Filed 6/30/26 P. v. Jordan CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A173478
v.
TYRODRIC L. JORDAN, (Alameda County Super. Ct.
No. 105168)
Defendant and Appellant.

In 1990, Tyrodric L. Jordan pled guilty to second degree murder and
attempted murder, both offenses committed while using a firearm — he was
sentenced to 20 years to life in prison. (Former Pen. Code, §§ 187, 664,
12022.5, undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.) In 2019,
he petitioned for resentencing under section 1172.6.1 After an evidentiary
hearing, the trial court denied the petition because Jordan testified at the
parole hearing that he personally shot both victims. He appeals, arguing the
court prejudicially erred by admitting his parole hearing testimony because
he was entitled to limited use immunity and it was involuntary. We affirm.

1 In June 2022, the original resentencing statute (former § 1170.95)

was renumbered without substantive change as section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022,
ch. 58, § 10.) We refer to section 1172.6 for clarity.
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 BACKGROUND
In January 1990, Kevin Young was talking to Eugenia Crawford at her
home when he saw Jordan driving his car. He walked to Jordan’s house to
retrieve it. Jordan refused to return it, stating Young “pawned the car off” to
him the night before and still owed him $300. Jordan asked for the money,
but Young did not respond. Eventually, Young returned to Crawford’s house.
Jordan went to Crawford’s house later that evening and talked to
Young in the kitchen. He claimed the car was stolen, and he had to flee from
officers while driving it. He asked for the money, identification, and pink
slips for the car. Jordan then spoke with Crawford in the living room, where
he inquired about her relationship with Young. After she explained they
were childhood friends, Jordan asked, “Can I kill him?” He asked her to
unplug her phone and take her children upstairs to prevent any disturbances.
Jordan left Crawford’s house and returned with another man.
Crawford came downstairs and saw a gun on the kitchen counter. She left
the kitchen and heard a gunshot two minutes later. She returned to the
living room where she saw Jordan shoot Young twice, killing him. Crawford
ran out the door, fell down, and felt a shot in her lower back. Officers arrived
shortly after the shooting. The bullets recovered from Young’s body and
Crawford’s spine were fired from the same gun.
Following a preliminary hearing in 1990 during which Crawford
recounted the above series of events, Jordan pled guilty to second degree
murder (former § 187) and attempted murder (former §§ 187, 664), both with
the use of a firearm (former § 12022.5). The trial court sentenced him to 20
years to life in prison.
At a parole hearing — accompanied by his counsel — Jordan admitted
shooting Young because he felt threatened by his insistence on retrieving the

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car. He also admitted shooting Crawford because she was a witness, and he
believed he killed her. He noted that, at the time of the shooting, he was part
of a big gang known for fighting. Shooting Young, he explained, would prove
something to those around him.
In his July 2019 petition for resentencing, Jordan alleged he could not
now be convicted of second degree murder based on recent amendments to
the Penal Code. (§ 1172.6.) The trial court issued an order to show cause and
conducted an evidentiary hearing in May 2025. Relying in part on the parole
hearing testimony, the court denied the petition after finding Jordan
admitted to personally shooting both victims.
DISCUSSION
Jordan challenges the admission of his parole hearing testimony on
several grounds. None are persuasive.
Until 2019, defendants could be convicted of murder under the felony-
murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine. (People v.
Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 449–450.) But amendments to the murder
provisions, sections 188 and 189, subsequently limited accomplice liability
under the felony-murder rule and eliminated liability for murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine. (Ibid; Stats. 2018, ch. 1015,
§§ 1, subd. (f), 2–3; Sen. Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.).) The
legislation ensured that “murder liability is not imposed on a person who is
not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major
participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to
human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).)
Those convicted of murder under the prior law may ask the trial court
to vacate the conviction and resentence them on any remaining counts.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a); People v. Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 449–450.) To

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obtain such relief, a defendant must establish: (1) the prosecution proceeded
under a felony murder or natural and probable consequences doctrine; (2) the
defendant was convicted of murder or attempted murder; and (3) the
defendant could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder
because of the changes to the murder provisions. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1)–(3);
Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § (1)(a); Curiel, at p. 450.) If a prima facie case for
eligibility is made, the court must issue an order to show cause and hold a
hearing to determine whether to vacate the murder conviction. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (c), (d)(1).)
At the evidentiary hearing, the court may consider evidence admitted
at a prior hearing or trial, as well as new or additional evidence such as
testimony at a parole hearing. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3); People v. Zavala (2024)
105 Cal.App.5th 366, 373 (Zavala); People v. Myles (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th
688, 698 (Myles) [“the Legislature intended to allow both the prosecution and
defendant to rely on evidence that becomes available after a trial or plea,
whether the evidence previously existed or not”].) The prosecution must
demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of
murder or attempted murder under the amended murder provisions.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
Jordan contends the trial court erred by admitting his parole hearing
testimony because he is entitled to use immunity under People v. Coleman
(1975) 13 Cal.3d 867 — concluding that a defendant’s testimony at a
probation revocation hearing was inadmissible in a later trial to prove guilt
on related criminal charges because it is unfair to require a defendant to
choose between the privilege against self-incrimination and asserting other
rights, such as a liberty interest in release on parole. (Id. at p. 878.) After
independently reviewing this issue, we disagree — many of our sister courts

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have reached the same conclusion. (Zavala, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 373
[de novo review of whether “ ‘use immunity exists’ ”]; People v. Hart (2025)
113 Cal.App.5th 1099; People v. Rodriguez (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 458, 466–
468 (Rodriguez); People v. Mitchell (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 575, 588–590.)
We acknowledge cases have treated Coleman as creating a “limited
species of use immunity grounded in California’s constitutional guarantee
against self-incrimination.” (Zavala, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 374;
Ramona R. v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 802, 808–809.) And courts
have applied Coleman’s use immunity rule in other contexts. (Zavala,
at p. 375 [collecting cases noting use immunity applying to privileged
disclosures in other contexts].) But as Jordan recognizes, “California courts
have uniformly concluded that incriminating statements made by a prisoner
during parole proceedings may be admitted at an evidentiary hearing under
section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) without violating the privilege” against self-
incrimination. (People v. Hart, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 1107.)
The privilege against self-incrimination protects defendants from
serving as coerced government witnesses against themselves in criminal
trials. (Myles, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 705.) Section 1172.6 resentencing
petitions, however, entail postconviction proceedings regarding acts of
lenity — sentence modification — rather than a de novo trial on criminal
charges. (Myles, at pp. 705–706.) Defendants are “not compelled to
file . . . section [1172.6] petition[s], nor to testify at [their] parole hearing[s].”
(Id. at p. 706.) A “defendant’s conviction remains ‘intact’ throughout the
process and is not vacated unless and until the prosecution fails to prove a
defendant’s ineligibility for relief beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Rodriguez,
supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 468.) Thus, extending Coleman’s use immunity
to this context is inappropriate. Jordan’s reliance on the dissenting opinion

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in People v. Mitchell — finding defendant’s statements made at a parole
hearing inadmissible under Coleman — fails to persuade. (People v. Mitchell,
supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 604–605 (dis. opn. of Stratton, P. J.).) Like the
majority in Mitchell, we discern no reason to depart from the reasoning in
Myles. (Mitchell, at p. 588; Rodriguez, at p. 468 [no detrimental effect flowing
from use of defendant’s prior statements since there are only two outcomes
from a § 1172.6 resentencing petition: “a defendant’s conviction and sentence
remain in place, or a defendant’s conviction and sentence are reduced to
reflect their proven level of culpability”].)
Next, Jordan argues the parole hearing was coercive, rendering his
incriminating statements involuntary. When reviewing a “claim of
involuntary incriminating statements,” we examine the uncontradicted facts
surrounding the statement to independently determine whether they were
made voluntarily, without threat or inducement, and accept the version of
events most favorable to the People. (Zavala, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th
at p. 376.) Having reviewed the hearing transcript, we discern no coercion.
At the outset, we reject Jordan’s assertion that parole could be denied if
he refused to admit his guilt, rendering his incriminating statements
involuntary. But parole may not be denied based solely on the applicant’s
assertion of innocence. (Rodriguez, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 468.) “The
Board of Prison Terms shall not require, when setting parole dates, an
admission of guilt to any crime for which an inmate was committed.” (§ 5011,
subd. (b); see also Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2236 [prohibiting the board from
requiring “an admission of guilt to any crime for which the prisoner was
committed” and allowing a prisoner to “refuse to discuss the facts of the crime
in which instance a decision shall be made based on the other information
available and the refusal shall not be held against the prisoner”].) “Standing

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alone, a defendant’s right to speak on their own behalf at a parole hearing
cannot support a conclusion that parole hearing testimony was compelled or
involuntary.” (Zavala, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 377.) Moreover,
although “the parole hearing transcripts do not reflect whether [Jordan] was
advised of his right not to discuss his commitment offense,” he was
represented by counsel at the hearing, thus undermining his assertion his
testimony was compelled. (Ibid.)
Jordan further insists certain statements made by the prison board
commissioner during the parole hearing — noting Jordan’s need to
demonstrate growth and maturity since his offenses; observing prior
credibility issues in risk assessments, including his statements that he dealt
drugs to feed his family; and emphasizing the importance of being truthful
during the hearing — were improper implicit promises of leniency in
exchange for an admission of guilt. We see no such promises in the record.
Those statements simply “emphasize[d] the importance of voluntary,
unvarnished truthtelling,” as well as identifying Jordan’s prospects. (People
v. Mitchell, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 590.) “ ‘[A]dvice or exhortation’ ” to be
truthful “ ‘unaccompanied by either a threat or a promise, does not render a
subsequent confession involuntary.’ ” (People v. Hill (1967) 66 Cal.2d 536,
549.) “That [Jordan] may have had an incentive to admit having committed
the offenses of conviction” — e.g., parole — “does not suggest his will was
overborne by official coercion, such that his statements were involuntary.”
(Zavala, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 377, italics added.) Thus, the court did
not err by admitting the parole hearing testimony. Given our conclusion, we
do not address Jordan’s argument that admission of the testimony was
prejudicial.
DISPOSITION

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The order denying Jordan’s petition for resentencing is affirmed.

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 _________________________
RODRÍGUEZ, J.

I CONCUR:

_________________________
FUJISAKI, J.

A173478; P. v. Jordan

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TUCHER, P. J., Concurring in the Judgment.
I concur in the result on harmless error grounds. Without deciding the
weighty issue that divided the court in People v. Mitchell (2022) 81
Cal.App.5th 575, I would affirm the order denying defendant’s petition for
resentencing on the basis that no reasonable factfinder could conclude, even
if the parole hearing testimony had been excluded, that appellant was
neither the shooter nor “a major participant in the underlying felony who
acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1,
subd. (f).) Eugenia Crawford’s testimony at the preliminary hearing
established defendant had had a beef with Kevin Young that prompted him
to ask about killing Young in Crawford’s home; he left Crawford’s home only
to return with another individual and a firearm; and Crawford then saw
defendant shoot Young twice, killing him, and was herself shot in the back
with a bullet from the same gun as she fled the scene. Even if this evidence
did not conclusively establish defendant as the shooter in both crimes, it
admits to only one conclusion as to whether he was a major participant acting
with reckless indifference to human life. (See People v. Banks (2015) 61
Cal.4th 788; People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522.) Defendant, thus,
remains liable for felony murder even after changes in the law of homicide,
and his petition for resentencing was appropriately denied.

TUCHER, P. J.

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