Filed 6/29/26 Costa v. Kral CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

SHAUNA COSTA,

Plaintiff and Appellant, G065336

v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2024-
01426950)
NATASHA KRAL,
OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Julianne Bancroft, Judge. Reversed and Remanded.
Quinn & Dworakowski, Stephane Quinn, and David
Dworakowski for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Natasha Kral in pro. per., for Defendant and Respondent.
 Appellant Shauna Costa sought $21,335.70 in attorney fees after
obtaining a civil harassment restraining order under Code of Civil Procedure
section 527.61 against respondent Natasha Kral. The trial court awarded
Costa $4,500. Costa contends the trial court abused its discretion in reducing
the fee award by over 75 percent. We agree.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In October 2024, the trial court granted Costa’s request for a civil
harassment restraining order against Kral based on a series of videos Kral
posted on social media. As the prevailing party, Costa requested $21,335.70
in attorney fees and costs. This amount was based on work done by an
attorney, two paralegals, and three law clerks.
In Kral’s opposition, she stated she was unable to pay the
requested fees. Kral also raised concerns about the accuracy and
reasonableness of the fees requested based on three billing discrepancies she
found in Costa’s attorney’s billing. First, Costa’s attorney billed to set up a
new client file even though Costa was an existing client. Second, Costa’s
attorney billed for fees connected to Costa’s unrelated family case. Third,
Costa’s attorney had given Kral ex parte notice for a hearing, but when Kral
and her attorney showed up to the hearing, they discovered no hearing had
been scheduled because Costa had failed to file the ex parte paperwork.
Costa’s attorney billed for travel to the ex parte hearing even though they did
not appear.
At the hearing for attorney fees, Costa’s attorney conceded there
were two “double charge” mistakes in their attorney fee request. One charge,
for $385, was for work performed in Costa’s family law matter. The other, for

1 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil

Procedure, unless stated otherwise.

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$85, was for a personal service that had been charged twice. The trial court
took the matter under submission. In its written ruling, the court determined
the $21,237.50 fees requested by Costa were “not reasonable” but otherwise
offered no explanation or rationale for ultimately awarding reduced fees in
the amount of $4,500.
Costa timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I.
GOVERNING LAW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under section 527.6, subdivision (a)(1), “[a] person who has
suffered harassment . . . may seek a temporary restraining order and an
order after hearing prohibiting harassment as provided in this section.”
Section 527.6, subdivision (s), provides that “[t]he prevailing party in an
action brought pursuant to this section may be awarded court costs and
attorney's fees, if any.”
The decision whether to award attorneys’ fees under section
527.6, subdivision (s), “is a matter committed to the discretion of the trial
court.” (Krug v. Maschmeier (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 796, 802; accord, Wash v.
Banda-Wash (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 561, 568.) The court likewise has
discretion to determine the amount of attorney fees. (Wash, at p. 568; Krug,
at p. 802.) We review the court's decision in awarding attorneys’ fees for an
abuse of discretion. (See Adler v. Vaicius (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 1770, 1777.)
“‘Although this standard is deferential, a court abuses its discretion where no
reasonable basis for the action is shown.’” (The Kennedy Com. v. City of
Huntington Beach (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 436, 456.)
While trial courts have significant discretion to determine
reasonable attorney fee awards, that discretion is not unbounded. “‘“The

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starting point of every fee award . . . must be a calculation of the attorney's
services in terms of the time he [or she] has expended on the case. Anchoring
the analysis to this concept is the only way of approaching the problem that
can claim objectivity . . . .’”” (Roe v. Halbig (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 286,
311 (Roe).) Thus, “[i]n setting attorney’s fees ‘[t]he basis for the trial court's
calculation must be the actual hours counsel has devoted to the case, less
those that result from inefficient or duplicative use of time.’” (Ibid.)
Although a trial court is not required to issue a statement of
decision regarding a fee award or to identify each charge it finds
unreasonable, it must articulate—at least in general terms—its reasons for
significant reductions to a fee request. (Snoeck v. ExakTime Innovations, Inc.
(2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 908, 921.) That is, a court presented with a voluminous
fee request may “‘“make across-the-board percentage cuts either in the
number of hours claimed or in the final lodestar figure,”’” but it “must clearly
explain its reasons for choosing the particular [reduction] that it chose;
otherwise, the reviewing court is unable to determine that the court had
valid, specific reasons for its across-the-board percentage reduction.” (Warren
v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 41 (Warren).)
Where no statement of decision is requested by the parties, we
assume the trial court made whatever findings were necessary to support the
order. (Horning v. Shilberg (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 197, 202.) In doing so, we
must indulge all presumptions in favor of the order. (Ibid.) We also review
the trial court’s express and implied factual findings for substantial evidence.
(Sabbah v. Sabbah (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 818, 822–823; Fladeboe v.
American Isuzu Motors, Inc. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 42, 60.)
“‘“‘‘The abuse of discretion standard is “deferential,” but it “is not
empty’”’ [Citation.] ‘When the record is unclear whether the trial court's

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award of attorney fees is consistent with the applicable legal principles, we
may reverse the award and remand the case to the trial court for further
consideration and amplification of its reasoning.’” (Roe, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th
at p. 312.)
II.
ANALYSIS
Costa contends the trial court abused its discretion by arbitrarily
reducing her fee request by more than 75 percent without sufficient
explanation, application of the lodestar method, or any discernible
methodology. On this record, we agree.2
First, the trial court did not undertake a lodestar analysis. This
was error. As we have said, trial courts “must . . . begin any calculation of
reasonable attorney fees with the total number of hours counsel have actually
spent on the case.” (Roe, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 311.) Because the court
did not do so here, it failed to “[a]nchor[ ] [its] analysis” to an objective
measure. (See ibid.)
Second, the trial court reduced the fee amount by over 75 percent
but did not explain whether the reduction was based on the hours charged or
the hourly rate. While it was well within the court’s discretion to determine
the number of hours claimed and the hourly rates sought by Costa’s counsel
were excessive, it was incumbent on the court to explain, at least in general
terms, how it arrived at its attorney fee award. (See Warren, supra, 30
Cal.App.5th at p. 41.) The court did not do so here.

2 Because we reverse on the basis that the trial court abused its

discretion by reducing the fee award without explanation, we need not
address Costa’s argument that the court’s ruling rested on improper
considerations or undermined the purpose of section 527.6.

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 Kral urges that the trial court’s fee award was warranted
because Costa’s time records were unreliable. She cites evidence of how
counsel’s time entries were duplicative and inflated (i.e., they billed for an
unrelated family matter and for an unfiled ex parte motion). There is no
question that, if it agreed with Kral’s contentions, the trial court had the
discretion to award Costa’s attorneys less than they requested. But we cannot
assess whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion, including
whether it was based on valid or invalid criteria, because, on this record, we
cannot determine how it arrived at the attorney fees it awarded. Therefore,
we reverse the fee award and remand the case to the trial court for further
consideration.
DISPOSITION
The order is reversed, and the matter is remanded to the trial
court to reconsider Costa’s motion for attorney fees and provide an
explanation of the attorney fees award sufficient to permit meaningful
appellate review. Costa is awarded her appellate costs.

DELANEY, J.

WE CONCUR:

SANCHEZ, ACTING P. J.

SCOTT, J.

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