Filed 7/6/26 Kim v. Yepremian CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying
on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a).
This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule
8.1115(a).

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR

SHIN HO KIM, et al., B344376

Plaintiffs and Appellants, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 23GDCV00376
ROBERT YEPREMIAN,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Ashfaq G. Chowdhury, Judge. Affirmed.
Salem Law Firm and Edmond E. Salem for Plaintiffs and
Appellants.
Law Offices of Raymond Hovsepian and Raymond
Hovsepian for Defendant and Respondent.
 Shin Ho Kim and Gena Soon Yoon appeal from the
judgment in their unlawful detainer action against Robert
Yepremian. Kim and Yoon do not own the subject property.
Instead, they are the sole members of the limited liability
company that owns the property. The trial court ruled Kim and
Yoon had no standing and dismissed the action. Kim and Yoon
argue the trial court abused its discretion by denying them leave
to amend the complaint to name the company as a plaintiff. We
reject this argument and affirm the judgment.

BACKGROUND

Kim’s father, Hong Soo Kim, leased commercial property to
Yepremian. After the lease began, Hong Soo Kim transferred
title to the property and assigned the lease to Shin Ho Kim and
Yoon. In 2022, Kim and Yoon created Volort, LLC (Volort) and
transferred the subject property to it. Kim and Yoon were the
company’s sole members.
Yepremian’s written lease expired in July 2022. He tried to
exercise his option to extend the lease. Volort declined to renew
the lease on the basis that Yepremian had defaulted on the rent.
In February 2023, Kim and Yoon—not Volort—brought this
unlawful detainer action against Yepremian. The complaint and
first amended complaint alleged Yepremian’s lease had expired
(They ultimately pursued eviction solely because the lease
expired.)
Kim and Yoon alleged they, as individuals, owned the
premises. At the court trial, however, Kim testified that Volort
owned the property. Neither this fact nor the resulting issues
had been raised in the litigation before.
Kim and Yoon orally moved for leave to amend the
complaint to conform to proof by adding Volort as a plaintiff. The

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court denied the motion and ruled Kim and Yoon did not have
standing. The court therefore dismissed the action.
Kim and Yoon timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

I. Kim and Yoon Lacked Standing
Kim and Yoon had no standing to bring this action. A
plaintiff’s “lack of standing is a jurisdictional defect to an action
that mandates dismissal.” (Cummings v. Stanley (2009) 177
Cal.App.4th 493, 501.) We independently review the legal
question of whether, based on the undisputed facts, plaintiffs had
standing. (River’s Side at Washington Square Homeowners Assn.
v. Superior Court (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1209, 1223.)
In unlawful detainer actions, standing requires the
plaintiff’s “ownership or some other enforceable right to
possession.” (Income Estate LLC v. Perez (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th
Supp. 1, 7 (Income Estate).) Normally, such an action “may be
brought by ‘the landlord, or the successor in estate of the
landlord.’ ” (Ibid.) “An unlawful detainer, being a summary
proceeding, requires strict compliance with all applicable
statutes. [Citation.] The requirement of standing is no
exception. Thus, an unlawful detainer case filed by a plaintiff
who is not the real party in interest or an authorized
representative may be” defective. (Id. at p. 9.)
Kim and Yoon had no standing because Volort owned the
property. “It is fundamental that” a business entity is legally
“distinct” from its individual owners. (Grosset v. Wenaas (2008)
42 Cal.4th 1100, 1108.) Individuals who own or control a
business entity “may be estopped to deny the [entity’s] separate
legal existence.” (Communist Party v. 522 Valencia, Inc. (1995)

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35 Cal.App.4th 980, 994; accord In re Marriage of Imperato (1975)
45 Cal.App.3d 432, 439, fn. 9 [“a sole stockholder is estopped to
deny the validity of his own corporation”].) Kim and Yoon
created a limited liability company and transferred the property
to it. They cannot disregard the entity they created and bring
this unlawful detainer action as individuals. Maintaining this
action required naming Volort as the plaintiff.
II. Denying Leave to Amend Was Not an Abuse of Discretion
Kim and Yoon contend the trial court abused its discretion
by denying their motion for leave to amend the complaint.
“ ‘When a request to amend has been denied, an appellate court is
confronted by two conflicting policies. On the one hand, the trial
court’s discretion should not be disturbed unless it has been
clearly abused; on the other, there is a strong policy in favor of
liberal allowance of amendments.’ ” (Honig v. Financial Corp. of
America (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 960, 965.) “Courts must apply a
policy of liberality in permitting amendments at any stage of the
proceeding, including during trial, when no prejudice to the
opposing party is shown.” (P&D Consultants, Inc. v. City of
Carlsbad (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1332, 1345.) But “ ‘ “ ‘even if a
good amendment is proposed in proper form, unwarranted delay
in presenting it may—of itself—be a valid reason for denial.’ ” ’ ”
(Ibid.)
Kim and Yoon’s unwarranted and unexplained delay
supported the trial court’s ruling. “[A]ppellate courts are less
likely to find an abuse of discretion where . . . the proposed
amendment is ‘ “offered after long unexplained delay . . . or where
there is a lack of diligence.” ’ ” (Melican v. Regents of University
of California (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 168, 175.) The record shows

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no clear reason why Kim and Yoon did not seek to add Volort as a
plaintiff until after trial began.1
Kim and Yoon contend their delay in seeking amendment
did not prejudice Yepremian. Courts, however, consider
prejudice in unlawful detainer cases differently than in other
cases.
Unlawful detainer actions are summary, purely statutory
proceedings created to give landlords a means to evicting tenants
that is more expeditious than the common law causes of action of
ejectment and quiet title. (Marquez-Luque v. Marquez (1987) 192
Cal.App.3d 1513, 1518.) Given the summary nature of such
actions, plaintiffs must “strictly adhere[ ] to” the statutory
scheme and procedural requirements. (Stancil v. Superior Court
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 381, 394; accord 1215 Fell SF Owner LLC v.
Fell Street Automotive Clinic (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 739, 750, fn.
10 [“the statutory procedures governing summary unlawful
detainer proceedings must be followed strictly, with punctilious
attention to detail”].) And as discussed above, Income Estate
found this principle of “strict compliance” also applies to “[t]he
requirement of standing.” (Income Estate, supra, 117
Cal.App.5th Supp. at p. 9.)
Appellate courts have repeatedly held minor deviations
from the statutory requirements of unlawful detainer actions

1 Kim testified that, based on Volort’s governing documents,
he and Yoon (as Volort’s sole members) were entitled to bring this
action as individuals. The trial court did not credit Kim’s
testimony that Volort authorized him to bring this action, and we
have no basis to reject that finding. (See In re Caden C. (2021) 11
Cal.5th 614, 640.) Kim and Yoon do not raise this issue on
appeal.

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were fatal, regardless of whether they did or could prejudice the
defendant. For example, Heffesse v. Guevara (2025) 108
Cal.App.5th Supp. 74 held a notice to pay or quit was defective
because it demanded a $4.44 monthly code enforcement fee in
addition to rent. (Id. at pp. 78–79, 83.) Similarly, ESA
Management, LLC v. Jacob (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th Supp. 1 held
that, where the notice omitted the amount due and the means to
cure the default, it was “irrelevant” that the defendant “did not
raise the defective notice as a defense or never intended to pay
it.” (Id. at p. 5.) Likewise, City of Alameda v. Sheehan (2024) 105
Cal.App.5th 68 held a notice stating payment “ ‘must be delivered
to City of Alameda c/o River Rock Real Estate Group’ ” (id. at p.
73) was defective because the corporation’s true name was
“ ‘RiverRock Real Estate Group, Inc.’ ” (id. at p. 82).
One of the strongest illustrations of this principle is Foster
v. Williams (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th Supp. 9. There, the court
held a notice to pay or quit was defective because (among other
reasons) it did not “contain instructive language ‘stating . . . that
the payment may be made pursuant to’ ‘an electronic funds
transfer procedure [which] has been previously established.’ ”
(Id. at p. 17.) Though the notice included the web address used to
pay, and the defendant admitted paying his rent using that
website for about a year (id. at p. 13), it was fatally defective for
not telling him what he already knew: that the electronic
payment procedure was “previously established.” That defect in
the notice could not realistically prejudice the defendant.
Nevertheless, the defect was fatal to the unlawful detainer
action.
We find the same principle applies to moving for leave to
amend the complaint to name the proper plaintiff. Kim and Yoon
brought their unlawful detainer action pursuant to Code of Civil

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Procedure sections 1161 and 1161.1. These statutes provide that
the action must be brought by the “landlord” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§§ 1161, subds. 1 & 2, 1161.1, subds. (b) & (c)), which includes the
owner or another person with the right to possession of the
property. (Staudigl v. Harper (1946) 76 Cal.App.2d 439, 444.)
Further, section 1165 incorporates Part II of the Code of Civil
Procedure relating to “parties to civil actions,” which includes
section 367, the statute requiring lawsuits be filed and
maintained by the real party in interest. Kim and Yoon failed to
strictly comply with the requirement of the unlawful detainer
statutes requiring that actions be brought by the landlord.
Regardless of any prejudice to Yepremian, Kim and Yoon’s
inexcusable delay was a dispositive failure to strictly comply with
the procedures governing unlawful detainer actions. Under these
circumstances, denying plaintiffs leave to amend was not an
abuse of discretion.
III. Whether Yepremian Was a “Squatter” Is Irrelevant
Lastly, Kim and Yoon argue the judgment should be
reversed because Yepremian “had become a squatter.” An
appellant’s “duty on appeal is to present reasoned arguments
with citations both to the record and to governing legal
authorities.” (Barrios v. Chraghchian (2026) 117 Cal.App.5th
1276, 1283.) By not doing so, the appellant forfeits the issue.
(Ibid.) This portion of Kim and Yoon’s brief cites no authority
and makes no legal argument. Furthermore, this contention
overlooks the reason unlawful detainer actions exist: tenants who
become “squatters” cannot be ejected without due process of law.
(Spinks v. Equity Residential Briarwood Apartments (2009) 171
Cal.App.4th 1004, 1038 [“ ‘A tenant holding over without
permission is technically a trespasser. But by statute the owner

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must use the unlawful detainer procedure, and, if the owner
ousts the tenant forcibly, the tenant may regain possession by an
action for forcible entry.’ ”]; 10 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate
(4th ed. 2025) § 34:10.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Robert Yepremian shall recover
his costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

TAMZARIAN, J.

We concur:

ZUKIN, P. J.

COGLIATI, J.*

* Judge of the Santa Cruz Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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