Filed 7/6/26 Pawar v. Wholesale 209 CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(San Joaquin)

KAMAL JEET SINGH PAWAR, C102231
Plaintiff and Appellant,
(Super. Ct. No.
v. STKCVUPI20210010637)

WHOLESALE 209, LLC, et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.

Plaintiff Kamal Jeet Singh Pawar (Pawar) sued defendants Naveed Asghar
(Asghar) and Wholesale 209, LLC, doing business as Tires Direct (Tires Direct), for civil
assault and battery, negligence, and other tort causes of action. A jury returned a split
special verdict for Pawar on all causes of action against Asghar, and against Pawar on all
causes of action against Tires Direct. The jury awarded compensatory damages against
Asghar in the amount of $6,000 and punitive damages in the amount of $100,000.
Pawar, proceeding in propria persona, appeals from the judgment, arguing, inter alia, the
trial court erred in excluding his proposed demonstrative exhibit, an instrument said to
have been used to strike him. Finding no error, we will affirm the judgment.

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 I. BACKGROUND
A. The Altercation
Pawar is a commercial truck driver. Asghar owns and operates Tires Direct, a
regional chain that sells tires and rims. Tires Direct’s principal place of business is a
wholesale warehouse in Stockton, which is where Asghar maintains his office.
Pawar and Asghar know each other professionally. They exchanged phone calls
and text messages over the course of two weeks in August 2019. As part of those
communications, Pawar proposed entering into a business arrangement with Asghar.
Asghar was not interested in going into business with Pawar and told him as much, using
profanity in the process.
Pawar appeared unexpectedly inside the warehouse on August 31, 2019. Asghar
ordered Pawar to leave at once. Pawar made no move to do so. Asghar grabbed the
nearest object—a metal rod—which had been sitting in a pile of similar objects on the
floor. He ordered Pawar to leave again. When Pawar refused, Asghar struck him twice
with the metal rod, once on the forearm and once on the ribcage. Pawar left the
warehouse and went outside. Asghar followed Pawar, still brandishing the metal rod and
ordering him to leave. Pawar eventually got into his car and drove away.
B. The Trial Court Proceedings
Pawar brought suit against Asghar and Tires Direct. The operative second
amended complaint asserts causes of action for negligence, civil assault, civil battery,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, ratification by employer, negligent hiring or
retention of unfit employee, negligent supervision of employee, and premises liability.
Asghar and Tires Direct answered the second amended complaint by generally denying
the allegations and asserting various affirmative defenses. The matter was tried to a jury
in July and August 2024.

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 1. Pawar’s Proposed Exhibit 47
An Evidence Code section 402 hearing began on the afternoon of August 1, 2024.1
The hearing paused for jury selection and Pawar’s opening statement and resumed after
the jury was excused for the day. Our record does not include a reporter’s transcript of
the first day of the hearing.
The hearing resumed the next morning, before the jury was brought into the
courtroom. Our record begins with the continued cross-examination of Pawar by
Asghar’s counsel. The continued cross-examination focused on Pawar’s proposed
Exhibit 47, which was described as a “metal tool/instrument” or “rod,” that may have
been “part of a machine.” Pawar testified that proposed Exhibit 47 was the object Asghar
used to strike him. However, Pawar acknowledged that he never held the object Asghar
used to strike him, did not see the machine the object may have come from, and did not
disclose the object in discovery. Our incomplete record does not reveal how Pawar came
to have proposed Exhibit 47.
Pawar’s trial counsel argued proposed Exhibit 47 was the same or similar to the
object used to strike his client. Pawar’s counsel also represented that a photograph of the
object had been produced in discovery at some point. Asghar’s counsel responded that
he had never seen proposed Exhibit 47 before, and even assuming a photograph had been
produced, it would not have disclosed the weight or size of the object. Tires Direct’s
counsel argued Pawar’s testimony was speculative, inasmuch as he did not hold proposed
Exhibit 47 or see where it came from. Tires Direct’s counsel also argued Pawar likely
did not see the object, given the speed with which events unfolded.
The trial court excluded proposed Exhibit 47 for lack of foundation. The trial
court explained that Pawar had not shown that proposed Exhibit 47 was the same or
similar to the object used by Asghar, and the probative value of the exhibit was

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Evidence Code.

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substantially outweighed by the probability that the proposed exhibit would create a
substantial danger of undue prejudice, which would confuse and mislead the jury. The
jury was then brought back into the courtroom, and counsel for Asghar and Tires Direct
gave their opening statements.
2. Asghar’s Opening Statement
As part of his opening statement, Asghar’s counsel explained that jurors would be
shown surveillance video from outside the warehouse. Asghar’s counsel elaborated that
the video would “hopefully” allow jurors to make out the object used to strike Pawar,
which he described as “an aluminum bar” and “very lightweight.” Asghar’s counsel also
indicated that jurors would see Pawar leaving the warehouse uninjured. Pawar did not
object to Asghar’s counsel’s characterization of the anticipated video evidence.
Asghar’s counsel then turned to what he thought the medical evidence would
show. He explained that Pawar had gone to the emergency room after the altercation and
was found to have two contusions, but no broken bones. Asghar’s counsel added that
Pawar visited his personal physician soon thereafter, and was again found to have
contusions, but no other injuries. Asghar’s counsel then opined that Pawar suffered from
chronic anxiety, and his injuries were attributable to stress, rather than the altercation.
Pawar did not object to this part of Asghar’s opening statement either.
Turning to Pawar’s claim for damages from loss of income, Asghar’s counsel
recounted that Pawar got a job in February 2020, some five months after the altercation,
but was terminated four months later. Pawar’s counsel objected and an off-the-record
bench conference was held. Asghar’s counsel then resumed his opening statement,
stating, “So Mr. Pawar loses that job one way or another.” There were no further
objections to Asghar’s opening statement, and no objections whatsoever to Tires Direct’s
opening statement.

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 3. Defense Exhibit 500
After opening statements, the jury left the courtroom, and the trial court conducted
another section 402 hearing. The hearing concerned defense Exhibit 500, which was
described by Asghar on direct examination as “a chrome display rack” from Tires
Direct’s warehouse. According to Asghar, Exhibit 500 was “the exact object” he used to
strike Pawar.
On cross-examination, Asghar explained that Tires Direct uses display racks to
hold tire rims. He indicated that the display rack marked as Exhibit 500 had been
disassembled at the time of the altercation, and its component parts deposited in the
corner of the warehouse. Later, Asghar clarified that Exhibit 500 was a “rod,” which was
part of the display rack.2
After hearing Asghar’s testimony, the trial court reviewed the surveillance video
from outside the warehouse. The trial court also examined a screenshot from the
surveillance video. The trial court then heard testimony from defense witness Shahid Ali,
Asghar’s brother-in-law.
Ali testified that he works for Tires Direct and was at the warehouse at the time of
the altercation. Ali recalled that Asghar picked up a piece of chrome tubing, which had
broken off a display rack and was lying on top of it. Ali said the object used to strike
Pawar was similar to the object marked as Exhibit 500. After the altercation, Ali said
Asghar threw the object away somewhere inside the warehouse. On cross-examination,
Ali clarified that Exhibit 500 was not the specific object used to strike Pawar.
Asghar’s counsel argued that Exhibit 500 was relevant and should be admitted
because it was the same or similar to the object used to strike Pawar. Pawar’s counsel

2 The reporter’s transcript says that Pawar’s counsel asked Asghar about “Exhibit 501.”
However, the discussion up to that point was about Exhibit 500, and Exhibit 501 is
elsewhere described in the reporter’s transcript as a screenshot of one or more text
messages.

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responded that Exhibit 500 should be excluded for lack of foundation because Asghar
failed to show that the exhibit was “the actual instrument that was used on the date of the
incident.”
The trial court found sufficient foundation had been laid to show that Exhibit 500
was the same or similar to the object used in the altercation, and its probative value
substantially outweighed any risk of prejudice or confusion of the jury. Accordingly, the
trial court admitted Exhibit 500. The jury was then brought back into the courtroom, and
Pawar’s counsel called his first witness (Asghar).
4. Jury Trial and Verdict
The trial consumed 13 court days. Fifteen witnesses were called. Our record
includes reporters’ transcripts for only three court days and three witnesses (not including
the witnesses called at the section 402 hearings). Consequently, the record offers an
exceedingly limited view of the trial court proceedings. This will become important
momentarily.
One way or another, the matter was eventually given to the jury, which found for
Tires Direct and against Pawar on all causes of action. The jury found for Pawar and
against Asghar on the causes of action for civil assault and battery, negligence, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. However, the jury also found comparative
fault on Pawar’s part. The jury awarded compensatory damages in the amount of $6,000
and punitive damages in the amount of $100,000. The trial court entered judgment
reflecting these amounts and Pawar timely appealed.

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 II. DISCUSSION
Pawar advances four arguments on appeal.3 First, he argues the trial court abused
its discretion by excluding proposed Exhibit 47 and admitting Exhibit 500. Second, he
argues the trial court erred in allowing Asghar’s counsel to “narrate” the surveillance
video and offer “medical opinions” in his opening statement. Third, Pawar argues the
trial court erred in allowing Asghar to attribute his emotional distress to unrelated work
stressors, rather than the altercation. Finally, Pawar argues the foregoing alleged errors
combined to deprive him of a fair trial. None of these arguments have merit.
A. General Principles
It is “a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is
ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the
basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error
that justifies reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-609
(Jameson); see also Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 [“ ‘A judgment
or order of the lower court is presumed correct. All intendments and presumptions are
indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be
affirmatively shown’ ”].)
Appellants have the burden of overcoming the presumption of correctness. To do
so, they must demonstrate that the trial court committed reversable error, which means
they must designate “ ‘an adequate record.’ ” (Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 609; see
also Osgood v. Landon (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 425, 435 (Osgood) [“It is the appellant’s
affirmative duty to show error by an adequate record”].) Without an adequate record,
error cannot be demonstrated, and the presumption of correctness requires that the issue

3 Pawar raises a host of new arguments in his reply brief. We do not consider arguments
raised for the first time in a reply brief. (United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC
(2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142, 157 (United Grand).)

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be resolved against appellants. (Jameson, supra, at p. 609.) Appellants must also show
where in the record any error occurred. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C)
[requiring parties to “[s]upport any reference to a matter in the record by a citation to the
volume and page number of the record where the matter appears”].)
In addition to an adequate record, appellants “must present meaningful legal
analysis supported by citations to authority and citations to the facts in the record that
support the claim of error.” (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408; see also WFG
National Title Ins. Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 881, 894.)
Appellate courts are “ ‘not required to search the record … seeking error,’ ” (Nwosu v.
Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246) and they are “not bound to develop appellants’
arguments for them” (In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814,
830). Consequently, “ ‘ “[a]ny statement in a brief concerning matters in the appellate
record … must be supported by a citation to the record.” ’ ” (Wentworth v. Regents of
University of California (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 580, 595; see also WFG National Title
Ins. Co., supra, at p. 894 [“we may decide that the appellant has forfeited a point urged
on appeal when it is not supported by accurate citations to the record”].) In addition,
“ ‘ “[c]ontentions supported neither by argument nor by citation of authority are deemed
to be without foundation and to have been abandoned.” ’ ” (In re Phoenix (2009) 47
Cal.4th 835, 845; see also Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836,
852 [a “conclusory presentation, without pertinent argument or an attempt to apply the
law to the circumstances of this case, is inadequate,” and the reviewing court will treat
the issue as abandoned”].) Put another way, “conclusory claims of error will fail.” (In re
S.C., supra, at p. 408.)
These principles apply even when parties represent themselves, as Pawar does
here. (See Denny v. Arntz (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 914, 920 [“We treat a party who
represents himself on appeal as we would any other party or attorney”].) Thus, Pawar is
“ ‘entitled to the same, but no greater, consideration than other litigants and attorneys.’ ”

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(Tanguilig v. Valdez (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 514, 520; see also Stover v. Bruntz (2017) 12
Cal.App.5th 19, 31 [“ ‘as is the case with attorneys, pro. per. litigants must follow correct
rules of procedure’ ”].)
B. Challenges to Evidentiary Rulings
Pawar argues the trial court abused its discretion by excluding proposed Exhibit 47
and admitting defense Exhibit 500. Pawar’s argument encompasses two assignments of
error, one challenging the exclusion of proposed Exhibit 47 and another challenging the
admission of defense Exhibit 500. We need not reach the first of these, as Pawar has
failed to provide an adequate record of the relevant section 402 hearing.
As mentioned, our record begins on the second day of the first hearing, in the
middle of Pawar’s continued cross-examination. Consequently, we do not have a
complete record of the hearing and cannot know whether Pawar laid an adequate
foundation for proposed Exhibit 47 or demonstrated the proffered object was more
probative than prejudicial. On the limited record before us, we must presume the full
transcript would have supported the trial court’s ruling. (See Construction Financial v.
Perlite Plastering Co. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 170, 179 [“If any matters could have been
presented to the court below which would have supported its findings and judgment, it
will be presumed that such matters were presented”].) Accordingly, we reject Pawar’s
challenge to the trial court’s exclusion of proposed Exhibit 47. That leaves Exhibit 500.
We review the trial court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. (Adoption
of X.D. (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 812, 831.) We will not disturb such rulings “ ‘except on
a showing the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently
absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.’ ” (People v. Pineda
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 186, 222; Alliance San Diego v. California Taxpayers Action Network
(2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 1121, 1151.) “An ‘ “erroneous evidentiary ruling requires
reversal only if ‘there is a reasonable probability that a result more favorable to the

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appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.’ ” ’ ” (K.M. v.
Grossmont Union High School Dist. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 717, 760.)
After reviewing the surveillance video and screenshot, and hearing from Asghar
and Ali, the trial court found an adequate foundation had been laid to justify admitting
Exhibit 500, and its probative value substantially outweighed any risk of prejudice or
confusion of the jury. Pawar does not make any attempt to explain why either
determination constituted an abuse of discretion. While Pawar suggests the trial court
could not reasonably admit Exhibit 500 and exclude proposed Exhibit 47, he does not
argue that one was necessarily tied to the other, and our record does not give us any
reason to view them that way. That the trial court excluded proposed Exhibit 47 does not
mean the court was also obliged to exclude Exhibit 500. Neither does it mean the trial
court somehow took sides on the question of which object was used to strike Pawar, as he
suggests.4 On the record before us, we conclude the trial court reasonably admitted
Exhibit 500 and excluded proposed Exhibit 47. No abuse of discretion appears.
C. Challenges to Asghar’s Opening Statement
Pawar next argues the trial court erred by allowing Asghar’s counsel to “narrate”
the surveillance video and offer “medical opinions” in his opening statement.5
According to Pawar, Asghar’s argument included “subjective interpretations of the
video” and “improper medical speculation” that “invited the jury to accept counsel’s
interpretations as evidence.” Pawar’s argument fails from the start.
For one thing, Pawar forfeited the challenge to Asghar’s opening statement by
failing to object in the trial court. (See, e.g., Horn v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe

4 Pawar argues the trial court “endorsed [Exhibit 500] as ‘the real rod,’ ” but that
characterization does not appear anywhere in our record.
5 For clarity, Asghar’s counsel merely foreshadowed the surveillance video during his
opening statement. The video was not played for the jury at that time.

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Railway Co. (1964) 61 Cal.2d 602, 610 [“Generally a claim of misconduct [in opening or
closing arguments] is entitled to no consideration on appeal unless the record shows a
timely and proper objection and a request that the jury be admonished”]; see also
Brokopp v. Ford Motor Co. (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 841, 860 [“A party is foreclosed from
complaining on appeal of misconduct during arguments to the jury where his counsel sat
silently back during the arguments, allowed the alleged improprieties to accumulate
without objection, and simply made a motion for a mistrial at the conclusion of the
argument”].) Pawar made no objection to any argument about what the surveillance
video or medical evidence would show and so forfeited the issue on appeal.
For another thing, Pawar presents no argument or authority to support the
challenge to Asghar’s opening statement. “ ‘The purpose of the opening statement is to
inform the jury in a general way of the nature of the action and defense, to advise them of
the facts relied on by the party to make up his right of action or defense, to define the
nature of the questions involved, and advise them of the issues to be tried and the facts
intended to be proved, so as to enable them to understand the case to be tried.’ ”
(Williams v. Goodman (1963) 214 Cal.App.2d 856, 869; see also People v. Dennis (1998)
17 Cal.4th 468, 518 [the purpose of an opening statement “is not only to inform the jury
of the expected evidence, but also to prepare the jurors to follow the evidence and more
readily discern its materiality, force, and meaning”].) So far as Pawar’s brief and record
citations reveal, Asghar’s counsel previewed what he thought the evidence would show,
and thus stayed within the bounds of acceptable argument.
Finally, though Pawar does not suggest that Asghar’s counsel mischaracterized the
evidence, we would have no way of determining that for ourselves, as again, we have
only a partial record of the trial court proceedings. We therefore assume that Asghar’s
counsel fairly characterized the expected evidence. (Hotels Nevada, LLC v. L.A. Pacific
Center, Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 336, 348 [“ ‘Failure to provide an adequate record
on an issue requires that the issue be resolved against appellant’ ”]; see also Osgood,

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supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 435 [if an appellant asserts an error on only a partial record,
and the missing part of the record could provide grounds for affirming the judgment, the
appellate court will affirm the judgment].)
D. Challenge to Argument Regarding “Unrelated Emotional Issues”
Pawar next argues the trial court erred by allowing “Respondent” (presumably
Asghar) to attribute his emotional distress to “unrelated workplace issues reflected in
medical records, rather than to the assault at issue.” This argument also fails.
Pawar directs our attention to 10 pages of the reporter’s transcript, which covers
the end of the first section 402 hearing and the beginning of Asghar’s opening statement.
Most of the cited pages have nothing at all to do with “unrelated workplace issues.” Only
a portion of Asghar’s opening statement is even arguably relevant.
As mentioned, Asghar’s counsel opined without objection that Pawar suffers from
chronic anxiety, and his injuries were attributable to stress rather than the altercation.
Later, in part of the opening statement not cited in the opening brief, Asghar’s counsel
noted Pawar had been terminated from his job after the altercation. That observation
drew an objection, and a discussion was held off the record. After that discussion,
Asghar’s counsel reiterated, without further objection, that Pawar had been terminated.
It is not clear whether Pawar means to challenge the trial court’s resolution of that
single, unspecified objection or something else. Regardless, it is not our role as an
appellate court to independently review the record for error, and to construct arguments
for appellants that would require reversal of the judgment. (United Grand, supra, 36
Cal.App.5th at p. 153.) Pawar fails to explain the basis for the assignment of error, and
we will not attempt to construct an argument on his behalf.
E. Cumulative Error
Finally, Pawar argues the foregoing alleged errors amount to cumulative error,
requiring reversal. However, Pawar has failed to identify any error in the trial court’s

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handling of the matter. Consequently, there is nothing to cumulate. (Evans v. Hood
Corp. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1022, 1053-1054.)
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are entitled to their costs on appeal. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1) & (2).)

/S/
RENNER, J.

We concur:

/S/
EARL, P. J.

/S/
WISEMAN, J.*

* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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