Filed 7/2/26 P. v. Colato CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B346018
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 24CJCF07773)
NANCY COLATO,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Mildred Escobedo, Judge. Judgment
affirmed; remanded with directions to correct minute order.
Steven S. Lubliner, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Megan A. Donovan,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________
Defendant and appellant Nancy Colato (Colato) appeals
from her conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon. Colato
challenges the trial court’s denial of her motion to suppress
evidence found during a search of her purse. We affirm the
judgment but remand the matter to correct errors in the April 9,
2025, minute order.
BACKGROUND
I. Facts1
On December 18, 2024, at approximately 6:00 p.m.,
Los Angeles Police Department Officer Christopher Aguilar and
his partner were driving and observed Colato riding a bicycle
with no bike light in violation of Vehicle Code section 21201,
subdivision (d). Aguilar recognized Colato from five or six
previous encounters when he worked in the gang unit.
When Colato saw the officers, she gave them “a wide-eyed
look,” and rode away. She then dismounted from the bicycle and
walked away from the officers at a moderate pace. Aguilar
observed that she was carrying a purse strapped around her
shoulder.
The officers conducted a pedestrian stop. As the officers got
out of their vehicle, Colato dropped her bike. Colato also dropped
her purse and “walked a couple of steps to the east, to her right,
away from where the bag was.” When the purse hit the ground,
1 We draw these facts from the testimony and evidence
presented at the concurrently held hearing on the motion to
suppress and preliminary hearing.
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Aguilar heard a “loud metallic thud” that made him believe there
“was some type of weapon inside of the bag.”
Aguilar picked up the purse, and Colato shouted, “ ‘You
can’t search my bag.’ ” The purse felt heavy to Aguilar. Aguilar
“conducted a pat[-]down on the bag” and felt a “hard, L-shaped
object[.]” Aguilar immediately recognized it as a firearm.
Aguilar then passed the purse to his partner, who opened it and
removed a loaded black semiautomatic handgun.
II. Procedural History
The Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office filed a
felony complaint charging Colato with one count of felony
possession of a firearm by a felon. (Pen. Code, § 29800,
subd. (a)(1).) Colato filed a motion to suppress, which the trial
court heard simultaneously with the preliminary hearing.
The trial court denied the motion. The court found that
“[t]he officers were entirely justified in conducting a pedestrian
stop at that point in time, based upon a violation of the Vehicle
Code.” The court found that “dropping the bag and walking away
from that location . . . demonstrated abandonment,” and therefore
Colato had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the bag. In
the alternative, the trial court found that “the officers simply
patt[ed] down something that had been discarded” and they were
“entitled to conduct a further investigation” based upon what
they heard and saw.
Colato pleaded no contest to the charge. This timely appeal
followed.
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DISCUSSION
I. Applicable Law
A defendant may move to suppress evidence obtained
during a warrantless search on the ground that the search was
unreasonable. (Pen. Code, § 1538.5, subd. (a)(1)(A).)
Unreasonable searches and seizures are prohibited under the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (People v.
Lopez (2019) 8 Cal.5th 353, 359.) “Warrantless searches ‘are per
se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a
few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’
[Citations.]” (Ibid.)
One such exception is a search of abandoned property,
because people have no reasonable expectation of privacy in
property they abandon. (People v. Parson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 332,
345.) Whether property is abandoned is an issue of fact. (People
v. Daggs (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 361, 365.)
Another exception is a Terry search for weapons. (Terry v.
Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 20.) After a lawful stop, police officers
may conduct a limited search of a suspect if they have reason to
believe the suspect is armed and dangerous. (Id. at p. 27.)
Although a Terry search does not require probable cause, it is
justified only when “specific and articulable facts . . . taken
together with rational inferences from those facts” warrant a
suspicion that a suspect is armed and dangerous. (Id. at p. 21.)
A Terry search must be “limited to that which is necessary for the
discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the officer or
others nearby.” (Id. at pp. 25–26.)
II. Standards of Review
In ruling on a Penal Code section 1538.5 motion to
suppress, the trial court “sits as a finder of fact with the power to
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judge credibility, resolve conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw
inferences[.]” (People v. Laiwa (1983) 34 Cal.3d 711, 718.) On
appellate review, we “must uphold the [trial] court’s express or
implied findings if they are supported by substantial evidence.
[Citation.]” (Ibid.) We exercise our independent judgment to
determine whether the search was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. (People v. Macabeo (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1206, 1212.)
III. The Search Was Reasonable and Lawful
We need not determine whether there was substantial
evidence that Colato abandoned her purse. Even if not, we find
that Aguilar’s pat-down of the purse was reasonable. When
Colato dropped her purse, Aguilar heard a “loud metallic thud”
that sounded like “some type of weapon.” This was sufficient to
justify a pat-down of the bag, especially considering that Aguilar
was familiar with Colato from his work in the gang unit.
Colato argues that this was insufficient because “[a]ny time
a bag or purse hits the ground it will make a sound that might be
a weapon.” This is not a case in which the purse made some
nondescript or “non-metallic” sound that cannot necessarily be
associated with a weapon. It was reasonable for Aguilar to
suspect a weapon, because that would be the item most likely
found inside a purse that would make a “loud metallic thud”
when the purse was dropped. Colato argues that “[p]erhaps it is
possible to articulate why the noise a purse makes when hitting
the ground plausibly sounds like there is ‘some type of weapon’ in
it rather than an innocent object carried in purses.” However,
Colato does not articulate what “innocent object carried in
purses” would make that sound when the purse was dropped.
In sum, we find that Aguilar had sufficient reason to
believe Colato was armed and conduct a pat-down search of the
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purse. The pat-down revealed a “hard, L-shaped object” that
Aguilar immediately recognized as a handgun, based upon which
his partner was reasonable in opening the purse and removing it.
Therefore, we find that the trial court correctly denied Colato’s
motion to suppress.
IV. Correction of the April 9, 2025, Minute Order
The parties identify several errors in the minute order of
April 9, 2025. The minute order incorrectly states that Colato
pleaded no contest to a violation of Health and Safety Code
section 11378. In fact, Colato admitted this prior conviction, but
she pleaded no contest to a violation of Penal Code section 29800,
subdivision (a)(1). The minute order further states that felony
probation was denied when, in fact, the trial court placed Colato
on felony probation. We order the minute order to be corrected.
(See People v. Lopez-Vinck (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 945, 954.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The matter is remanded to the
trial court with directions to correct the minute order of April 9,
2025, to reflect: (1) Colato pleaded no contest to a violation of
Penal Code section 29800, subdivision (a)(1); (2) Colato admitted
a prior conviction for violation of Health and Safety Code section
11378; and (3) the trial court placed Colato on felony probation.
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NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
GOORVITCH, J.
We concur:
CHAVEZ, Acting P. J.
GILBERT, J.*
* Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second
Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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