detaining officer’s experience and
training. (See United States v. Briggs (10th Cir. 2013) 720 F.3d 1281, 1288–
1289; id. at p. 1288, fn. 4, and cases cited; see also People v. Montague (N.Y.
App.Div. 1991) 175 A.D.2d 54, 55 [“We can hardly ignore what is apparent to
probably every police officer, that a handgun is often carried in the
waistband”].)
A trained police officer may draw inferences “ ‘that might well elude an
untrained person,’ ” but “the officer must articulate that experience and
expertise as an objective circumstance justifying the detention.” (Flores,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 1046.) Officer Leong did so here. First, Officer Leong
testified to his classroom instruction and field experience, including his
participation in “well over dozens” of firearm abatement operations and the

4 Whether the magistrate erred in finding that the officers only

detained Harrington was raised at the hearing on Harrington’s motion to set
aside the information.

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“[n]umerous times” he had seen suspects grabbed their waistband before
being apprehended for a firearm arrest. Even more pointedly, Officer Leong
articulated that a suspect “holding his waistband area and leaning forward”
was a specific mannerism that he had seen before when the suspect was
carrying a concealed firearm in their waistband area. Thus, Officer Leong’s
training and experience explains the salience of Harrington’s mannerisms.
We further observe that the transcript indicates that Officer Leong
demonstrated how Harrington bent over and held his waistband area during
his cross-examination and redirect. From this we may infer that the
magistrate made an implied finding that the demonstrated movement would
heighten a reasonable officer’s suspicion. (See People v. Harrington (1970) 2
Cal.3d 991, 995–996 [superior court entitled to rely on magistrate’s
interpretation of defendant’s gesture after magistrate asked the officer to
demonstrate it].)
Based on the totality of the relevant factors, Officer Leong had
reasonable suspicion to detain Harrington. Specifically, it was objectively
reasonable for Officer Leong to entertain a suspicion that Harrington was
illegally carrying a concealed firearm considering: (1) Harrington was in an
area known for frequent shootings; (2) Harrington was clutching at his
waistband and at one point held onto his waistband area while bending over;
and (3) Harrington’s mannerisms were typical of firearm concealment in light
of Officer Leong’s extensive training and experience. Despite possible
innocuous explanations for Harrington’s mannerisms, it is well established
that conduct consistent with criminal behavior supports reasonable suspicion
to detain even if the conduct also is consistent with innocent behavior.
(Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 233; see Illinois v. Wardlow (2000) 528 U.S.
119, 125 [“ambiguous” conduct “susceptible of an innocent explanation” may

11
still heighten a reasonable officer's suspicion and justify a detention to
resolve the ambiguity]; see also United States v. Briggs, supra, 720 F.3d 1281,
1288, fn. 4 [“Common sense suggests that pockets are often used to carry all
manner of items. The same cannot be said of a person’s waistline”].)
Therefore, the investigatory stop was legal.
We are not persuaded by Harrington’s contention that Officer Leong’s
observations merely amounted to a “hunch.” Harrington notes that Officer
Leong testified that he did not see a bulge at Harrington’s waistline and that
Officer Leong did not testify one way or the other whether it appeared that
Harrington manipulated or adjusted an object when he clutched at this
waistline. While such observations would have supplied Officer Leong with
more cause to be suspicious that Harrington was involved in criminal
activity,5 the absence of such evidence is not dispositive.
Nor are we persuaded that the present circumstances are analogous to
those at issue in Flores, supra, 15 Cal.5th 1032. In Flores, the officers were
on patrol at around 10:00 p.m. in an area considered to be a “ ‘known

5 Many cases have held that an investigatory stop was justified, at least

in part, on an officer’s observation of a bulge at a suspect’s waistline area
(e.g., Garcia v. Superior Court (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 803, 820–821
[magistrate could infer detention was lawful based on officer’s observation of
“four men, one a known gang associate holding a bulge at his waistband,
walking together and then dispersing upon espying a police cruiser”]; United
States v. Bontemps (9th Cir. 2020) 977 F.3d 909, 915 [“a bulge that appears to
be a concealed firearm can form the basis for a Terry stop in a jurisdiction
where carrying a concealed weapon is presumptively unlawful”]), of a
suspect’s manipulation of an unseen object (e.g., United States v. Padilla (2d
Cir. 2008) 548 F.3d 179, 189 [lawful stop where defendant “adjust[ed] a
weighty object concealed at the center of his waistline”]), or of the appearance
that the suspect was holding a heavy object in his waistband (People v.
Lindsey (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1390, 1393 [“it appeared there was
something heavy in [suspect’s] pocket or waistline” and his “hand was on his
waistline for the entire time [the officer] observed him walking”]).

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narcotic[s] area[ ]’ and ‘gang hangout.’ ” (Id. at p. 1038.) The officers saw the
defendant standing alone by a Nissan parked at a red curb. (Id. at pp. 1038–
1039.) Upon seeing the officers, the defendant acted “ ‘suspiciously’ ” by
trying to “ ‘conceal himself from the police’ ” and “ ‘pretending to tie his
shoe.’ ” (Id. at p. 1039.) Based on his behavior, the detaining officer believed
the defendant was “ ‘loitering for the use or sale of narcotics.’ ” (Ibid.) The
California Supreme Court explained that the standard for suspicion
justifying a “ ‘detention is not satisfied simply because a person’s behavior is
‘odd.’ ” (Id. at p. 1045.) The court expounded: “Notably, [the officer] did not
see [defendant] engage in any conduct suggesting he was there to buy or sell
drugs or was otherwise involved in illegal conduct.” (Ibid.) In the case at
bar, by contrast, Officer Leong articulated that Harrington was “holding his
waistband area and leaning forward” in a manner that indicated he was
concealing a firearm based on Officer Leong’s training and experience.
III.
The Pat Search Was Lawful
Even if the detention was lawful, Harrington contends Officer Leong
lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct a pat search. Again, we disagree.
“The ‘sole justification’ of the patsearch ‘is the protection of the police
officer and others nearby.’ [Citation.] Its purpose ‘is not to discover evidence
of crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his [or her] investigation without
fear of violence.’ ” (In re Jeremiah S. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 299, 304.) Thus,
“the right to conduct a patdown search of a detained person requires a
separate type of suspicion” than that required for an investigatory detention.
(People v. Parrott (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 485, 495.)
“The validity of a patsearch depends on the totality of the
circumstances and turns on whether ‘a reasonably prudent [person] in the

13
circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his [or her] safety or that
of others was in danger.’ ” (In re Jeremiah S., supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at
p. 305.) “Considerations relevant to this inquiry typically include visible
bulges or baggy clothing that suggest a hidden weapon; sudden movements or
attempts to reach for an object that is not immediately visible; evasive and
deceptive responses to an officer’s questions about what the individual was
doing; and unnatural hand postures that suggest an effort to conceal a
weapon. [Citation.] Other relevant circumstances can include the type of
crime at issue; the detained individual’s suspected involvement in such a
crime; and the searching officer’s experience with such crimes and their
associated weapon use in the particular location of the detention.” (Ibid.)
After Harrington complied with Officer Leong’s order to put his hands
up, Officer Leong approached Harrington and asked what he had just placed
in his pocket, to which Mr. Harrington responded: “Nothing.” Then
Harrington’s hands quickly dropped, reaching the pocket area of his
sweatshirt before Officer Leong again ordered Harrington to put his hands
up.
These circumstances are enough for a reasonable prudent person to
believe Harrington was armed and dangerous. Officer Leong already
reasonably suspected Harrington was illegally carrying a concealed firearm,
which is “an important fact in considering the totality of the circumstances”
(In re Jeremiah S., supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 307), and then Harrington
suddenly moved his hands down toward the area where Officer Leong
believed Harrington carried the firearm.6

6 The magistrate did not mistakenly find that Harrington touched his

waistband, as Harrington contends; rather it stated that Harrington “put his
hand towards the area of his waistband,” which is accurate.

14
 Harrington’s benign explanation that his action was a “reflexive, non-
verbal cue used to reinforce his statement that he had not placed anything in
his pocket” is unavailing. The standard is what a reasonably prudent person
would believe under the circumstances. Nor is this a case where the officer
frisked Harrington due to a “furtive gesture” indicative of hiding contraband,
as Harrington suggests. Harrington’s movement was in front of Officer
Leong and, in the context of the Officer Leong’s observations and experience,
would give rise to a reasonable belief that Harrington was reaching for a
weapon.
Harrington’s authorities do not help him either. It is true that he did
not repeatedly disobey an officer’s orders, like the defendants in People v.
Lopez (2014) 119 Cal.App.4th 132 and In re Frank V. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d
1232. But that is not required to justify a pat search.
Harrington’s reliance on United States v. Elmore (D. Mass. 2019) 382
F.Supp.3d 136 is also misplaced. There, the officers were investigating
suspected gang shootings when they saw the defendant, “who had a prior
firearm arrest and was a known affiliate of the suspected gang,” walk away
when the officers approached. (Id. at p. 141.) On those facts alone, the court
held “[t]here was ample reasonable suspicion” to detain the defendant. (Id. at
p. 142.) The officers further observed that the defendant “reached towards
his waistband several times,” acted nervously, and there was “a bulge in the
front of [defendant’s] pants.” (Ibid.) The court held that “[t]hose
observations, combined with [the officers’] training and experience and other
known facts, provided more than reasonable suspicion to frisk defendant for a
weapon . . . .” (Ibid., italics added.) Thus, by its own terms, Elmore did not
set the floor for determining reasonable suspicion to justify a pat search.

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 DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

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 _________________________
Sweet, J.*

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Brown, P. J.

_________________________
Goldman, J.

A172744/People v. Harrington

* Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Marin, assigned

by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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