Filed 6/29/26 Bayer v. Guttbinder CA1/2
Opinion following rehearing
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

EVE BAYER,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A175180

v. (Alameda County Super. Ct.
STEVEN GUTTBINDER, No. HF19029664)
Defendant and Appellant.

Steven Guttbinder and Eve Bayer were once married and have one
child. Bayer petitioned for dissolution in 2019, and the family court entered a
judgment of dissolution in 2021. The parties have been litigating ongoing
custody issues in family court and this court. This particular appeal by
Guttbinder is from the family court’s Findings and Order After Hearing filed
on June 27, 2025 (the challenged order).1 Guttbinder contends that the
family court erred in imposing sanctions against him and by admitting and

1 There are other appeals pending, including case number A174545.

And there have been writs in case numbers A174763 and A174883.

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relying on a letter from the parties’ parenting coordinator announcing she
was terminating her services. We affirm.2
BACKGROUND
In December 2024, Guttbinder filed an Ex Parte Request for Order.
Guttbinder requested changes to child custody and visitation and the removal
of Jamie Duddy as parenting coordinator.
Bayer opposed the Ex Parte Request for Order. In her responsive
declaration to Guttbinder’s Ex Parte Request for Order, Bayer checked the
box next to “ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS” and noted: “(FC §271
SANCTIONS RESERVED),” and in her accompanying memorandum of
points and authorities, Bayer reiterated the point.3 Bayer filed an updated
statement of issues on April 1, 2025, and once again stated she had “sought
reservation over § 271 sanctions for [Guttbinder’s] unsupported and harmful
[Request for Order],” adding that, at the hearing, she would seek the fees she
had “incurred since December 2024 to defend herself against his [Request for
Order], totaling $25,386.”
In his reply to Bayer’s update, Guttbinder requested that the family
court deny Bayer’s request for attorney’s fees and instead award him
attorney’s fees and costs as sanctions against Bayer pursuant to section 271.
After the hearing date was continued, in an update filed on May 6,
2025, Bayer “reiterate[d] the requests she made in her April 1, 2025 pleading,
including . . . her request for $25,386 in Section 271 fees to oppose
[Guttbinder]’s [Request for Order].”

2 On June 12, 2026, Guttbinder filed a motion to augment and/or

correct the record and a petition for rehearing. We granted his motion, and
his petition for rehearing.
3 All undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.

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 On May 13, 2025, the family court held a hearing on Guttbinder’s Ex
Parte Request for Order. The hearing transcript runs 17 pages. The family
court asked Guttbinder about his financial situation. Guttbinder stated that
he had about $20,000 of cash in his account, and that his gross monthly
income was “zero” because he did event work, had just finished a job, and was
“in between jobs.”
The family court questioned Guttbinder about allegations in Bayer’s
papers that he had made inappropriate statements to their child. Guttbinder
admitted that he told their child: “I’m doing everything I can. I’m spending
more money to see you more and one day you’ll understand why this whole
court thing is a thing.” Guttbinder also admitted that, in February, he told
their child: “I’m pretty sure I’ll be at your [birthday] party. I just have to
triple check some things with Mommy and her lawyer.” The family court
observed: “[E]ven when it’s been established that please don’t talk about the
court case . . . or attorneys . . . to the child, those things are still
happening. . . . [I]t’s still a problem. . . . [A] child shouldn’t have to hear
things like this and I need to see improvements in that regard.” The family
court also stated: “What would he be saying if there was no [visitation]
supervisor there. I’d be concerned about that.”
The family court concluded that it was “not going to order a step-up [in
parenting time] . . . at this time,” although it later noted: “I’m not saying you
could never have a step-up in time, but from what I’m seeing right now there
are still problems here that aren’t addressed and I’m concerned about
increasing time or making it unsupervised.”4

4 The family court made other observations in connection with custody

and visitation. For example, the family court stated: “[T]here’s evidence of
issues that are still not being resolved. [¶] Many of the issues identified by
Dr. Chambers still appear to remain[:] deflecting or reassigning blame,

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 Near the outset of the hearing, when the family court stated that it had
reviewed the letter in which Jamie Duddy withdrew as parenting
coordinator, Guttbinder objected. Asked for the basis of his objection,
Guttbinder replied: “On the fact that it was supplied yesterday.” The family
court responded: “[I]t’s not like this was provided two months ago and it was
just withheld and nobody saw it. The letter was to both of you at the same
time. You both had equal access to it and it was recently drafted and it’s
relevant. So, frankly, I’m glad I saw it.” When Guttbinder asked for
clarification if the court was “talking about the one that happened on May
12th that occurred after they withdrew her testimony on May 7th,” the family
court replied: “The letter where she says that she’s no longer working with
this family and why.” When the family court stated that it did not
understand his objection, Guttbinder stated: “The fact that I did not have a
chance to review it and rebut the fact that most of it is not true. [¶] . . .
[¶] . . . For one, it was submitted directly to not just me and [Bayer], but also
to . . . [Bayer’s] counsel and not to my counsel without any knowledge of them
not being my counsel anymore which I think is very interesting in terms of
timing.” “[T]he whole entire letter starts off as a financial dispute which
already makes it very biased. The fact that the letter came just days after
[Bayer] no longer require[s] her testimony, I think is just interesting timing
in terms of providing this to the Court. It seems like in the 11th hour: Let’s
just get this in and let’s not have [me] have the ability to cross-examine her
in front of you. [¶] And it terminates the letter also having her . . . back-door

engaging in conflict all the time, justifying wrongdoing. I see [it] in
[Guttbinder’s] own papers. I see it in his responses in his testimony today.
It’s [Bayer’s] fault for things. It’s ineffective counselors for years. . . . It’s the
[parenting coordinator’s] fault.”

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ability to say . . . I don’t think that he should move up in the plan whatsoever
having never spoken to any of the [visitation] supervisors or [been] given the
reports [of] any of those [visitation] supervisors and also not taking into
account any of the work that I’ve been doing. It’s a completely a one-sided
letter.”5
The family court then granted Guttbinder’s request to remove Duddy
as parenting coordinator. The family court stated: “[T]he reason I’m taking
Ms. Duddy out of the equation is, number one, she seems to have terminated
her services anyway and I can’t force her to be in there if she’s not being paid
and no one’s showing up. But, you know, Mr. Guttbinder also doesn’t want to
work with her anymore and doesn’t go to the appointments anymore and
didn’t allow her to talk to his counsel. And if I had ordered that both parties
continue to work with her or a different [parenting coordinator], I could see
the same thing happening. . . . Co-parenting counseling has been attempted
numerous times and isn’t working anymore.”
At the end of the hearing, the family court stated: “[T]here’s a request
for sanctions. [¶] And, frankly, I think sanctions are warranted.” The family
court noted: “[T]his should not had been filed as an ex parte. . . . [T]hat’s not
what emergency ex parte requests are for. . . . It resulted in additional
pleadings that didn’t really have to be filed in this case as well.” The family
court concluded: “I’m going to order [sanctions] in the amount of $5000 . . . to
be paid . . . directly to . . . [Bayer’s] counsel. [¶] . . . [E]veryone’s got their

5 Guttbinder represented himself at the May 13, 2025 hearing and

conceded in response to a comment by the family court that his counsel had
substituted out on May 2 and was no longer his counsel when Duddy sent the
letter to the parties and Bayer’s counsel.

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positions. I don’t find them to be completely unreasonable so I’m not going to
order additional sanctions on top of that.”
The family court issued a written order, filed on June 27, 2025. Among
other things, and as stated at the hearing, the family court granted
Guttbinder’s request to remove Jamie Duddy as parenting coordinator (and
Duddy’s request to withdraw), denied Guttbinder’s request for unsupervised
parenting time, and did not order a custodial “step-up.” The family court
ordered Guttbinder to pay $5,000 in attorney fees to Bayer’s counsel’s office,
and denied Bayer’s request for additional sanctions. The court found that
sanctions were “warranted in this matter, as the issues were not emergencies
and therefore not needed on an ex parte basis,” and “a custodial step-up plan
not going up quickly enough is not considered an emergency.”
Guttbinder appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Principles of Appellate Practice
“ ‘A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct. All
intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to
which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown. This is not
only a general principle of appellate practice but an ingredient of the
constitutional doctrine of reversible error.’ [Citations.]” (Denham v. Superior
Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) “[T]he burden is on an appellant to
demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that
the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment.
(Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609 (Jameson); Contra Costa County
v. Pinole Point Properties, LLC (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 914, 925 (Contra
Costa County) [“The appellant has the burden of demonstrating prejudicial
error based on an adequate record and appropriate legal argument”].) “ ‘In

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the absence of a contrary showing in the record, all presumptions in favor of
the trial court’s action will be made by the appellate court. . . .’ [Citation.]”
(Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 609.)
“ ‘As an aspect of the presumption that judicial duty is properly
performed [Evid. Code, § 664], we presume . . . that the court knows and
applies the correct statutory and case law [citation] and is able to distinguish
admissible from inadmissible evidence, relevant from irrelevant facts, and to
recognize those facts which properly may be considered in the judicial
decisionmaking process.’ [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of Davenport (2011) 194
Cal.App.4th 1507, 1526 (Davenport).) “Stated another way, a trial court is
presumed to ignore material it knows is incompetent, irrelevant, or
inadmissible.” (Ibid.) “Only proof that the evidence actually figured in the
court’s decision will overcome these presumptions.” (Ibid.)
These principles apply even when parties represent themselves, as
Guttbinder and Bayer do here on appeal, because “[w]e treat a party who
represents himself on appeal as we would any other party or attorney.” (See
Denny v. Arntz (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 914, 920.)
B. Analysis
1. Sanctions
We cannot find that the family court erred in imposing sanctions, as
Guttbinder contends. Guttbinder first argues that the family court failed to
identify the statute under which it was imposing sanctions in the challenged
order, and thereby “deprived [him] of the ability to create a record and assert
defenses tailored to the statute actually being applied.” This argument is
specious. The family court was not imposing sanctions on its own motion; the
family court was ruling on Bayer’s request for sanctions, and it was

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abundantly clear to all parties that the basis for sanctions was section 271.6
Bayer specifically referred to section 271 in her filings on December 19, 2024,
April 1, 2025, and May 6, 2025. Accordingly, we conclude that Guttbinder
had adequate notice of the specific sanctions statute relied upon by Bayer.
Guttbinder next contends that, even if the sanction was ordered under
section 271, it is reversible for failure to ensure that it does not impose an
unreasonable financial burden. Under section 271, subdivision (a), a court
may impose, as a sanction, “an award of attorney’s fees and costs on the
extent to which any conduct of each party or attorney furthers or frustrates
the policy of the law to promote settlement of litigation and, where possible,
to reduce the cost of litigation by encouraging cooperation between the
parties and attorneys.” Section 271, subdivision (a), provides that, in making
an award, “the court shall take into consideration all evidence concerning the
parties’ incomes, assets, and liabilities.” “Sanctions under section 271 are
committed to the discretion of the trial court, and will be reversed on appeal
only on a showing of abuse of that discretion, that is ‘only if, considering all of
the evidence viewed more favorably in its support, and indulging all
reasonable inferences in its favor, no judge could reasonably make the order.’
[Citations.]” (Davenport, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 1524.) Here,
Guttbinder simply cites his testimony at the hearing that he had about
$20,000 of cash and that his gross monthly income was currently “zero”

6 In the absence of a contrary showing on the record, we make all

presumptions in favor of the family court’s action (Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th
at p. 609), and, here, we presume that the family court was applying section
271 when it ordered Guttbinder to pay $5,000 in attorney’s fees directly to
Bayer’s counsel’s office. Thus, we do not address Guttbinder’s arguments
that the sanction is also reversible if it is “construed as CCP § 177.5” or
“construed as CCP § 128.5.” (Bolding omitted.)

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because he did event work, had just finished a job, and was “in between jobs.”
But we cannot say that no judge could reasonably impose $5,000 of sanctions
against a party who is between jobs but has $20,000 of cash.7
Guttbinder additionally argues that reversal is required because the
challenged order “contains no meaningful analysis explaining why this does
not impose an unreasonable financial burden.” But he cites no authority for
the proposition that the order must include such an explanation. In the
absence of cogent legal argument supported by citations to authority, we may
deem a contention forfeited, and we do so here. (See Clary v. City of Crescent
City (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 274, 294 [“ ‘ “This court is not required to discuss
or consider points . . . which are not supported by citation to authorities
. . . .” ’ [Citation] . . . [Appellant] has forfeited the issue”].)
2. The Letter from Duddy
Guttbinder contends that the family court’s “custody/visitation ruling”
must be reversed and remanded because the family court violated due
process and tainted the evidentiary record by “admitting and relying” on
Duddy’s letter terminating her services. (Capitalization and bolding
omitted.) We need not address whether the family court erred in admitting
the letter from Duddy because Guttbinder has failed to carry his “burden of

7 Furthermore, the cases that Guttbinder cites do not persuade us that

the $5,000 sanction against Guttbinder imposed an unreasonable financial
burden, because none of the cases found sanctions to be unreasonable. (See
Sagonowsky v. Kekoa (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1142, 1157 [“We have considered
and rejected [the appellant’s] arguments that the amount of sanctions would
impose an unreasonable financial burden on her”]; In re Marriage of Fong
(2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 278, 292 [concluding that the appellant has not
shown that the award was excessive in light of the evidence]; Davenport,
supra, 194 Cal.App.4th 1507 [no discussion of unreasonable financial
burden].)

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demonstrating prejudicial error.” (See Contra Costa County, supra, 235
Cal.App.4th at p. 925.) In his opening brief, Guttbinder cites only one
statement by the family court to support his argument that the family court
relied on the letter from Duddy: “[I]t’s relevant. So, frankly, I’m glad I saw
it.” In his reply brief, he additionally refers to the family court’s statement
that the letter it was talking about was “[t]he letter where she says that she’s
no longer working with this family and why.” The family court appears to
have found these statements relevant to Guttbinder’s own request to remove
Duddy as parenting coordinator (which was one of the grounds for his Ex
Parte Request for Order to begin with) rather than custody or visitation; the
letter from Duddy was relevant because, as the family court noted at the
hearing, “she seems to have terminated her services anyway and I can’t force
her to be in there if she’s not being paid and no one’s showing up.” At the
hearing, when the family court explained the reasons for its rulings related to
custody and visitation, it did not discuss the Duddy letter at all. Nor did it
discuss the Duddy letter in the challenged order, other than noting that
Duddy had requested to withdraw from the matter. In the absence of proof
that the letter from Duddy “actually figured in the court’s decision,” we
presume that the family court did not err by considering any inadmissible
evidence in making its rulings related to custody and visitation. (See
Davenport, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 1526.)
Guttbinder’s reliance on In re Marriage of Swain (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th
830, is misplaced. In that case, the former wife filed an income and expense
declaration and did not appear at the hearing. (Id. at p. 834.) The appellate
court concluded that the trial court relied on the former wife’s declaration to
determine her need, obligations, and assets in the trial court’s statement of
decision. (Id. at pp. 834-835.) The appellate court held that the trial court

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should not have considered the former wife’s declaration because the
appellant had no opportunity to cross-examine her about it. (Id. at p. 832.)
Here, as discussed above, we presume that the family court did not rely on
the letter from Duddy in making its rulings related to custody and visitation.
3. Reassignment
In his opening brief, Guttbinder requested that we direct reassignment
of this case to a different judicial officer in the family court. After briefing
was complete, we granted Guttbinder’s request to take judicial notice of a
document showing that the superior court had reassigned this case for all
purposes to a different family court judge. The question of reassignment is
thus moot, and we will not address it. (See In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266,
276 [“A court is tasked with the duty ‘ “to decide actual controversies by a
judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot
questions . . . which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.” ’
[Citation.]”].)
DISPOSITION
The challenged order is affirmed. Bayer shall recover her costs on
appeal.

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 _________________________
Miller, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Stewart, P. J.

_________________________
Richman, J.

A175180, Bayer v. Guttbinder

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