Filed 6/30/26 Ramsey v. State Personnel Board CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)

BENJAMIN RAMSEY, C103766
Plaintiff and Appellant,
(Super. Ct. No. 23WM000035)
v.

STATE PERSONNEL BOARD,
Defendant and Respondent;

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND
REHABILITATION,
Real Party in Interest and Respondent.

The Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (the Department) terminated
Benjamin Ramsey’s employment as a correctional officer for slapping an employee from
another agency during an off-duty training session and lying about the incident in a
subsequent investigation. Ramsey appealed the termination to the State Personnel Board
(the Board). An administrative law judge (ALJ) held an evidentiary hearing and found
Ramsey’s conduct constituted inexcusable neglect of duty, insubordination, dishonesty,
willful disobedience, and other failure of good behavior, which justified the dismissal.
The Board adopted the ALJ’s proposed decision.
Ramsey sought judicial review of the Board’s decision by filing a petition for writ
of mandate in the trial court. The trial court denied the petition. Ramsey appeals,

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arguing the trial court should have independently reviewed the ALJ’s findings and would
have set aside the termination had it done so. Ramsey’s arguments lack merit.
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Ramsey’s Time in the Reserve Officer Training Corps
Ramsey matriculated at Weber State University in Ogden, Utah in 1998. He
joined the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) on campus and participated in the
program throughout his freshman year, from August 1998 through March 1999. During
that time, Ramsey was an active reservist in the United States Army Reserve, which
meant he could be called for military service should the need arise.
Ramsey took a two-year leave of absence from Weber State University and ROTC
to participate in a religious mission at the end of his freshman year. Upon returning from
his mission, in 2001, Ramsey received a medical discharge from the United States
Department of the Army for post-traumatic stress disorder, hypoglycemia, and
depression. As a result, Ramsey was disenrolled from the ROTC program and
discharged from the United States Army Reserve.
B. Ramsey’s Employment Application for the Department
Ramsey submitted an employment application to work for the Department in
2004. As relevant here, the application form asked: “Have you ever served in any
Armed Forces, National Guard, or military reserves?” Ramsey wrote: “D.N.A.,” an
acronym for “does not apply.” He responded the same way to other questions about
military service, including one that asked whether he had received a medical discharge
from the military. He certified under penalty of perjury that all such responses were true
and correct. Ramsey became a correctional officer in 2005. He was promoted to the
position of correctional sergeant in 2012.

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C. The Training Incident
Ramsey became friends with E.H., a National Park Service ranger, through their
church. They shared an interest in self-defense techniques and training, and sometimes
they practiced together after fulfilling their religious obligations. They also offered self-
defense instruction to young people from their church.
In early 2021, E.H.’s supervisor asked her to organize a self-defense training
session for her fellow rangers. E.H. thought of Ramsey and told her supervisor she knew
someone from the Department who could provide self-defense instruction to rangers.
E.H.’s supervisor agreed to Ramsey’s involvement, and E.H. sent an email letting rangers
know the session would take place on April 29, 2021, at the National Park Service office
in Crescent City.
Two rangers attended the class, E.H. and J.L. J.L. was new to the National Park
Service, having joined some six months earlier. She understood from E.H. that Ramsey
worked at Pelican Bay State Prison. She also understood that Ramsey was friends with
E.H., someone she liked and respected.
J.L. arrived late that morning and began working with Ramsey. They practiced
“ground escapes,” which are techniques for escaping from a defensive position on the
ground. One ground escape scenario began with J.L. lying on her back, with Ramsey
straddling her chest. J.L. employed a bucking maneuver to dislodge Ramsey. She
managed to turn the tables on Ramsey, so she was now straddling him. J.L. started
moving towards Ramsey’s head to gain control of him. As she moved forward, Ramsey
slapped J.L.’s genital area with an open hand. J.L. jumped up and exclaimed, “My
vagina!” She looked at Ramsey, who smirked at her. An uncomfortable silence
followed. J.L. laughed to break the silence and Ramsey said, “It’s a sensitive area no
matter what gender you are.” The training session resumed.
J.L. and E.H. communicated afterward. J.L. told E.H. that she enjoyed the training
session, but she was surprised by the “vag slap.” It was only then that E.H. understood

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what happened. E.H. had heard J.L. cry out, and Ramsey say, “It’s a sensitive area no
matter what gender you are.” But she had not seen the slap and had not previously
understood that Ramsey slapped J.L. in the genital area. E.H. encouraged J.L. to report
the incident, and J.L. did so. Federal and state investigations ensued.
D. Investigatory Interviews
Ramsey was interviewed by investigators for the National Park Service in May
2021. Ramsey told the investigators that he served in the Army from 1998 through 2001,
when he was medically discharged due to an injury.1 He said he learned self-defense in
the Army, and took online courses from an organization that offered “the closest thing
[he’d] been able to find to what [he] learned in the [A]rmy.”
Ramsey acknowledged making contact with J.L.’s genital area during the training
session. However, he said the contact occurred while they were practicing a “bear hug
escape,” a standing self-defense technique used to break free from an attacker who comes
from behind and wraps their arms around the victim’s torso. According to Ramsey, the
bear hug escape scenario began with J.L. standing behind him with her arms wrapped
around his torso. Ramsey shifted his weight to one side and swung an arm back in an
attempt to break free. It was then, Ramsey said, that he accidentally made contact with
J.L.’s genital area with his hand. Ramsey described the contact as a “light tap” and
insisted that it was accidental.
Ramsey was interviewed by special agents from the Department’s Office of
Internal Affairs in September 2021. Ramsey told the agents he learned self-defense
techniques at the parole and correctional officer training academies and received yearly
training on use of force and baton use, which he supplemented with online courses. He
also said he served in the military and received informal training in self-defense from

1 Ramsey later acknowledged his medical discharge papers said post-traumatic stress
order and hypoglycemia.

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other members of his unit. Later, Ramsey clarified that he participated in ROTC from
August 1998 through March 1999. As a participant in the ROTC program, Ramsey said
he was also an active-duty member of the United States Army Reserve. Ramsey
explained that he became an inactive member in order to complete his mission, and he
received a medical discharge upon his return. Ramsey acknowledged denying military
service on his employment application, and admitted the response was untruthful. When
asked why he responded untruthfully, Ramsey said he was embarrassed about the
circumstances surrounding his medical discharge.
Turning to the training session, Ramsey said he accidentally made contact with
J.L.’s genital area while practicing a bear hug escape. He again characterized the contact
as a “light tap” with the outside of the hand. He added that J.L. responded to the contact
by jumping up and down and giggling, while saying, “my vagina, my vagina.” As
before, Ramsey maintained that the contact was accidental. Ramsey acknowledged
practicing ground escapes with J.L., but denied any inappropriate contact during those
exercises, accidental or otherwise.
E. Administrative Proceedings
The Department served Ramsey with a notice of adverse action terminating his
employment. The notice alleged Ramsey intentionally misrepresented his military
service on his employment application, inappropriately touched J.L. during the training
session, and made false statements in the Department’s investigatory interview. The
notice charged Ramsey with inexcusable neglect of duty, dishonesty, insubordination,
willful disobedience, and other failure of good behavior under Government Code section
19572, subdivisions (d), (e), (f), (o), and (t).2

2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Government Code.

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 Ramsey appealed the termination to the Board. An evidentiary hearing was held
in January 2023. At the hearing, Ramsey testified that he considered himself to have
served in the Army and held himself out as having done so to investigators, members of
his church, and the Department. Nevertheless, he admitted to denying military service on
his employment application. When asked why, Ramsey said he could not remember
telling investigators he had been embarrassed about the circumstances surrounding his
medical discharge and instead offered a new explanation; namely, that his commanding
officer instructed him at the time of his discharge that he should deny military service in
future employment applications. Ramsey acknowledged saying nothing about this
alleged instruction in either investigatory interview. With respect to the training incident,
Ramsey testified he accidentally made contact with J.L.’s genital area with the side of his
hand while practicing a bear hug escape. Once again, Ramsey said J.L. responded by
giggling and saying, “my vagina, my vagina.”
J.L. remembered things differently. She testified that Ramsey slapped her while
practicing a ground escape scenario. She said the slap was delivered with an open hand
and was “hard and deliberate.” J.L. remembered that she got up, and said, “my vagina.”
She then turned to look at Ramsey. Ramsey smirked at her but said nothing. An
uncomfortable silence followed, and J.L. laughed to break the silence. The training
session then resumed.
J.L. testified that Ramsey discussed his work for the Department during the
training session. Ramsey described situations in which he made off color comments to
prisoners—including allusions to sex and sexual assault —as a way of keeping them off
balance and maintaining control over them. J.L. said she typically extends the benefit of
the doubt to other law enforcement officers, but she found Ramsey’s comment about
sexually assaulting inmates was one of the “weirdest, most vulgar things [she had] ever
heard ever in [her] several years doing law enforcement.” All in all, J.L. believed the

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slap was intentional, and Ramsey could not be trusted to wield power responsibly over
incarcerated persons under his supervision.
E.H. testified she was standing nearby when Ramsey and J.L. practiced the ground
escape scenario. She said she heard J.L. cry out and saw Ramsey’s hand between her
legs. She also said she heard Ramsey say, “something about, you know, it’s a sensitive
area no matter what gender you are.” Looking back, E.H. was struck by the fact that
Ramsey made that comment, rather than apologize for the supposedly accidental contact.
Under the circumstances, E.H. also believed the slap was intentional.
The ALJ issued his proposed decision in February 2023. The proposed decision
included an eight-page credibility determination using the criteria provided by Evidence
Code section 780. (Evid. Code, § 780 [when evaluating credibility, the trier of fact may
consider “any matter that has any tendency in reason to prove or disprove the truthfulness
of the [witness’s] testimony,” including witness demeanor; character of testimony; extent
of the witness’s ability to perceive, recollect or communicate any matter about which she
or he testifies; the existence or nonexistence of bias, interest or motive; the existence or
nonexistence of any fact testified to by the witness; and the witness’s attitude toward the
action or testimony”].) Generally speaking, the ALJ found that Ramsey was not credible.
In the ALJ’s opinion, Ramsey “appeared more interested in telling a particular story than
in providing the requested information” and gave responses that “sounded more
rehearsed than sincere.” “This was particularly true,” the ALJ said, when Ramsey “was
offering testimony on key disputed matters.”
With respect to the employment application, the ALJ emphasized Ramsey’s
inconsistent responses to questions about his military service. Although Ramsey held
himself out as having served in the Army, he denied military service in the employment
application. Years later, he acknowledged the denial was untruthful, adding that he was
embarrassed by the circumstances surrounding his medical discharge. He stuck with that
explanation throughout the investigatory interview and thereafter, even after reviewing

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the transcript of the interview. It was only at the evidentiary hearing, over a year later,
that Ramsey for the first time said his commanding officer instructed him to deny
military service. The ALJ found it significant that Ramsey made no attempt to reconcile
his inconsistent statements but instead said he did not remember acknowledging the
untruthfulness of the denial in his interview.
Ramsey’s shifting explanations might have given the ALJ reason enough to
question his veracity, but the ALJ also found the alleged instruction to deny military
service was “facially odd,” given that Ramsey’s contemporaneous discharge papers were
on Department of the Army letterhead and said he was being discharged from the United
States Army Reserve. Taking everything into consideration, the ALJ concluded Ramsey
likely denied military service on his employment application because he was embarrassed
by the circumstances surrounding his medical discharge, and not because his
commanding officer instructed him to do so.
With respect to the training incident, the ALJ observed that J.L. and E.H. testified
consistently with one another, and “presented as sincere.” In the ALJ’s words: “Each
appeared to give thoughtful responses, and each was careful not to overstate when
testifying. Neither exaggerated, neither showed any bias against [Ramsey], and both
were ready to give [Ramsey] credit for positive aspects of their interactions.” The ALJ
rejected Ramsey’s attempt to impeach J.L.’s credibility by suggesting she was biased
against men. The ALJ was also unmoved by Ramsey’s argument that J.L. supposedly
“giggled” after the slap and so must not have been bothered by it. The ALJ noted that
J.L. characterized her laughter as a response to an uncomfortable moment, and E.H.
described it as “surprised.” Neither testified to giggling, and the ALJ found not credible
Ramsey’s supposition that J.L. would “giggle and smile after being surprised by a painful
slap to her vagina.” By contrast, the ALJ found persuasive E.H.’s theory that someone
who accidentally made contact with another’s genital area could ordinarily be expected to
apologize. In the ALJ’s opinion, Ramsey’s reaction was “more consistent with an

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intentional action taken in order to escape the hold [J.L.] had on him.” Accordingly, the
ALJ credited J.L.’s testimony that Ramsey’s conduct was intentional over Ramsey’s
testimony that it was all an accident.
When all was said and done, the ALJ sustained most of the charges as alleged,
including that Ramsey made false statements on his employment application,
intentionally slapped J.L.’s genital area during the training session, and made false
statements about the slapping incident in the investigative interview. The ALJ also
sustained the dismissal, finding Ramsey’s misconduct was severe, intentional, and likely
to repeat. The Board adopted the ALJ’s proposed decision.
F. Trial Court Proceedings
Ramsey filed a petition for writ of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section
1094.5. The Department opposed the petition. The trial court issued a tentative ruling
denying the petition. Following argument, the trial court affirmed the tentative ruling and
entered judgment in favor of the Department and the Board. This appeal timely followed.
II. DISCUSSION
Ramsey advances three arguments on appeal. First, he argues the trial court
applied the wrong standard of review in ruling on the petition. Second, he argues the
ALJ’s findings were not supported by substantial evidence. Third, he argues the trial
court erred in upholding the penalty of dismissal. These arguments fall flat.
A. Standard of Review
The Board is the state agency vested with authority to review disciplinary actions
taken against public employees. (Thaxton v. State Personnel Bd. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th
681, 691.) In conducting that review, the Board acts in an adjudicatory capacity under
powers granted by the California Constitution. (Ibid.) As such, the Board acts much as a
trial court would in an ordinary judicial proceeding; it makes factual findings and
exercises discretion on matters within its jurisdiction. (Ibid.)

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 The Board’s decision may be reviewed by the superior court by way of a petition
for writ of administrative mandamus. (Code Civ Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (a).) The trial
court reviews the Board’s findings for substantial evidence, considering all relevant
evidence in the administrative record including evidence that fairly detracts from the
evidence supporting the Board’s findings. (Cate v. State Personnel Bd. (2012) 204
Cal.App.4th 270, 281 (Cate).) Our review is the same as that of the trial court; we
independently determine whether substantial evidence supports the Board’s findings, not
the trial court’s conclusions. (Telish v. State Personnel Bd. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th
1479, 1487 (Telish); Furtado v. State Personnel Bd. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 729, 742.)
“ ‘Substantial evidence’ is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion. [Citation.] Such evidence must be reasonable,
credible, and of solid value.” (California Youth Authority v. State Personnel Bd. (2002)
104 Cal.App.4th 575, 584-585 (California Youth Authority).) In applying the substantial
evidence test, “ ‘ “[w]e do not reweigh the evidence; we indulge all presumptions and
resolve all conflicts in favor of [the Board’s] decision. Its findings come before us ‘with
a strong presumption as to their correctness and regularity.’ [Citation.] We do not
substitute our own judgment if [the Board’s] decision ‘ “ ‘is one which could have been
made by reasonable people….’ ” ’ ” ’ ” (Palmieri v. State Personnel Bd. (2018) 28
Cal.App.5th 845, 851 (Palmieri).) The appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that
the Board’s findings are not supported by substantial evidence. (Telish, supra, 234
Cal.App.4th at p. 1497.)
The penalty imposed by the Board is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Skelly v.
State Personnel Board (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194, 217; County of Los Angeles v. Civil Service
Com. of County of Los Angeles (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 871, 877 (County of Los
Angeles).) We will not disturb the Board’s choice of penalty unless the Board “ ‘patently
abused its exercise of discretion by acting arbitrarily, capriciously, or beyond the bounds
of reason.’ ” (Cate, supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at p. 284; see also County of Los Angeles,

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supra, at p. 877 [the penalty imposed must be upheld if there is any reasonable basis to
sustain it].) “ ‘It is only in the exceptional case, when it is shown that reasonable minds
cannot differ on the propriety of the penalty, that an abuse of discretion is shown.’ ”
(Bautista v. County of Los Angeles (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 869, 879.)
In considering whether an abuse of discretion has occurred in the context of public
employee discipline, “ ‘the overriding consideration . . . is the extent to which the
employee’s conduct resulted in, or if repeated is likely to result in, “[h]arm to the public
service.” [Citations.] Other relevant factors include the circumstances surrounding the
misconduct and the likelihood of its recurrence.’ [Citation.] The public is entitled to
protection from unprofessional employees whose conduct places people at risk of injury
and the government at risk of incurring liability.” (County of Santa Cruz v. Civil Service
Commission of Santa Cruz (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1577, 1582; see also County of
Siskiyou v. State Personnel Bd. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1606, 1615.) In weighing such
factors, the nature of the employee’s profession must be considered, “because ‘some
occupations such as law enforcement, carry responsibilities and limitations on personal
freedom not imposed on those in other fields.’ ” (County of Los Angeles, supra, 40
Cal.App.5th at p. 878 [“Peace officers . . . are held to higher standards of conduct than
civilian employees, and dishonesty by law enforcement personnel is considered to be
highly injurious to their employing agencies”].)
B. Whether the Trial Court Applied the Wrong Standard of Review
Ramsey argues the trial court applied the wrong standard of review in ruling on
the petition. He argues the trial court was required to exercise its independent judgment
on the evidence before the Board, because the Board’s decision affected his fundamental
vested right in employment. Ramsey is wrong.
As previously discussed, the Board is a statewide administrative agency to which
the California Constitution grants adjudicatory power to review disciplinary actions taken
against state civil service employees. (Cal. Const., art. VII, § 3; California Youth

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Authority, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 584.) “Because the State Personnel Board
derives its adjudicatory authority from the state Constitution rather than from a legislative
enactment, a superior court considering a petition for administrative mandate must defer
to the board’s factual findings if they are supported by substantial evidence.” (State
Personnel Bd. v. Department of Personnel Admin. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 512, 522.) The
Board’s factual determinations are not subject to independent review by the trial court
even if fundamental vested rights are involved. (Coleman v. Department of Personnel
Administration (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1102, 1125 [“Decisions of the State Personnel Board, an
agency of constitutional authority [citation], are reviewed only to determine whether
substantial evidence supports the determination, even when vested rights are involved”];
Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28, 35 [“the
court’s scrutiny of the [constitutional] agency’s factual findings is limited to a
determination whether those findings are supported by substantial evidence in light of the
whole record—and this is so whether or not the decision of the agency affects a
fundamental vested right”].) The trial court thus properly reviewed the Board’s findings
for substantial evidence.
Ramsey’s confusion concerning the applicable standard of review permeates every
other argument in his opening brief. Throughout the brief, Ramsey argues the trial court
erroneously deferred to the Board and would have reached different conclusions had it
reviewed the evidence independently. These arguments are also wrongheaded, as
Ramsey concedes by abandoning them on reply.
“ ‘When an appellant fails to apply the appropriate standard of review, the
argument lacks legal force,’ and the appellant ‘fails to show error in the judgment.’ ”
(Symons Emergency Specialties v. City of Riverside (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 583, 597.)
Ramsey fails to tailor any of the arguments in his opening brief to the appropriate
standard of review and thus fails to demonstrate error. (Id. at p. 598 [an appellant “does
not meet its burden to show error on appeal when it fails to tailor its arguments and,

12
indeed, seemingly ignores, the appropriate standard of review”].) And, though Ramsey
tries to recalibrate his arguments in his reply brief, he still fails to understand or apply the
substantial evidence standard of review, as we next explain.
C. Whether Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ’s Findings
Ramsey raises three principal challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. First,
he argues there was insufficient evidence of the required nexus between his conduct in
the off-duty training session and his employment as a correctional officer. Second, he
argues there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that the slap was intentional.
Third, he argues there was insufficient evidence he acted dishonestly in filling out his
employment application and describing J.L.’s reaction to the slap. None of these
arguments has any merit whatsoever.
1. Sufficiency of Evidence of Nexus
Section 19572, subdivision (t) authorizes discipline for “[o]ther failure of good
behavior either during or outside of duty hours, which is of such a nature that it causes
discredit to the appointing authority or the person’s employment.” The subdivision
requires “more than failure of good behavior.” (Warren v. State Personnel Bd. (1979) 94
Cal.App.3d 95, 104.) It also requires that the misconduct “be of such a nature as to
reflect upon the employee’s job.” (Yancey v. State Personnel Bd. (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d
478, 483; accord Stanton v. State Personnel Board (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 729, 739-740.)
That is, the misconduct “must bear some rational relationship to [the person’s]
employment and must be of such character that it can easily result in the impairment or
disruption of the public service.” (Warren, supra, at p. 104; see also Johnson v. County
of Santa Clara (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 26, 32.) [“ ‘If the misconduct bears some rational
relationship to the employment and is of a character that can reasonably result in the
impairment or disruption of public service,’ the employee may be disciplined”].)
Ramsey argues the trial court erred in finding a nexus between the training
incident and his employment. He emphasizes that the training session was an off-duty,

13
volunteer activity that occurred outside of any Department facility and involved
participants having no connection to the Department. He also emphasizes that he
informed E.H. and J.L. at the outset that he was not certified by the Department to teach
self-defense tactics. These arguments are misguided.
As we have said, we are concerned with the Board’s findings, not the trial court’s
conclusions. (Telish, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 1487 [“ ‘an appellate court
independently determines whether substantial evidence supports the SPB’s findings, not
the trial court’s conclusions’ ”].) Ramsey’s sights are thus set on the wrong target. But
even assuming Ramsey had taken aim at the Board’s nexus finding, he would still miss
the mark.
The ALJ found Ramsey’s conduct was rationally related to his employment
because E.H. and the National Park Service asked him to lead the training session “based,
in part, on the fact that he worked for [the Department].” We need not decide whether
that finding would be enough on its own to establish the required nexus, because there
was additional evidence connecting Ramsey’s misconduct to his employment as a
correctional officer.
The administrative record reveals that Ramsey held himself out as someone with
specialized knowledge of self-defense, gained from his military service and work for the
Department. Ramsey told investigators he originally learned self-defense tactics in the
Army, which he subsequently modified for use in prison. He similarly told E.H. and J.L.
that he learned unconventional self-defense techniques so he could use them at work,
should the need arise.
During the training session, Ramsey discussed something called an “OODA loop,”
which describes stages of the decision-making process. 3 Ramsey explained that

3 “OODA” is an acronym for “[o]bserve, [o]rient, [d]ecide[,] and [a]ct.”

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incarcerated persons often say and do unexpected things to disrupt a correctional officer’s
OODA loop and throw them off-balance. Ramsey observed that the same technique
could be used on incarcerated persons or suspects. For example, Ramsey said he
sometimes refers to anal penetration in brushes with inmates as a way of disrupting their
OODA loops and getting them to “knock it off.” J.L. recalled that Ramsey demonstrated
the technique on at least one occasion during the training session. Ramsey and J.L. were
practicing a knife defense scenario, with one playing the role of law enforcement officer
and the other playing the role of the suspect.4 As they struggled, J.L. said, “Fuck you.”
Ramsey replied, “when and where baby?” When the knife defense scenario was over,
Ramsey explained that he made the off-color remark to break J.L.’s OODA loop. This
was essentially the same tactic he described using with inmates.
Viewing the record as a whole, we are satisfied that substantial evidence supports
the Board’s nexus finding. Ramsey presented himself as someone with specialized
knowledge in self-defense honed through years of on-the-job training. He conducted a
training session at which participants assumed the roles of suspect and law enforcement
officer, and he used examples from work to demonstrate techniques for disrupting the
OODA loop. Indeed, the slap may well have been an ill-advised attempt to further
demonstrate the concept. Regardless, Ramsey’s conduct brought discredit to the
Department by casting doubt on the judgment and professionalism of its officers amongst
members of another law enforcement agency and necessitating a federal investigation.
These circumstances are more than enough to support the Board’s finding that Ramsey’s
failure of good behavior was rationally related to his job as a correctional officer. (See,
e.g., Anderson v. State Personnel Bd. (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 761, 771-772 [substantial
evidence supported determination that CHP officer’s habitual nudity within view of

4 The record is inconsistent as to who was playing what role on this occasion.

15
neighbors was reasonably related to his employment and “brought embarrassment and
discredit to the law enforcement agency he served”].)
2. Sufficiency of Evidence of Ramsey’s Intent to Slap J.L.
Ramsey next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the Board’s
finding he intentionally slapped J.L. Ramsey emphasizes that E.H. did not see the
moment of contact with J.L., and neither characterized the slap as intentional until after
the training session. He also emphasizes that there was evidence from which the Board
could have inferred the slap was accidental. These arguments are unavailing.
Again, we independently review whether substantial evidence supports the
Board’s findings. (Telish, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 1487.) Substantial evidence
includes “ ‘ “[c]ircumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn from that
evidence.” ’ ” (LaMarr v. Regents of University of California (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th
671, 676.) “Even where contradicted by direct testimony, the finder of fact is entitled to
accept persuasive circumstantial evidence to the contrary.” (Norris v. State Personnel
Bd. (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 393, 398-399.)
Witnesses offered markedly different accounts of the training incident. Ramsey
acknowledged making contact with J.L.’s genital area, but said the contact occurred
during a bear hug escape and amounted to a “light tap” with the pinky side of his left
hand. By contrast, J.L. testified that Ramsey delivered a “hard” and “stinging” blow to
her genital area with an open palm during a ground escape scenario. When J.L. stood and
turned to face Ramsey, he said nothing but smiled or smirked at her.
E.H.’s testimony tended to corroborate J.L.’s. Although E.H. missed the moment
of contact, she heard J.L. cry out during the ground escape scenario and saw Ramsey’s
hand “between her legs somewhere.” Rather than apologize, E.H. heard Ramsey say,
“[I]t’s a sensitive area no matter what gender you are.” E.H. further testified that she had
many years of self-defense training and had never known anyone to touch another
person’s genital area on purpose.

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 As previously discussed, the ALJ evaluated the credibility of each witness under
Evidence Code section 780, and found J.L. and E.H. testified credibly and consistently,
while Ramsey did not. The Board adopted the ALJ’s credibility determinations, and we
do not second-guess them. (Do v. Regents of University of California (2013) 216
Cal.App.4th 1474, 1492.) The testimony of J.L. and E.H. constitutes substantial
circumstantial evidence that the slap was intentional. (Gubser v. Department of
Employment (1969) 271 Cal.App.2d 240, 243 [circumstantial evidence may be used to
prove intent].) Drawing on their testimony, the ALJ could reasonably infer that someone
intending to deliver a painful blow to a woman’s genital area would be likely to use an
open palm, rather than the pinkie side of his hand. The ALJ could also reasonably infer
that someone who accidentally struck another person’s genital area would be likely to
apologize, rather than smile or smirk. The ALJ could also reasonably infer that someone
who accidentally struck another person’s genital area would be unlikely to
unapologetically observe that, “[I]t’s a sensitive area no matter what gender you are.”
Thus, substantial evidence supports the finding that the slap was intentional.
Ramsey observes that there was also evidence from which the ALJ could have
drawn the opposite conclusion. He points to his own statements to investigators, in
which he insisted as much, and the nature of the training, which involved grappling at
close quarters. As we have suggested, the ALJ as the trier of fact was entitled to believe
some or none of Ramsey’s testimony. (See Evid. Code, § 780.) As a court of review, we
neither reweigh the evidence nor reevaluate witnesses’ credibility; rather, we examine
“all relevant evidence in the entire record, considering both the evidence that supports the
Board’s decision and the evidence against it, in order to determine whether that decision
is supported by substantial evidence.” (Telish, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 1487.) Here,
as we have said, substantial evidence supports the finding that the slap was intentional.
That other evidence might support another finding does not mean the ALJ’s finding of
intent lacks substantial evidence.

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 Ramsey also observes that E.H. and J.L. did not characterize the slap as intentional
at the time of the training session. But neither had reason to narrate events as they
unfolded. To the contrary, they each had reason to keep their counsel. J.L. testified her
immediate reaction to the slap was confusion, as nothing similar had ever happened to
her before. E.H. similarly testified that she had never experienced such a thing in many
years of self-defense training. From this testimony, the ALJ could have reasonably
inferred that Ramsey’s conduct was so shocking and unexpected that J.L. and E.H. were
unable to make sense of it in the moment. That does not mean that their subsequent
understanding of events was not believable, or the ALJ could not have reasonably relied
upon it. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s intent finding.
3. Sufficiency of Evidence of Dishonesty
Ramsey next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the findings of
dishonesty. The ALJ found Ramsey acted dishonestly by denying military service on his
employment application and by telling investigators that J.L. reacted to the slap by
giggling. Both dishonesty findings are supported by substantial evidence.
“Dishonesty is incompatible with the public trust.” (Talmo v. Civil Service Com.
(1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 210, 231.) “By its enactment of section 19572, subdivision (f),
the Legislature indicated a strong public policy against having dishonest employees in the
state service.” (Gee v. California State Personnel Board (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 713, 719.)
A finding of dishonesty generally requires a showing of an intentional misrepresentation
of known facts, or a willful omission of pertinent facts, or a disposition to lie, cheat, or
defraud. (See generally id. at pp. 718-719; see also Paulino v. Civil Service Commission
(1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 962, 972.)
Ramsey argues there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that he acted
dishonestly by denying military service on his employment application. He points to the
Army’s website, which supposedly contains information to support an argument that the
question whether he “served” in the Army could have been interpreted in various ways,

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including one that would made his response truthful. That information does not appear to
have been part of the administrative record, and the trial court properly refused to
consider it. (See Toyota of Visalia, Inc. v. New Motor Vehicle Bd. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d
872, 881 [“The general rule is that a hearing on a writ of administrative mandamus is
conducted solely on the record of the proceeding before the administrative agency”].)
Ramsey does not challenge the trial court’s ruling, and we decline to revisit it.
Regardless, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s dishonesty finding. Ramsey held
himself out as having served in the Army and admitted having denied military service
because he was embarrassed by the circumstances surrounding his medical discharge. He
also admitted the denial was untruthful. The ALJ found Ramsey’s subsequent
explanation—that his commanding officer instructed him to deny military service—
implausible, and we will not disturb that finding.
Ramsey also argues there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that he
acted dishonestly by telling investigators that J.L. “giggled” in response to the slap.
Ramsey emphasizes that J.L. and E.H. both testified that J.L. laughed after the slap. He
argues his statement to investigators could not have been false, because laughing and
giggling are similar responses. We are not persuaded. Again, Ramsey told investigators
he accidentally delivered a “slight tap” or “light tap” to J.L.’s genital area. According to
Ramsey, J.L. responded by saying, “My vagina, my vagina, while jumping up and
down.” Later in the interview, Ramsey said, “She was giggling with a smile on her face.”
Still later, he said, “she was jumping up and down, giggling, my vagina, my vagina.”
But J.L. and E.H. painted a different picture. J.L. testified that Ramsey made
contact with her genital area, and she stood up. She said, “my vagina.” She then turned
and looked at Ramsey. Ramsey smirked at J.L., an uncomfortable silence followed, and
J.L. laughed to break the silence. E.H., for her part, testified she heard J.L. give “a
surprised laugh” after standing up. Together, their testimony supports an inference that
J.L. reacted to the slap with shock and discomfort, rather than amusement. That

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inference, in turn, supports a finding that Ramsey acted dishonestly in describing J.L. as
“jumping up and down, giggling” in the investigative interview. Substantial evidence
thus supports both dishonesty findings.
D. Whether the Penalty of Termination was an Abuse of Discretion
Finally, Ramsey’s opening brief argues the trial court erred in failing to
independently review the Board’s decision to terminate his employment. Here again,
Ramsey opens with the wrong standard of review. (Landau v. Superior Court (1998) 81
Cal.App.4th 191, 218 [“In reviewing the severity of the discipline imposed, we look to
the correctness of the agency’s decision rather than that of the trial court”].) Ramsey tries
to course-correct in the reply brief arguing the Board exceeded the bounds of reason in
imposing the penalty of termination. But that argument assumes the success of each of
the previously discussed challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. Thus, Ramsey
argues the Board abused its discretion in imposing the penalty of termination because
there was insufficient evidence he intentionally slapped J.L during the training session
and acted dishonestly by mischaracterizing J.L.’s reaction to the slap and denying
military service on his employment application. Having rejected Ramsey’s challenges to
the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the Board’s culpability findings, we likewise
reject his derivative challenge to the Board’s choice of penalty. (Ibid. [“Neither an
appellate court nor a trial court is free to substitute its discretion for that of the
administrative agency concerning the degree of punishment imposed”].)

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 III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

/S/
RENNER, J.

We concur:

/S/
EARL, P. J.

/S/
WISEMAN, J.*

* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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