Filed 6/30/26 Powell v. The City and County of S.F. CA1/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
DANIEL POWELL,
Plaintiff and Appellant, A174609
v.
THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN (City and County of San
FRANCISCO et al. Francisco Super. Ct. No. CGC-24-
Defendants and Respondents. 616533)
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
Pro se plaintiff Daniel Powell seeks relief from an order granting a
motion for judgment on the pleadings in favor of individual defendant,
London Breed, and staying his causes of action against the remaining named
defendants, San Francisco Fire Department (SFFD) and the City and County
of San Francisco (together, the City defendants; collectively, with Breed,
defendants), pending resolution of a prior action raising similar claims
against defendants. We affirm.
1 This matter is proper for disposition by a memorandum opinion in
accordance with the California Standards of Judicial Administration,
Standard 8.1. (Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin., § 8.1; see Ct. App., First Dist., Local
Rules of Ct., rule 19, Abbreviated Opinions; People v. Garcia (2002) 97
Cal.App.4th 847, 850–855 [use of memorandum opinions].)
As the parties are familiar with the facts and procedural history, we
review them in brief. In the operative complaint, Powell alleged that on
November 6, 2023, employees of the San Francisco Fire Department
“[v]iolated [his] [p]erson and [s]pirit by Assault, Battery, and Abduction/False
Imprisonment” in an ambulance on the “300 block of Ellis St[reet], San
Francisco, CA.” He further alleged that Breed “functioned . . . as element of
CONCEALING THE CRIMES against [Powell] by way of City Adjuster,
Grace Glenn.”
Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings as to Breed on the
ground that she was the mayor at the time of the alleged tort and therefore
immune from vicarious liability for acts by public entities. In their
supporting papers, defendants also notified the trial court that Powell
recently had filed an amended complaint in another case, CGC-24-616508
(Powell I). Defendants attached the operative complaint in Powell I, in which
Powell alleged that on November 6, 2023, employees of the San Francisco
Fire Department assaulted and abducted him “inside [an] SFFD ambulatory
vehicle” at “373 Ellis Street” and “Municipal Adjacent Defendants did have at
least some representative employees engaged in concealing those
actions . . . .” Defendants also attached an order from Powell I in which the
trial court stated: “[Powell] filed another action growing out of the same
transaction and between the same parties. (See CGC-24-616533.) The
problem is the instant case is ‘the earlier action,’ and CGC-24-616533 is ‘the
second action’ subject to abatement.”
In August 2025, the trial court entered an order granting defendants’
motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Breed. It explained that
Government Code section 820.9 precludes vicarious liability for the mayor,
immunizing Breed as the former mayor from Powell’s claims. The court also
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took judicial notice of the records in Powell I, found that the actions arose
“out of the same events,” and issued an interlocutory judgment of abatement,
“stay[ing] [the instant] action pending the resolution of Case No. CGC-24-
616508.” Powell appealed.
On appeal, we must presume the trial court’s judgment is correct.
(Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609.) The appellant bears the
burden to show error with an adequate record and to support any points
made with citations to the record. (Id. at p. 609; Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.204(a)(1)(C) [“Support any reference to a matter in the record by a citation
to the volume and page number of the record where the matter appears.”].)
We may disregard assertions and arguments that lack record references or
citations to legal authority. (Champir, LLC v. Fairbanks Ranch Assn. (2021)
66 Cal.App.5th 583, 597.) We hold in propria persona litigants to the same
standards as attorneys. (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984–
985.)
Based on these standards, we must affirm the order. To the extent
Powell alleges the trial court erred, his assertions are unsupported by
citations to the record. It is not the role of this court to search the record for
evidence that supports a party’s statements. (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122
Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246.)
Powell also fails to provide any cogent legal analysis in his opening
brief as to how the trial court erred. A liberal reading of his opening brief
reveals only an oblique reference to the order granting judgment on the
pleadings as to Breed. Citing “Harshbarger v. City of Colton (1988) 197 Cal.
App. 3rd [1335],” Powell asserts that “the perceived immunity is only
effectively providing immunity for municipal employees, unless and until
Actual Fraud, Malice, and/ Oppression is/are shown.” However, Harshbarger
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did not address elected officials’ immunity from vicarious liability for the acts
or omissions of public entities under Government Code section 820.9 and
therefore is inapposite. For the same reason, Powell’s reliance on Masters v.
San Bernardino County Employees Retirement Assn. (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th
30 is likewise misplaced. Moreover, Powell also does not address the
interlocutory judgment of abatement at all, forfeiting any claim that the court
erred on that issue. (See Golden Door Properties, LLC v. Superior Court
(2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 733, 786 [“issues not addressed as error in a party’s
opening brief with legal analysis and citation to authority are forfeited”].)
Powell’s status as a self-represented litigant does not exempt him from
the rules of appellate procedure or relieve his obligation to present intelligible
argument supported by legal authority and the record. (Nwosu v. Uba,
supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1246–1247.) In view of the substantial
deficiencies in his brief, we conclude he has failed to meet his burden of
establishing error.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. In the interests of justice, no costs are
awarded. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)
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_________________________
Sweet, J.*
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Brown, P. J.
_________________________
Streeter, J.
A172591/Powell v. City & County of SF
* Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Marin, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
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