Filed 6/29/26 Max v. Shih CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not
been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

DAVID MAX, B344402

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BC645117)
v.

GEORGE SHIH,

Defendant and Respondent;

RALPH ROGARI,

Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, William F. Fahey, Judge. Affirmed.
Rogari Law Firm and Ralph Rogari for Plaintiff and
Appellant David Max.
Ralph Rogari, in pro. per., for Appellant Ralph Rogari.
Newmeyer & Dillion, Benjamin P. Pugh and Michelle D.
Brunson for Defendant and Respondent George Shih.
 Appellants David Max and Ralph Rogari appeal from
postjudgment orders awarding judgment debtor discovery sanctions
to respondent George Shih. We affirm.

BACKGROUND
In 2016, Max sued several directors and shareholders of 8e6
Corp., including respondent Shih (collectively, defendants). The
court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment and,
on June 27, 2019, entered judgment in their favor on all claims.
The judgment provided “[d]efendants may seek costs pursuant to
the California Code of Civil Procedure and the California Rules of
Court.” Max appealed the 2019 judgment. (Max v. Shih (Nov. 30,
2020, B301010) [nonpub. opn.].)
While the appeal from the 2019 judgment was pending,
defendants timely filed a joint prevailing party cost memorandum,
seeking $13,333.83 in prejudgment costs. (See Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1032, subd. (b) [generally “entitl[ing]” a “prevailing party . . .
as a matter of right to recover costs in any action or proceeding”];
see also § 1033.5 [describing types of costs recoverable].)1 Max
filed a motion to tax, but the court concluded Max’s motion was
“inadequate,” and took the motion off calendar. Max did not object
to the court’s order, never attempted to modify or renew the motion,
nor ask that it be put back on calendar.
We affirmed the 2019 judgment and awarded defendants
their costs on appeal. After a remittitur issued, defendants
filed with the trial court a memorandum seeking $452.20 in
appellate costs. The court took no action in response to the cost
memorandum. Nor did Max. On June 1, 2022, the court issued a
final amended judgment awarding defendants all requested costs,

1 All subsequent statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.

2
totaling $13,788.03 ($13,333.83 in prejudgment prevailing party
costs plus $452.20 in costs on appeal). (Max. v. Shih (July 27, 2023,
B322716) [nonpub. opn.].)
Max appealed the amended judgment in appeal no. B322716
and, on July 27, 2023, this court affirmed.
As of May 2024—almost a year after we affirmed the
amended cost judgment—defendants had received no payment.
Therefore, on May 21, 2024, Shih served judgment debtor discovery
on Max pursuant to sections 708.010 and 708.020. On June 24,
2024, Max served boilerplate objections but produced no documents.
On July 16, 2024, Max paid defendants $16,646.37,
characterizing it as payment in full on the cost judgment with all
interest due. In calculating this amount, Max used June 1, 2022—
the date the court amended the judgment to include the specific
amount of costs—as the date postjudgment interest began accruing
on prevailing party prejudgment costs.
In a July 24, 2024 letter, defendants informed Max that
defendants did not view this payment as fully satisfying the
amount owed with interest, explaining their view that interest
began accruing on the prejudgment costs as of the date of the
original judgment, June 27, 2019. The letter also addressed Max’s
objections to the judgment debtor discovery requests and his failure
to produce anything. Max did not respond.
On August 12, 2024, Shih filed two motions to compel
substantive responses to the judgment debtor discovery. The
motions also sought attorney fees as discovery sanctions from
both Max and Rogari.
At the initial October 29, 2024 hearing on these motions,
the court “gave a tentative that the motions were well taken and
would be granted, but invited the parties to meet and confer and
to see if the case could be resolved.” Specifically, the court informed

3
the parties it was “tentatively and strongly inclined” to agree
interest on the costs judgment began accruing on the date of the
original judgment, and thus that the judgment “ha[d] not been fully
satisfied.” The court further informed the parties that, absent party
agreement resolving the case, it would grant the motions to compel
and award attorney fees as sanctions. The court took the matter
under submission and “[gave] the parties . . . a week to negotiate”
the specific amount of “[Shih’s counsel’s] attorney’s fees for one
motion,[2] approximately $9,900, plus the interest due and payable
of about [$4,000]” for a total of “roughly $14,000.”
On November 4, 2024, Rogari “paid [Shih’s counsel] the
remainder of the judgment amount in cash, but . . . did not discuss
[with counsel] the sanctions amount for bringing . . . [the] motions.”
At the continued hearing on November 6, 2024, Shih’s counsel
acknowledged that this payment satisfied the judgment, but
confirmed Shih was still seeking attorney fees as sanctions, per
the court’s tentative ruling.
The court granted the discovery motions “with respect to
the request for attorney’s fees only.” In two orders, it awarded
Shih a total of $9,087.50 in sanctions against appellants, jointly
and severally. Appellants timely appealed the orders, which we
review here.

2 The motions to compel requested attorney fees in
approximately this amount for each motion to compel. During
the October 29, 2024 hearing, however, the court stated it was not
inclined to grant this request in full. Shih’s counsel stated he was
open to accepting the requested fees for only one of the two motions
if doing so would end the dispute.

4
 DISCUSSION
A. Postjudgment Interest on Cost Judgment
Appellants argue Max fully satisfied the judgment when he
made his initial July 16, 2024 payment. They contend the court
concluded otherwise, because it used the incorrect interest accrual
date.3 They argue postjudgment interest could not and did not
start accruing on prejudgment costs until June 1, 2022, the date
the court set the specific amount of those costs and amended the
judgment to include that amount. According to appellants, the
costs judgment could not constitute a “money judgment” on which
interest may accrue (§ 685.020, subd. (a)) until it included a specific
dollar amount.
Case law does not support—and indeed Felczer v. Apple Inc.
(2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 406 (Felczer) expressly rejects—appellants’
argument. We agree with Felczer’s well-reasoned and thorough
analysis. As explained in Felczer, a judgment creating a
prevailing party’s right to collect prejudgment costs—even if it
does not identify the specific dollar amount—constitutes a “money
judgment.” (Id. at p. 415.) The code requires “interest commence[ ]
to accrue on a money judgment on the date of entry of the
judgment.” (§ 685.020, subd. (a).) Thus, “in a civil case where the
prevailing party is entitled to recover certain litigation expenses
and attorney’s fees from the losing party, . . . postjudgment interest
on an award of prejudgment costs begin[s] to run . . . on the date

3 Appellants’ briefing does not clearly identify how this issue
is relevant to their appeal from the sanction orders. From the
nature of their arguments, appellants appear to be arguing that,
had the court correctly viewed Max’s initial July 16, 2024 payment
as fully satisfying the judgment and ending the judgment debtor
discovery dispute, the court would not have awarded sanctions for
failure to comply with discovery requests over three months later.

5
of the judgment or order that establishes the right of a party to
recover a particular cost item, even if the dollar amount has yet
to be ascertained.” (Felczer, supra, at pp. 409–410.) This approach
is consistent with federal law applying similar statutes. (See id.
at pp. 416–417.) It is also in line with one of the policies behind
awarding postjudgment interest—“ ‘compensat[ing] the judgment
creditor for the loss of use of the money until the judgment is
paid’ ”—because “[p]revailing parties lose use of ‘their’ funds as
soon as their entitlement to those funds is established,” which
occurs when a judgment in their favor is entered. (Id. at p. 418.)
We disagree with appellants that Felczer renders meaningless
the following language in section 685.090, subdivision (a): “Costs
are added to and become a part of the judgment . . . [¶] . . . [u]pon
the filing of an order allowing the costs pursuant to this chapter . . .
[or] . . . [¶] . . . [i]f a memorandum of costs is filed . . . and no
motion to tax is made, upon the expiration of the time for making
the motion.” (§ 685.090, subd. (a)(1)–(2).) We interpret this as
establishing the point when the specific dollar amount of costs
automatically becomes part of the underlying cost judgment, and
confirming that additional requests for relief are not necessary
for this to happen. This interpretation is consistent with
California Rules of Court, rule 3.1700(b)(4), “which provides
that once allowable costs have been determined, ‘ “the clerk
must immediately enter the costs on the judgment.” ’ ” (Felczer,
supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 412, quoting Chodos v. Borman
(2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 707, 714.)4 Felczer is not inconsistent

4 Accordingly, in affirming the amended cost judgment
in 2023, we characterized it as “neither adjudicat[ing] the cost
issue, nor chang[ing] the parties’ rights and obligations[, but]
[r]ather . . . correct[ing] the clerk’s and court’s failures to include in

6
with section 685.090, subdivision (a)(1), interpreted in the manner
we propose.
Appellants next argue Felczer’s holding is inconsistent with
California Supreme Court authority. Specifically, appellants cite
Stockton Theatres, Inc. v. Palermo (1961) 55 Cal.2d 439 for the
proposition that “[a] judgment for costs should be governed by the
law applicable to judgments generally. Such awards are, in fact,
separate and complete judgments in themselves.” (Id. at p. 443.)
But appellants do not explain how this concept is inconsistent with
the analysis in and holding of Felczer; indeed, Felczer cites Stockton
for this very proposition (Felczer, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 415),
and Stockton is consistent with our decision, not appellants’
position.
Consistent with Felczer, and as the trial court correctly
concluded, “when judgment was entered [on June 27, 2019], it
established [defendants’] right to certain costs as the prevailing
parties in the action. (See § 1033.5, subd. (a).) That judgment
was therefore a money judgment for these costs because
it required [Max] to pay them, even if the exact amount
remained to be determined. Interest on those amounts began
to accrue immediately upon entry of the judgment,” pursuant
to section 685.020. (Felczer, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 415.)

B. The Sanctions Award
Appellants next argue the sanctions awarded were “legally
unauthorized.” (Boldface omitted.) Because Max had satisfied the
judgment, at the latest, on November 4, 2026, they contend, the

the judgment costs to which [defendants], under California Rules
of Court, rule 3.1700(b)(4), had a right by operation of law ‘as an
incident of the judgment given upon the issues in the action the
moment of its rendition.’ ”

7
court lacked authority to issue any orders in connection with
judgment debtor discovery after that date. We disagree.
The code authorizes specific forms of postjudgment discovery,
including interrogatories and document production demands,
seeking “information to aid in enforcement of [a] money judgment.”
(§§ 708.020, subd. (a) & 708.030, subd. (a); see §§ 708.010–708.030.)
Such judgment debtor discovery requests “may be enforced, to
the extent practicable, in the same manner as . . . in a civil action.”
(§ 708.020, subd. (c) [interrogatories]; § 708.030, subd. (c) [document
inspection and production].)
The Civil Discovery Act (§§ 2016.010–2036.050) (the Act)
governs the general enforcement of discovery requests in a civil
action. Sanctions for “misuse of the discovery process” are a key
tool to such enforcement. The Act specifically identifies particular
sanctions to be awarded for particular types of misuse of particular
discovery methods. (City of Los Angeles v. PricewaterhouseCoopers,
LLP (2024) 17 Cal.5th 46, 62.) In addition, “when another, more
specific provision of the . . . Act [does not] set[ ] conditions or limits
on a trial court’s authority to sanction [the] particular form[ ]
of discovery misuse” (PricewaterhouseCoopers, supra, at p. 65;
see id. at pp. 65–74), the Act generally authorizes the court to
impose sanctions for discovery misuse. (See § 2023.030; see also
PricewaterhouseCoopers, supra, at p. 74 [in sections 2023.010 and
2023.030, “the Legislature gave trial courts a statutory basis for
exercising authority to address egregious forms of misconduct not
addressed elsewhere in the Act”].) These sanctions may include,
inter alia, “attorney’s fees . . . incurred by anyone as a result of
[the] [discovery misuse] conduct.” (§ 2023.030, subd. (a).) The
“independent authority to impose sanctions” that section 2023.030
confers exists even after the underlying action has concluded.
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, supra, at p. 69; see id. at p. 56 [affirming

8
award of “monetary sanctions for the [plaintiff ’s] discovery
misconduct” that defendant sought and court awarded only “[a]fter
the [plaintiff] voluntarily dismissed its suit”].)
Applying this framework here, the court had authority to
“enforce[ ]” Shih’s judgment debtor discovery requests as it would
such request “in a civil action” (§§ 708.020, subd. (c) & 708.030,
subd. (c)—that is, by imposing, in its discretion, monetary
sanctions, including attorney fees, for a failure to respond to
the requests, even after the underlying dispute has concluded.
(See § 2023.010, subd. (d) [generally defining “misuse[ ] of the
discovery process” to include “[f]ailing to respond or to submit to
an authorized method of discovery”].) Even though the discovery
request had become moot at the time the court awarded sanctions,
“forcing a party to resort to the court to get discovery [can be]
sanctionable behavior.” (Masimo Corp. v. The Vanderpool Law
Firm, Inc. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 902, 909, fn. 9.) After Max failed
to pay the cost judgment for over a year, defendants were indeed
“forc[ed]” to seek the discovery they did, and incur attorney fees in
the process.
In arguing to the contrary, appellants contend more specific
statutory language regarding judgment debtor discovery in
section 708.010, subdivision (a) prevents application of the general
section 2023.030 sanction authority here. Namely, section 708.010,
subdivision (a) provides that the judgment debtor discovery
“procedure[s] in this article may be used at any time a money
judgment is enforceable.” Appellants interpret this as suggesting
the court may only impose sanctions based on misuse of judgment
debtor discovery when a judgment has not yet been satisfied and
is thus still “enforceable.” But section 708.010 and the “article”
referenced therein address how a judgment creditor may make
judgment debtor discovery requests. Thus, it is not a more specific

9
sanctions provision limiting a court’s general discovery sanction
authority under section 2023.030.5
Finally, appellants argue that the court lacked authority to
impose the sanctions because he did not “unsuccessfully make[ ]
or oppose[ ] a motion to compel further response to a demand”
(§ 2031.310, subd. (h)), nor did he “unsuccessfully make[ ] or
oppose[ ] a motion to compel a further response to interrogatories.”
(§ 2030.300, subd. (d).) He cites sections 2031.310 and
2030.300, which require a court to impose sanctions under
such circumstances. But that sanctions are mandatory under
circumstances not present here does not mean the court erred in
choosing to impose discretionary sanctions under the independent
authority section 2023.030 confers. Other authority is also
inconsistent with appellants’ position. (See Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 3.1348(a) [“[t]he court may award sanctions under the
Discovery Act in favor of a party who files a motion to compel
discovery, even though no opposition to the motion was filed, or
opposition to the motion was withdrawn, or the requested discovery
was provided to the moving party after the motion was filed”].)

5 The portion of section 708.010, subdivision (a) on which
appellants do not rely also supports our interpretation of the
section. That section provides in full: “Except as provided
in this section and in subdivision (b) of Section 708.020, the
procedure in this article may be used at any time a money
judgment is enforceable.” (§ 708.010, subd. (a), italics added.)
Section 708.020, in turn, speaks to times when a creditor may
not make certain types of discovery requests on a judgment
debtor. This is consistent with viewing the limiting language in
section 708.010, subdivision (a) as limiting when discovery requests
can be made—not when a creditor may seek to “enforce” requests
already made.

10
 Accordingly, the court did not lack authority to impose
sanctions, nor did it abuse its discretion in choosing to do so.

DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed. Respondent shall recover his costs
on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:

BENDIX, J.

M. KIM, J.

11