Filed 7/2/26 P. v. Collins CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B343639
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. TA063812
ERIC COLLINS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Carol J. Najera, Judge. Affirmed and
remanded with directions.
Steven A. Torres, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Stephanie C. Brenan and Nancy Lii Ladner,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________
Defendant and appellant Eric Collins (Collins) broke into a
woman’s home, pointed a shotgun at her and her baby, forced her
to orally copulate him, and then stole jewelry and money. In
2002, Collins was convicted of first degree burglary (Pen. Code,
§ 459),1 first degree robbery (§ 211), forcible oral copulation
(§ 288a, subd. (c)(2)), two counts of assault with a firearm (§ 245,
subd. (a)(2)), and assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245,
subd. (a)(1)). He was sentenced to serve 57 years to life in prison.
In 2024, the trial court recalled Collins’s sentence pursuant
to section 1172.75, struck two one-year prior prison term
enhancements (former § 667.5, subd. (b)), stayed a five-year
serious felony enhancement (§ 667, subd. (a)), and resentenced
Collins to 50 years to life.
On appeal from his resentencing, Collins contends that the
trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion under
section 1385, subdivision (a), and People v. Superior Court
(Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero) to dismiss the prior
“strike” conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12). He also
contends that the court erred in imposing a restitution fine and
calculating his custody credits. We remand with instructions to
vacate the restitution fine and correct the custody credits. We
otherwise affirm the court’s order.
1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
BACKGROUND
I. Facts2
After her husband left for work on the morning of
January 18, 2002, G.G.3 locked the door to her home and went
into her bedroom to feed her three-month-old son. G.G.’s older
daughters were asleep in another bedroom.
About 15 minutes later, G.G. heard a door open and
thought that her husband had returned. When she went to the
kitchen, she was confronted with an intruder, later identified as
Collins. Collins obtained a sharp knife from a drawer and
pointed the blade at G.G.’s chest. At Collins’s direction, G.G.
retreated to her bedroom. Collins told her to disconnect her
telephone and sit on the bed with her baby.
While holding the knife toward G.G., Collins searched the
nightstand drawers and found shotgun bullets. He then
retrieved a shotgun from the closet and placed a bullet in it. He
dropped the knife and aimed the shotgun at G.G., demanding
money. She told him she had none.
Collins ordered G.G. off the bed and told her to sit in the
corner while he took some rings and chains from a hallway closet.
He then ordered G.G. to put her baby on the bed and kneel on the
floor. Collins unzipped his pants and removed his penis. When
G.G. told him “no,” he aimed the shotgun at her baby as if he was
going to shoot him. Collins put his penis in G.G.’s mouth six or
seven times.
2 We draw these facts from Collins’s prior appeal. (People v.
Collins (Aug. 19, 2003, B160440) [nonpub. opn.] (Collins).)
3 Per California Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(4), we use the
victim’s initials to protect her personal privacy interest.
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Collins again ordered G.G. out of the bedroom and into the
hallway. He searched a dresser, taking jewelry belonging to
G.G.’s husband. He found and took some money in a diaper bag.
Collins ordered G.G. into the bathroom and told her to remain
there until he left.
II. Procedural History
A. Conviction and sentencing
Collins was charged with first degree burglary (§ 459;
count 1), first degree robbery (§ 211; count 2), forcible oral
copulation (§ 288a, subd. (c)(2); count 3), two counts of assault
with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2); counts 4 & 5), and assault
with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 6). The
information alleged various enhancements.
Collins proceeded to trial and took the stand in his own
defense. Collins admitted that he was a robber and burglar by
trade. He admitted that he broke into G.G.’s house, threatened
G.G. with a sharp knife, and stole money and a shotgun. He
further admitted to having committed two residential burglaries
the next day and that he had been previously convicted of robbery
in 1985 and burglary in 1992 and 1994. Collins denied pointing
the shotgun at G.G.’s baby or having sexual contact with her.
The jury convicted Collins on all counts. The jury found
true that, as to counts 2 and 3, Collins personally used a firearm
(§ 12022.53, subd. (b)) and, as to count 3, he committed the crime
during a burglary (§ 667.61). The trial court found true that
Collins had suffered one prior strike conviction (§§ 667,
subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12), one prior serious felony (§ 667,
subd. (a)(1)), and two prior prison terms (former § 667.5,
subd. (b)).
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The trial court sentenced Collins to a total of 57 years to
life in state prison. The court also imposed and suspended a
$10,000 restitution fine. (§§ 1202.4, subd. (b), 1202.45.)
The judgment was affirmed on direct appeal. (Collins,
supra, B160440.)
B. Section 1172.75 proceedings
In 2022, Collins became eligible for resentencing under
Senate Bill No. 483 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) and section 1172.75.
Collins moved to dismiss the prior prison term enhancements,
the prior serious felony enhancement, and the strike conviction.
On November 19, 2024, the trial court recalled Collins’s
sentence. The court struck the two one-year prior prison term
enhancements and the five-year term for the prior serious felony.
However, the court declined to dismiss the prior strike conviction.
The court resentenced Collins to a total of 50 years to life and
gave him credit for 8,177 actual days in custody. The court did
not reimpose the restitution fine. The abstract of judgment,
however, reimposes and suspends the $10,000 restitution fine.
Collins filed a timely notice of appeal from his
resentencing.
DISCUSSION
I. The Romero Motion
Collins first contends that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying his motion to dismiss his strike conviction
under section 1385, subdivision (a), and Romero.
Section 1385, subdivision (a), gives a trial court the
discretion to dismiss an “action” in the furtherance of justice.
Under that section, a court may grant a defendant’s motion to
strike prior felony conviction allegations brought under the
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“Three Strikes” law. (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 529–530.)
In assessing a Romero motion, the court “must consider whether,
in light of the nature and circumstances of his present felonies
and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the
particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the
defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or
in part, and hence should be treated as though he had not
previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent
felonies.” (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161.)
We review the denial of a Romero motion for abuse of
discretion. (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 374
(Carmony).) “Abuse of discretion in failing to strike a prior
conviction occurs in limited circumstances: where the trial court
is not aware of its discretion; where the trial court considers
impermissible factors; or where applying the Three Strikes law
would produce an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd result
under the specific facts of a particular case.” (People v. Dryden
(2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 1007, 1029 (Dryden).)
The trial court acknowledged that it had discretion to
dismiss the strike. However, the court denied the Romero
motion, focusing on the nature and circumstances of Collins’s
offenses of conviction. In particular, the court focused on the
devastating impact of Collins’s crimes on G.G. and her child. The
court considered “the entire file,” which necessarily included the
details of Collins’s background and criminal history. The court
also considered Collins’s arguments concerning his record in
prison. The court concluded that Collins was not entitled to “an
alternate sentencing scheme” because “[his] sentencing scheme
was exactly what the legislature had in mind when they enacted
it in the first place.”
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Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the
“specific facts” of Collins’s case render application of the Three
Strikes law “arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd.” (Dryden,
supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 1029; see also Carmony, supra,
33 Cal.4th at p. 378 [“ ‘[w]here the record demonstrates that the
trial court balanced the relevant facts and reached an impartial
decision in conformity with the spirit of the law, we shall affirm
the trial court’s ruling’ ”].) Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s
order denying the Romero motion.
II. Restitution Fine
Collins contends, and the People concede, that the abstract
of judgment erroneously includes a restitution fine.
Section 1465.9, subdivision (d), provides that “[u]pon the
expiration of 10 years after the date of imposition of a restitution
fine pursuant to Section 1202.4, the balance, including any
collection fees, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any
portion of a judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated.”
(§ 1465.9, subd. (d).)
In fact, the trial court did not reimpose the restitution fine,
so this appears to have been a clerical error. Therefore, we
remand so the court may correct the abstract of judgment.
III. Custody Credits
Collins contends, and the People again concede, that the
trial court incorrectly calculated his custody credits.
Collins’s resentencing hearing was held on November 19,
2024. At the hearing, Collins’s counsel incorrectly informed the
trial court that Collins was originally sentenced on July 2, 2002.
As a result, the court awarded 8,177 days of custody credit. In
fact, Collins had been sentenced on July 18, 2002. Therefore,
Collins is only entitled to 8,161 days of postsentencing custody
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credit. Collins’s counsel also neglected to inform the trial court
that Collins was entitled to 209 days of presentence custody
credit.
Based upon the foregoing, we remand so the trial court may
correct the abstract of judgment to order 8,370 days of custody
credit.
DISPOSITION
The matter is remanded for the trial court to correct the
number of custody credits, vacate the restitution fine, prepare an
amended abstract of judgment, and forward a certified copy of the
amended abstract of judgment to the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation. The court’s November 19, 2024,
order is otherwise affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
GOORVITCH, J.
We concur:
CHAVEZ, Acting P. J.
RICHARDSON, J.
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