Filed 7/6/26 In re J.M. CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re J.M. et al., Persons Coming B348690
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
Los Angeles County
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Super. Ct. No.
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 25LJJP00191A–B
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

S.M.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Jennifer Baronoff, Juvenile Court Referee.
Affirmed.
Marissa Coffey, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
 Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, and Jessica S. Mitchell, Principal
Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________

The juvenile court declared P.G. (born December 2021) a
dependent child, finding the parents’ persistent domestic violence
and father’s alcohol and drug abuse put the child at risk of
serious physical harm. After initially denying Native American
heritage, father filed a Parental Notification of Indian Status
form (ICWA-020) stating he might have ties to a Choctaw or
Cherokee tribe through his mother (the paternal grandmother).
The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family
Services (the Department) interviewed the paternal
grandmother. She denied Native American heritage and
questioned why father had reported the family had ties to the
specific tribes.1 Based on the paternal grandmother’s statement,
the juvenile court found there was no current reason to believe
P.G. might be an Indian child under the federal Indian Child
Welfare Act (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related
California law (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224 et seq.).2 The court
removed P.G. from parental custody, ordered reunification
services for the parents, and directed the Department to continue

1 The paternal grandmother also reported that both her
parents and her sister were deceased, and she could not identify
any other family members who might have information about
possible Native American heritage.

2 All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare
and Institutions Code.

2
its ICWA investigation, consistent with its affirmative and
continuing duty of inquiry. (See § 224.2, subd. (a).)
Mother challenges the court’s ICWA finding. She contends
father’s reported “belief” that he might have ties to a Choctaw or
Cherokee tribe through the paternal grandmother conclusively
established a reason to believe P.G. might be an Indian child, and
thus triggered the duty to make further inquiry of the Bureau of
Indian Affairs (BIA) and of the named tribes under our state
ICWA law.3 (See § 224.2, subds. (e)(2)(B) & (e)(2)(C).) We reject
the contention. Substantial evidence supports the juvenile
court’s finding. We affirm.4

3 Mother denied Indian heritage and does not raise any other
ground to challenge the court’s ICWA finding. Her other children
are not part of this appeal.

4 The Department asks us to dismiss the appeal as
premature in light of the juvenile court’s order to continue the
ICWA investigation as mandated under section 224.2,
subdivision (a). Dismissal is not appropriate here. Although it is
subject to change if the continuing investigation reveals new
information about P.G.’s possible Indian status (see § 224.2, subd.
(i)(2)), the court’s ICWA finding was nonetheless sufficiently final
to allow review and (had it been erroneous) effective relief. (Cf.
In re Baby Girl M. (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 635, 637–638 [where
child welfare agency both “conceded it had not undertaken an
appropriate ICWA inquiry” and confirmed “it was ‘already
engaged in the further inquiry that was lacking,’ ” there was no
“effective relief” appellate court could order, as “remedial ICWA
[inquiry]” could be reviewed only in a “later appeal”]; J.J. v.
Superior Court (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 447, 461 [appeal was
“premature” where “the juvenile court made no final ICWA ruling
at or before the challenged dispositional hearing as to whether
the ICWA applied”].)

3
 ICWA and related California law define an “Indian child”
as “any unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either
(a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership
in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an
Indian tribe.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4); § 224.1, subd. (b).) Under our
state law, “courts and child welfare agencies are charged with ‘an
affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether a child . . . is
or may be an Indian child’ in dependency cases.” (In re Dezi C.
(2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1125 (Dezi C.), quoting § 224.2, subd. (a).)
“Child welfare agencies discharge this state law duty by ‘asking
the child, parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended
family members, [and] others who have an interest in the
child . . . whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child.’ ” (Dezi
C., at p. 1125, quoting § 224.2, subd. (b).)
“[F]urther inquiry” is required if there is “reason to believe”
the child is an Indian child. (§ 224.2, subd. (e).) This standard is
met whenever the court or child welfare agency “has information
suggesting that either the parent of the child or the child is a
member or citizen, or may be eligible for membership or
citizenship, in an Indian tribe.” (Id., subd. (e)(1).) When there is
reason to believe the child is an Indian child, the requisite
further inquiry includes contacting the BIA “for assistance in
identifying the names and contact information of the tribes in
which the child may be a member or citizen, or eligible for
membership or citizenship” (id., subd. (e)(2)(B)) and contacting
“the tribe or tribes and any other person that may reasonably be
expected to have information regarding the child’s membership,
citizenship status, or eligibility” (id., subd. (e)(2)(C)).
We review the juvenile court’s finding as to whether there
is reason to believe a minor is an Indian child for substantial

4
evidence. (See In re Kenneth D. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1087, 1101; cf.
Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1141.) We have no trouble
concluding the evidence was sufficient to support the finding in
this case. By his own account, father—who notably does not
challenge the ICWA finding—believed his family might have ties
to a Choctaw or Cherokee tribe through his mother. The
Department interviewed the paternal grandmother, and she
unequivocally denied her family had Native American heritage,
while disclaiming any “knowledge or understanding” about why
her son would have identified those specific tribes on his ICWA-
020 form.
As we have explained in assessing the reliability of a
parent’s denial of Indian heritage, because an “ ‘Indian child’ ” is
defined as a minor who “is either (a) ‘a member of an Indian tribe’
or (b) ‘is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe,’ ” and “tribal
membership typically requires an affirmative act . . . , a child’s
parents will, in many cases, be a reliable source” for determining
whether there is reason to believe a minor is an Indian child. (In
re Ezequiel G. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 984, 1009–1010.) This
reasoning applies with even greater force to a grandparent’s
denial of Indian heritage. (See, e.g., id. at p. 1015 [recognizes
there may be reason to question the reliability of a parent’s
denial if she had been adopted and did not have information
about her biological parents].) Because the paternal
grandmother could be relied upon to know whether she had taken
affirmative steps to enroll father or to make him eligible for
membership in a Choctaw or Cherokee tribe, her unequivocal
denial—and her expressed bewilderment at father’s report—was
plainly sufficient to rebut father’s stated belief about P.G.’s
possible Indian-child status. Substantial evidence supports the

5
juvenile court’s finding that there was no reason to believe P.G.
was an Indian child. (See In re Katrina C. (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d
540, 547 [under the substantial evidence standard, “[a]ll conflicts
must be resolved in favor of the [challenged factual finding] and
all legitimate inferences indulged in to uphold the verdict, if
possible”].)
In view of the paternal grandmother’s statement, further
inquiry of the BIA and the specific tribes was not necessary. If
the Department’s continuing investigation uncovers new
information that gives the court reason to believe P.G. might be
an Indian child, then the court must order further inquiry.
(§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2).)

6
 DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

HANASONO, J.

We concur:

EGERTON, Acting P. J.

OCHOA, J.*

* Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution

7