Filed 7/6/26 L.L. v. J.L. CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

L.L.,

Plaintiff and Appellant, G065487

v. (Super. Ct. No. 22P000531)

J.L., OPINION

Defendant and Respondent.

Appeal from a judgment and order of the Superior Court of
Orange County, Yolanda V. Torres, Judge. Affirmed. Request for Judicial
Notice. Granted in part and denied in part.
L.L., in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
No appearance for Defendant and Respondent.
 L.L. filed this parentage action regarding her four children with
J.L. Following extensive litigation, the trial court issued final custody orders
and entered judgment, which, among other things, awarded the parties joint
physical and legal custody of the children. The court also made other orders,
including imposing sanctions against L.L. and denying L.L.’s October 2024
request for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO). On this appeal,
L.L. contends the court erred in a number of respects. We find no error and
affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
L.L. and J.L. were in a relationship for approximately eleven
years and have four children together. In June 2022, L.L. commenced this
parentage action and requested orders regarding custody, visitation, and
support. Although the parties entered into an agreement regarding
temporary custody, extensive litigation ensued, including multiple requests
for a DVRO and motions.
In July 2023, L.L. filed a DVRO request. In December 2023 and
early 2024, the trial court (Judge Stephen T. Hicklin) held a multiday trial
and denied L.L.’s DVRO request. The court found L.L. “failed to establish by
a preponderance of the evidence that domestic violence has occurred” and
“neither party has been completely credible in their testimony.” The court
ordered L.L. to pay sanctions of $4,500 under Family Code section 271.1 The
court also subsequently denied L.L.’s motion for a new trial and sanctioned

1
All undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.

2
her an additional $5,000. L.L. appealed, and this court affirmed. (L.L. v. J.L.
2
(Aug. 21, 2025, G064080) [nonpub. opn.].)
On December 1, 2023, L.L. filed a motion for damages and
3
sanctions. In January 2024, the trial court (Judge Yolanda V. Torres) held a
hearing and denied L.L.’s motion. The court granted J.L.’s request for
sanctions under section 271 and reserved decision on the amount of the
sanctions until the time of trial.
On February 15, 2024, L.L. filed a motion for reconsideration
regarding her December 2023 motion for damages and sanctions. In March
2024, the trial court held a hearing and denied L.L.’s motion for
reconsideration. Additionally, the court granted J.L.’s request for sanctions
under section 271 and reserved decision on the amount of the sanctions until
the time of trial.

2
L.L. requests that we take judicial notice of the clerk’s
transcript and reporter’s transcript in her prior appeal to this court in case
No. G064080, and we grant that request. (Evid. Code, § 459.) We also grant
L.L.’s request to take judicial notice of the writ petitions and records in case
Nos. G065642 and G065743, which include, among other things, the court’s
April 3, 2025 notice of motion and motion to determine whether L.L. should
be deemed a vexatious litigant; the transcript of a June 6, 2025 hearing; the
June 6, 2025 order striking statement of disqualification and, in the
alternative, verified answer of Judge Yolanda V. Torres; and the June 6, 2025
prefiling order. We deny L.L.’s request for judicial notice of her petition for
review to our Supreme Court in S291622 because it is not relevant to this
appeal. (See Moran v. Endres (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 952, 953, fn. 2 [denying
request for judicial notice because “those documents are not relevant to our
discussion or disposition of this matter”].)

3
L.L. filed this motion in propria persona. In the trial court, L.L.
appeared in propria persona for some proceedings and was represented by
counsel in others.

3
 On May 31, 2024, L.L. filed a motion styled as a “motion to
quash, modify subpoena, protective order [Code of Civil Procedure section]
1987.1” (boldface and capitalization omitted). It sought to quash a subpoena
for production of L.L.’s bank records or, alternatively, for redactions in the
documents or entry of a protective order. The trial court held a hearing in
4
August 2024 and denied L.L.’s motion. The court also granted J.L.’s request
for $3,500 in attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.2 and
reserved the issue of a payment plan until the time of trial.
Trial occurred over multiple days in September and October
2024. Seven witnesses testified, including both L.L. and J.L. Both parties
presented closing arguments on October 10, 2024, and on October 16, 2024,
the trial court filed its final custody and parenting orders (final custody
orders). Among other things, the final custody orders awarded the parties
joint physical and legal custody of the children.
Also on October 16, 2024, L.L. filed a motion for a mistrial and
the trial court heard testimony regarding the reserved sanctions issues. L.L.
testified at the hearing, and the court found her testimony not credible. The
court awarded $3,500 in sanctions against L.L. for her December 2023 motion
for damages and sanctions and $5,000 for her February 2024 motion for
reconsideration, and it established a payment schedule for those sanctions as
well as the $3,500 it previously had imposed for L.L.’s motion to quash.
On October 18, 2024, L.L. filed an ex parte request for orders. It
sought a stay of the final custody orders, entry of temporary orders for final
decision-making authority regarding health and school decisions for one of

4
This hearing also addressed other requests for orders filed by
L.L. and a motion to compel brought by J.L.

4
the children (Le.L.), an order that J.L. administer all doctor-prescribed
medication when the children are in his care, and an order that J.L. and
Le.L. attend family reunification therapy. At an October 22, 2024 hearing,
the trial court ordered both parties to administer all prescribed medication to
the children when the children are in their care.
On October 25, 2024, L.L. filed a motion to disqualify J.L.’s
counsel, and on October 30, 2024, she filed a new DVRO request.
On November 15, 2024, the trial court held a hearing on L.L.’s
motion for a mistrial and DVRO request. The court denied her motion for a
mistrial. The court also denied J.L.’s request to dismiss L.L.’s request for a
DVRO. During the course of the hearing (part of which was continued to
November 18), five witnesses testified regarding the DVRO request,
including both L.L. and J.L. The court denied L.L.’s DVRO request. The court
found “there is no credible evidence of domestic violence or abuse committed
by” J.L., and it found “the testimony of [J.L.] more credible than [L.L.’s]
testimony.” The court also sanctioned L.L. $4,500 for the motion for a
mistrial and another $4,500 for the DVRO request under section 271.
On December 6, 2024, the trial court held a hearing regarding
L.L.’s motion to disqualify J.L.’s counsel and L.L.’s October 18, 2024 request
for orders. The court denied the motion to disqualify J.L.’s counsel. Regarding
the request for orders, the court noted it had already ordered, as part of its
October 22, 2024 order directed to both parties, J.L. to administer all doctor-
prescribed medication to the children while in his care. The court denied the
other requests. The court also sanctioned L.L. $5,000 for the disqualification
motion and $2,500 for the request for orders under section 271.

5
 5
On March 7, 2025, the trial court entered judgment.
DISCUSSION
“‘“‘A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct. All
intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to
which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown. This is not
only a general principle of appellate practice but an ingredient of the
constitutional doctrine of reversible error.’”’” (In re Marriage of Falcone &
Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 822; see also Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5
Cal.5th 594, 609 [“the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis
of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed
an error that justifies reversal of the judgment”].) “‘“A necessary corollary to
this rule is that if the record is inadequate for meaningful review, the
appellant defaults and the decision of the trial court should be affirmed.”’

5
L.L.’s May 6, 2025 notice of appeal states she is appealing from
the final judgment entered on March 7, 2025, and orders entered on March
22, 2024; April 10, 2024; August 30, 2024; October 16, 2024; November 15,
2024; November 18, 2024; December 4, 2024; December 6, 2024; and January
6, 2025. L.L.’s challenges to orders that were entered prior to the judgment
and were not separately appealable are reviewable in an appeal from the
judgment. (See Rao v. Campo (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1557, 1565 [“Generally
speaking, under the one final judgment rule, interlocutory or interim orders
are not appealable, but are only ‘reviewable on appeal’ from the final
judgment”].) The trial court’s denial of L.L.’s 2024 DVRO request in its
January 6, 2025 findings and orders after hearing is also appealable. (See
Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(6).)

In June 2025, L.L. filed in this court an emergency motion for a
stay pending appeal with attachments, a declaration and exhibits in support
of her motion for a stay, and a motion to seal those documents. In August
2025, this court denied her motion for a stay. L.L.’s motion to seal is also
denied as unnecessary in that those filings in this appeal are treated as
confidential.

6
[Citation.] ‘Consequently, [the appellant] has the burden of providing an
adequate record. [Citation.] Failure to provide an adequate record on an issue
requires that the issue be resolved against [the appellant].’” (Jameson, at
p. 609.)
“‘The appellant must present an adequate argument including
citations to supporting authorities and to relevant portions of the record.
[Citations.]’ [Citation.] Accordingly, the California Rules of Court expressly
require appellate briefs to ‘[s]tate each point . . . and support each point by
argument and, if possible, by citation of authority’ and to ‘[s]upport any
reference to a matter in the record by a citation to the volume and page
number of the record where the matter appears.’ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.204(a)(1)(B) & (C).)” (L.O. v. Kilrain (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 616, 619–620.)
“‘The appellate court is not required to search the record on its own seeking
error.’ [Citation.] Thus, ‘[i]f a party fails to support an argument with the
necessary citations to the record, . . . the argument [will be] deemed to have
been waived.’” (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246.)
Additionally, “[i]t is not our place to construct theories or arguments to
undermine the judgment and defeat the presumption of correctness. When an
appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with
reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived.”
(Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852.) “These
rules apply both to parties represented by counsel and self-represented
parties. [Citation.] ‘A party proceeding in propria persona “is to be treated
like any other party and is entitled to the same, but no greater consideration
than other litigants and attorneys.”’” (L.O., at p. 620.)
L.L. makes numerous arguments in her appellate brief, some of
which are confusing and unclear. We have addressed her arguments as best

7
we understand them. As discussed further below, L.L. has forfeited many of
her arguments by failing to adequately cite the record on appeal and provide
developed arguments. Notably, although L.L.’s appellate brief occasionally
cites the reporter’s transcript and refers to some orders by their names, her
brief contains no citations to the clerk’s transcript, which is more than 2,300
pages.
I.
THE FINAL CUSTODY ORDERS
L.L. argues the trial court committed many errors in the final
custody orders. L.L.’s arguments are without merit.
“The standard of appellate review of custody and visitation orders
is the deferential abuse of discretion test. [Citation.] The precise measure is
whether the trial court could have reasonably concluded that the order in
question advanced the ‘best interest’ of the child. We are required to uphold
the ruling if it is correct on any basis, regardless of whether such basis was
actually invoked.” (In re Marriage of Burgess (1996) 13 Cal.4th 25, 32
(Burgess).) “Under California’s statutory scheme governing child custody and
visitation determinations, the overarching concern is the best interest of the
child. The court and the family have ‘the widest discretion to choose a
parenting plan that is in the best interest of the child.’” (Montenegro v. Diaz
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 249, 255.)
L.L. challenges the final custody orders on the ground they lack
evidentiary support and because she disagrees that they are in the best
interests of the children. According to L.L., the final custody orders
“misapplied best-interest standards and imposed punitive conditions
unsupported by evidence.” (Capitalization and boldface omitted.)

8
 As an initial matter, based on several references in the record on
appeal to a statement of decision, it appears the trial court issued a
6
statement of decision. L.L., however, fails to cite or mention the statement of
decision in her appellate brief, and it does not appear to be included in the
record on appeal. (See Foust v. San Jose Construction Co., Inc. (2011) 198
Cal.App.4th 181, 187 [“‘Failure to provide an adequate record on an issue
requires that the issue be resolved against [appellant]’”].) Moreover, to the
extent L.L. is challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, she has not fairly
summarized the evidence that supports the judgment, as she is required to
do. (See Rayii v. Gatica (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1402, 1408 [“An appellant
who fails to cite and discuss the evidence supporting the judgment cannot
demonstrate that such evidence is insufficient”].) Indeed, L.L.’s appellate
brief contains no summary of the testimony supporting the final custody
orders, including the testimony by J.L.
In any event, even if L.L. did not forfeit her arguments by failing
to provide an adequate record on appeal and failing to fairly summarize the
evidence, L.L. has not demonstrated the trial court abused its discretion in
the final custody orders. There was extensive testimony over multiple days
during the trial, including ample evidence that supported the final custody
orders. For example, J.L. testified about his prior care for the children and
expressed his desire to have custody of them. J.L. also testified to numerous

6
During trial, L.L.’s counsel requested a statement of decision
regarding custody and visitation. The final custody orders stated, “[t]he
court’s reasoning for its orders will be set forth in the Statement of Decision.”
Additionally, during the November 15, 2024 hearing, the trial court
referenced a statement of decision that it had rendered, and the January 6,
2025 findings and order after hearing stated, “[t]he Court notes that this is a
high conflict case as indicated in the Statement of Decision, filed November 8,
2024.”

9
instances in which L.L. interfered with his ability to exercise his parenting
time with the children since the case began. There was evidence the children
were often absent from or late to school while in L.L.’s care.
L.L. argues the trial court “labeled the parents ‘high conflict’ yet
paradoxically imposed five to six custody exchanges every two weeks”
(boldface omitted), and contends “[f]requent transitions are destabilizing even
in amicable families; in high-conflict cases, they expose children to repeated
stress and parental hostility.” We cannot say the court abused its discretion
7
in setting the number of custody exchanges during the week.
L.L. argues the trial court erred in purportedly denying a school
change for the children and imposing a “punitive commute.” (Boldface and
capitalization omitted.) L.L. contends “[t]he order forced [her] to drive the
children 11 miles each way to school despite the availability of a school two
minutes away,” and although she “testified about the extraordinary difficulty
of transporting [one of the children, Li.L.], who has moderate-to-severe
autism,” “[t]he court nevertheless ordered that the children ‘shall not be late
to school’—a directive plainly aimed at [L.L.], ignoring her testimony.”8
(Boldface omitted.) According to L.L., “[t]he commute also creates serious

7
Citing Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 32, L.L.’s appellate brief
states, “[t]he Supreme Court has cautioned against custody orders that
‘maximize conflict at the expense of stability.’” L.L.’s assertion appears to
erroneously attribute the quotation “maximize conflict at the expense of
stability” to Burgess, as that quotation does not appear in Burgess.

8
In fact, the court’s order that the children be taken to school on
time was directed to both parents: The final custody orders stated, “[t]he
parties shall ensure that the children shall attend school and arrive on time.”

10
 9
safety risks,” and “[b]y denying the school change, the court elevated [J.L.’s]
preferences above the children’s best interests and imposed a punitive burden
on [L.L.].” L.L. forfeited these arguments by failing to provide any supporting
record citations. Moreover, as discussed, there was evidence the children
were absent from or late to school a significant number of times while in
L.L.’s care. Even if L.L. testified to the difficulty of transporting one of her
children, she has not demonstrated the court abused its discretion by
ordering that the children arrive on time to school; nor has she demonstrated
the school the children were attending (or the commute to it) was unsafe.
L.L. asserts Le.L. “expressed strong resistance to visitation with
[J.L.] and would have benefitted from reunification therapy,” but “the court
ordered conjoint counseling against [Le.L.’s] wishes.”10 (Boldface omitted.)
According to L.L., ignoring Le.L.’s wishes was a violation of section 3042.
Again, however, L.L. forfeited this argument by failing to provide supporting
record citations. Additionally, we disagree that ordering joint physical
custody of Le.L. and conjoint therapy between J.L. and Le.L., who was 10
years old at the time of trial, was an abuse of discretion or violated section
3042. Even if Le.L. expressed a resistance to visitation with J.L., section 3042
does not mandate that a court adhere to a 10-year-old child’s wishes

9
L.L. asserts that, during emergencies, she “could not reach
school fast enough from 11 miles away” and one of her children who had an
anaphylactic reaction “went untreated for hours until [L.L.] arrived.”

10
The final custody orders stated J.L. “shall attend conjoint
counseling with [Le.L.] so as to repair the relationship.” L.L. does not explain
in her appellate brief how the reunification therapy that she believes was
appropriate for Le.L. differs from the conjoint counseling the trial court
ordered.

11
 11
regarding visitation regardless of the circumstances. It provides, among
other things, “[i]f a child is of sufficient age and capacity to reason so as to
form an intelligent preference as to custody or visitation, the court shall
consider, and give due weight to, the wishes of the child in making an order
12
granting or modifying custody or visitation.” (§ 3042, subd. (a).)
L.L. argues the trial court abused its discretion by relying on a
visitation framework from Dr. Peterson’s 2022 evaluation under Evidence
Code section 730 but ignoring his recommendation that sole physical custody
be granted to L.L. Again, L.L. has failed to address the evidence supporting
the final custody orders. For instance, J.L. testified he told Peterson in 2022
that he thought it was in the children’s best interest for primary custody to

11
The trial court spoke with Le.L. during the trial and
subsequently noted, among other things, it was “very concerned about the
fact that the child appeared to be coached.”
12
L.L. also asserts the order “conflicts with Piqui’s Law (SB 616),
which bars coercive therapeutic programs in estrangement cases.” (Boldface
omitted.) L.L. forfeited this argument by failing to provide developed
argument. To the extent L.L. is referring to section 3193, that section
provides, “[n]othwithstanding any other law, a court shall not order family
reunification treatments, programs, or services, including, but not limited to,
camps, workshops, therapeutic vacations, or educational programs that, as a
condition of enrollment or participation, require or result in any of the
following: [¶] (1) A no-contact order. [¶] (2) An overnight, out-of-state, or
multiday stay. [¶] (3) A transfer of physical or legal custody of the child. [¶]
(4) The use of private youth transporters or private transportation agents
engaged in the use of force, threat of force, physical obstruction, acutely
distressing circumstances, or circumstances that place the safety of the child
at risk. [¶] (5) The use of threats of physical force, undue coercion, verbal
abuse, isolation from the child’s family, community, or other sources of
support, or other acutely distressing circumstances.” (Id., subd. (a).) L.L.
provides no developed argument for how conjoint therapy between J.L. and
Le.L. is prohibited by this statute.

12
be with L.L. and for them to be with J.L. during certain days, but J.L.’s
opinion has changed since then. L.L. has not demonstrated the court abused
its discretion, and particularly given her failure to designate the court’s
statement of decision as part of the record on appeal, she cannot assert the
court erred by purportedly not explaining its reasoning for not adopting
13
Peterson’s 2022 recommendation.
L.L. contends the trial court made a demeaning and inaccurate
characterization of her in the final custody orders by noting she was
unemployed. The final custody orders stated: “The court has reviewed the
parties’ income and expense declarations and notes that both parties are
unemployed. The court finds that the parties shall each pay one-half of their
co-parenting sessions and one-half of all therapy/counseling for the children.”
L.L. asserts she “has been continuously employed as the primary caregiver
for [Li.L.]—a child with moderate-to-severe autism whose therapy schedule
alone exceeds forty hours per week—as well as for her elderly mother, who
has stage 5 dementia, and for her three other children.” Additionally, L.L.
claims “the trial court treated her labor as valueless,” and “[b]y contrast,
[J.L.’s] voluntary unemployment was excused, and the Final Order imposed
no accountability for his refusal to work.” We disagree that the court’s

13
Citing In re Marriage of Battenburg (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th
1338, 1345, L.L. claims courts “must explain” a departure from an evaluator’s
conclusion. Given L.L.’s failure to provide the trial court’s statement of
decision in the record on appeal, we cannot say the court failed to explain
why it did not concur with Peterson’s recommendation. In any event,
Battenburg does not so hold. Indeed, Battenburg makes clear “[a] trial court
is not required to accept even unanimous expert opinion at face value,” and
“[a]s long as the decision to reject such testimony is not ‘arbitrary,’ the trial
court may reject the conclusion of an expert.” (Ibid.) L.L. has not shown the
trial court’s decision on this issue was arbitrary.

13
reference to L.L. being unemployed was demeaning or demonstrates bias.
The court’s reference in the final custody orders to both parties being
unemployed was referring to whether they were being paid by an employer
and was made in the context of discussing how payments for co-parenting
sessions, therapy, and counseling would be made.
L.L. argues the final custody orders “expressly allocated Chinese
New Year but omitted Vietnamese Tết—despite the children being equally
Vietnamese and Chinese,” and “[i]t also omitted Patriots Day, which [she]
14
testified she commemorates because of her personal connection to 9/11.”
(Boldface omitted.) According to L.L., “[b]y selectively recognizing only one
aspect of the children’s heritage and disregarding [L.L.’s] cultural
observances, the order reflects cultural bias.” We disagree that the custody
schedule for holidays demonstrates bias or any improper action by the trial
court. L.L. does not argue (much less demonstrate) that she specifically
raised this issue with the trial court and asked the court to include in the
final custody orders a schedule for a Vietnamese holiday or any other holiday
that she observes.15

14
The final custody orders included specific custody schedules for
certain holidays, including that “[t]he parties shall alternate having custody
of the children on the Chinese New Year from 9:00 a.m. on New Year’s Day
until return to school or 9:00 a.m. the following morning with [L.L.] having
custody in the even-numbered years and [J.L.] having custody in the odd-
numbered years.”

15
L.L. also claims there is “structural bias in the custody
schedule.” (Boldface and capitalization omitted.) According to L.L., “[b]y
requiring 3:00 p.m. weekday pickups and therapy exchanges, the court
assumed neither parent worked outside the home. For [L.L.], whose
caregiving obligations already amount to a twenty-hour-a-day job, this order
is both unrealistic and punitive.” L.L. again includes no record citations for

14
 L.L. raises an issue regarding the trial court’s order about
responding to messages. The final custody orders stated L.L. and J.L. “shall
check their messages daily and respond to the other party’s messages within
24 hours” and “shall respond [within] 24 hours or sooner when applicable.”
L.L. argues that when she “sought [J.L.’s] approval for orthodontic estimates,
the court excused his non-response.” L.L.’s only record citation for this
argument is to two pages of the reporter’s transcript from a hearing on
November 18, 2024, which occurred more than a month after the court issued
its final custody orders. At that hearing, the court noted J.L. “does not need
to be at your beck and call to answer an e-mail with respect to giving
approval within 24 hours, unless it’s, maybe, an emergency; that is not the
intent. The intent was to answer questions, for example, why wasn’t one of
the children at school? You should be answering that within 24 hours. But he
doesn’t necessarily have to make a decision on medical treatment within 24
16
hours, unless, of course, it’s life-threatening.” L.L. asserts the court excused
J.L.’s purported obstruction but “the rule was enforced strictly against” her,
and “[s]uch disparate treatment reflects bias.” L.L. did not provide any record
citations to support her contention that the rule was enforced unequally

this argument, and in any event, we disagree that the custody schedule
reflects bias.

16
In its findings and order after hearing, the court stated, “[e]ach
party shall respond to requests made of the other party on Our Family
Wizard within 24 hours but the party is not required to agree or make a
decision to the request but only to respond to the request within 24 hours
unless it is a life-threatening situation.”

15
against her, and in any event, we disagree that the court’s order and
17
comments show bias.
L.L. also asserts J.L. has “weaponized” the final custody orders
by filing enforcement motions. L.L. has forfeited this argument by failing to
provide supporting record citations. Her appellate briefing does not contain a
18
record citation to any such motions or any court orders on them.
II.
EVIDENTIARY ISSUES
L.L. argues the trial court erred in excluding evidence, refusing
to hear testimony, and admitting unreliable hearsay. “We review evidentiary
rulings for abuse of discretion.” (Loy v. Kenney (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 403,
406.) Additionally, an appellant must show prejudice from the evidentiary
error. (Christ v. Schwartz (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 440, 447 [“it is the burden of

17
L.L. argues the trial court’s “reinterpretation rewrote the
order, sanctioned [J.L.’s] obstruction, and left [one of the children] without
orthodontic care for months—contrary to [section 3020, subdivision (a)’s]
health/safety mandate and the duty to facilitate needed medical care.” To the
extent L.L. is attempting to argue the court erred by not ordering J.L. to
agree to orthodontic care, L.L. has forfeited this argument. L.L. provided no
record citations showing she sought an order requiring J.L. to approve
orthodontic care; nor did she provide record citations showing the child went
months without urgently needed orthodontic care because of J.L.

18
L.L. contends the trial court ignored coercive control under the
Domestic Violence Prevention Act and the structure in the final custody
orders “fails to account for coercive dynamics and places [L.L.] at continuing
disadvantage.” L.L.’s only citation to the record for this argument is to a
subsequent hearing on her DVRO request. As discussed further below, L.L.
has not shown the court ignored the law and abused its discretion in denying
L.L.’s DVRO request.

16
appellants to show that it is reasonably probable that they would have
received a more favorable result at trial had the error not occurred”].)
L.L. contends the trial court erroneously excluded a report by
child protective services (CPS). L.L. says the report was authenticated by a
custodian declaration and “[e]xcluding it violated child-safety mandates
under” section 3011, subdivision (a)(5). L.L. has failed to show the court
abused its discretion. L.L. cites the October 10, 2024 minute order (without
citation to the clerk’s transcript), which states the “[c]ourt will not allow
DMV or CPS records.” L.L., however, does not mention that, earlier in the
trial, the court explained why it was not allowing the CPS report, noting
“[t]here was no subpoena where it came directly from the entity to the court.”
L.L. provides no developed argument demonstrating the court erred in its
reasoning for excluding the CPS record. Moreover, even if it were error not to
admit the CPS report, L.L. has not demonstrated any prejudice; L.L. has
failed to explain what specific content she wished to use (and for what
purpose) and how it is reasonably probably such content would have led to a
more favorable result for L.L.19
L.L. asserts, “on November 15, 2024, the [trial] court sustained
hearsay objections to a treating doctor’s communication, cutting off testimony
despite its admissibility for notice and effect on the recipient.” L.L. says
“[t]his deprived the court of relevant medical evidence.” L.L. has failed to
demonstrate an abuse of discretion. Although not specified by L.L., this
evidentiary issue occurred during the hearing on L.L.’s DVRO request. L.L.
provides no developed argument describing the content of the doctor’s email

19
L.L. says it was “a substantiated CPS report of neglect,” but
she does not explain who committed the neglect, what the neglect was, and
what statements in the report she sought to use.

17
and explaining how it would be relevant and admissible for a non-hearsay
purpose. L.L. also has not demonstrated prejudice.
L.L. contends, “on October 16, 2024, the [trial] court admitted
Zillow printouts to suggest [she] owned multi-million-dollar property,” which
L.L. says is “classic hearsay.” Again, L.L. does not specify to which order this
purported error relates. The portion of the reporter’s transcript cited by L.L.
for this argument was from a hearing regarding the amount of sanctions to
be awarded against L.L. and her ability to pay. The portion of the reporter’s
transcript cited by L.L. reflects a portion of her testimony in which she
appears to have been shown a document and asked questions. Contrary to
L.L.’s assertion, the record does not show this document was admitted into
evidence. Moreover, even if this document were admitted and it was error to
do so, L.L. has not shown prejudice.
L.L. also argues she “identified a witness who attended IEP
meetings with [J.L.] and could rebut [J.L.’s] credibility,” but “[t]he court cut
her off.” The only record support for this argument that L.L. cites is a page of
the reporter’s transcript from a hearing on March 27, 2025, which took place
after judgment was entered in this case. L.L.’s notice of appeal did not
indicate she was appealing from the order from the March 27, 2025 hearing.
Accordingly, that order is not before us on this appeal and, even if it were,
L.L. has failed to provide developed argument regarding how the trial court
abused its discretion. The March 27, 2025 hearing appears to have concerned
a request for order regarding some kind of settlement agreement with a
school, which L.L. does not discuss in her appellate brief. Moreover, it
appears L.L. succeeded at this hearing, as the minute order indicates the
court granted L.L.’s request to allow her to sign the settlement agreement
without J.L.’s signature.

18
 L.L. argues she sought testimony from W.V., “a physician and
father of autistic children who had observed Li.L.” (boldface omitted), which
“would have helped the court understand the daily realities of raising an
autistic child,” but the court purportedly committed reversible error by
excluding his testimony. L.L. has forfeited this argument by failing to provide
support in the record and developed argument. L.L.’s only citation to the
record in support of this argument is two pages of the reporter’s transcript
from the March 27, 2025 hearing, which, as discussed above, took place after
judgment was entered and concerned a settlement issue that is not part of
this appeal.20
L.L. also argues the trial court erred by refusing to order an
updated evaluation under Evidence Code section 730, which she asserts was
recommended by the special master. The court’s decision regarding whether
to appoint an evaluator under Evidence Code section 730 is also reviewed for
abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of E.U. & J.E. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th
1377, 1389.) The record indicates the court denied a request for an updated
evaluation under Evidence Code section 730 because “[n]either party is able
to pay for the evaluation.” L.L. does not provide developed argument showing
how it was an abuse of discretion for the court to decline to order an updated
evaluation because neither party could pay for it.

20
Although not cited by L.L., the record reflects L.L.’s counsel
attempted to call someone named W.V. to testify during trial on September
24, 2024, but the trial court excluded him from testifying. To the extent L.L.
meant to refer to this evidentiary ruling, she has failed to provide developed
argument for how the court abused its discretion by excluding W.V.’s
testimony. Even if W.V. could have provided some relevant testimony, L.L.
does not address whether the court abused its discretion in excluding that
testimony under Evidence Code section 352.

19
 III.
THE DENIAL OF THE DVRO
“The Domestic Violence Prevention Act . . . (Fam. Code, § 6200 et.
seq.) permits the trial court to issue a protective order ‘to restrain any person
for the purpose’ of preventing a recurrence of domestic violence and ensuring
a period of separation of the persons involved; the petitioner must present
‘reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse.’ (§ 6300.)” (Rodriguez v.
Menjivar (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 816, 820, fn. omitted.) “The Legislature
defined ‘abuse’ broadly to include intentionally or recklessly causing or
attempting to cause bodily injury, sexual assault, placing a person in
reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury, or engaging in
behavior that could be enjoined under section 6320. (§ 6203, subd. (a).) The
behaviors incorporated by the reference to section 6320 include ‘molesting,
attacking, striking, stalking, threatening, sexually assaulting, battering,
credibly impersonating . . . , falsely personating . . . , harassing,
telephoning, . . . destroying personal property, contacting, either directly or
indirectly, by mail or otherwise, coming within a specified distance of, or
disturbing the peace of the other party.’ (§ 6320, subd. (a).)” (Hatley v.
Southard (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 579, 589.)
“‘[D]isturbing the peace of the other party’ refers to conduct that,
based on the totality of the circumstances, destroys the mental or emotional
calm of the other party. This conduct may be committed directly or indirectly,
including through the use of a third party, and by any method or through any
means including, but not limited to, telephone, online accounts, text
messages, internet-connected devices, including connected devices as defined
in [s]ection 22948.30 of the Business and Professions Code, or other electronic
technologies. This conduct includes, but is not limited to, coercive control,

20
which is a pattern of behavior that in purpose or effect unreasonably
21
interferes with a person’s free will and personal liberty.” (§ 6320, subd. (c).)
“We may not disturb a court’s ruling on a request for a DVRO
absent an abuse of discretion. [Citation.] ‘“The appropriate test for abuse of
discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two
or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing
court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.”’
[Citation.] ‘To the extent that we are called upon to review the trial court’s
factual findings, we apply a substantial evidence standard of review.’” (In re
Marriage of G. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 773, 780.) “‘All exercises of discretion
must be guided by applicable legal principles, however, which are derived
from the statute under which discretion is conferred. [Citations.] If the court’s
decision is influenced by an erroneous understanding of applicable law or
reflects an unawareness of the full scope of its discretion, the court has not
properly exercised its discretion under the law. [Citation.] Therefore, a

21
“Examples of coercive control include, but are not limited to,
unreasonably engaging in any of the following: [¶] (1) Isolating the other
party from friends, relatives, or other sources of support. [¶] (2) Depriving the
other party of basic necessities. [¶] (3) Controlling, regulating, or monitoring
the other party’s movements, communications, daily behavior, finances,
economic resources, or access to services. [¶] (4) Compelling the other party
by force, threat of force, or intimidation, including threats based on actual or
suspected immigration status, to engage in conduct from which the other
party has a right to abstain or to abstain from conduct in which the other
party has a right to engage. [¶] (5) Engaging in reproductive coercion, which
consists of control over the reproductive autonomy of another through force,
threat of force, or intimidation, and may include, but is not limited to,
unreasonably pressuring the other party to become pregnant, deliberately
interfering with contraception use or access to reproductive health
information, or using coercive tactics to control, or attempt to control,
pregnancy outcomes.” (§ 6320, subds. (c)(1)–(5).)

21
discretionary order based on an application of improper criteria or incorrect
legal assumptions is not an exercise of informed discretion and is subject to
reversal. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘The question of whether a trial court applied
the correct legal standard to an issue in exercising its discretion is a question
of law [citation] requiring de novo review [citation].’” (Rodriguez v. Menjivar,
supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at pp. 820–821.)
Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying L.L.’s
DVRO request. L.L. argues the trial court misapplied domestic violence law
in that it “ignored [J.L.’s] pattern of harassing electronic communications.”
(Boldface and capitalization omitted.) L.L. asserts she testified J.L. sent her
134 messages on Our Family Wizard between September 26 and October 25,
2024, and “[m]any contained accusations of ‘manipulation,’ ‘coaching,’ and
‘abuse by proxy.’” According to L.L., “[i]nstead of recognizing this as
harassment, the court dismissed the issue.” As support for this assertion, L.L.
cites the court’s comment at the hearing that, “[a]t this juncture, the court
finds the request for dismissal—the court is not going to grant the request for
dismissal; we’re going to go forward.” L.L. appears to be suggesting this
statement shows the court dismissed the issue of whether messages could
constitute abuse, but the record shows otherwise. In fact, the court’s comment
was denying J.L.’s request to dismiss L.L.’s DVRO request.
The record also does not support L.L.’s contention that the trial
court refused to consider the messages sent by J.L. or misapplied the law.
There was extensive testimony at the hearing by both L.L. and J.L. regarding
the messages exchanged between them. The court noted it had considered the
totality of circumstances regarding L.L.’s request, the exhibits presented by
L.L., the testimony of the five witnesses, and all relevant code sections
regarding domestic violence, including disturbing the peace of the other

22
party. The court also stated it had reviewed relevant messages between L.L.
and J.L. on Our Family Wizard that were provided to it. The court ultimately
concluded “there is no credible evidence of domestic violence or abuse
committed by” J.L. It further found “the testimony of [J.L.] more credible
than [L.L.’s] testimony.”
L.L. contends the trial court “excluded testimony about coercive
control through medical obstruction.” (Boldface and capitalization omitted.)
Citing one instance, L.L. contends “[w]hen [she] explained that [J.L.’s] refusal
to approve medical and therapy services left her powerless—‘without his
approval, I’m a sitting duck’—the court sustained objections.” The cited
instance does not support her argument that the trial court misunderstood
the law regarding coercive control. Although not explained by L.L., in the
cited instance, she attempted to introduce an exhibit of pictures of one of the
children’s teeth, and the court sustained a foundation objection. L.L. also
does not mention the court allowed L.L. to question J.L. regarding the fact he
had not, as of that time, approved of L.L. getting estimates for one of their
children’s orthodontic work.
L.L. also argues “the court’s truncation of evidence demonstrates
bias and prejudice.” (Boldface and capitalization omitted.) L.L. claims “[t]he
court repeatedly told [her] ‘Let’s move on’ when she attempted to document
[J.L.’s] harassment or explain medical obstruction.” We disagree that the
record shows the court was biased or prejudiced against L.L. Although the
court did occasionally sustain objections or tell L.L. to move on to the next
question, the court permitted extensive testimony regarding the alleged
abuse and messages. Moreover, a court has broad discretion to control the
proceedings before it, including placing reasonable limits on testimony,

23
including cumulative or unduly lengthy testimony. L.L. has not shown any
abuse of discretion.
IV.
FAMILY CODE SECTION 271 AND CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SECTION 1987.2
A. Family Code Section 271
L.L. challenges the trial court’s awards of sanctions against her
under section 271 in the sums of $3,500 for her December 2023 motion for
damages and sanctions, $5,000 for her February 2024 motion for
reconsideration, $4,500 for the October 2024 DVRO request, $5,000 for the
October 2024 request to disqualify J.L.’s counsel, and $2,500 for the October
2024 request for orders. L.L. has not demonstrated the trial court abused its
discretion in awarding any of these sanctions under section 271.
Section 271, subdivision (a), provides: “Notwithstanding any
other provision of this code, the court may base an award of attorney’s fees
and costs on the extent to which any conduct of each party or attorney
furthers or frustrates the policy of the law to promote settlement of litigation
and, where possible, to reduce the cost of litigation by encouraging
cooperation between the parties and attorneys. An award of attorney’s fees
and costs pursuant to this section is in the nature of a sanction. In making an
award pursuant to this section, the court shall take into consideration all
evidence concerning the parties’ incomes, assets, and liabilities. The court
shall not impose a sanction pursuant to this section that imposes an
unreasonable financial burden on the party against whom the sanction is
imposed. In order to obtain an award under this section, the party requesting
an award of attorney’s fees and costs is not required to demonstrate any
financial need for the award.” (Ibid.)

24
 “It has been said that section 271 and its predecessor imposes a
‘minimum level of professionalism and cooperation,’ to effect the policy
favoring settlement of family law litigation—and a reduction of the attendant
costs. [Citations.] Section 271 ‘“authorizes sanctions to advance the policy of
promoting settlement of litigation and encouraging cooperation of the
litigants” and “does not require any actual injury.” [Citation.] Litigants who
flout that policy by engaging in conduct that increases litigation costs are
subject to imposition of attorney fees and costs as a section 271 sanction.’” (In
re Marriage of Davenport (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1507, 1524.) “Section 271
does not require that the sanctioned conduct be frivolous or taken solely for
the purpose of delay.” (In re Marriage of Tharp (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1295,
1318.)
“Sanctions under section 271 are committed to the discretion of
the trial court, and will be reversed on appeal only on a showing of abuse of
that discretion, that is ‘only if, considering all of the evidence viewed more
favorably in its support and indulging all reasonable inferences in its favor,
no judge could reasonably make the order.’” (In re Marriage of Davenport,
supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 1524.)
On appeal, L.L. argues the trial court abused its discretion
because her motions do not meet the standard of a frivolous filing under In re
Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637 (Flaherty). Although the court
referred to some of L.L.’s motions as frivolous, L.L. is not correct that the
court was required to find her motions met the standard under Flaherty in
order to impose sanctions under section 271. “Flaherty sets a different—and
higher—standard for an appellate court’s imposition of sanctions for a
frivolous appeal. ‘Flaherty sanctions are appropriate “only when [the appeal]
is prosecuted for an improper motive—to harass the respondent or delay the

25
effect of an adverse judgment—or when it indisputably has no merit—when
any reasonable attorney would agree that the appeal is totally and
completely without merit.”’” (Parker v. Harbert (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 1172,
1179.) In contrast, section 271 “does not require the conduct ‘be frivolous or
taken solely for the purpose of delay’ as is the case with sanctions imposed
under Flaherty.” (Parker, at pp. 1179–1180.) To the extent L.L. is attempting
to challenge whether the motions met the applicable standard under section
271, she has failed to provide developed argument with adequate citations to
the record.
L.L. argues the trial court did not make a finding on her ability to
pay before imposing sanctions under section 271. The court, however, held a
hearing on October 16, 2024, regarding L.L.’s ability to pay and found her
testimony to not be credible. Although the court’s orders awarding the
sanction amounts did not expressly state L.L. had the ability to pay, we
presume it found so.
L.L. contends she was denied due process because she “was not
notified that custody and financial issues were bifurcated,” and “she was not
given a fair opportunity to present evidence or defend herself.” L.L. has not
shown any deprivation of due process. She attended and testified at the
hearing on October 16, 2024, and she cites nothing in the record indicating
that she was not informed in advance of the purpose of that hearing. Indeed,
at the conclusion of the October 10, 2024 hearing, the court noted that, at the
next scheduled hearing (i.e., the October 16 hearing), “we can discuss or hear
testimony on the financial component of these sanctions.”
L.L. argues her October 2024 request for orders was partially
granted and that this somehow should insulate her from a sanction award.
But simply because one of L.L.’s requests was granted does not mean the

26
motion is entirely immune from sanctions under section 271, without regard
22
to the other arguments raised in the motion.
B. Code of Civil Procedure Section 1987.2
L.L. challenges the award of $3,500 in attorney fees under Code
of Civil Procedure section 1987.2. Again, we conclude her arguments are
unavailing.
Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.2, subdivision (a),
“[e]xcept as specified in subdivision (c), in making an order pursuant to
motion made under subdivision (c) of [s]ection 1987 or under [s]ection 1987.1,
the court may in its discretion award the amount of the reasonable expenses
incurred in making or opposing the motion, including reasonable attorney’s
fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or
without substantial justification or that one or more of the requirements of
the subpoena was oppressive.” (Ibid.) As discussed above, in May 2024, L.L.
filed a motion to quash a subpoena. J.L.’s counsel filed a responsive
declaration to the request for order, which requested $3,500 in attorney fees
under Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.2, subdivision (a). At the August
30, 2024 hearing, the court awarded $3,500 in attorney fees under Code of
Civil Procedure section 1987.2.

22
L.L. also appears to argue the trial court erred by purportedly
denying some of her motions without addressing her arguments. For
example, L.L. argues the court dismissed her December 2023 motion solely
because of its length. The record does not support that assertion. Although
the court noted the motion and supporting papers appeared to be longer than
allowed under the rules, the court also noted it had reviewed the papers and
did not state it was dismissing the motion because of its length. Moreover,
L.L. cites no authority requiring the court to provide a detailed explanation of
why each and every argument set forth in her motions did not succeed.

27
 On appeal, L.L. asserts she objected to J.L.’s counsel not filing a
billing declaration setting forth the hours and hourly rates for the time spent.
L.L.’s citation for her objection, however, is to a hearing on October 16, 2024.
That was not a timely objection. The court ordered the award of $3,500 under
Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.2 at the hearing on August 30, 2024. If
L.L. intended to object to the lack of a billing declaration supporting that
award of sanctions, she needed to assert that specific objection before or
during the August 30, 2024 hearing, not months later.
L.L. also appears to assert the trial court violated due process
when it characterized the award as a punitive sanction and failed to make
new findings in support of it. L.L. appears to be arguing it was erroneous for
the court to refer to an award of attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure
section 1987.2 as a sanction, which it did at the October 16, 2024 hearing.
Even assuming an award of attorney fees under section 1987.2 is not a
sanction as that term is used in some contexts, it is clear the court’s award of
$3,500 was under Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.2. We conclude there
was no violation of due process.
V.
DUE PROCESS AND ALLEGED BIAS
A. Alleged Denial of a Meaningful Opportunity to Be Heard
L.L. argues the trial court violated due process by denying her a
meaningful opportunity to be heard. According to L.L., “[t]he reporter’s
transcripts reveal a consistent pattern of the trial court silencing [her] and
curtailing her ability to present argument and evidence.” We disagree.
“A trial court has the inherent authority and responsibility to
fairly and efficiently administer the judicial proceedings before it. [Citations.]
This authority includes the power to supervise proceedings for the orderly

28
conduct of the court’s business and to guard against inept procedures and
unnecessary indulgences that tend to delay the conduct of its proceedings.”
(California Crane School, Inc. v. National Com. for Certification of Crane
Operators (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 12, 22, fn. omitted.) “Unquestionably, the
trial court has the power to rule on the admissibility of evidence, exclude
proffered evidence that is deemed to be irrelevant, prejudicial or cumulative
and expedite proceedings which, in the court’s view, are dragging on too long
without significantly aiding the trier of fact. If the court errs in any of these
respects, its rulings may be reviewed by a higher court and, if prejudicial, the
judgment will be reversed.” (In re Marriage of Carlsson (2008) 163
Cal.App.4th 281, 291 (Carlsson).) “However, the court must permit a party to
have his day in court. Denying a party the right to testify or offer evidence
deprives him of a fair trial and constitutes reversible error.” (California
Crane School, Inc., at pp. 22–23; see also Carlsson, at p. 291 [“‘Denying a
party the right to testify or to offer evidence is reversible per se’”].)
L.L. asserts the “trial court repeatedly silenced [her] and her
counsel,” and “the court denied [her] request for rebuttal during closing
argument, even while allowing [J.L.’s] counsel to argue fully.” At the custody
trial, L.L.’s counsel and J.L.’s counsel each made a closing argument. L.L.’s
counsel then asked if she could reply, which the court did not permit, stating
“[t]he court has heard everything I think it needs to hear.” L.L. cites no
authority that requires the court, during a bench trial, to permit a rebuttal
closing argument. To the contrary, a court may exercise its discretion in

29
deciding whether to permit additional argument, and there is no basis to find
23
that it abused that discretion here.
L.L. further asserts “[t]he pattern recurred throughout trial” and
cites three purported instances. According to L.L.,“[t]hese interruptions
silenced [her] while [J.L.’s] counsel was allowed uninterrupted presentation.”
We note the three instances she cites did not occur during the custody trial,
and in any event, these instances do not support that the trial court denied
L.L. a meaningful opportunity to be heard or otherwise violated due
24
process. Additionally, to the extent L.L. is attempting to generally assert
she was denied due process because she was not permitted sufficient
opportunity to present argument and testimony, she has not demonstrated a

23
Relying on Carlsson, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 291, L.L.
asserts “[t]he Court of Appeal has made clear that the opportunity to present
closing argument and rebuttal is an essential component of due process.” In
Carlsson, “[a]fter displaying ill-disguised impatience with [the appellant] and
his counsel and repeatedly threatening a mistrial if the proceedings were not
concluded quickly enough, [the trial judge] abruptly ended the trial before
[the appellant] had finished his presentation, cutting off any opportunity for
rebuttal evidence (other than six questions posed to [the appellant’s] expert)
or argument of counsel.” (Id. at p. 291.) The trial judge in Carlsson walked
out of the courtroom while a witness was on the witness stand. (Id. at
pp. 289, 293.) The facts in Carlsson are not remotely similar to those here.
Nor did Carlsson hold that due process requires a party be allowed to present
a rebuttal closing argument during a bench trial.
24
The first instance cited by L.L. occurred at the August 30, 2024
hearing, at which L.L. was represented by counsel. When the trial court was
making its ruling, L.L. asked the judge “may I,” and the court responded,
“No. You have an attorney.” The second instance cited by L.L. occurred at the
December 6, 2024 hearing, when the court told L.L. not to talk over the court.
The third instance cited by L.L. occurred at a March 27, 2025 hearing, when
the court stated, “[s]tay where you are” after noting it was going to get a
witness online and was pausing the proceedings for a moment. None of these
comments by the court is in any way problematic.

30
due process violation. As discussed, L.L. was permitted to present multiple
witnesses and there was extensive testimony as to both the custody issue and
L.L.’s DVRO request.
L.L. contends the trial court denied her due process by
purportedly summarily denying her motion for a mistrial and refusing to
consider her substantive arguments in support of that motion. During the
November 15, 2024 hearing, the court addressed L.L.’s motion for a mistrial
and stated it had read the documents and intended to deny the motion. The
court also noted the motion is “procedurally defective; also, it does overlap
with [L.L.’s] request for the motion for the 170.1. And I will note, going to the
issue of the—well, again, this goes to the issue of the 170.1. And, again, I’m
not going to rule on that.”25 The court then permitted L.L. to provide further
argument on the motion, which she did, and the court then denied the
motion.26 We find no violation of due process. The court noted it had reviewed
the documents concerning the motion, it heard argument by L.L., and it
ultimately denied the motion. L.L. provides no developed argument
demonstrating her mistrial motion was timely, particularly given it was filed
six days after closing arguments. Moreover, L.L. has not demonstrated on
appeal that any of her arguments in the mistrial motion required a mistrial;
to the extent L.L.’s mistrial motion raised the same arguments she raises on

25
Based on the limited record on appeal, it appears L.L. filed a
motion to disqualify Judge Torres in October 2024 that was referred to
another judge and was pending at that time. L.L. does not address what
happened to that motion, but we presume it was denied as the record does
not indicate Judge Torres was disqualified from continuing to hear the case.

26
L.L. claims she “was never permitted to present her points.”
The record before us does not bear that out. The record shows the court
permitted L.L. to provide argument on the motion at the hearing.

31
this appeal, those arguments are unavailing for the reasons discussed in this
27
opinion.
B. Alleged Bias
L.L. argues the trial court’s conduct created the appearance of
bias and amounted to a violation of due process. L.L.’s arguments regarding
bias are unavailing.
As an initial matter, L.L. does not apply the correct legal
standard for her argument. Citing Catchpole v. Brannon (1995) 36
Cal.App.4th 237, 245–246, L.L. claims due process requires “the absence of
circumstances that create an appearance of bias.” (Boldface omitted.) The
California Supreme Court, however, has explained that, “while a showing of
actual bias is not required for judicial disqualification under the due process
clause, neither is the mere appearance of bias sufficient. Instead, based on an
objective assessment of the circumstances in the particular case, there must
exist ‘“the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker
[that] is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.”’” (People v. Freeman (2010)
47 Cal.4th 993, 996; see also id. at p. 1006, fn. 4 [disapproving of Catchpole to
the extent it has language inconsistent with the analysis in Freeman].)
L.L. claims the trial court was hostile and demeaning toward her.
L.L. cites the same three instances discussed above, as well as two additional
incidents.28 We do not find these comments indicate any appearance of bias,

27
Given L.L. has not demonstrated any errors by the trial court,
we also reject L.L.’s argument that cumulative error requires reversal.

28
One additional incident occurred at the December 6, 2024
hearing when J.L.’s counsel was speaking and L.L. interrupted. The court
admonished L.L., stating “Ma’am, don’t speak. Let [J.L.’s counsel] finish. She
did not interrupt you. You will not interrupt her.” The second additional

32
let alone a probability of actual bias. L.L. also claims there was an unequal
application of evidentiary rules, citing the purported admission of the Zillow
listing and exclusion of a communication from a doctor. As discussed above,
the court did not abuse its discretion in making those evidentiary rulings,
and we find no indication of bias.
L.L. asserts the trial court mischaracterized evidence regarding
an incident involving the towing of a vehicle driven by J.L. L.L. cites a
comment by the court during the custody trial that it was “also interested in
why the car was towed during [J.L.’s] visitation time in the first place; that is
weighing, right now, on my mind.” L.L. asserts “the car was not towed during
a visitation exchange, and the children did not witness the incident. By
mischaracterizing the facts in a way that blamed [L.L.], the court displayed
predisposition against her.” L.L.’s argument mischaracterizes the cited
comment by the court, which did not specifically refer to a visitation exchange
or suggest the children witnessed the incident; the court’s comment simply
referred to the vehicle being towed during J.L.’s visitation time. In any event,
the court’s comment does not display a predisposition against L.L. The court’s
comment came in the context of discussing the admissibility of an exhibit,
after J.L. had testified the vehicle he had driven was towed while he was
visiting with the children at the house.
L.L. also argues there was a pattern of punitive sanctions
imposed by the trial court. As discussed above, L.L. has not shown the court

incident occurred at the October 16, 2024 hearing. After hearing testimony
and argument, the court stated: “I think I’ve heard enough on all ends. So I
assume that we submit; correct?” The reporter’s transcript indicates J.L.’s
counsel responded “[y]es” but does not reflect any comment or response by
L.L.

33
abused its discretion in issuing the sanctions. Moreover, we conclude the
29
sanctions do not demonstrate a probability of actual bias.
In sum, L.L. has not demonstrated any bias by the trial court.
DISPOSITION
The judgment and order denying L.L.’s October 2024 request for
a DVRO are affirmed. L.L.’s request for judicial notice is granted in part and
denied in part. No appellate costs are awarded because respondent did not
appear.

GOODING, J.

WE CONCUR:

SANCHEZ, ACTING P. J.

DELANEY, J.

29
L.L. argues that on June 6, 2025, the trial court on its own
motion deemed her a vexatious litigant and imposed a prefiling order under
Code of Civil Procedure section 391.7. She asserts the prefiling order is void
and further evidences bias by the court. L.L.’s challenge to the prefiling order
is not at issue on this appeal given that her notice of appeal here was filed
before June 6, 2025, and obviously did not (indeed, could not) identify that
later order. L.L. has a separate appeal pending in this court regarding the
vexatious litigant determination and prefiling order (case No. G065836).

34