Filed 6/30/26 P. v. Alvarez CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not
been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B344112
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA086838)
v.
RAMIRO JUAN ALVAREZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Ronald S. Coen, Judge. Dismissed as moot.
Robert A. Werth, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Stephanie C. Brenan,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________
We decide this appeal by memorandum opinion. (See Cal.
Stds. Jud. Admin., § 8.1.)
Ramiro Juan Alvarez appeals the trial court’s order denying
his request to vacate a $10,000 restitution fine imposed in
connection with his sentence. We conclude the court properly
denied the request: As set forth, post, the fine was vacated by
operation of statute before Alvarez filed his request. Accordingly,
we dismiss Alvarez’s appeal as moot.
In 2012, a jury convicted Alvarez of first degree murder
(Pen. Code1, § 187, subd. (a)). Later that same year, the trial
court sentenced Alvarez to prison for life without the possibility
of parole, plus a consecutive term of 25 years to life for a firearm
enhancement. In addition, the court ordered Alvarez to pay
approximately $22,000 in direct restitution and imposed a $10,000
restitution fine pursuant to section 1202.4, subdivision (b).2
Effective January 1, 2025, the Legislature enacted
subdivision (d) of section 1465.9, which provides: “Upon the
expiration of 10 years after the date of imposition of a restitution
fine pursuant to [s]ection 1202.4, the balance, including any
collection fees, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and
any portion of a judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated.”
(§ 1465.9, subd. (d).) In Mattison, supra, Division Two of the Fourth
Appellate District recently concluded that vacatur of eligible
section 1202.4 fines occurred automatically—i.e., without any
1 Subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 A section 1202.4 restitution fine is “imposed on nearly every
convicted defendant and [is] paid into a statewide pool used to
compensate victims.” (In re Mattison (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 1062,
1066 (Mattison).)
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action on the part of affected defendants—when section 1465.9,
subdivision (d) took effect:
“On January 1, 2025, when the statute became effective,
[the defendant’s] restitution fine was rendered uncollectible and
unenforceable. At that time, the portion of his judgment imposing
that fine was vacated. The judgment is the sentence ordered
orally by the court; the abstract of judgment is not the judgment.
[Citations.] Once the new law was effective, [the defendant’s]
restitution fine was vacated as surely as if the trial court judge had
ordered it. While other changes in sentencing law might require a
judicial determination before a judgment is changed [citation], this
one does not.” (Mattison, supra, 115 Cal.App.5th at p. 1069.) No
published decision has disagreed with Mattison.
On January 26, 2025, Alvarez, representing himself, sent
a letter to the court requesting that “both [the] restitution [fine]
& direct [restitution] orders [be] removed from [his] account.”
On February 6, 2025, the court issued a minute order summarily
denying Alvarez’s request, which the court characterized as a
motion to dismiss the restitution fine and direct restitution order.
Alvarez now asks us to reverse the portion of the court’s
order declining to dismiss the restitution fine. He contends
that, pursuant to section 1465.9, subdivision (d), the “court
was statutorily required to vacate” the fine. But we agree with
the conclusion in Mattison that Alvarez’s fine—imposed 12 years
earlier—was vacated automatically when section 1465.9,
subdivision (d) took effect on January 1, 2025. (See Mattison,
supra, 115 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1069-1070.) Alvarez’s January 26,
2025 request to dismiss or vacate the fine therefore was (and
remains) moot. (See People v. Armas (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 350,
353 [“ ‘[a] case becomes moot when a court ruling can have no
practical effect or cannot provide the parties with effective relief ’ ”].)
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Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal as moot.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:
BENDIX, J.
WEINGART, J.
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