Filed 7/1/26 Cooper v. Octapharma Plasma CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
TAWANA JEAN COOPER, B348357
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 23NWCV01923)
v.
OCTAPHARMA PLASMA, INC., et
al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Lee W. Tsao, Judge. Affirmed.
Tawana Jean Cooper, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Hogan Lovells US, Tao Y. Leung and Harmony R. Gbe for
Defendants and Respondents.
____________________
Plaintiff Tawana Jean Cooper appeals the trial court’s
order declaring her a vexatious litigant and prohibiting her from
initiating litigation in a California court in propria persona
without obtaining permission from that court’s presiding judge or
justice. (See Code Civ. Proc.,1 §§ 391, subd. (b), 391.7.) We
affirm.2
BACKGROUND
In June 2023, Cooper sued her former employer
Octapharma Plasma, Inc. (Octapharma) and her former
supervisor Caitlin Ryan (collectively, Defendants), alleging they
violated an oral agreement that Cooper would work a part-time,
late afternoon to evening, schedule of no more than five hours per
shift.
On October 2, 2023, Octapharma served its responses to
Cooper’s first set of requests for production and attached a
verification form signed by its Senior Manager for Human
Resources Karen Singletary. Singletary stated that to the extent
she had personal knowledge of the responses, the information
was true and correct, and to the extent the matters set forth in
the responses were a composite of the information of many
individuals, she was informed and believed those matters were
true.
On November 22, 2023, Cooper moved to compel a response
from Octapharma to her requests for production and for
monetary sanctions. Cooper contended the responses were
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
2 We deny Defendants Octapharma Plasma, Inc., and Caitlin
Ryan’s request for judicial notice as unnecessary to our resolution
of the appeal.
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unverified because Octapharma was required to verify its
responses in the responses and was not permitted to use a
verification form. Cooper also argued Singletary’s affidavit was
hearsay because it was based on information and belief. After
Octapharma opposed, Cooper replied, claiming she never received
an opposition.
On December 19, 2023, the trial court denied Cooper’s
motion. The court explained Octapharma properly verified its
responses using a verification form and Singletary properly
verified the responses on information and belief because
corporate parties can verify discovery responses in that manner.
Between March and May 2024, Cooper filed, by our count,
some 10 motions to compel and for monetary sanctions against
Defendants. These motions repeated that Defendants could not
verify their discovery responses using verification forms, and
three of these motions repeated that Defendants could not verify
the responses on information and belief. Although Defendants
opposed the motions, Cooper filed replies stating she did not
receive any opposition. The court denied these motions. In the
last of these instances, on June 27, 2024, the court sanctioned
Cooper $100 for making a motion to compel without substantial
justification. Cooper refused to pay the sanctions.
Meanwhile, Defendants filed a motion asking the trial
court to declare Cooper a vexatious litigant and impose a
prefiling order under section 391.7. Cooper opposed. On July 16,
2024, the court denied Defendants’ motion without prejudice,
reasoning that at that time the court could not say Cooper was a
vexatious litigant.
Between September and October 2024, Cooper filed
seven more motions to compel and for monetary sanctions against
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Defendants, again arguing Defendants could not verify their
discovery responses using verification forms. Again, after
Defendants opposed, Cooper filed replies stating she did not
receive any opposition.
While Cooper’s latest motions were pending, on January 3,
2025, Defendants renewed their vexatious litigant motion. On
January 15, 2025, Defendants applied ex parte for an order
advancing the hearing on their motion. The next day, the trial
court granted the application and advanced the hearing to
February 19, 2025. On February 10, 2025, Defendants notified
the court Cooper did not file an opposition.
On February 13, 2025, Cooper filed a notice claiming
Defendants improperly served her with the renewed motion and
ex parte application, claiming they did not serve the documents
via e-mail as required pursuant to an agreement between the
parties. Although Cooper acknowledged Defendants served these
documents via FedEx and personal service, she claimed
“personnel at [her] mailing address forgot to inform [her] of her
deliveries.”
On February 18, 2025, Defendants responded to Cooper’s
notice and submitted proofs of service indicating they served
Cooper with the renewed motion via FedEx on January 3, 2025,
and personally served Cooper with the ex parte application on
January 15, 2025. They also showed e-mail service on Cooper on
January 16, 2025.
On February 19, 2025, the trial court granted Defendants’
renewed motion and declared Cooper a vexatious litigant. The
court first found Defendants properly served Cooper. As for the
merits of the motion, the court reasoned: “Given that [Cooper]
has repeatedly filed discovery motions raising the same
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arguments, after rulings which have repeatedly stated that the
argument has no basis in law, the Court finds [Cooper] has
engaged in tactics which are frivolous and only serve to cause
delays. [Cooper] has not adjusted her conduct in this litigation
despite numerous rulings, sanctions, and Defendants’ attempts to
preempt the issue through meet and confer efforts. . . .
Accordingly, [Cooper] is a ‘vexatious litigant’ within the meaning
of [section] 391[,] subd[ivision] (b)[(3)].” The court also imposed a
prefiling order under section 391.7, subdivision (a) prohibiting
Cooper from filing any new litigation in California courts “in
propria persona without first obtaining leave of the presiding
justice or presiding judge of the court where the litigation is
proposed to be filed.”
Cooper timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Cooper makes two arguments on appeal: (1) the vexatious
litigant order is void because the trial court never acquired
personal jurisdiction over her; and (2) the record does not support
the finding she was a vexatious litigant. We reject both
contentions.
I. The Vexatious Litigant Order Is Not Void
Cooper’s first contention lacks merit. Cooper submitted to
the trial court’s jurisdiction by filing this action. (See, e.g., Nobel
Farms, Inc. v. Pasero (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 654, 658 [“By
choosing a particular forum, plaintiff is considered to have
voluntarily submitted to the court’s jurisdiction ‘for all purposes
for which justice to the defendant requires his presence’ ”].)
Cooper argues the trial court never acquired personal
jurisdiction over her because Defendants did not properly serve
her with the renewed motion and ex parte application and
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because her challenge to improper service merely constituted a
special appearance. But the principles Cooper invokes have no
application here because they concern establishing personal
jurisdiction over defendants, not plaintiffs. (See, e.g., Ziller
Electronics Lab GmbH v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d
1222, 1229; Dial 800 v. Fesbinder (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 32, 52.)
In any event, the record supports the trial court’s finding
Defendants properly served Cooper. As Cooper acknowledges,
Defendants served her with the renewed motion and the ex parte
application via FedEx and personal service. The record also
shows Defendants e-mailed Cooper the renewed motion on
January 16, 2025. Although Cooper claimed she did not timely
receive Defendants’ briefing because personnel at her mailing
address forgot to inform her of her deliveries, the court was not
obligated to accept Cooper’s explanation, and we defer to the
court’s credibility determinations. (See Lebel v. Mai (2012)
210 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1159 [“Where . . . an issue is resolved by
way of declarations or affidavits, ‘ “the rule on appeal is that
those affidavits favoring the contention of the prevailing party
establish not only the facts stated therein but also all facts which
reasonably may be inferred therefrom, and where there is a
substantial conflict in the facts stated, a determination of the
controverted facts by the trial court will not be disturbed” ’ ”].)
In short, the vexatious litigant order is not void for lack of
jurisdiction or failure to serve Cooper.
II. Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court’s
Finding that Cooper Was a Vexatious Litigant
“To be declared a vexatious litigant, the plaintiff must come
within one of the definitions in section 391, subdivision (b).”
(Goodrich v. Sierra Vista Regional Medical Center (2016)
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246 Cal.App.4th 1260, 1265 (Goodrich).) Relevant to this appeal,
section 391, subdivision (b)(3) defines a vexatious litigant as a
person acting in propria persona who “repeatedly files
unmeritorious motions, pleadings, or other papers, conducts
unnecessary discovery, or engages in other tactics that are
frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.” (Ibid.)
“We review the trial court’s order declaring a party to be a
vexatious litigant for substantial evidence. [Citation.] We are
required to presume the order declaring a litigant vexatious is
correct and imply findings necessary to support that designation.
[Citation.] A reversal is required only where there is no
substantial evidence to imply findings in support of the vexatious
litigant designation.” (Goodrich, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1265–1266.)
Here, ample evidence supports the trial court’s finding
Cooper repeatedly filed unmeritorious motions and engaged in
frivolous tactics to cause delay. After the court denied Cooper’s
first discovery motion, Cooper filed 10 more discovery motions
raising the same arguments that had been rejected by the court.
Not only did the court deny these motions, it also sanctioned
Cooper $100 to convey the message her arguments had no basis
in law. Undeterred, Cooper refused to pay the sanctions and filed
seven more discovery motions raising the same rejected
arguments. This evidence supports the court’s conclusion Cooper
met the definition of a vexatious litigant. (See Bravo v. Ismaj
(2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 211, 226–227 [affirming vexatious litigant
determination where the plaintiff repeatedly filed motions
identical to motions previously brought and denied].)
Cooper’s arguments do not persuade us otherwise. First,
Cooper argues her interpretation of the discovery statutes was
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correct and thus her conduct was grounded in law. Cooper is
mistaken. The trial court is correct parties may verify discovery
responses using verification forms rather than in the responses
themselves. (See § 2015.5 [“Whenever, under any law of this state
. . . any matter is required . . . to be supported, evidenced,
established, or proved by the sworn statement, declaration,
verification, certificate, oath, or affidavit, in writing of the person
making the same . . . , such matter may with like force and effect
be supported, evidenced, established or proved by the unsworn
statement, declaration, verification, or certificate, in writing of
such person which recites that it is certified or declared by him or
her to be true under penalty of perjury” (italics added)].) The
court is also correct a corporate party may verify on information
and belief discovery responses that necessarily encompass the
collective knowledge of numerous individuals. (Perry v. Kia
Motors America, Inc. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 1088, 1097.)
Second, Cooper contends the trial court’s finding that she
was a vexatious litigant is irreconcilable with its denial of
Defendants’ first vexatious litigant motion. According to Cooper,
nothing changed between the two rulings except for the “court’s
disagreement with [her] continued insistence on statutory
compliance.” Not so. When the court denied Defendants’ first
motion, it had just been several weeks since the court denied
Cooper’s latest slate of motions and imposed monetary sanctions.
The court could have reasonably excused Cooper’s initial lay
misunderstanding of the discovery statutes and could have
reasonably concluded at the time that monetary sanctions were a
sufficient remedy for her repeated filings. Cooper, however,
disregarded the sanctions and continued to file meritless motions.
Thus, when Defendants filed their renewed motion, there was
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sufficient evidence for the court to conclude Cooper was a
vexatious litigant. (See Goodrich, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1267–1268 [affirming vexatious litigant determination, even
though the trial court initially declined to declare the plaintiff a
vexatious litigant, where the plaintiff disregarded the court’s
admonition that her arguments were frivolous].)
Finally, Cooper argues what she did below was appropriate
persistence in advocating for her right to discovery. Although
Cooper may vigorously advocate for her rights and disagree with
the trial court, the record supports the court’s finding Cooper’s
litigation tactics went beyond acceptable advocacy. Within a
single year, Cooper filed a total of 17 duplicative discovery
motions, each making the same arguments that the court had
rejected, and repeatedly disregarded the court’s sanctions. On
this record, there was sufficient evidence for the court to conclude
Cooper was a vexatious litigant.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s vexatious litigant order is affirmed.
Defendants are entitled to costs on appeal.
RICHARDSON, J.
WE CONCUR:
CHAVEZ, Acting P. J.
GOORVITCH, J.
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